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Thesis Abstract 
 
 
The Wrong Side of the Frontline: Exploring the Utilisation of Civilian 
Investigators by Police Forces across England and Wales. 
 
The key aim of this thesis is to examine the roles being undertaken by non-warranted 
civilian investigators (CIs) in relation to those of warranted police detectives (DCs) 
working within police forces across England and Wales (E&W). Formally introduced by 
the Police Reform Act 2002, CIs are non-warranted members of police staff charged with 
assisting warranted officers with their investigative enquiries. Specifically, the research 
examines the extent to which CIs can be considered in terms of being a ‘junior partner’ 
or a ‘paraprofessional’ role to that of their warranted detective counterparts. The study 
employed a mixed methods research design and drew upon data collected via a series of 
semi-structured interviews with police officers and police staff, observation and a semi-
structured survey which was sent to all of the 43 police constabularies across E&W.  
Findings point to the widespread yet inconsistent uptake of the CI provision by police 
forces across the country. Overall, CIs were found to be contributing to the investiga t ion 
of most crime types including the most serious in some instances (e.g. murder, rape and 
domestic abuse). However, the research also draws attention to a high level of disparity 
in the utilisation of CIs between forces. The research found that in some units CIs have 
become increasingly utilised in tasks outside of their intended ‘supportive’ remit and, in 
some cases, are in fact being afforded a role which is almost identical to that of warranted 
police detectives. Despite the evolving nature of their role and evidence of continued 
‘mission creep’, findings suggested that CIs continue to enjoy a secondary and in some 
respects outsider status within the police organisation, enjoying only marginal valuing 
and limited integration. These conditions are currently being sustained by the ‘civilian’ 
designation of CIs alongside powerful actors in the field of policing and politics and the 
weakness or absence of any alternative (or convincing) narrative on how effective 
investigation might be achieved.  
 
This research provides a much-needed insight into the impact of recent civilianis ing 
trends on ‘core’ areas of police service provision. It also contributes to a growing body 
of information on the increasing significance of the role now being played by private 
security in public policing and more specifically, to the blurring of occupational and 
sectoral boundaries with regard to the provision of ‘professional’ criminal investiga t ion 
in E&W. The thesis concludes by arguing that the utilisation of CIs may be instigating a 
renegotiation of the boundaries surrounding the role of the warranted police detective and 
in turn, the dilution of professional orthodoxies in the investigative specialism. The 
uncertain future trajectory of the CI role may, in coming years, encourage disputes over 
the title and role of the ‘detective’, as recognition of the proficiency of CIs continues to 
call into question the legitimacy of the warranted detective’s claim to professiona l 
jurisdiction in respect of contemporary criminal investigation.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Despite its enduring popularity as a staple of popular literary fiction and topic of 
fascination amongst the British general public, criminal investigation and the world and 
work of police detectives continues to exist as one of the least researched topics in the 
field of police/policing studies (Stelfox, 2009). While efforts have indeed been made 
more recently to rectify this current gap in knowledge (cf Bacon, 2011; Hallenberg, 2012; 
Innes, 2003; O’Neill, 2011; Westmarland et al., 2012)1, much of what is ‘known’ about 
the detectives and detection continues to be based largely on fictional narratives which 
promote ‘old regime’ notions of criminal investigation and detective work as an 
instinctive ‘art’ and intuitively learned ‘craft’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006). While 
entertaining, such depictions have done little to counter the stereotypical picture of police 
detective work which has built up around the idea that investigation is reactive, 
reconstructive and perhaps most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, a task which 
is exclusively performed by police detectives (Maguire, 2003: 367). Consequently, very 
little is known about the true nature of detectives’ work and, within the body of literature 
that does exist on investigative work by the police, few have sought to explore the 
significant contribution now also being made by non-warranted police staff. 
Like most police services across the world, the police in England and Wales (E&W) have 
made considerable investment in the ‘civilianisation’ process over the last three decades 
as the need for specialist skills/expertise and cost-effective policing has taken precedence. 
At the time of writing2 this thesis there were approximately 207,140 full-time equivalent 
members of police personnel working within the forty three police forces across E&W. 
Of those, 61 per cent (126,818) are police officers and 39 per cent (80,322) are police 
staff3 (Home Office, 2015: 6-7). That means that currently, over a third of those who work 
for the police organisation are not warranted police officers. While there now exists a 
general consensus of opinion on ‘the need for a professional, dedicated and highly skilled 
police staff component in modern policing, there is less consensus regarding the scale and 
                                                                 
1 See also, Harris (2013) for an interesting account of homicide detectives working in France. 
2 Figures correct as of March 2015 (Home Office, 2015). 
3 Figure is inclusive of Police Community Support Officers, Designated Officers and Traffic Wardens. 
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extent of their direct involvement in operational service delivery’ (HMIC, 2004: 28) - 
particularly in those areas of work considered ‘core’ to the police business (e.g. 
investigation, patrol, custody etc.). 
 
Traditionally considered the sole preserve of warranted police officers, crimina l 
investigation is one area of core police work where police staff have come to occupy a 
progressively significant position. Many specialised and strategically important roles (e.g. 
crime/intelligence analysts, forensics personnel, Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID) unit managers etc.), requiring high levels of professional competence and 
considered central to the effective functioning of the investigative process, are now 
reserved for operation by non-warranted individuals (cf Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). Despite 
their comparatively low profile, in many ways non-warranted individuals make a vital 
contribution to the contemporary criminal investigation process and are charged with 
making decisions and undertaking tasks as part of their role which directly influence the 
strategic direction and overall success of contemporary police investigations. The 
increased significance and centrality of the roles now being undertaken by non-warranted 
individuals within the police more generally, naturally raises important questions about 
the role and legitimacy of the police, the professional ethos of detectives and the future 
of investigatory practice in E&W. While useful empirical studies do exist on the role and 
occupational experience of a range of non-warranted police staff and/or civilian types (cf 
Atkinson, forthcoming; Cosgrove, 2011; Ludwig, 2012; O’Neill, 2014; Wilson-Kovacs, 
2014), most have either been impact oriented (Chatterton and Rowland, 2005; Crawford, 
Blackburn, Lister and Shepherd, 2004; Crawford and Lister, 2004) or have been 
concerned with the capacity of police staff to improve equality and diversity within public 
policing (Johnston, 2006).  Within the small body of work that does exist, none to my 
knowledge has sought to explore the valuable contribution now being made by civilian 
investigators (CIs)4 to the criminal investigation process.  
                                                                 
4 It should be noted that while the Police Reform Act 2002 refers to CIs as ‘investigating officers’, it seems 
that the police organisation itself generally refers to these individuals under the arguably less indistinct title 
of ‘civilian investigator’. Thus, this is the title that has been used throughout this thesis. However, it is also 
important to note that following the recent publication of the Home Office consultation report, ‘Reforming  
the Powers of Police Staff and Volunteers’ (published online on 20th January 2016) - which (amongst other 
things) sets out the police’s and Government’s response to the consultation on reforming the roles and 
powers available to non-warranted police staff and police volunteers - the role of Investigating Officer, 
Detention Officer and Escort Officer is proposed to be amalgamated under the role/title of ‘Policing Support 
Officer’ (Home Office, 2016: 6-7).  
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Put simply, this thesis is about the world and work of non-warranted CIs and their 
contribution to the police criminal investigation process in E&W. Formally introduced 
by the Police Reform Act 20025, CIs are non-warranted individuals charged with assisting 
warranted police detective constables (DCs) with the investigation of crime. CIs are most 
often found operating within the CID and, alongside Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSOs), Detention Officers (DOs) and Escort Officers (EOs), are one of the newest 
members of the ‘police extended family’ (Crawford and Lister, 2004). This study 
provides an in-depth exploration of the lived experiences and identities of CIs, their work 
and their overall value to the police organisation. In so doing, the research seeks to 
challenge some of the prevailing assumptions about the nature of criminal investiga t ion 
and the world and work of warranted DCs. The utilisation of CIs not only highlights the 
pervasiveness of contemporary civilianisation within the police, but also raises important 
questions about the changing nature of contemporary criminal investigation and the 
centrality/hegemony of the role being played by DCs. 
 
The guiding rationale for this research therefore is that there is a major gap in our 
knowledge and a subsequent lack of appreciation of the important roles now being 
performed by non-warranted individuals within the police organisation. To date, no 
empirical work has been undertaken into how the role being performed by CIs ‘fits’ 
within the contemporary CID and in relation to that of their warranted DC counterparts. 
In this sense, the original contribution to knowledge I offer in this thesis is an empirica l ly 
informed critical insight into the world and work of CIs and of their role and value as a 
resource within the contemporary CID. This thesis asks how and to what extent CIs are 
being utilised across E&W and what can be inferred from their utilisation about the 
changing nature and character of criminal investigation. At a theoretical level, and 
drawing on work by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972), Hoogenboom (1991) and 
Bourdieu (1990), this study also examines the degree of ‘blurring’ inherent to the CI role 
when compared with that of DCs and, with that, whether or not CIs are, in practice, 
performing a ‘junior partner’ (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1972) role compared to that of DCs. 
This research is unique for a number of key reasons: 
                                                                 
5 It is important to note that a number of police forces did make use of police staff as investigators prior to 
the Reform Act. What the Act did was to formalise the role and allow the Chief Constable to designate 
police type powers to CIs at their individual discretion (HMIC, 2004: 158). 
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First, very little research has been undertaken on the growing involvement and 
occupational positioning of non-warranted individuals within core areas of policing6 . 
Like the expanding use of police staff more generally, the deployment of CIs has been 
allowed to occur in a notably ad hoc fashion providing a marked level of disparity with 
regard to their numbers and also the ways these individuals are being utilised between 
and even within constabularies. Such lack of uniformity has also resulted in a failure to 
properly evaluate the financial aspects of CI use and their overall impact on operational 
service delivery beyond that of immediate and short term gains. As such, hardly anything 
is currently known about the working practices, skills or significance of CIs to the 
undertaking of effective criminal investigations. This is of particular significance given 
the recent 20 per cent reduction in the police’s budget as part of the Coalition 
government’s post-financial crisis ‘Comprehensive Spending Review’ (HM Treasury, 
2010) which has had, and may continue to be having, a significant impact on the job 
security of many police staff.  
 
Second, with the exception of the work such as that by Micucci (1998) and Singh and 
Kempa (2007) concerning private policing cultures and the limited body of work in the 
area of public policing (cf work by Cosgrove (2011) on PCSOs, Atkinson (forthcoming) 
on civilian intelligence analysts (CIAs) and Ludwig et al. (2012) on Crime Scene 
Examiners), studies of police cultures have been disproportionately concerned with 
warranted police officers (Cain, 1971; Manning, 1997; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999), 
including DCs (Hobbs, 1988; Innes, 2003; Young, 1991). This study therefore provides 
a valuable opportunity to examine the occupational identity of non-warranted CIs within 
the broader occupational and organisational culture/s of the CID.  It will therefore provide 
an original contribution to existing theoretical knowledge and understanding of police 
(sub) cultures.  
 
Third, the increasing marketisation7 of police services (in particular security8) in recent 
decades coupled with steady privatisation at the margins of the function (e.g. forensics, 
                                                                 
6 Of that research which does exist, most has sought to explore the role and occupational identity of PCSOs 
(cf Cosgrove, 2011) providing only a limited picture of the current situation with regard to the working  
practices and occupational culture/s of non-police officers (particularly non-warranted police personnel).  
7 ‘Marketisation’ refers to the introduction of incentive structures (such as market competition) in public 
service provision. 
8 Private security is now far more likely to be found policing shopping malls and sports events than the 
police although (since the Police Act 1964) the police are able to charge for ‘special services’ such as the 
policing of football matches. 
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vehicle maintenance, police training etc.), arguably points towards a developing public -
private interface in regard to the provision of roles previously undertaken by warranted 
officers. This research will help to uncover the extent to which such privatising trends 
have impacted on core areas of police work - namely criminal investigation - at an 
operational level. Is the role of CI being viewed as a marketable commodity within the 
current context of austerity? Is, for example, the acute need to ensure significant 
economies in all areas of the police’s business encouraging the buying- in of CIs from 
private security agencies? These are both questions which this research seeks to uncover. 
Recent developments in public police-private security relations, particularly with regard 
to custody provision (Skinns, 2011; Skinns, Wooff and Sprawson, 2015; White, 2015), 
are arguably suggestive of a move towards the greater involvement of private security in 
core areas of police work. This research therefore seeks to draw attention to the potential 
impact of this development and in doing so, seeks to critically explore the idea that a more 
integrative, collaborative model of investigation may be emerging (Hoogenboom, 1990).  
 
Fourth, the influence of CI use upon the professional ethos of warranted police DCs is an 
issue which could ultimately have potentially serious implications for how we 
comprehend the nature of the criminal investigation process in E&W, an understanding 
which currently is largely built upon old regime notions of investigative art and craft 
(Tong and Bowling, 2006) (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.4 of this thesis for a more 
detailed discussion of this issue). It is therefore a central aim of this thesis to explore the 
extent to which the professional ethos of warranted DCs may be being contested by the 
use of paraprofessional CIs. 
 
In consideration of the above, the empirical research sought to answer two main research 
questions: 
 
1) What is the role being undertaken by CIs working in police forces across E&W? 
2) To what extent can CIs be considered to be performing a junior partner role when 
compared to the role of warranted detectives? 
 
The aims and objectives of the study are as follows: 
 
 Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working 
practices, occupational identity and positioning and sense of value. 
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 Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices 
and occupational identity. 
 Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and 
in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective 
investigative practice. 
 Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisa t ion 
of CIs by police forces across E&W. 
 Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the crimina l 
investigation process in E&W. 
 
In the broadest sense, civilianisation was selected as an area of study because it fulfil led 
the criterion of being a policy area in which there has been substantial change over recent 
years and in which, given the current context of austerity, there is likely to be continued 
(and substantial) alteration. Civilianisation also importantly highlights three central issue s 
about the nature of the organisation of the police. First the employment of non-warranted 
individuals to undertake roles and tasks previously performed by warranted officers and 
traditionally considered the sole preserve of the police, undoubtedly calls into question 
popular understandings of the police role, the significance of the warranted constable, and 
also raises questions about what the core functions of the police actually are. Furthermore, 
with regard to the supposed value-for-money which is offered to the police through 
engagement with civilianisation, it raises the question whether the police function is in 
any way unique and distinct from that of other public services? Second, civilianisa t ion 
raises important questions about control and accountability of policing provision and with 
that, the potential social implications of emerging ‘policing networks’ (see Chapter Two, 
section 2.2.4). As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter (section 1.2.2), 
civilianisation has in more recent years given way to a degree of privatisation which has 
not only served to blur long existing boundaries between the public and the private sectors 
with regard to the provision of policing and security, but also raises the possibility of 
increasing influence/involvement by private security in public policing provision. Third, 
distinctive terms and conditions of their employment from those of warranted officers 
mean that non-warranted police staff have the right to join a trade union and also to take 
industrial action. While this issue is sometimes rather melodramatically argued, given the 
scale of police staff presence and nature of their use (often in highly specialised areas of 
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work), it may well be that the impact of their removal may currently be being 
underestimated.  
 
1.2 Matters of Substance 
 
1.2.1 Police Officers and Police Staff 
 
Within most police organisations there exist two distinct categories of personnel, 
police officers and police staff. Police officers are unique in terms of their warranted or 
attested status which affords them with a diverse range of powers not held by the general 
public, namely, powers of arrest, search and seizure and of course, the ability ‘to use 
reasonable force when and wherever necessary’ (Bittner, 2010: 123). In addition, officers 
are also vested and trusted with the ability to exercise a wide degree of discretion9 when 
exercising their role (Banton, 1964; Ericson, 2007; Skolnick, 1966; Van Mannen, 1973; 
Wilson, 1968). Another key difference relates to the fact that every officer serving in 
E&W does so under the ‘Office of Constable’, a title which affords them a constitutiona l 
status which is peculiar to English common law (Lustgarten, 1986). Bearers of the Office 
of Constable do not have the legal status of employees, although employment law is 
increasingly being applied to them. As a Crown status, the position brings with it a 
number of benefits for officers including protection from redundancy. However, these are 
also balanced by a number of restrictions such as having no right to strike and not being 
permitted to overtly demonstrate political affiliation (HMIC, 2004: 29)10.  
In this thesis the terms ‘non-warranted’, ‘police staff’ and ‘civilians’ are used 
interchangeably when making reference to those members of police personnel who work 
within the police organisation but who do not have the attested status of a constable. This 
may include those individuals who are employed by the police organisation and also those 
who work for the police but who are employees of private security agencies (the 
recruitment of CIs from private security agencies is an issue discussed later in this 
                                                                 
9 In policing, discretion refers to the availability of a choice of options or actions which individual officers 
may take in a given situation, namely, whether or not to make an arrest and/or enforce some other form of 
action (Waddington, 1999: 38-9). The need for officers to be able to exercise a level of discretion is widely  
accepted in the UK as a necessary and inevitable part of policing (Reiner, 2010: 207). 
10  Such restrictions are of course not unique to police constables. For example, prison officers have 
effectively no right to strike (section 127, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and civil servants 
are not permitted any overt political affiliation. 
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chapter)11. The term ‘police staff’ was adopted across the service in 2003 in preference 
to the variety of other labels which were frequently applied to this body of people, 
including ‘civilian’, ‘support staff’ and ‘civil staff’ (HMIC, 2004: 29-30). The decision 
to adopt the term was, in large part, driven by growing recognition of the need to reflect 
‘the wide range of roles performed by police staff within today’s police service and in 
particular the fact that many such roles are very much ‘frontline’ rather than ‘support’ in 
nature’ (HMIC, 2004: 30). According to HMIC (2011: 18), ‘frontline’ policing includes 
roles undertaken by ‘those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly 
intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law’. The range of roles now being 
performed by police staff can broadly be grouped into five distinct categories: those 
performing manual, clerical and administrative roles; those who undertake supervisory 
and managerial roles, including as members of senior and chief officer teams; those who 
occupy professional positions such as in Human Resources (HR), Finance and IT; those 
who perform specialist roles that are unique to the police service (e.g. crime and/or 
intelligence analysts); and those who undertake frontline, operational support and 
operational roles such as scene of crime officers, traffic wardens, PCSOs and 
communications centre staff (positions most of which until relatively recently would have 
been exclusively carried out by police officers) (HMIC, 2004: 30). 
 
Increasingly and as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, police staff can be found 
performing roles which traditionally have been passionately defended by the organisat ion 
and its representatives (e.g. Association of Chief Police Officers12 (ACPO) and the Police 
Federation) as the sole preserve of warranted police officers and as core areas of the police 
function (e.g. custody, patrol, criminal investigation). Furthermore, the role and remit of 
certain police staff members may now also be supplemented at the behest of Chief 
Constables by the addition of powers of enforcement13 comparable to those afforded to 
warranted officers under the Office of Constable14 . The increased blurring of police 
                                                                 
11 Following the recent outcome of the consultation into extra powers for police volunteers and extended 
powers for non-warranted police employees (Home Office, 2016), the scope of the term police staff may  
now be extending to also include a growing number of police volunteers operating within a wider range of 
operational roles and, potentially, with an accompanying (but limited) range of police type powers. 
12 At the time the research was undertaken ACPO was in the process of disbandment and was subsequently 
replaced by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) in 2015. 
13 Please see Appendix 7 for a full list of the powers available for des ignation to ‘investigating officers’ 
under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002. 
14 As will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis, powers afforded to civilians are limited and 
fundamentally, do not include the authority to engage in the legit imate use of force in any given situation 
and the ability to arrest outside of a police station. 
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officer and staff roles and responsibilities without doubt ‘raises important questions about 
the traditional division of labour and indeed the ‘unique’ status enjoyed by police officers’ 
(HMIC, 2004: 30). However, it also draws attention to the enduring saliency and 
relevance of the existing stark distinction between officers and staff - which is embodied 
in the Office of Constable - and with that, raises more fundamental questions about the 
extent to which current distinctions can (and should) still be considered ‘valid and 
appropriate to the requirements of policing in the 21st century’ (HMIC, 2004: 30-31). 
Together these questions lie at the heart of the issues subject to consideration in this thesis 
in relation to the function of criminal investigation and the role of DCs and as such, will 
be a recurrent theme.  
 
1.2.2 Civilianisation 
 
Traditionally defined as ‘the direct replacement of police officers by non-
warranted staff to perform roles previously undertaken by officers’ (HMIC, 2004: 31), 
civilianisation is a trend which has increased in both style and scope. Despite growing 
interest in the overall impact of civilianising trends on the police organisation in recent 
years, the roots of civilianisation are in fact traceable back to the earliest days of the police 
organisation when forces employed a number of civilians in ancillary and clerical posts 
(Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1994). As Jones et al. (1994: 168) note, for example, ‘The 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 recognised that the Commissioner could employ civilian 
clerks which he did from the early days of the force’. Further to this point, Loveday (1993) 
also refers to a strong ‘civilian influence’ in quite senior positions within the police before  
the 1950s with a number of Metropolitan Police Commissioners being appointed from 
outside the police service. He adds that during this period, civilians were also appointed 
to senior positions in most provincial forces, many of which were ex-military personnel 
(Loveday, 1993). The use of non-warranted personnel within frontline police roles is 
indeed a well-established trend whose lineage can arguably be traced back to Special 
Constables. Police Specials (unpaid volunteers with police uniforms and accompanying 
powers) have been present in their various guises within E&W for a significant period of 
time (the first statute to deal with Special Constables was the Act of Charles II in 1667 
(Critchley, 1967: 60; Seth, 1961)). However, historically, it would appear that the 
majority of civilian staff working within the provincial forces have been largely confined 
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to clerical or ancillary posts and it was not until the post war years that civilian 
employment really began to expand in scope (Jones et al., 1994).  
 
Although a particularly important part of policing policy in the 1980s when 
administrative, ancillary tasks not requiring the training and full powers of police officers 
were routinely ‘hived off’ to non-warranted police civilians (Jones et al., 1994; 
Department of Environment, 1983), since the second world war, UK legislation has 
increasingly allowed for not only an increase in absolute numbers of police staff, but also 
changes in the kinds of tasks they are employed to do15. Thus, police staff are increasingly 
found in higher grade positions within the police organisation and carry out tasks which 
were traditionally the preserve of warranted officers (e.g. patrol, detention, investiga t ion 
etc.). Additionally, developments in new technologies and ways of dealing with crime 
have resulted in an increased demand for specialist skills and non-traditional professiona l 
expertise within the organisation. This has in turn resulted in the creation of entirely new 
civilian posts which have never been filled by police officers and which are arguably now 
of central importance to effective policing in E&W. It has also been a key factor 
encouraging the emergence of a range of new key support roles in connection with 
operational policing (e.g. PCSOs, CIs). In the broad sense then, civilianisation now means 
more than simply the transfer of tasks from police officers to police staff, but more 
generally the increasing importance of the civilian element within the police organisat ion 
(Jones et al., 1994: 166).  
Since the 1980s - a period of heightened scepticism about the police and their ability to 
provide efficient and effective service (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4) - civilianisa t ion 
has in many respects become a necessary condition to the granting of increases to the 
authorised establishment (Cabinet Office, 2003; HMIC, 2004; Home Office, 1988a, 
1988b; Jones et al., 1994: 171). The alleged cost-effectiveness16  of employing police 
civilians to undertake tasks previously performed by their more expensive warranted 
colleagues has been a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of civilianisation post-1945 and has 
                                                                 
15 It should also be noted that official interest in the policy also appeared well before the 1980s. For example, 
the Oaksey Committee (Oaksey, 1949, cited in Jones et al., 1994: 168) report on police, pay, pensions and 
other aspects of police service conditions made recommendations that ‘police establishments in general 
should be thoroughly overhauled with a view to releasing policemen for police duty wherever p ossible by 
the employment of civilians’. 
16 In this thesis, ‘cost-effectiveness’ refers simultaneous to: a) the fact that non-warranted individuals are 
cheaper to employ than their warranted counterparts and b) that non-warranted individuals are said to free-
up the time and expertise of officers who can then return to the policing ‘frontline’. 
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been a key factor encouraging the police’s notable investment in civilianisation from the 
1980s onwards (Bullock, 2008)17.  
The two decades subsequent to the appointment of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative 
party leader and Prime Minister are perhaps best characterised by a reform process 
focused upon social market principles. For the police organisation, part of this involved 
attempts to determine the ‘core’ functions of the police with a view to shedding auxiliary 
roles to non-warranted police civilians. Many of the centrally inspired policy 
developments during the latter half of the 1980s into the 1990s and foreshadowing the 
passing of the Police Reform Act 2002 were driven by the desire for improved efficiency. 
This thread subsequently formed a major plank of Home Office policy during the period, 
and was mainly translated as a concern over ‘value for money’. Home Office interest in 
value for money increased after 1979, when the Conservatives were elected on a platform 
of bringing new management disciplines borrowed from private enterprise to the public 
sector. Under the umbrella title of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) many of the 
managerialist accoutrements of private sector management were introduced into the 
public sector. These included fixed-term contracts, performance-related pay, competitive 
tendering, league tables and (key) performance indicators (Newburn, 2007: 231). While 
value for money appeared a common theme to all public services after 1979 - when it 
took on various doctrinaire aspects under the guise of ‘Thacherism’ or more generally, 
managerialism - the police were, almost uniquely, treated differently. Indeed, overall 
police funding actually increased during the period, primarily as a result of the 
Conservative's commitment to ‘law and order’ as a policy18. The National Audit Office 
calculated that the police in fact enjoyed a 50% real increase in funding between 1979-80 
and 1989-90 - five times higher than education, for example (National Audit Office, 
Promoting Value for Money in Provincial Police Forces, 1991). However, while the 
police might be considered a special case when it came to pay and resources, they were 
by no means exempt from general public sector reform.  
                                                                 
17  See Jones et al. (1994: 168-173) for a detailed commentary on the historical development of 
civilianisation 1945-1988. 
18 Exempting the police from budget cuts also helped elicit loyalty to the government, a loyal police force 
being seen as essential to defeat the ‘enemy’ within in the shape of militant trade unionism and other 
resistance to the economically polarising consequences of free-market economies. 
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Increasingly the police had to justify themselves in terms of the three Es - 'effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy' - eventually implementing NPM policies of privatisation and 
civilianisation19. Much of the concern over value for money and the police’s effectiveness 
and efficiency centred on expenditure and the notable increase in spending on the police  
between the years of 1979-80 and 1989-90 (National Audit Office, 1991) following the 
result of the Edmund Davies Committee, when police officer pay became linked to the 
national average (which included the earnings accrued by the mushrooming private sector 
during the following decade) (Jones et al., 1994: 170-171), and the Conservative party’s 
commitment to crime reduction. Given the context of a government committed to drastic 
reduction in public expenditure, this, according to Loveday (1993), made further 
civilianisation somewhat inevitable. Indeed, increased government concern over the 
ability to maintain the rate of increase quickly manifested as did concern over the 
seemingly limited impact increased expenditure (mainly reflected in an increase in 
personnel) was having on crime statistics (also related to the increased degree of 
specialisation in the police which was emerging during this period and absorbing 
personnel). This led to the publication of Circular 114/1983, Manpower Effectiveness and 
Efficiency in the Police20, which addressed both of these issues and stipulated that ‘value 
for money’ should be an overarching consideration when resourcing police work. 
However, alongside its potential attractiveness to those seeking ways to reduce polic e 
expenditure, civilianisation was also increasingly coming to be recognised as a valuable 
means through which to improve the overall operational efficiency of the organisat ion. 
Increased levels of training coupled with the demands of paperwork and growth of 
specialist units during the 1980s meant that, despite the rapid escalation in police 
expenditure during the period (Home Office, 1983), a degree of discrepancy continued to 
exist with regard to total officer numbers and those actually available for operational 
duties and/or who were suitably skilled to deal with the increasingly complex nature of 
crime (Loveday, 1993). It is in this sense that the policy of civilianisation found renewed 
                                                                 
19 Indeed, ‘value for money’ dominated much of the debate about policing over the final two decades of the 
twentieth century, replacing the more overtly political debates about accountability in the earlier decades 
of the twentieth century (Marshall, 1978). 
20 The Circular was subsequently expanded upon and refined: Circular 105/1988, Civilian Staff in the Police 
Service, and Circular 106/1988, Applications for Increases in Police Force Establishments. Both helped 
pave the way for further developments in civilianisation and a growing emphasis on value for money .  
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impetus as a measure of efficiency during the latter half of the twentieth century (ACPO, 
1988; Home Office, 1988a, 1988b; Home Office, 1995; Parrett, 1991, 1998).  
The need for greater scrutiny of applications to increase the police establishment was 
established and new ‘bidding criteria’ proposed which required Chief Constables be more 
specific and strategic in their requests. For the public police organisation, the 
managerialist apparatus of NPM rapidly became an everyday reality of policing as well 
as an essential focus of management if funding was to be successfully secured (Skinns, 
2011). Home Office Circular 114/83 therefore put civilianisation firmly back on the 
police agenda by linking future increases in police establishment to the civilianisation of 
posts which did not require police powers or police training. Thereafter, Home Office 
Circulars 105/88 and 106/88 were to provide detailed guidance on further civilianisa t ion 
and also identified procedures for establishment applications from individual forces. 
Circular 105 in particular not only emphasised the need for civilianisation, but also set 
out to delineate the duties that civilian staff may perform (e.g. clerical and administra t ive 
tasks, data entry and processing, driving and training etc.). Following a slowing down of 
the civilianisation programme during the latter half of the 1980s, the Audit Commiss ion 
(1988) (which conducted national value-for-money police studies and, until March 2015, 
was responsible for the financial audit of police authorities and auditing best-value 
performance plans) argued that disincentives to civilianisation were caused by anomalies 
in the system for financing the police. Whereas the Home Office policing-specific grant 
was paid on all police-related local authority expenditure, since 1987, the police element 
of the Department of Environment Revenue Support Grant was related only to police 
officer establishments. Thus, although the Home Office was encouraging the increased 
use of civilians there was a financial incentive for forces to concentrate on increasing 
police establishments. However, in 1993, and resulting from growing concern over police 
governance and the nationalisation and politicisation of Police Authorities, the White 
Paper, Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty-First Century, made 
recommendations for reforming Police Authorities and the autonomy of Chief Officers in 
making decisions about the structuring of force establishments. The Authorities were 
proposed to be ‘restructured, reduced in size and become freestanding bodies comprising 
of 50% councillors and 50% amalgam of magistrates and independent local people 
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nominated by the Home Secretary’21 (Martin, 2004: 34). The Paper also proposed that 
Chief Constables should be allowed greater freedom to manage the resources at their 
disposal.  
Despite concerns voiced by ACPO that such reforms of Police Authorities would allow 
for greater central control by government, most of the proposals outlined in the White 
Paper were subsequently set in place by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 
which granted Chief Constables greater management powers and financial autonomy with 
regard to deploying resources, including personnel (and thus, responsibility for police 
staff), within their police forces. There was an expectation however that this would result 
in increased efficiency and improved performance. The Police Reform Act 2002 later 
continued this trend by authorising the Home Secretary to set annual performance targets 
which the Police Service was expected to meet. 
As Cockcroft (2013: 95) has discussed,  
‘at a symbolic level, Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police  
(Circular 114/83), represented an unequivocal statement of the future direction 
that senior officers and police authorities would be expected to take in 
quantifying the level of quality that they delivered in return for the funding that 
they received’. 
 It may also be considered the point at which a notable transformation in the formal 
organisation of police governance began to take hold (with the usual emphasis upon 
economy gains at the same time as the achievement of customer satisfaction, proof of 
which must be measurable). The arrival of NPM saw the emergence of an intensified form 
of police governance and greater use of the language of performance indicators, 
monitoring, audit, value, efficiency and effectiveness, all of which found expression in 
the plethora of subsequent reports published by the Home Office, Audit Commission and 
HMIC during the 1990s. Spearheaded by Kenneth Clarke and Michael Howard - 
‘architects of the mid-1990s police package’ (Reiner, 2010: 13) - the proposals for reform 
consisted of the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993), the 1993 
Sheehy Report into the potential restructuring of police ranks and remuneration (from the 
                                                                 
21 Reducing the size of the Authorities was primarily because their size and structure were seen as inhibiting 
them from being effectual. 
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1992 Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards 22 ), the 1994 Police and 
Magistrates Courts Act23  and the Home Office Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks 
(Home Office, 199524)25 . In the managerialist agenda of the early 1990s, the ‘entire 
package was premised on an official definition of the police task as “catching crimina ls”, 
a reverse of the notion of the priority of preserving public tranquillity as advocated by 
British police tradition from Peel to Scarman’ (Reiner, 2000: 209). The reforms were 
clearly directed at imposing the disciplines of the marketplace on policing (Reiner, 2000: 
209). 
Subsequent debates about alternative ways to deliver core police services in a more 
effective and efficient fashion - in particular, patrol and community reassurance - led to 
the production of numerous reports and reviews of police duties and tasks in the 1990s. 
The Operational Policing Review (JCC, 1990), for example, examined a range of issues 
including civilianisation, stressing the need to take a longer-term view of the impact of 
the process and highlighting a range of unresolved matters. Similarly, the Audit 
Commission in particular was a central component of the government’s manageria list 
reform programme26 and turned its attention to the police during the 1980s onwards, as 
one of the significant and growing sources of local spending. The Audit Commiss ion 
subsequently produced a series of supporting reports in the 90s concerned with police 
performance, effective management and value for money. Of particular significance for 
                                                                 
22 The terms of reference for the inquiry considered rank structures and conditions of service, in particular, 
whether flexible systems of rewards for performance existed and to ensure adequate remuneration in order 
to recruit, retain and motivate officers (Home Office 1993: I). The final (Sheehy) report in turn, presented 
a series of recommendations; these included reducing the ranks structure (by eliminating some ranks e.g. 
chief inspectors) to dissolve a top-heavy management structure, establishing fixed term appointments for 
all ranks, the introduction of performance related pay and the abolition of certain allowances. 
23 The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 afforded Chief Officers greater freedom to manage their 
budgets and their staff. It also meant that they were thus, held far more to account for their use of resources 
and performance. Combined, both pressures to be more efficient and productive were intended to drive 
greater innovation in civilianisation. 
24 The Posen Inquiry was another major inquiry to impact upon the police and was set up to 'examine the 
services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering  
core police services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks' (Home Office 1995: 1). 
Arguably, the primary intention behind this review was to identify potential ways of contracting out 
policing tasks and privatisation. 
25 Aspects of the managerialist philosophy are most evident in the Audit Commission’s, Police Papers 
No.8: Effective Policing (Audit Commission, 1990), the Home Office White Paper, Police Reform (Home 
Office, 1993) and the (Sheehy) Inquiry into Policing Responsibilities and Rewards (Sheehy, 1993). 
However, it was not until the introduction of the Police Act 1996 that ‘value for money’ became a major 
plank of Home Office concern over the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in policing providing a 
statutory footing for managerialist and ‘best value’ changes. 
26 The Audit Commission was a significant instrument of facilitation of police reform for the government 
throughout the 1990s and ‘was used by central government to introduce a performance culture into the 
police service’ (Savage et al., 2000: 37-38). 
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the concerns of this thesis, these included, Fine Lines: Improving the Traffic Warden 
Service (1992), Helping with Enquiries (1993) and Streetwise; Effective Police Patrol 
(1996), each of which sought to draw attention to police performance and potential ways 
of improving ‘best value’ in policing and laid firm footings for progressive explorations 
of civilianisation. In particular, Streetwise, which criticised the effectiveness of some 
aspects of 'community policing' (namely the fact that increased patrol officer numbers did 
not necessarily lead to increased clear ups for crime) while also recognising public 
demand for visible patrol, notably provided scope for the subsequent formulation of the 
PCSO role in E&W. Supported by the Home Office’s Review of Police Core and 
Ancillary Tasks (Home Office, 1995) and subsequent Independent Committee of Inquiry 
into the Roles and Responsibilities of the Police (Police Foundation/Policy Studies 
Institute, 1996), these developments all drew clear attention to the roles, responsibilit ies 
and ultimately, cost of the policing. In particular, the reports highlighted employment 
conditions (including contracts of officers) and overall cost of all areas of policing, 
including those roles traditionally considered ‘frontline’ or ‘core’ to the police mission. 
This, in turn, also quickly drew attention to potential new ways of organising work and 
of structuring the police workforce which may allow for ‘best value’ and further 
experimentation with civilianisation in core areas of work (e.g. criminal investigation). 
However, despite the relatively consistent push from government towards civilianisa t ion 
(and NPM more broadly) from the late 1980s onwards, not everyone viewed this move 
to a new form of management quite so positively. Indeed, attempts to produce change 
were by no means clear-cut, primarily because of resistance by the police, its related 
representing bodies and Local Authorities.  
In relation to workforce reform, the Sheehy Inquiry (Sheehy, 1993) provoked the greatest 
level of opposition, with concerns being voiced from every quarter of the police ranks. 
At the highest level of these, ACPO and the Police Superintendents' Association believed 
that, if accepted, the proposals for changes in rank structure and the introduction of 
performance related pay would result in adverse consequences for the police service in 
terms of recruitment, retention and the morale of police officers (Leishman, Cope and 
Starie, 1996: 14). John Burrows, the President of ACPO at the time, argued that the 
introduction of contracts and performance related pay for officers would turn the police 
'into just another job, with people coming in and out, rather than giving dedicated service 
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over many years and would affect the nature of the police force and the job it does' (Daily 
Telegraph, 19 July 1993, cited in Martin, 2003). At the other end, the Police Federation - 
representing those officers of rank lower than Superintendent - organised a rally at 
Wembley on 20th July 1993 to show their anger at the proposals and to air their objections 
to them. This unique spectacle consisted of 17,000 police officers and was addressed by 
the then Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, and also marked a concerted effort on the 
part of Labour to actively reach out to the police. The police campaign was without doubt 
effective in its ability to influence the media and, in turn, a number of Conservative MPs, 
and ultimately led to the recommendations of the Sheehy report being abandoned by 
October 1993.  
The subsequent Cassels Inquiry, which was set up in 1993, looked at the role and 
responsibilities of the police and, in particular, the significance of the patrol function 
(Police Foundation/Policy Studies Institute, 1996). Controversially, one of the options put 
forward by Cassels who chaired the independent inquiry, was based on the Dutch 
Stadswacht (city warden) and Politiesurveillant (police patroller). The Stadswacht operate 
in Dutch cities and are charged with providing high visibility uniformed patrols, assist 
with crime prevention, deal with minor public enquiries, minor anti-social behaviour, 
provide public reassurance and generally act as the eyes and ears of the police (Thomas, 
2014: 21). A large number of Stadswacht are managed by the police, although they do 
not possess any police powers and thus, do not operate as law enforcers. ‘The 
Politiesurveillant on the other hand operate in several large Dutch cities, where they also 
provide high visibility uniformed patrols’ (Thomas, 2014: 21). The Politiesurveillant 
operate at a rank which is above that of the Stadswacht but below that of a constable and  
have the powers of a constable, albeit that these are somewhat restricted (Police 
Foundation/Policy Studies Institute, 1996). The inquiry proposed a similar approach to 
that adopted in some parts of continental Europe and thus (alongside the Audit 
Commission paper, Streetwise: Effective Police Patrol (1996), which also made similar 
claims) laid the foundation for the formulation and later emergence of PCSOs under the 
2002 Act27.  
                                                                 
27 The inquiry also noted that private security or special constables had carried out some very successful 
patrol work in the past although the report did not make overt recommendations for a system of patrol 
outside the direct control of the local Chief Constable. 
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A similar campaign was launched against the Posen Inquiry (Home Office, 1995) 
(commissioned to review police core and ancillary tasks) but assumed a lower profile, 
with ACPO increasingly adopting a position of trying to influence the Inquiry from the 
inside. Somewhat expectedly, ACPO were more muted in their opposition that the lower 
ranks. Generally during the period, proposed reforms which were opposed by the police 
(in particular, ACPO) were more often obstructed and/or diluted while those reforms 
which appeared more favourable to the police were left relatively unscathed (Leishman 
et al., 1996: 36). Somewhat ironically, an interesting consequence of the increasing 
managerialism of the police was the enhanced ability of ACPO, in swaying the outcome 
of the Conservatives’ reform agenda (Newburn, 2003: 94). 
Indeed, like the Sheehy Inquiry before it, the NPM agenda of the Posen and Cassels 
Inquiries were not able to be fully accomplished. Leishman et al. (1996: 17) put this down 
to the fact that ‘an attempt to bring markets into networks and consequently redistribute 
power, may encounter resistance from entrenched interest within police policy networks, 
thus blunting the thrust of reform’. In his analysis, the capacity of the police to elicit 
sympathy and support from the public allowed them to be highly vocal and resistant 
against central government plans (Leishman et al., 1996). The most recent and well-
documented example of this may be seen following the introduction of PCSOs (Caless, 
2007), with the Police Federation initially leading criticism of the PCSO concept, also 
refusing to grant them membership initially28. 
Probably the most important efficiency document oriented to criminal investigation and 
the world and work of police detectives was the Audit Commission report of 1993, 
Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively. In the context of urging a re-
emphasis on core tasks of prevention and detection of crime, it argued that police should 
spend less time on a reactive strategy of responding to reported incidents and more time 
developing intelligence- led strategies including the proactive targeting of known 
offenders. The Audit Commission was worried that rising crime would overwhelm 
reactive policing; Police would spend all their time reacting to reported incidents and 
serious offenders would not be caught and there would eventually be a fall in public 
                                                                 
28 No specific information exists with regard to the reactions of either of the forces in which fieldwork 
was undertaken (Newtown and Shorewick) (see Chapter Three, section 3.6) to policy developments and 
associated reports/inquires undertaken within the political landscape of NPM during the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  
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confidence. The Commission therefore advocated a shift in focus from targeting the crime 
(reactive) to targeting the offender (proactive) and as part of this, a greater use of 
informants. Growing recognition of the administrative burden of the task of policing on 
warranted officers, coupled with growing incentives to explore the greater use of police 
civilians undoubtedly laid the foundation for CIs who were proposed on the basis of 
freeing-up the time of detectives allowing them to focus on proactive detection. 
Following New Labour’s election in 1997, the new government were seemingly just as 
favourable to much of the NPM agenda as the previous Conservative government, and 
continued to implement the ‘business-like’ reform agenda with at least as much rigour as 
the Tories had (Savage, 2007: chapts. 3, 5). Their commitment to this was signalled early 
on by the 1999 Local Government Act and its ‘Best Value’ scheme which ‘raised the 
culture of performance management to another level altogether’ (Savage, 2007: 110). 
According to Reiner (2010: 104), ‘The collection and analysis of performance indicators 
and the league tables they generated became ever more rigorous and sophisticated’. The 
government’s subsequent White Paper, Policing a New Century (Home Office, 2001), 
which preceded the more general Justice for All (Home Office et al., 2002), made clear 
its intentions of ‘slimming down bureaucracy and reassigning tasks in a way that frees up 
police officers to do their real job more effectively’ (Home Office, 2001: foreword). The 
White Paper called for the modernisation of employment terms and conditions which 
were considered a bar to contemporary needs and efficient, effective policing29. The paper 
thus also focused upon extending the police family, in part, through the ‘more flexib le 
use of support staff’ (Home Office, 2001: 15) and, in many ways, provided firm footings 
for the Police Reform Act 2002. Indeed, the report also made explicit reference to CIs 
(under the title of ‘civilian investigator’ rather than ‘investigating officers’ as they are 
referred to in the 2002 Act) who, it was envisaged, would be used to increase capacity in 
specialist areas of investigative provision (Home Office, 2001: 4). The White Paper 
adopted a progressive stance with regard to CIs, recognising their potential for increasing 
                                                                 
29 As Loveday (2008: 137) highlights, ‘Career progression for all officers is through the ranks by way of 
promotion usually following paper-based examinations’, with pay rewards being traditionally linked to 
rank rather than responsibility. It is for this reason, according to Loveday, ‘that the patrol function (visible 
policing) has never proved to be a way to achieving professional career success’ (Loveday, 2008: 137). As 
Loveday continues, ‘This perception has been encouraged where police forces have traditionally placed 
greater emphasis on specialised functions and services and this was perhaps best reflected in the rise of the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) where the number of senior posts available was always greater 
than within the uniformed service’ (Loveday, 2008: 137-138).  
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specialist skills within the CID and also proposing the extended career trajectory of CIs 
within the police organisation (Home Office, 2001: 44). 
While much of the drive towards civilianisation in the latter half of the twentieth century 
has been rooted in the alleged cost-effectiveness of police staff – a rationale which itself 
has been born out of popular perceptions of the traditional image of police staff work as 
being predominately support in nature and therefore complementary to that of warranted 
officers, - as will be explored in this thesis in regard to the work of CIs, the roles which 
are now being undertaken by many non-warranted personnel within the police may in fact 
have moved beyond that which can be conceived as complementary. Furthermore, at an 
operational level, the use of police staff is also said to reduce bureaucratic burdens and 
free-up the time of experienced warranted officers who can then be re-deployed to 
supervise and perform frontline duties such as arrest (HMIC, 2004: 168). It is under this 
logic that the more recent and controversial developments in civilianisation have been 
allowed to occur, namely extensions in police staff use in core areas of police work and 
the subsequent growth of key support roles in connection with operational policing.  
The introduction of the Police Reform Act 2002 marked something of a watershed in the 
evolution of the civilianisation agenda. Alongside the introduction of CIs as part of a 
package of new frontline civilian categories 30 , section 38 of the Act also includes 
provisions allowing for the designation of these individuals with a limited but expansive 
range of police type powers. Under the Act, the powers exercisable by those deemed by 
‘suitable’ and/or ‘qualified’ for designation are dependent upon their role/job title and are 
subject to the discretion of the Chief Constable of each police force. However, generally 
speaking, a designated person is able to exercise a range of powers comparable to those 
bestowed upon their warranted colleagues, which include the power to apply for and 
execute search warrants, to arrest at a police station and to interview a suspect under 
caution. According to the most recent available figures, designated individuals currently 
make up around six per cent of the total number of police staff31 working within the police 
organisation (Home Office, 2015: 8). The introduction of CIs represents one of the latest 
and arguably most momentous developments in the civilianisation agenda and is directly 
reflective of both the growing need for specialist expertise within the contemporary CID 
                                                                 
30 PCSOs, DOs and EOs. 
31 Figure includes PCSOs, traffic wardens and all other non-warranted police personnel working within the 
organisation. 
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and the police’s need to ensure cost-efficiencies in all areas of its business. CIs are also, 
to some extent, demonstrative of a new era in police workforce modernisation in which 
roles previously considered the sole preserve of warranted police officers are also being 
formally offered for operation by non-warranted police personnel.  
1.2.3 Pluralisation and the Mixed Economy Workforce 
 
Despite a notable shift in focus within the sociology of policing from a 
preoccupation with the police, to a broader concern with policing over the last few 
decades (see Chapter Two, sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for further detail), both symbolica l ly 
and literally, the police and the ‘intuitive notion of what the police are’ (Reiner, 2010: 3) 
continue to dominate popular conceptions of policing. Generally speaking, the police are 
‘the body of men and women employed by the state who patrol the streets, deal with 
crime, ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-type functions’ 
(Button, 2002: 6). However, as the complex nature of crime has emerged in the late 
modern era, so has the varied totality of policing provision (see Chapter Two, section 
2.2.4) and with it, our understanding of the role and functional and geographica l 
parameters of the public police. The police are now generally accepted to operate 
alongside and in conjunction with a varying assortment of ‘others’ in their drive to ensure 
effective and efficient crime control (Flanagan, 2008) (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4). 
Explicit reference is now made within the police/policing studies literature to the mixed 
economy of policing, plural policing, the police extended family, security partnerships 
and policing networks which together, have replaced older notions of police 
omnicompetence32 and the idea of the police as the monopolistic (even if only in a 
symbolic sense) guardians of security, public safety and order (Crawford, 2011: 147). As 
Jones and Newburn (2006: 1) note:  
‘…policing is now authorized and delivered by diverse networks of commercia l 
bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local 
governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police’. 
 
However, despite increased academic interest in the plurality of organisations, agencies 
and individuals now routinely engaged in policing in E&W (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; 
Jones and Newburn 1998; Loader, 2000), for the most part, the literature documenting the 
                                                                 
32 This being the traditional idea that a police constable is both able and willing to deal effectively with any 
and every policing eventuality and as the sole entry point into the police ‘profession’.  
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developing mixed economy in policing has tended to pay less attention to changing 
arrangements and emerging divisions of labour within the police organisation itself. 
Indeed, as Crawford (2011: 152) makes clear, ‘the pluralisation of policing is a trend 
which is evident within as well as beyond the police organisation [emphasis added]’.  
Increasingly, police organisations are experimenting with a more diverse and  
flexible mix of personnel. Growing demand for specialist policing provision has for the 
most part, ‘exposed the rigidity of the idea that the basic training and experience of a 
constable is the sufficient and appropriate basis for the complex array of tasks demanded 
of modern police’ (Crawford, 2011: 153). Under the ideologically fuelled rhetoric of 
workforce modernisation, the police extended family has been allowed to flourish, giving 
rise to a more complex and fragmented division of labour in policing (Crawford, 2011: 
147) and creating new spaces and professional spheres of activity within the police 
organisation in which warranted officers have little stake (e.g. forensics) and/or where 
they have, over time, relinquished their claim (e.g. control room staff, escort function 
etc.). The trend of pluralisation has been apparent in most areas of police work but perhaps 
none more so than in regard to criminal investigation where a broad shift from a reactive 
to proactive investigative approach, coupled with developments in science and 
technology have encouraged an opening up of the CID to a range of new faces33. Many 
specialised and professional roles (e.g. intelligence analysts, scene of crime officers, CID 
unit managers etc.), requiring high levels of professional competence and considered 
central to the effective functioning of the investigative process, can now also be subject 
to operation by non-warranted police staff and civilians (cf Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). For 
example, the production of intelligence - considered the bedrock of the proactive 
approach - is a complex role requiring specialist knowledge of various analyt ica l 
techniques and software packages. It is similarly a function which is also being regular ly 
undertaken in some forces by police staff (CIAs) (Atkinson, forthcoming). However, 
despite often performing an increasingly important and often essential role in shaping the 
strategic direction and ultimate success of investigations in E&W (as in the above stated 
example), the significance of the contribution now being made by police staff continues 
to be largely overlooked at the organisational level. 
                                                                 
33 It should be noted that the Police Advisory Board’s (Home Office, 1967) report, ‘Police, Manpower, 
Equipment and Efficiency’, which made recommendations for an increased use of civilians within the police 
force generally, also advocated the employment of CID clerical assistants, scenes of crime assistants, 
civilian fingerprint takers and photographers.  
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In addition to the increased recruitment of police staff, policy reforms have also 
increasingly allowed for the growing involvement of private security in public policing. 
The steady marketisation of policing since the Police Act 1964 which allowed the police 
to charge for ‘special services’ such as the policing of football matches, has seen the 
police engage more extensively in both the buying and selling of services (Ayling, 
Grabowsky and Shearing, 2009). Along with the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 
which also allowed the police to charge more generally for goods and services and the 
contracting out of police officer time, the Police Reform Act 2002 in many ways 
guaranteed the trend towards the ‘privatisation’ of police services and functions. While 
most often referred to within popular political and media discourse as ‘privatisation’, for 
the most part34 , much of what has happened with regard to the growing involvement of 
the private sector in public policing provision in recent years can be understood more 
appropriately as ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting-out’. Like many other areas of the public 
sector, the post-Thatcher period has seen an exponential growth in the outsourcing of 
partial and/or entire parts of the police’s business to the private sector including those 
areas traditionally considered frontline, core police functions (White, 2014). This can 
perhaps be seen most patently with the provision of custody where, in some instances, the 
entire provision of this service has been outsourced to private sector providers (Skinns, 
2011).  
However, in the case of CIs, unlike outsourcing - a specific type of public-private 
engagement in which partial or entire parts of a function are contracted out for tender to 
the private sector - the recruitment of individuals from private sector recruitment agencies 
as ‘agency workers’ (under the control and direction of the police) is perhaps rather more 
suggestive of a new style of privatisation in which non-police personnel are being used 
to undertake roles and perform tasks traditionally considered frontline and solely 
operational by warranted police officers. The introduction of CIs therefore provides a 
significant contribution in further diversifying the network of policing and adding to an 
already established mixed economy (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn and Burnett, 2005). 
Furthermore, not only is the use of CIs - whose role is arguably suggestive of the 
civilianisation of the DC role to some degree - somewhat indicative of both the 
pervasiveness of civilianising trends, as will be demonstrated and discussed in later 
                                                                 
34 Previously a function undertaken by government-owned Forensic Science Service (FSS), the provision 
of forensic science has since 2010 (following the closure of the FSS), been largely contracted out to the 
private sector. 
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chapters of this thesis, it may also be pointing towards a possibly increasing level of 
cooperation between the public police and private security in regard to the provision of 
criminal investigation. As in many other areas of the public sector, the police - faced with 
mounting budgetary pressures - may be being increasingly drawn to the flexibility and 
potential lucrativeness of formalised (contractual) engagement with the private sector for 
the supply of a variety of resources - including staff. In this sense, CIs, who may be 
employed via contracts agreed with private security providers (e.g. G4S), might be seen 
as providing police managers with a reserve body of auxiliary investigators who can be 
drawn in to assist the CID to cope with operational crises and periods of exceptiona l 
demand, such as during a major criminal investigation or other critical incident.  
While the powers which may be afforded to CIs employed directly by the organisat ion 
are not currently available to those employed by private security agencies, potential for 
the extension of this provision to agency CIs has been made more likely by the creation 
of Community Safety Accreditation schemes (also introduced by the Police Reform Act 
2002, section 40) which allow for the granting of limited powers (namely the issuing of 
fixed penalty notices 35 ) to employees of non-police organisations (e.g. community 
wardens (employed by local councils), security guards (employed by shopping malls) 
etc.) (Grace, 2014). Recent developments in civilianisation therefore not only bring to 
light the changing nature of the police workforce demographic, namely, the nature of 
policing and the respective roles of police officers and police staff, but increasingly, ‘also 
raise concerns about the dangers of ‘creeping privatisation’ and emergence of ‘two tier 
policing’’ (HMIC, 2004: 28). Furthermore, alongside questions about effectiveness and 
coordination, the advent of the mixed economy workforce in policing and security also 
undoubtedly raises important normative and ethical considerations regarding the interests 
served by developing security networks and how exactly democratic values of justice, 
equity, accountability can be ensured (Crawford, 2011: 194; Lister and Jones, 2015). As 
Crawford (2013: 185) suggests, we are now standing ‘on the brink of a possible new dawn 
in relations between private security and the public police in Britain’ (at least in some 
                                                                 
35 Alongside the ability to issue fixed penalty notices and penalty notices for disorder for a range of offence 
types (e.g. dog fouling, littering, graffiti, riding a bike on a public footpath etc.), a person accredited under 
a Community Safety Accreditation Scheme may also be designated an additional number of p owers 
including the ability to confiscate alcohol from young people and ability stop a vehicle for purposes of 
inspection (Grace, 2014). 
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police force areas), a development which may (or may not) have implications for crimina l 
investigation as a public good.  
 
1.3 Existing Research on Police Staff - A Brief Review 
 
 
Despite receiving far less academic attention than work conducted on the police - 
particularly on the world and work of the rank-and-file (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; 
Fielding, 1988, 1995; Manning, 1977; Young, 1991) - interest in the varying styles of 
contribution now being made by non-warranted members of police staff to the police 
organisation is starting to grow. Arguably most notable is the emerging body of evaluat ive 
research which has sought to examine - both directly and indirectly - the role of non-
warranted PCSOs 36  (Accenture, 2005; Chatterton and Rowland 2005; Cooper, 
Anscombe, Avenell, McLean and Morris, 2006; Crawford et al., 2004; Greig-Midlane, 
2014; Hearnden, 2004; Long, Robinson and Senior, 2006; Singer, 2004).  
Since their introduction in 2002, PCSOs have been a popular focus of interest for 
academics keen to assess the impact of this ‘new breed’ of civilian on the police’s 
reassurance agenda. A key driver behind the introduction of PCSOs was the public’s 
seemingly insatiable demand for visible police patrols and, with that, perception of the 
declining ability of the police to secure confidence in their ability to deliver effective and 
efficient policing (HMIC, 2002). Despite enduring testament of the inefficiency of foot 
patrol in deterring crime (Audit Commission, 1996), public demand for ‘more Bobbies 
on the beat’ coupled with a changing political and economic climate in the early twenty-
first century meant that PCSOs were invited to join the police family as auxiliary patrol 
officers. Since their arrival the role of the PCSO has developed and they are in many ways 
considered the ‘paraprofessionals of patrol’ (O’Neill, 2014). There now exists a growing 
body of empirical work which, broadly speaking, has sought to move beyond the body of 
impact oriented work conducted on PCSOs, towards the advancement of theoretical 
                                                                 
36 PCSOs are non-warranted, uniformed members of police staff who are employed by the police and who 
were introduced in order to satisfy demands for increased police visibility and accessibility and restore 
public confidence. According to Cosgrove (2011: 12-13), the primary purpose of PCSOs was ‘to provide 
visibility, deliver public reassurance and tackle lower level disorder through the provision of dedicated foot 
patrols’. It is therefore important to note that PCSOs ‘are not able to draw upon the same range of powers 
as police constables, are not equipped with the same protective equipment and, as such, are not expected t o 
engage in tackling criminal behaviour, its investigation or control due to the increased risks to personal 
safety and the high level of skill and working knowledge that such activities entail’ (Cosgrove, 2011: 13).  
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understandings of the role and what can be inferred from this with regard to contemporary 
patterns of policing, its implications for the role of the police, the legitimate basis of their 
authority and the distinctiveness of the police ‘brand’ (Crawford, 2011: 175-176). For 
example, Cosgrove (2011) explored the working practices, decision making and 
occupational culture of PCSOs in one Northern city. This research found that the pull of 
the performance culture in the police coupled with high public demand for visible beat 
policing encouraged a shift in the remit of PCSOs away from reassurance and towards 
reactive policing. The findings of the research also point to the emergence of a PCSO 
occupational culture which, due to the civilian status and frontline role played by PCSOs, 
was found to be both distinct and similar to that of warranted uniformed officers  
(Cosgrove, 2016). Qualitative research undertaken by O’Neill (2014) also points to the 
valuable contribution being made by PCSOs to the project of Neighbourhood Policing, 
both in terms of both their capacity to improve the performance and overall legitimacy of 
the police. However, the research also found that in some areas PCSOs continue to be 
poorly trained, are offered limited opportunities for career progression and suffer from 
conflicted operational direction.   
While research on the role and occupational experiences of PCSOs arguably dominates 
extant literature on the various roles of police staff in E&W, a number of scholars have 
also sought to take account of the variety of other non-warranted individuals currently 
working within the police organisation. As part of her study into the occupational and 
organisational dynamics of contemporary custody provision in E&W, findings by Skinns 
(2011) also examined of the role of designated DOs (employed by the police) and custody 
assistants (CAs) (employed by private security companies) including limited information 
on their individual orientations to work, working relationships with officers and cultura l 
attributes. The study not only found that both DOs and CAs ‘undertook virtually the same 
tasks’ as jailors37 (warranted police constables) (Skinns, 2011: 49) but also that, due to 
their permanence within the custody area, both DOs and CAs had accumulated specialist 
skills which made them ‘invaluable to the police custody process’.  
 
Extant academic interest in the world and work of non-warranted individuals within the 
police organisation has also begun to take stock of the valuable roles now being 
                                                                 
37 This included collecting biometric data, carrying out cell checks, looking after the welfare of suspects in 
the cells (e.g. responding to their requests) and accompanying suspects to and from their cells (Skinns, 2011: 
49). 
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undertaken by police staff working within the CID. Work by Wilson-Kovacs (2014) for 
example, explored the occupational dynamics of Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) working 
within forensic scene examination teams in English police forces. The research found 
that, like police officers, CSEs displayed a strong sense of mission and set of professiona l 
values. However, findings of the study also pointed towards a lack of formal recognit ion 
of the value of the role being played by CSEs by their warranted colleagues which was 
itself framed by the general scepticism of officers towards forensic science. More recent 
research conducted by Atkinson (2013, forthcoming) also explored the role and 
occupational and cultural positioning of CIAs working within Scottish police forces and 
who, up until this point, were an otherwise unknown body of police personnel. Atkinson 
found that patriarchal responses to the introduction of CIAs by officers had resulted in 
the ‘infantilisation’ of the role and emergence of a ‘them and us’ culture between officers 
and CIAs. Together, these valuable pieces of empirical work draw attention to the 
growing significance of the non-warranted element within the contemporary police 
organisation and with that, some much needed recognition of the important contribution 
being made by police staff to core police work - including criminal investigation. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters. Chapter Two provides a critical 
review of the existing literature in relation to the emergence and development of CIs. This 
chapter sets the scene for subsequent discussion of the findings in later chapters and 
provides contextual grounding to the overall aims and objectives of the research. It begins 
by providing a brief historical account of the development of the police, policing and 
criminal investigation in E&W, before going on to discuss changing theoretical traditions 
which take account of ‘policing beyond the police’. The chapter then moves on to explore 
extant debates on the development of private security in E&W and with that, its increasing 
significance as a key player in the changing policing landscape. Drawing upon relevant 
literature, the chapter then explores the impact of pluralising trends on the police 
profession and, in particular, on the professional ethos of warranted police DCs before 
providing the reader with a substantial review of key debates and new directions in 
understandings of police culture(s). 
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In Chapter Three consideration is given to the research methodology used to access the 
inner world of policing and study the routine, day-to-day working realities of CIs and 
their contribution to the contemporary criminal investigation process. To begin with, this 
chapter reflects broadly upon the epistemology and ontology of the research38  before 
discussing the methodological approach adopted by the study. The chapter pays particular 
attention to debates on mixed methods research, data collection and analysis techniques 
and ethical issues experienced throughout the research. 
Chapters Four to Seven present the findings of the study. Chapter Four sets out an 
overview/profile of the structure and make-up of the CID units visited as they existed 
when the fieldwork was undertaken. The Chapter begins by presenting a general overview 
of both police forces and the people encountered during fieldwork before going on to 
discuss in relevant detail, the arrangement of the individual units in which fieldwork was 
undertaken at both sites. Chapter Five presents findings from a semi-structured survey 
which sought to broadly examine the extent and nature of CI deployment within police 
forces across the country. Information presented and discussed in this chapter includes 
the extent of power designation, varying views of police senior management, degrees of 
variance in regard to levels of training and supervision provided to CIs and the extent of 
engagement of participating forces with private security agencies. This chapter therefore 
places the utilisation of CIs in a national context and explores variation and similar ity 
with regard to CI deployment between forces. Chapter Six provides an empirical account 
of the role currently being undertaken by CIs within the police organisation in E&W and 
discusses a range of issues relevant to their introduction and current use at the 
occupational level. This chapter draws upon interview data, field observations and 
personal reflections of CIs during interviews to examine the occupational position of CIs 
in relation to that of their warranted DC colleagues. The chapter is structured thematica l ly 
and takes account of varying issues central to the research including the identity and 
occupational status of CIs, levels of motivation, commitment and resilience, acceptance 
and integration of CIs within the CID, where CIs ‘fit’ within the existing police and DC 
cultures and how the role being undertaken by CIs may (or may not) be impacting upon 
                                                                 
38 The current study is broadly framed by a post-positivist epistemological stance and is rooted in a critical 
realist approach (Bhaskar, 1975; 1998) which argues that choice of methods should be dictated first and 
foremost by the nature of the research problem (see Chapter Three, section 3.2) for a more detailed 
overview). 
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the legitimacy of the police. Building upon the findings presented in Chapter Five and 
again drawing upon relevant empirical data (for both the forces studied in depth and those 
gleaned from the survey), Chapter Seven examines the relationship of CIs with the police 
organisation. This chapter explores the range of related structural features currently 
impacting on the employment experience of CIs and includes discussion on CI career 
progression, powers of enforcement, remuneration and job security.  
The thesis concludes in Chapter Eight, in which the central themes presented in this thesis 
are discussed in relation to the overall aims and objectives of the study. Chapter Eight 
provides a much broader discussion of findings presented in Chapters Four to Seven and, 
in particular, pays attention to their implications for our understanding of emerging (re-
emerging) patterns of policing and in particular, what can be inferred from current 
practices with regard to the utilisation of CIs about the future of criminal investiga t ion 
and standing of the DC.  
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Chapter Two: Criminal Investigation in Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the key literature on the changing nature of 
policing, the police role and police culture. In doing so, it illustrates the background from 
which the introduction and utilisation of CIs has developed and provides some critical 
discussion of extant debates on recent shifts in patterns of policing in E&W, in particular, 
the civilianisation and privatisation of policing. Specifically, this chapter ‘sets the scene’ 
for subsequent critical discussion of the study’s findings presented in Chapters Four to 
Seven, by tracing the introduction and deployment of CIs in the light of their emergence 
within an increasingly pluralised and fragmented policing and security landscape. This 
chapter focuses predominately on literature concentrating on E&W and subsequently 
draws upon only a limited body of relevant comparative literature.  
 
This chapter will begin with a concise discussion of key developments within the 
sociology of policing, taking into account the gradual pluralisation of policing and the 
impact of this changing policing landscape upon popular theoretical understandings of 
the role of the police. This will then be followed by a short and selective overview of the 
historical, socio-political and economic context within which the deployment of CIs has 
taken place and of which their introduction can be considered broadly reflective. The 
chapter will then move on to provide brief discussion of what has been termed the 
‘rebirth’ of private security (Johnston, 1992) in E&W since the Second World War and 
with it, the growing ‘privatisation’ of public policing. Attention will then be given to the 
ongoing pursuit of professionalism by the public police with particular focus afforded to 
assessing the impact of growing civilianisation and of ‘policing beyond the police’ upon 
the occupational parameters of police work and identities of warranted officers. Finally, 
this chapter will conclude by providing a detailed overview of extant debates in the field 
of police culture/s. This last section will explore key scholarly work on the topic of police 
cultures and will also provide a brief summary of relevant literature related to the 
development of fragmented cultures within the public police CID. 
As well as ‘setting the scene’ for the following discussion, it is also the intention of this 
chapter to set forth the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. Key theories 
and/or concepts discussed include Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1972) ‘junior partner’ theory, 
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Bourdieu’s (1990) work on ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ and Hoogenboom’s (1991) work on the 
‘policing complex’ 39 . Each of these key theoretical works have been applied in 
combination within this study, in an effort to adequately conceptualise the varying related 
facets associated with the world and work of CIs in relation to that of DCs and other 
warranted members of staff. They have also been drawn upon in an effort to explore the 
potential impact of CI utilisation on investigative practice more broadly, particularly with 
regard to the potential for further ‘blurring’ of the public-private divide in relation to 
operational level investigative practice. 
 
As this study is the first (to my knowledge) attempt to empirically examine the role/s 
currently being performed by CIs since their formal introduction in 2002, there is an 
obvious need to locate their emergence and subsequent deployment within relevant 
debate and theory. The scoping/exploratory nature of this study has thus necessitated the 
author delve into a wide body of relevant literature from a diverse range of fields. This 
has been done so as to situate the significance of CI introduction within wider debates 
about security governance, police professionalism and police cultures. It is hoped that in 
providing such a comprehensive review of the literature, the true value and significance 
of the role/s potentially being played by CIs may come to be realised. 
 
2.2 Police, Policing and Criminal Investigation  
 
2.2.1 Early Policing in England and Wales 
The ‘modern’ period in policing history is generally accepted to have been marked 
by ‘a general growth in the bureaucratic regulation of the population’ associated with the 
establishment of the ‘new police’ following the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act in 
182940 (Maguire, 2008: 432). Prior to this legislative reform, policing had been a diffuse 
activity operated via varying auspices and practised by a variety of rudimentary ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ actors. In eighteenth century E&W, policing, investigation and prosecution 
                                                                 
39 Each theory/concept will be discussed and its relevance to the current research explained in turn within 
this chapter. Discussion of Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1971) ‘junior partner’ theory takes place in section 
2.2.5, Bourdieu’s (1990) ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ in section 2.3.4 and Hoogenboom’s (1991) ‘policing complex’ 
in section 2.2.5.  
40 This new policing model was hugely influential and slowly spread throughout the land, culminating in 
the County and Boroughs Police Act 1856, which made the creation of a police service obligatory on all 
the counties and incorporated borough of E&W. 
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were primarily the business of self-governing, responsible local communities and 
individual citizens (Dixon, 1997: 50-51; Stelfox, 2009: 27). Suspicion of central state 
control ensured that the system of law enforcement in place during this period remained 
somewhat ad hoc in nature (Johnston, 1992: 8).  
The Statute of Winchester (1285) formalised and developed a number of established 
mechanisms of policing including the hue and cry and the system of watch and ward 
(otherwise referred to as the night watch system). The night watch system origina l ly 
consisted of unpaid men who served on rotation or by appointment as ‘watchmen’ and 
who patrolled the streets of larger English cities and towns, ‘reporting fires, dealing with 
runaway animals … caring for street lamps and raising a general alarm upon discovering 
criminal activity’ (Winright, 2001: 12). The Statute of Winchester also established the 
‘Office of the Parish Constable’ (for the most part, private citizens who were elected 
annually to serve as part of their civic duty), the bearer of which was responsible for 
organising and supervising the watch. The parish constable was, in effect, the primary 
metropolitan law enforcement agent of the period. In 1326 the ‘Office of Justice of the 
Peace’ was created to assist the Shire reeve in controlling the county. Eventually, justices 
of the peace - individuals elected or appointed by constituents of a county to keep the 
peace - took on judicial functions in addition to their role as peace keepers. ‘The local 
constable became the operational assistant to the justice of the peace, supervising the 
night watchmen, investigating offences, serving summonses, executing warrants and 
securing prisoners’. This system helped delineate the relationship between police and the 
judiciary, which has continued for more than 600 years. In keeping with the notion of the 
populace policing themselves during this period, from the latter half of the seventeenth 
century onwards, individuals could also be sworn in by the King as ‘Special constables’ 
to aid in the quelling of public disorder, later emerging as the more generalist volunteer 
organisation which still exists today. 
In addition to these early ‘public’ forms of policing, most of which were unpaid posts 
considered civic responsibilities rather than professions41, ‘private’ and profitable forms 
were also in routine operation by the seventeenth century. Some of these can be seen as 
developments of older, unpaid mechanisms of policing. For example, by the mid -
                                                                 
41 Justices of the peace did however charge fees and constables could reclaim costs incurred during their 
year of service (Johnston, 1992: 8) 
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eighteenth century, the parochial night watches had (in wealthier parts of London at least) 
become tantamount to professional law enforcement agencies, operating essentially as a 
fully paid, private force (Beattie, 2012: 2) (largely the result of the growing tendency of 
wealthy citizens paying deputies to serve in their place on the watch42). This was also 
similarly the case with some parish constables (Dixon, 1997: 53-4; Beattie, 2012: 2) who, 
prior to 1829, within many villages, were being paid via levied tax money and in some 
cities, effectively emerged as paid enforcers of the law43.  
Alongside these semi-public forms, new forms of private, monied police also gradually 
gained footing within the emerging policing market. These ‘private’ policing actors were 
able to profit both legally and criminally from the lack of formal police organisation and 
in the period prior to the formation of the new police, the market for private gain in crime 
control was ‘extensive, innovative and elastic’ and ‘driven by the provision of rewards, 
immunities and exceptions’ (McMullen, 1996: 89). Men known as ‘thief-takers’ were 
private police agents - not entirely dissimilar from the bounty hunters of the Wild West - 
who policed for profit rather than civic duty or public spirit. Engaged in the business of 
detection and prosecution, these individuals were prepared to recover stolen property for 
a reward announced by the town crier (Rawlings, 2002). They were ‘universally corrupt, 
taking profits not only from catching and informing on criminals but also from theft, 
receiving stolen property, intimidation, perjury and blackmail’ (Siegel, 2010: 201). Since 
thief-takers also routinely paid indigents to thieve so as to claim the reward for the 
apprehension of stolen goods, systems of rewards (including statutory rewards after 1689 
when Parliament introduced a reward of £40 for the conviction of offenders charged with 
offences causing public anxiety - robbery on the highways and the streets of London, 
burglary and coining (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 16)) served only to exasperate 
the problem (Dodsworth, 2004: 207).  
As Zedner (2006: 84) discusses, ‘In some areas, thief-takers enjoyed a virtual monopoly 
of policing, protected by their clients and effectively licenced by the manipulation of 
pardons and rewards to determine which thieves enjoyed immunity and which did not’. 
Such was their power that, as Rock (1983: 214) observes, ‘they appeared to engage in the 
                                                                 
42 The duties of the Watch were onerous and unpaid and householders had to undertake the duty alongside 
their usual employment. 
43 Emsley (1996) also notes how, in London, the formalisation of patrols and the use of paid officers 
occurred over the course of the eighteenth century. 
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business of wholesale crime-farming, carefully reaping the profits from cultivated areas 
of rule breaking’. Moreover, as Johnston (1992: 8) has noted, it was also common for 
justices of the peace to encourage victims ‘to seek out intermediaries to recover their 
property’. Furthermore, ‘the state’s trade in warrants and pardons linked the judiciary to 
the private thief-taking sector’, in effect, an early form of public-private partnership in 
crime control or, to take a more cynical view, an early version of the ‘commerc ia l 
compromise of the state’’ (Johnston, 1992: 8). Policing and justice pre-1829 according to 
Rock (1983: 203) came to manifest as ‘a market place in which an elaborate trading 
economy developed’ (Rock, 1983: 203) and in many respects, can be considered not 
entirely dissimilar to that arrangement which exists today (Zedner, 2006). 
This pluralised, multifaceted arrangement continued until the consolidation of modern, 
‘professional’ policing in the form of  ‘new police’ in 1829 when Peel made policing the 
statutory responsibility of the state (this is not to say that other forms did not persist) 44. 
Commentators have differed in their interpretations of the history and development of 
policing and the police in E&W and can generally be located within one of three broad 
categories. Orthodox ‘liberal’ theorists (Critchley, 1978; Reith, 1956) view rising crime 
rates - and to a lesser extent public disorder - during the period of the industr ia l 
revolution45 as the principal causal antecedent for the formation of Peel’s new police in 
1829; ‘professional policing’ by this view, was allowed to emerge in the interests of all 
members of society. However, in contrast to this rather ‘cop-sided’ view, revisionist 
historians/theorists (Brogden, 1982; Hay, 1975; Storch, 1975) emphasise the motive for 
police reform as being ‘the maintenance of order by the capitalist class’ (Reiner, 2010: 
51) whose control over policing enabled them to ensure that the attention of the police 
was directed at all areas which threatened to disrupt it, ‘crime, riots, political dissidence 
                                                                 
44 Older parochial mechanisms of policing continued to exist alongside the ‘new police’ in London and in 
other parts of the country post 1829. Regional police forces only began to take form after the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835 and later County Police Act 1839. It was only by 1856 following the passing of the 
County and Borough Police Act of the same year that all counties were obliged to organise their own police 
force marking the start of the modern police service (Hart, 1955). 
45 The advent of industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation in the late eighteenth and into the early 
nineteenth centuries, transformed the means through which policing was delivered. Within agrarian 
societies which typified the majority of towns and villages pre-revolution, values which are important to a 
community were generally maintained through community vigilance alongside a range of informal 
sanctions ranging from public rebuke to ostracism (Becker and Dutelle, 2013: 4), and were ensured by low 
levels of transience. However, processes of urbanisation and industrialisation encouraged the movement of 
individuals, seeking employment, across county borders and into the inner cities, many of which developed 
into industrial centres. Lenski, Lenski and Nolan (1991) note that such transience destroyed the 
effectiveness of kinship groups that had up until this point ensured a modicum of social and moral order 
was maintained within individual communities. 
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and public morality’ (Reiner, 2010: 51). As Storch (1976) discusses, it was in this latter 
sense that police officers came to be depicted as ‘domestic missionaries’ whose purpose 
was to coach the behaviour and moral habits of the proletariat46. Nevertheless, generally 
speaking, it was the law enforcement and order maintenance functions that continued to 
be considered the core activities of the new ‘Bobbies’. While both orthodox and 
revisionist models provide useful insight into the history and development of 
contemporary policing, neither interpretation offers a once-and-for-all means of 
understanding police development; a ‘neo-Reithian-revisionist synthesis’ model has since 
been advanced by scholars such as Reiner (2010) in response to this issue. Reiner argues 
that a better interpretation lies somewhere between these two opposing perspectives: 
whereas the Reithians ‘neglect the implication of the police in the structural conflicts 
associated with particular relationships of class and privilege’ (1985: 34), the revisionists 
‘pushed aside the aspects of policing concerned with universal interests in social order, 
cohesion and protection’ (Reiner, 2010: 57). In reality, both interpretations are likely to 
be correct to some extent.  
 
2.2.2 The Evolution of the Investigative Function 
 
As Beattie (2006: 15) discusses, ‘of the two crime-fighting functions of policing 
- surveillance on the one hand, detection and prosecution on the other - only the first has 
had a long history in England’. Order maintenance and crime prevention through 
coordinated street patrol was indeed the primary orientation of the new police in 1829 
(Emsley, 1996). Beyond this, constables called to the scene of a crime or watchmen 
coming upon an offence in progress could be called upon to assist the victim in 
apprehending the offenders and taking them before a magistrate. But as Beattie (2006: 
15) discusses:  
‘…there were severe limits as to the help victims of crime could expect to receive 
from such officials … Such men were never likely to take more on themselves 
than custom demanded, and neither they nor the night-watchmen had ever been 
expected to provide more than immediate help to victims of property crime or 
violence’.  
 
                                                                 
46 Indeed, in this pre-industrialised society the police gradually came to adopt a broader ‘service’ function 
which included the inspection of nuisances, dairies, contagious diseases, explosives and bridges (Jones and 
Newburn, 1998: 6), the operation of fire and ambulance services (Critchely, 1978) and, most notably, the 
‘knocking up’ of people for work (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 6). 
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There was therefore no expectation that such officials would help victims to identify, 
locate and apprehend perpetrators; ‘In a system of prosecution that depended 
fundamentally of the energy and resources of the private citizen, detective work was very 
much left to the victim’ (Beattie, 2006: 15).  
 
As was the case with the policing function more generally, in the late seventeenth century, 
responsibility for criminal investigation gradually began to shift away from the 
community and into the hands of dedicated semi-professionals with the required know-
how and authority. Concern over rising crime and a growing recognition of the limitat ions 
of existing responses47  paved the way for the first small unit of plain-clothes semi-
professional detectives known as the ‘Bow Street Runners’ and furthered the argument 
that the best deterrence for crime was the certainty of speedy detection (Birzer and 
Roberson, 2012; Gaskill, 2000; King, 2000; Rawlings, 2002). Eager to rid themselves of 
the reward payment system and the significant and thus, unpredictable costs involved in 
this, the Pelham administration (1743-1754) looked to Henry Fielding and his men for a 
solution. Essentially the first quasi-official48, semi-public funded thief-takers, the ‘Bow 
Street men’ were availab le for private hire by victims, but also acted as state-sponsored 
officials who could be sent to locate and apprehend offenders at no cost to the victim 
when judged by Fielding to be in the public interest (Beattie, 2012: 3). Nevertheless, the 
combination of state payment and private rewards allowed for some level of income 
security, encouraging continuous and permanent service amongst the Runners (Beattie, 
2006). The relative success49  of the Bow Street Runners undoubtedly served as the 
guiding principle for the way policing was to develop over the next eighty years; Bow 
Street was a manifestation of the move towards increasing professionalisation and state 
control of street life. 
 
                                                                 
47 Henry Fielding expressed strong views with regard to the causes of and potential solutions to the ‘crime 
wave’ which plagued the eighteenth century, views he expressed most notably in a pamphlet published in 
1751 entitled ‘An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers’. In this wide ranging publication, 
Fielding most notably criticised the way the criminal law was administered (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 
2006: 17). 
48 The Bow Street Runners were formally attached to the Magistrates Office. 
49  Sampson Wright said in 1783 that the Runners had been ‘enabled to procure a very comfortable 
livelihood and with reputation to themselves and benefit to the public’ (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 
23). 
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The reign of the Runners in Bow Street and in the half-dozen other offices run by 
stipendiary magistrates created in the years following the Middlesex Justices Act 179250 
continued with relative proficiency during the period prior to the arrival of the new police. 
While the establishment of the ‘new police’ from 1829 was clearly a deliberate break 
from past arrangements, it did not overnight introduce fresh or standard levels of 
investigative expertise. The Runners continued to function for a period alongside Peel’s 
‘Bobbies’51  (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 4) and even at the moment of their 
abolition at the end of the 1830s ‘there were no serious plans on the table for any detective 
establishment within the Metropolitan Police’ (2006: 4).  Indeed, it was some thirteen 
years later (1842) before the first small unit of ‘professional’ detectives emerged in the 
Metropolitan police (Mattassa and Newburn, 2007: 43), although there is evidence of a 
detective branch in Birmingham earlier, in 1839 (Morris, 2007; Wade, 2007). This delay 
owed much to the association between ‘detective work’ and that of the agent provocateurs 
and informers associated with the feared continental-style policing (Ascoli, 1979; 
Critchley, 1978; Emsley, 2005: 241). This same concern meant that expansion of the plain 
clothes detective department was slow (Emsley, 2005: 241). However, growing concern 
over rising street crime during the 1870s alongside popular media coverage of a number 
of sensational murder cases which highlighted the deficiencies of the current 
uncoordinated, preventative system helped secure a more substantial and autonomous 
CID in 1877 within the Metropolitan police consisting of over 250 detectives52 (Matassa 
and Newburn, 2007: 43). This was gradually followed by the development of similar 
plain-clothes units in the counties. 
 
Despite early years blighted by scandal - a time when three out of four Chief Inspectors 
of the detective branch were found guilty of corruption53 (Ascoli, 1979: 143-6; Hobbs, 
                                                                 
50 The Middlesex Justices Act 1792 created seven additional ‘public offices’ which were modelled on Bow 
Street and also introduced an administrative system that has left a complete run of financial accounts 
(Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 20-21). 
51 Even in the years which followed the formation of the first plain clothes detective units within the new 
police, private sector detectives continued to work (as they do today) alongside the public police, 
conducting inter alia surveillance work for divorce cases following the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 which 
amended the law of divorce making it an option for more people than was previously the case. 
52 The 1842 murder of an unnamed woman by Daniel Good in London and the media coverage associated 
with the case which highlighted the failure of the police to capture the suspect has been cited as a catalyst 
for the more formal establishment of a detective branch (cf Flanders, 2011: 144-145; Wade, 2007: 19-20). 
This case in particular very clearly pointed to the shortcomings of the preventative system and the lack of 
specialists (Wade, 2007). 
53 The Turf Fraud Scandal 1877 also known as ‘The Trial of the Detectives’ exposed the corrupt practices 
of a number of senior police officers (Moss and Skinner, 2013) and also led to the appointment of Sir 
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1988) - centralised crime investigation rapidly emerged as a major plank of the policing 
agenda, with the CID quickly establishing itself as the ‘owner’ of its core elements, these 
being the identification and questioning of suspects and the construction of case files. As 
Maguire (2008: 432) discusses, ‘senior CID officers took every opportunity to portray 
detectives as possessing a monopoly on expertise in these areas and to free themselves of 
any ‘interference’ or control by the uniform branch’. These early organisational and 
cultural divisions were furthered by the emergence of specialist squads and the 
subsequent development of expertise in certain areas of investigative police work, some 
key examples including currency fraud, obscene publications and art and antique thefts 
(Morris, 2007: 23). In later years, threats against the establishment, believed to be from 
the American-based Fenian Brotherhood who acted in support of an independent Irish 
Republic (Wade, 2007: 70), saw the swift launch of the Irish Bureau, which became the 
Special Irish Branch and eventually, the Special Branch in 1881-3. This further separated 
the detectives and created additional specialism within detection in the form of an early 
anti-terrorism unit.  The development of specialist units was not only important as a key 
strategy for dealing with ‘crime epidemics’ in the modern state as Rawlings (2002: 21) 
rightly notes, but was also significant for its use in extending the reach and influence of 
the CID and, also, for helping to secure the CID’s claim to unrivalled proficiency in 
investigation. Technological advancements at the start of the nineteenth century, 
including the development of an effective fingerprinting system and the establishment of 
the Criminal Records Office (both in 1801), were something of a milestone for the 
investigatory process and further helped to facilitate the trend towards specialisation and 
professionalism in investigation (Hobbs, 1988: 43) and, in turn, helped to consolidate the 
CID’s monopoly over the investigative function. 
 
The tendency of the CID to distinguish themselves from their uniformed counterparts 
progressively led to ‘a divided force’ (Hobbs, 1988: 41) with rigidly defined functions - 
a ‘firm within a firm’ (Emsley, 1996: 72-72).  In his short history of the police, Rawlings 
(2002: 176) concludes that such real and imagined structural, operational and cultura l 
differences stem from the fact that the investigative function undertaken by detectives, 
‘did not fit easily into the idea of preventative policing in which crime was deterred by 
arrests for petty offences and by the presence of uniformed officers on the street’. Instead, 
                                                                 
Howard Vincent as director of the new CID in 1878 which was established following reorganisation of the 
detective branch following the trials. 
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detectives were secretive and bargained for information by paying informants or by 
ignoring minor breaches in the law. Moreover, while in theory uniformed officers were 
supposed to be detached from the communities they policed, the reverse was true for 
detectives whose work often required them to circulate within the criminal underworld 
(Hobbs, 1988). The distinction between the detectives and their uniformed colleagues was 
bolstered by a number of highly celebrated cases and the arrival of popular fictiona l 
characters that began to emerge as public interest in forensic enquiry and murder 
narratives increased during the period. This new fascination stemmed largely from the 
popularity of ‘penny dreadful’ magazines as well as publications such as Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s ‘Sherlock Holmes’ which helped stimulate public interest in the idea of the police 
as a professional force of men in pursuit. It was this same ideal which helped to 
simultaneously raise the profile of the investigator as a ‘gifted individual’ and helped to 
consolidate the hegemony of the detective.  
 
The notion of the investigator as possessing a talent or flair for the role is something 
which has framed the process of criminal investigation for much of its history. It is an 
idea which stems from the long-held tradition of detective skill being learned, almost 
exclusively, through practice and the wisdom of experienced investigators (Monckton-
Smith et al., 2013: 5). Pragmatism and informal apprenticeship ruled the early years of 
the CID and resistance to formal detective training continued well into the twentieth 
century54: it was not until 1938 that a formal training structure for detectives was first 
introduced (ibid). The success of detectives in their resistance to formal training was in 
large part due to perceptions of the nature of crime during the period, as then Chief Police 
Commissioner Edmund Henderson put it:  
 
‘The real practical fact is that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred cases of 
crime, the detection is most humdrum work, and it only requires just ordinary 
care and intelligence. You do not want a high class mind to do it at all’ 
(Metropolitan Police, 1878: Q 5251).  
 
                                                                 
54 In 1919 the Desborough Committee report - the first major review of policing since the 1850s - which 
recommended against the provision of specialist training for detectives on the basis that such requirement  
might ‘adequately be met by experience and practical work’ (Desborough 1919-20: Part II, para. 115). 
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Nevertheless, the notion of investigation as an artisan craft continued to be promoted 
through the memoirs of officers whose growing self-consciousness as a distinct 
occupational group helped to delineate the investigative function as a specialist field. 
 
However, the increasingly complex nature of crime and necessary responses to it has 
encouraged a fundamental shift in both the role of investigation and of the police 
investigator. While the core role of the police - ‘bringing offenders to justice’ - arguably 
remains, in more recent decades social, structural and technological changes have served 
to both significantly alter the policing landscape and broaden the aims of the investiga t ive 
function. Victim care, community reassurance, intelligence gathering, disruption of 
criminal networks and the management of crime risks are also now seen as fundamenta l 
objectives of the process. Further to this and, as Stelfox (2009: 2) notes, ‘all of these 
developments have increased the complexity of the task of criminal investigation and 
mean that those who engage in it require high levels of professional competence if they 
are to perform their role effectively’. This realisation alongside developments in science 
and technology (in particular DNA profiling and forensics), changes in legislation and 
the general need for the process of investigation to be more effective both functiona lly 
and in terms of cost and resources, has encouraged further specialisation and the broad 
development of a pluralised, ‘multi-agency’ policing model which now dominates across 
E&W. Within this increasingly fragmented organisational context, those individuals now 
working within the contemporary CID are involved in the business of professiona l 
investigation which may or may not require specialist skills and/or knowledge, much of 
which is often not the preserve of the warranted police detective (e.g. crime analysts, 
scene of crime officers etc.). 
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2.2.3 The Police and Policing 
 
‘A cardinal principle for the understanding of police organisation and activity 
is that the police are only one amongst many agencies of social control’ 
(Banton, 1964: 1). 
 
 
Policing is an aspect of formal social control which has been variously defined by 
those who have sought clarification of this complex and highly contested term. For Reiner 
(2010: 5), policing can be best defined as ‘a set of activities aimed at preserving the 
security of a particular social order’. Button (2002: 7) similarly refers to policing as ‘a 
function of society that contributes to a particular social order that is carried out by a 
variety of different bodies and agents’. While diverging somewhat in their opinion on the 
extent to which policing preserves and/or contributes to existing patterns of social 
ordering, both definitions are clear in their assertion of the relative distinctness of policing 
as a specific form of the analytically vague concept of social control. They both also 
demonstrate recognition of the variety of styles of provision and range of individuals who 
may be collectively and variously engaged in its delivery. As Reiner (2010: 5-6) 
discusses: 
 
‘Policing may be done by a variety of agents: professionals employed by the 
state in an organization with an omnibus policing mandate … or by state 
agencies with primarily other purposes … Police may be professionals employed 
by specialist private policing firms - contract security - or security employees of 
an organisation whose main business is something else - in-house security … 
Policing functions may be performed by citizens in a voluntary capacity within 
state police organizations … or in completely independent bodies (such as the 
Guardian Angels and the many vigilante bodies which have flourished at many 
times and places …) Policing may be carried out by state bodies with other prime 
functions, such as the Army, or by employees (state or private) as an adjunct of 
their main job (such as concierges or bus conductors). Policing may be carried 
out by technology, such as CCTV cameras … [or] may be designed into the 
architecture and furniture of streets and buildings … All these policing strategies 
are proliferating today, even though it is only the state agency with the omnibus 
mandate of order maintenance that is popularly understood by the label ‘the 
police’’. 
 
 
The origins of the term ‘police’ are traceable back to the early 18 th century French school 
of thought on order and governance and also, to the ‘police science’ (Polizeiwissenschaft ) 
movement which developed in Prussia during the late 17th and 18th centuries with the aim 
of maintaining and promoting the happiness and prosperity of the population and 
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furthering the public good (Brodeur, 2010; Napoli, 2003). This older notion preceded the 
arrival of what has been popularly termed modern policing, this being the point at which 
the idea began to be intimately associated with the exercise of state authority and linked 
with the activities of the public police; a socially recognised body of personnel charged 
with undertaking specific functions and ascribed specific powers to aid them in their 
undertakings. As detailed previous in this chapter, the birth of the modern police in E&W 
occurred following the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 which was largely 
ushered in by Sir Robert Peel. Subsequent to this, the term ‘police’ has largely tended to 
be used when making reference to the public police: ‘the body of men and women 
employed by the state who patrol the streets, deal with crime, ensure order and who 
undertake a range of other social service-type functions’ (Button, 2002: 6). While an 
activity which, for many, is considered to be synonymous with law enforcement and the 
roles, responsibilities and processes of the police, it is important to draw a clear distinc t ion 
between policing as a process and broader social control phenomena and the police as an 
organisation. This is not least because policing is now (and always has been) a process of 
preventing and detecting crime and maintaining order which may be engaged in by any 
number of state and non-state agencies and individuals (Crawford, 2011: 147-176) and 
which, as an activity, may also take markedly different forms across time and place 
(Bayley, 1985, 1994; Reiner, 2010). 
 
For the most part, the distinctiveness of the public police from other organised forms of 
policing is widely recognised to lie not in their performance of social control functions or 
the fact that they are agents of the state, but rather in their capacity and/or authority to use 
‘coercive force in situations where its use is unavoidably necessary’ (Bittner, 1970: 122). 
While it is true that not all police work involves the use of force (e.g. the use of handcuffs, 
batons or firearms to physically restrain or incapacitate an individual), it is the threat of 
force and the capacity of the police constable to engage in its legitimate use which 
undoubtedly exists as a central tenet and defining feature of the police’s authority. While 
it is important to note that a range of non-police public and private individuals and 
organisations have also always been entitled to employ force in certain circumstances 
(e.g. parents, landowners and private security firms) the defining characteristic of the 
police remains that they alone are ‘equipped, entitled and required to deal with every 
exigency in which force may have to be used’ (Bittner, 1974: 35; see Manning, 2003: 33-
43 
 
43 for further discussion)55. Building upon Bittner’s thesis, Brodeur (2007: 34) suggests 
that while this may have been the best understanding of the role of police during the 
period in which he was writing, Bittner’s definition fails to sufficiently capture the 
assortment of policing agencies and the scope of extra-legality56 in policing. It is in this 
vein that Brodeur (2010: 130) draws attention to the role of ‘policing agents’ who, he 
argues, may be better defined as being ‘part of several connected organisations authorised 
to use in more or less controlled ways diverse means, generally prohibited by statute or 
regulation to the rest of the population’. 
 
While enduring in their importance to the study of the police function and policing more 
generally (Reiner, 2015), - providing tangible ‘benchmarks’ for further critical enquiry - 
such classic studies in the early sociology of policing tended to follow the tradition of 
analysing what policing is in terms of what constabularies do and it is only more recently 
that this tradition has begun to change. Since the 1960s scholarly attention has gradually 
directed its focus towards the police and more recently, policing. A growing desire to 
both understand and theorise the nature of the police role and police culture has since 
allowed for the rapid expansion of both the sociology of the police and sociology for the 
police (Banton, 1964). Early work by Banton (1964), Cain (1973) and Smith and Gray 
(1983) arguably set the parameters for much of the subsequent discussion on the police 
and policing. Banton’s (1964) classic study, ‘The Policemen in the Community’, was the 
first major attempt to explore the world and work of officers operating on the frontline in 
the fight against crime. In his study, Banton compared the police he observed in 
Edinburgh with a department in North Carolina and drew an important distinct ion 
between the police as ‘law enforcers’ and ‘peace keepers’. Wherever possible, the latter 
would use their discretion to keep the peace and maintain order without recourse to legal 
sanctions. In doing so, the officers would use words and wisdom to communicate with 
the people and act in accordance more with the norms and values of the policed 
                                                                 
55 While not seeking an all-encompassing definition of policing, Bittner’s conceptualisation of the police 
role helps delineate what is distinctive about the contribution of public constabularies to policing. ‘It is the 
fact that the police are available to deal with all manner of emergencies [and their legal capacity in which 
to do so] that sets them apart from other bodies concerned with law enforcement’ (Jones and Newburn, 
1998: 13). 
56 For example, the majority of stop and searches carried out by the public police and searches carried out 
by private security guards operating on private property are of a consensual nature (Button, 2007: 38) and 
thus require no recourse to legislative powers (providing, of course, that such powers have been legally  
bestowed upon the individual enforcer). Private security officers may also be afforded various other rights 
of property owners and employers, one of the most common being wheel-clamping which takes place on 
the private property of many organisations (Button, 2007: 41). 
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community than the rule of law. It is in this sense that popular perceptions and politica l 
rhetoric about the roles and responsibilities of the police have tended to vary over time, 
fluctuating between the idea of the police with a primary function of enforcing the 
criminal law and the idea of the police as a public service. Subsequent work by Cain 
(1973, 1979) - which was heavily influenced by Banton - also sought to explore the 
functional definitions of police work, arguing that the police ought to be defined in terms 
of their key practice - the maintenance of order57. In contrast to the developing body of 
work which focused on the police function in the early years (what the police do), work 
by Bittner (1974) rather focused on what he considered the more realistic aim58  of 
conceptualising the police’s role in terms of the legal capacity of officers and their 
inclusive occupational remit: 
 
‘…the police are empowered and required to impose or, as the case may be, 
coerce a provisional solution upon emergent problems without having to brook 
or defer to opposition of any kind, and that further, their competence to intervene 
extends to every kind, and that further, without any exceptions whatever. This 
and this alone is what the existence of the police uniquely provided, and it is on 
this basis that they may be required to do the work of thief-catchers and of nurses, 
depending on the occasion’ (Bittner, 1974: 18).  
 
 
In reflection of the apparently increasingly complex divis ion of labour, recent years have 
witnessed a marked shift in focus towards studies which allow for the fact that in practice, 
policing has always been done by ‘others’ in addition to the police. The sociology of 
policing has emerged as ‘a popular framework through which the ‘policing’ activities of 
public, private and other policing agencies can be considered, without automatica l ly 
distinguishing public from non-public bodies’ (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 18). Recent 
years have indeed seen much greater attention paid to the role played by private security 
and to the range of ‘hybrid’ policing providers that operate somewhere between the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres (cf Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Jones 
                                                                 
57 Understandings of the central role of the police vary considerably between time and space and, generally 
speaking, tend to exist somewhat dubiously in accordance with perceptions about the roles and 
responsibilities of the police as an organisation with the primary function of enforcing the criminal law or 
as a public service (as part of their role the police are routinely required to deal with a diverse range of 
tasks, from quietening noisy neighbours to investigating murders (Bayley, 1996; Cain, 1973)). 
58 Bittner argued against defining the police in terms of their functional role within society (compared to 
that of other organisations/agents whose primary function is also law enforcement (e.g. h ealth inspectors, 
truant officers  etc.) in that the ‘potential’ duties of police officers are so broad that ‘it compels the stronger 
inference that no human problem exists, or is imaginable, about which it could be said with finality that this 
certainly could not become the proper business of the police’ (Bittner, 1974: 250). 
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and Newburn, 1998; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; South, 1988). Much of this work has 
emerged in acknowledgment of the failing legitimacy of public constabularies and, as 
Reiner (2010: 256) notes, the growing recognition that ‘police and policing cannot deliver 
on the great expectations now placed on them in terms of crime control’. 
 
Given the wide variety of activities and processes which may be variously located under 
the broad remit of ‘policing’ (if understood in the most general sense of the term - the 
public police organisation being included within this conceptualisation), providing a 
definition of ‘policing’ which satisfies all of the relevant ambits remains highly 
problematic. This issue cannot be resolved by recourse to ‘social control’ which remains 
an inherently analytically vague concept, nor can it be solved through the notion of 
policing as including all order maintenance and rule enforcement, including the most 
informal as well as those whose primary focus is to enforce the law. With this in mind 
and drawing upon existing definitions provided by Button (2002: 6) and Bittner (1970: 
122) in this thesis the term ‘police’ is used when referring to the body of men and women 
(warranted and non-warranted) who work for (and may be employed by) the centrally 
organised, state-located institution commonly referred to as ‘the police’, who (if 
warranted) are bestowed with the power to use ‘coercive force’ force and ‘who patrol the 
streets, deal with crime, ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-
type functions’. Similarly, in this thesis ‘policing’ is conceived as a specific form of social 
control and, in keeping with the definition offered by Jones and Newburn (1998: 18-19), 
is defined as ‘those organised forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or law 
enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and 
associated information-brokering - which may involve a conscious exercise of coercive 
power - undertaken by individuals or organisations, where such activities are viewed by 
them and/or others as a central or key defining part of their purpose’. 
 
2.2.4 Plural Policing and the ‘New Sociology of Policing’  
As alluded to in the previous section (2.2.3), the birth of the public police is widely 
accepted to have signalled the point at which policing came to be firmly located within 
the functions of the state, a development which is widely acknowledged to have given 
rise to the fallacy that the police alone are responsible for the provision of crime control 
and order maintenance. Reiner (2010: 3) devised the term ‘police fetishism’ to describe 
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the willingness with which modern society has ascribed to, ‘the ideological assumption 
that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force 
chaos would ensue’. It is this popular conception that has led ‘policing’ to be for the most 
part, synonymously linked to the activities of the state-located public police (Cain, 1979) 
and the special powers they bring to the task (Bittner, 1980). Such a preoccupation with 
‘issues relating to the administration of security and justice by states’ (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003: 10) resulted in the relative neglect of analysis of the governing 
capabilities of miscellaneous forms of non-state policing (including many of the pre-
existing forms of self-regulation, community-based systems of order and justice and 
private policing provisions (Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2002)). However, over the past 
three decades or so there have been a number of notable changes in the character and 
texture of policing in the UK that have served to obscure the pattern of delivery of policing 
and security.  
 
Most obviously, recent decades have seen explicit reference to ‘plural policing’ and 
‘policing beyond the police’ (Crawford et al., 2005) as the state has seemingly sought to 
detach itself from matters of policing and security. Spurred on by a growing realisation 
that much of the research conducted on the subject of policing has not reflected the wide 
diversity of bodies engaged in this process (Johnston, 2000; Reiner, 2010), the fashion 
for what has been termed ‘late modern policing’ has sought to illustrate the significance 
of the role played by ‘others’. While debates continue about the extent to which recent 
changes in the patterns of policing (namely the growing plurality of providers) can be 
considered truly transformational or epochal in nature (Brodeur, 2010; Jones and 
Newburn, 1995, 2002; Zedner, 2006), they are nonetheless suggestive of the fact that 
some kind of change has indeed occurred. Generally speaking, state institutions are now 
more accepting of their limitations and consciously acknowledge (and in some instances 
encourage) the potential contribution of non-police providers in their varying forms (e.g. 
the general public, commercial bodies, voluntary sector etc.). As Newburn (2007: 230) 
illustrates, ‘put most simply, if there was a period when it was possible to assume that 
policing was largely provided by state agents, that time has passed for good’.  
 
While few would deny that the state’s monopoly on matters of policing and security has 
always been something of a myth - albeit a powerful one - it is only in more recent decades 
that this myth has come to be revealed. Cohen (1989: 353) noted that in privileging the 
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formal state apparatus of social control we had collectively ‘bullied ourselves (and others) 
into thinking social control is synonymous with state control’. Without doubt, a key 
driving force behind the growing pluralisation of policing has been the inability of the 
police to maintain the levels of public satisfaction and legitimacy enjoyed by the 
organisation during the ‘golden years’ of the 1960s - a period in which ‘policing by 
consent is said to have been achieved to the maximal degree it is ever attainable’ (Reiner, 
2010: 70). Generally speaking, recent developments in policing and crime control can 
and have been controversially viewed more broadly as the direct outcome of the changing 
relationship between society, state and the police where the state’s traditional monopoly 
of power has been severely eroded by societal change, growing insecurity and 
consequential failing police legitimacy (Reiner, 2010). It is this crisis of legitimacy 
according to scholars such as Bayley and Shearing (1996: 587) that has given rise to the 
‘general recognition that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by 
the police’.  
  
This same rationale has also given birth to the ‘desacralisation thesis’ (Loader and 
Mulcahy, 2003) in which some commentators have subscribed to the view that the public 
police now operate within a ‘permanent crisis of legitimation’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 
2003: 6). A once seemingly ‘Teflon service’ (Reiner 2010: 67), the police have been 
forced to relinquish their strong tradition of ‘constabulary independence’ (Savage, 2003: 
172: 3) whereby the organisation has remained impervious to reforms set forth by earlier 
governments59 to remain a powerful political and cultural force. Accompanied by a long 
standing and exaggerated belief that the state and the state alone is able to deal effective ly 
in matters of crime control - what Felson (2002: 3) calls the ‘cops-and-courts fallacy’ - 
the legitimacy of the police has gradually been eroded. This, it can be argued, is the direct 
result of a range of important and interrelated factors. First, rising crime rates during the 
post war period led to a rapidly emerging ‘demand gap’ (Maguire and John, 1995) in 
policing in which the demand for service significantly outpaced any increase in the 
resources available to the police. Coupled with the decline of the visible face of policing 
from the mid-1960s onwards, this has had a marked impact on public confidence in the 
                                                                 
59 The limited implementation of the ‘Sheehy Report’ (1993) (its official title being, ‘Inquiry into Police 
Responsibilities and Rewards’), which, amongst other things, sought to introduce performance-related pay, 
cuts in overtime and fixed-term contracts, provides one example of the resilience of the police organisation 
which continued well into the late twentieth century. However, it should also be noted that the then 
Conservative government did not drive through all of the reforms to the degree that they perhaps could 
have due largely to the help the police provided during the miners’ strikes in the 1980s. 
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police’s ability to police. Increased pressure for service on the police also encouraged the 
gradual decline in preventative patrol and later, also saw the visible drop in numbers of 
‘Bobbies on the beat’. 
 
Second, the politicisation of crime during the 1970s coupled with the rise of mass media 
over the last fifty years or so (Reiner, 2010: 177) has helped raise the salience of crime, 
‘institutionalising’ public concern and bringing awareness and thus, fear of crime60 into 
people’s everyday lives. As Van Steden and Jones (2010: 294) discuss, populist anxiet ies 
about crime and victimisation have since emerged in many ways as a proxy for the diverse 
range of social angsts ‘such as dog dirt in the street, Islamic fundamentalism, unruly 
youngsters, to uncertainties about the future’.  
 
Third, the emergence of numerous highly discrediting cases and high profile instances of 
police malpractice in E&W (Cox, Shirley and Short, 1977; McAlary, 1994; Scarman, 
1982) have drawn attention to the failure of the police to adequately meet the needs and 
expectations of an increasingly diverse and multicultural populace. The murder of 
Stephen Lawrence and subsequent ‘Macpherson report’ (1999) famously exposed the 
Metropolitan police as an ‘institutionally racist’ organisation and served to further erode 
the legitimacy and thus, confidence of the English population in the police’s ability to 
deliver adequate and effective policing provision for all.  
 
Finally, since the Second World War, processes of ‘detraditionalisation’, 
‘democratisation’ and ‘desubordination’ are said to have encouraged the emergence of a 
society more willing to scrutinise and question (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) and an 
overall decrease in deference to authority and declining trust in social institutions (Bayley 
and Shearing, 1996; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003), including the police. Together, these 
factors have cumulatively led to an overall decline in public esteem for the police over 
the past 30 years or so (FitzGerald, Hough, Joseph and Qureshi, 2002; Hough, 2007) and 
have proved influential in initiating a fundamental change in the dynamics of police -
public relationships (Reiner, 2010; McLaughlin, 2007; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) and 
thus, the style and texture of contemporary policing provision.  
                                                                 
60 Fear of crime is most frequently and consistently measured by the British Crime Survey (now the Crime 
Survey for E&W). It is important to note that recent research (Farrall, Jackson and Gray, 2006; Jackson, 
Farrall and Gray, 2007) has sought to analyse the nature of such recorded ‘fear’, differentiating between 
everyday worry and a more common diffuse or ambient anxiety about crime. 
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While existing as key precursors to the development of pluralised policing in many 
western democratic countries, much of what has happened in regard to the changing 
socio-economic context of policing and security and the changing role of the nation state 
(Garland, 1996; Jessop, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1995; Strange, 1996) 
can also be more broadly attributed to the arrival of ‘late modernity’. Late modernity is a 
term used (in part) to describe an intensified form of modernity in which globalisa t ion 
and the increased pervasiveness of risk-based thinking are endemic features (Garland, 
2001). Generally speaking, globalisation refers to the increasing interconnectedness of 
nations and practices (Held and McGrew, 2003; Loader and Sparks, 2002) and can be 
defined as ‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power’ (Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999: 16). The term ‘time-space distanciation’ was coined by 
Giddens (1984) to describe the stretching of social systems across space and time and 
declining geographical and spatial constraints. This process has been encouraged at a 
foundational level by innovations in science and communication technologies (e.g. 
television, internet) which have resulted in the world now appearing as a much smaller 
place. Within this increasingly globalised world, the ‘logic of risk’ (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997) has quickly emerged as a pervasive feature and has since assumed a 
dominant position within sociological and criminological theorising61. Beck (1992) and 
Giddens (1990) attribute the shift towards risk based thinking as being reflective of 
contemporary (late modern) dispositions to crime, security and danger in which ‘good’ 
normative ends such as equality or justice cease to be pursued and security - what Beck 
(1992) calls ‘preventing the worst’- becomes the somewhat elusive goal. As noted by Van 
Steden and Jones (2010: 294) ‘the flipside of expanding prosperity and freedom is a 
widespread sense of increasing fragility and insecurity, which manifests itself in demands 
for more security’. 
 
In regard to the developing crime and policing landscape, the pervasiveness of risk based 
thinking and concomitant globalising trends (in particularly ‘hard’ and ‘soft’  
                                                                 
61 Douglas’s (1992) ‘cultural theory of risk’ for example, draws attention to the way in which risk has 
become a ‘way of thinking’ throughout society. 
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technological advancements62 such as commercial air travel and the internet) have all but 
revolutionised the perceived contemporary context of criminality and with it, have 
encouraged a heightened recognition of the need for security and an altogether new and 
increasingly more sophisticated, joined-up and highly skilled response. The technica l 
skills required when dealing with developments such as complex fraud and internet crime, 
the growing threat and increased sophistication of multi-national terrorist groups and the 
unique skills required when dealing with child protection issues are all recent 
developments which have also added to the erosion of the state’s mythical monopoly over 
policing.  The advent of risk based thinking is also a key factor encouraging what has 
been referred to as the broad shift towards the separation of ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ 
policing approaches63 (Bacon, 2011: 233), which built upon early community policing 
models and rudimentary forms of surveillance and use of informants, to promote a more 
strategic approach to policing practice and provision.  
 
A major driver in the shift from a reactive to a proactive approach (and pluralisation of 
policing and the dispersal of responsibilities for crime prevention more generally) has 
been the impact of neo-liberal inspired reforms that have sought ‘to rearticulate the 
relationship between state, market and civil society’ (Crawford, 2011: 152). Neo-
liberalism - referring to the ‘the re-assertion of market disciplines’ (Garland, 2001: 98) 
and resulting in greater economic freedom and greater individual choice for most but not 
all - has contributed to a new variant of managerialism which entered the police lexicon 
in the 1980s and variously encouraged the development of what has come to be  labelled 
as the ‘mixed economy’ of policing, ‘plural policing’, the ‘extended policing family’, 
‘security partnerships’ or ‘policing networks’ (Skinns, 2011: 134). Reiner (1993) suggests 
                                                                 
62 Recent developments in criminal justice technologies may be broadly divided into two categories: hard 
technology (hardware or materials) and soft technology (computer software, information systems). The 
former of these categories incudes new materials, devices, and equipment that can be used to either commit 
crime or prevent and control crime (e.g. CCTV cameras, metal detectors, bullet proof teller windows at 
banks, tasers, mace, lifeline/emergency call mechanisms, new policer weapons, new technology -enhanced 
police patrol cars etc.). On the other hand, the latter of these categories involves the strategic use of 
information to prevent. Soft technology innovations include new software programs, classification systems, 
crime analysis techniques (e.g. predictive policing technology, the development of risk ass essment, and 
threat assessment instruments) and data sharing/ system integration techniques (Byrne and Marx, 2011: 
19). 
63 Generally speaking, this refers to the shift from traditional, reactive, ‘fire-brigade’ style responses to calls 
from the public to a more proactive, intelligence-led approach which promotes targeted operations and the 
development of forward-looking aims. This shift occurred during the 1990’s alongside the more general 
repurposing of punishment from the diagnosing and rehabilitation of individuals to the management of 
offender populations (Feeley and Simon, 1992). 
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that in recent times, a shift in paradigm has occurred with regard to accountability.  
Marshall’s (1978) two models of accountability (the ‘explanatory and cooperative’ and 
the ‘subordinate and obedient’) have largely been abandoned in favour of a mode which 
is best described as ‘calculative and contractual’. Unlike earlier models, the ‘calculat ive 
and contractual’ mode which emerged first during the 1980s, gave precedent to fiscal 
concern, competition and neo-liberal techniques of governance (such as 
‘responsibilisation’64 and auditing). This shift in paradigm was arguably signalled by the 
distribution, in 1983, of ‘Home Office Circular 114 (Manpower, Effectiveness and 
Efficiency in the Police Service) which introduced ‘value for money’ as a key 
consideration, with specific emphasis being placed on the three E’s - economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. As has already been discussed in this section, this, it was soon to be 
revealed, was to be achieved through the introduction of a more vigorous form of 
managerialism - sometimes referred to as ‘hyper-managerialism’ (Jones and Newburn, 
2002).  
 
Together, the various socio-economic and political developments have served to 
markedly alter both the style and nature policing and security provision in E&W and have 
cumulatively allowed for the relocation of responsibility for policing and security within 
‘self-organising, inter-organisational networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 53). The increasingly 
complex nature of late modern criminality coupled with enduring budgetary pressures on 
police spending has, without doubt, encouraged a growing recognition of the need to look 
‘beyond the state’ when it comes to matters of crime control and security:  
 
‘Crime control is ‘beyond the state’ inasmuch as the institutions of the criminal 
justice state are severely limited in their crime control capacities and cannot by 
themselves succeed in the maintenance of ‘law and order’. But it is also 
‘beyond the state’ inasmuch as there are crime control mechanisms operating 
outside the state’s boundaries, and relatively independently of its policies’ 
(Garland, 2001: 123). 
 
 
                                                                 
64 In ‘The Culture of Control’, Garland (2001) introduced the term ‘responsibilisation’ in acknowledgement 
of the (re)discovery of the idea that responsibility for security and crime control, if it is to be truly effective, 
must be distributed amongst the government, non-state actors and organisations. According to Garland , 
such an approach can be best implemented through ‘preventative partnerships’ or a ‘network of more or 
less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the 
criminal justice state’ (Garland, 2001: 124). He suggests this is one of the most important lessons of the 
twentieth century.  
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With regard to the focus of the current study, CIs may be employees of the police 
organisation and thus, are very much within the state. However, as explored in this 
research, budgetary constraints may also have encouraged the recruitment of CIs from 
private security agencies - individuals who work under the direction and supervision of 
the police (state) but who are employees of the private security agencies and in this sense, 
may be considered as existing outside the state. Such complex security arrangements 
within late modern economies has prompted some scholars to adopt new theoretical 
perspectives on policing, variously locating it within the broader frameworks of 
‘regulation’, ‘governance’ and ‘security’ (Braithwaite, 2000, 2008; Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2004; Rhodes, 2007; 
Wood and Dupont, 2006). The provision of policing65  has now widely come to be 
understood as taking place as part of the broader ‘governance of security’66 (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003) and is recognised as a more general form of social control which may 
also be effected by any number of agencies, organisations and individuals as part of an 
ever-growing extended policing family (Crawford and Lister, 2004; Crawford 2013). The 
concept of ‘nodal governance’ has emerged as commentators such as Shearing (2001) 
seek to take account of and examine the current late modern policing landscape and the 
need to look beyond the apparatus of the state and towards the increasingly diverse 
‘network of power’ in policing and security (Castells, 1997: 304). This network of power 
extends responsibility for matters relating to the provision of policing and security beyond 
direct provision (and supervision) by institutions of national and local government to a 
host of ‘others’67. Advocates of the nodal governance theory recognise that citizens are 
‘governed by different sets of state and non-state agencies according to the rules and 
standards that are set by both state and non-state auspices’ (Shearing, 2001: 217). 
According to this perspective no set of nodes is given conceptual priority; this ‘networked 
model’ presupposes a level of integration, co-operation and co-ordination between the 
                                                                 
65 As was discussed in Chapter One (section, 1.2.3) and in the current chapter (section 2.2.3), the rhetoric 
of ‘policing’ is now more broadly understood as a process through which crime is both detected and 
prevented and order maintained (Mawby, 2008: 17). 
66 Johnston and Shearing (2003) introduced the term ‘security governance’ in an attempt to counter what 
they view as the ‘state-centred strait jacket’ in which policing has been unduly placed. 
67 For example, as Loader (2000: 321) discusses, this could be to private forms of policing secured through 
government; to transnational police arrangements taking place above national government; to markets in 
policing and security services unfolding beyond government; and to policing activities engaged in by 
citizens below government’. 
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varying nodes rather than competition 68 : the state is conceived as a partner (and a 
potentially equal player) and should no longer be thought to carry the mantle, for it 
constitutes one node amongst many engaged in the broader governance of security 
(Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 25-26). In the light of the limited roles and resources of 
the state, it is argued that it is neither possible nor appropriate for the public police to seek 
to be the sole or primary provider of policing with the position of dominance in respect 
of the ‘locus of power/control’ being subject to variation across time and space (Skinns, 
2011: 32).  
 
Naturally the idea of state withdrawal is not supported by everyone (Crawford, 2006). 
For example, starting from the position of security as a public good, Loader and Walker 
(2001, 2006, 2007: 170) argue that the state has a pivotal, indispensable and distinct ive 
role to play with regard to governance within its territories and the production of security. 
Through their concept of ‘anchored pluralism’ they argue that the state should retain the 
most prominent role in governing security to enable it to act, for example, as an arbiter in 
decisions about public security and that this is in the interests of ensuring that security 
remains for all to enjoy equally69. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the emergence 
of ‘security networks’ and ‘multi-agency partnerships’ indicates that there is still a long 
way to before we see horizontal relationships (cf Skinns, 2011). In their research on the 
developing mixed economy of public and private policing provision in England, 
Crawford et al. (2005: 90) found ‘little evidence of a networked model of policing as a 
dominant or prevailing reality’. Their research also found plural policing relations to be 
inharmonious and poorly organised, which indicates that the routine assumption that 
many agencies are better than one lacks a firm evidentiary base. 
 
In his subsequent work, Crawford (2006: 466 cited in Skinns, 2011: 34-3570) points to the 
fact that with regard to the governance of policing and security, the state may in fact play 
                                                                 
68 This conception of security governance is undeniably linked to the earlier work of Foucault (1991[1977] ) 
and Cohen (1979) and the analysis of the ‘disciplinary society’ and the dispersal of mechanisms of control 
across an ever broadening surface of social space (what Foucault (1991[1977]) famously dubs the ‘Carceral 
Archipelago’ of modernity). Indeed, as Foucault illustrates: ‘the term ‘police’ does not signify at least not 
exclusively the institution of police in the modern sense; ‘police’ is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to 
ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the conditions of preservation of health in 
general’ (Foucault, 1980:170). 
69 This governance arrangement, powerfully articulated in the 17th-century writings of Hobbes, Locke and 
their followers in the liberal traditional, came to have a profound influence upon the state -building process 
taking place across Europe and its colonies during the 18th and 19th centuries, in the process giving rise to 
the first modern police forces (Emsley, 1991). 
70 The following list has been adapted from that presented by Skinns (2011, 34-35). 
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a variety of roles which broadly, can be illustrated by his useful five-fold categorisat ion 
of context/time dependent relationships between the state and other policing providers: 
 
 The monopolistic model, whereby forms of policing are integrated within the 
immediate policing family. The state retains primary responsibility for policing 
provision. This is illustrated by the proliferation of PCSOs and, with regard to the 
focus of the current research, CIs (if employees of the police organisation), who are 
non-warranted police staff, but who are paid and directed by the police. 
 
 The steering model, whereby the police seek to ‘govern at a distance’ the policing 
activities of others71. This involves state agencies mobilising and making use of 
non-state resources, for example, individual citizens and private security officers. 
A key element of the strategy is the accreditation and licensing by police of the 
policing activities of others. Perhaps the best example of this is the Police Reform 
Act 2002 which introduced provisions for Community Safety Accreditation 
Schemes and, in certain circumstances, the granting of limited powers to accredited 
members of those schemes. 
 
 The networked or nodal model, whereby state and non-state providers link in 
provision/co-production of policing through horizontal alliances. No node within 
this network is given priority. What differentiates a networked/nodal model from a 
market model is that the former presupposes an element of coordination and 
cooperation, whereas the latter presupposes competition. 
 
 The market model, whereby potential competition 72  (and conflict) structure 
relations between the different providers. As is necessary, the police might 
‘contract-out’ their services (e.g. to football matches) or ‘buy-in’ services from the 
private security agencies (e.g. CIs in police CIDs). This model suggests a need for 
the development of an independent regulatory agency above and outside the 
competing contracted parties to ensure fair competition, appropriate standards and 
                                                                 
71 It is important to note that this is a broader trend than within policing (e.g. the raising of children - the 
state seeks to organise the internal conduct of the family not based upon coercive mechanisms such as laws, 
decrees and regulations, but through the expertise associated within disciplines like family guidance, 
welfare, counselling and pedagogy (Rose, 1985 cited in Tait, 2016: 90)) and viewed with suspicion by 
strong state countries like France and Britain (for example) as being symptomatic of a ‘weak state’ model.  
72 Arguably, only in the procurement process, not in operation when contracts have been let.  
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safeguarding of the public interest. However, it is important to note that this could 
also be provided by the buyer of the services e.g. the state. 
 
 The private government model, whereby policing by the state is shut out or partly 
shut out of providing policing (e.g. within businesses, mass public space and gated 
communities) or has relinquished its responsibility (and expertise) for an area of 
policing to non-state actors and organisations. This has been the case with many 
types of fraud investigation for example. 
 
Whatever the position of the state police within contemporary policing arrangements, in 
terms of provision, it would appear no longer possible (if it ever truly were) to recognise 
policing provision as the sole prerogative of the state as exercised by a single state 
institution (the police). Within existing systems (at least in E&W) private security has 
emerged as a key player within the developing mixed economy of policing. 
 
2.2.5 Private Security and the Public Police - A Developing Mixed Economy 
 
As suggested in the previous section of this chapter, much of the early sociology 
of policing tended not to allow its gaze to stray far beyond those functions and activit ies 
being undertaken by the public police. Recent years have however seen much greater 
attention paid to the policing and security related activities of non-state agencies and 
individuals as well as to the range of policing providers that lie somewhere between the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres (cf Hoogenboom and Morré, 1988; Hoogenboom, 1991, 
2010; Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Nalla and 
Newman, 1991; Shapland and Van Outrive, 1999; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; South, 
1988). Much in keeping with the early sociology of the police, initia l writing on private 
security in E&W tended to concern itself with the function/s of the sector, more broadly, 
on the position of this industry in the overall policing division of labour. While discussion 
of emergent phenomenon of ‘private security’ and ‘private justice’ can certainly be traced 
back to the early 1970s at least (cf Farnell and Shearing, 1977; Scott and McPherson 
1971; Spitzner and Scull, 1977), it would be far from contentious to suggest that concerted 
criminological interest in contemporary matters of private security was decisive ly 
stimulated by the publication (and reception) of Shearing and Stenning’s 1981 article, 
‘Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications’. In this piece the authors sought 
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to explore the increasing significance of the private security industry in Canada and 
identified what they termed a ‘quiet revolution in the policing and social control systems 
of many countries of the world’ post Second World War (1981: 193). Generally speaking, 
the incremental expansion of private provision of services that largely focused upon 
‘protection against depredation’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 195) - what in more recent 
discussion has been characterised as the shift towards a preventive logic of action 
(Zedner, 2007) - characterised the ‘revolution’ in private security. For Shearing and 
Stenning (1981) such developments were indicative of a redemption of the origina l 
Peelian dream of ‘a truly preventative police force’, albeit manifested ‘through private 
security rather than the public police’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 217).   
 
In the UK as in other parts of the Europe73 (in particular in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands), interest in the development of private security (and private policing 
specifically) has notably grown over the last few decades (Cools and Verbeiren, 2004; 
Cools, Ponsaers, Verhage and Hoogenboom, 2005; De Waard, 1993, 1999; Mulkers and 
Haelterman, 2001; Nogala, 1995; Nogala and Sack, 1999; Ocqueteau, 1993; Ogliati, 
1993; Van Steden and Sarre, 2007). Early works by Van Outrive (1988, 1995), 
Hoogenboom (1988, 1991), Hoogenboom and Morre (1988) and Boon (1993) for 
example set a firm precedent for much of the work on private security which has 
developed in the UK (and elsewhere), laying the necessary theoretical and empirica l 
groundwork for scholars such as Gill and Hart (1997a, 1997b, 1997c), Button (2002, 
2007) and Wakefield (2003) to name but a few. Hoogenboom (1988) for example was 
the first to draw attention to the private aspect of policing in the Netherlands with his 
work on the role of private investigators74  (and subsequent work on ‘grey policing’ 
(Hoogenboom, 1991)). This was followed by comparable work in the UK conducted by 
Gill and Hart (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). Similarly, studies by Van Outrive (1988) and Boon 
(1993) (and more recently by Cools and Verbeiren, 2003) drew attention to the world of 
private security and guarding in Belgium and were likely of influence to scholars 
                                                                 
73 This is not to discount important studies also being undertaken in other parts of the world in the same 
period, in particular, in the US (cf Cunningham et al. 1985; McCrie, 1988; South, 1988) and Canada (cf 
Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987). 
74 Boon (1993) also conducted work on private investigators in Belgium as has Cools et al. (2005) more 
recently. 
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reflecting upon the UK experience (cf Button, 2002, 2007; Wakefield, 2003; White, 2010 
etc.). 
Many of the existing studies (conducted both in the UK and elsewhere) on private security 
were (and continue to be) unanimous in their assertion that - when conceptualised in terms 
of numbers of personnel - the private security industry could outnumber the public police 
by as many as two to one (Draper, 1978; George and Button, 2000; Grabowsky and 
Braithwaite, 1986; Jones and Newburn, 1998; South, 1988). While few would deny that 
a ‘quiet revolution’ (Stenning and Shearing, 1980) in private security has indeed taken 
place, there exists little consensus about the true size of the industry75. Research has 
however consistently pointed to the fact that the private security industry employs more 
people than the public police in many countries (De Waard, 1999; Jones and Newburn, 
1995) and is responsible for undertaking a wide range of tasks76 (Cunningham, Strauchs, 
Van Meter and Hallcrest Systems Inc., 1990 De Waard, 1999; George and Button, 2000; 
Jones and Newburn, 1998), many of which are also routinely undertaken by the public 
police (Gill and Hart, 1997a). 
 
The expansion of the private security industry (broadly understood for the purposes of 
this study to mean separate companies providing security personnel and/or services for a 
fee77) over the last forty years or so has seen rapid development not only in terms of the 
numbers of individuals working within the industry, but also in the types of functions and 
spaces which it has come to fill. In some contexts, private security personnel now 
routinely comprise the visible frontline of policing and protective services (Wakefield, 
2003). There has been a long debate in academic, legal, policy making and industry circles 
over what constitutes private security (and private policing) (Draper, 1978; George and 
Button, 2000; Prenzler, 2009; Manunta, 1999; Sarre, 2005; Shearing and Stenning, 1981; 
South, 1988) with definitional differences tending to include the focus on tasks, the 
influence of profit and the client and the inclusion of products, such as the manufactur ing, 
                                                                 
75  Ambiguities surrounding the definition of private security and in more general sense, due to the 
definitional complexities associated with both the concept of ‘privateness’ and  the activity of ‘policing’ (cf 
Jones and Newburn, 1998; Wakefield, 2003) mean there is less consensus about precisely how big the 
private security industry is (Jones and Newburn, 1995). 
76 All of the functions undertaken by the public police (namely, tackling and preventing crime, upholding 
the law, bringing justice to those who break the law, protecting, helping and reassuring the community) are 
also now undertaken in varying degrees by private policing personnel. 
77 This is distinct from ‘corporate security’ which refers to the policing and security activities of individuals 
carried out on a contractual commercial basis or within private firms/organisations. 
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distribution and installation of equipment and technology (Cunningham et al., 1990). 
While there continues to exist little consensus amongst commentators about how exactly 
to best define and/or conceptualise private security, for the purposes of the current study, 
the definition provided by George and Button (2000: 15) will be used:  
 
‘The term ‘private security industry’ is a generic term used to describe an 
amalgam of distinct industries and professions bound together by a number of 
functions, including crime prevention, order maintenance, loss reduction and 
protection; but these functions are neither common nor exclusive to all the 
activities of the private security industry, though the more that apply to a 
particular activity the more clearly it can be considered as private security. To be 
included within the industry, personnel must have a primarily security role, 
whether this is full-time or part-time, and there must also be an employment 
relationship, whether as an employee or self-employed’. 
 
 
As Prenzler (2009: 241) makes clear, the delivery of private security provision may, in 
practice, take a number of divergent and increasingly ambiguous forms. Generally 
speaking, private security provision may fall within one of three broad categories, the first 
and arguably the largest of these being ‘contract security’ - whereby an independent 
security firm supplies security services direct to clients. Those engaged in the purchasing 
of ‘contract security’ may include other private organisations (e.g. supermarkets, night 
clubs etc.) as well as public sector organisations such as government departments, 
resulting in a mixed mode of public-private delivery. The contract security industry 
includes a multitude of services and may be divided into two sections: the manned or 
‘staffed’ services sector78 and the security hardware sector79 (Wakefield, 2003: 2). Private 
security also includes ‘in-house’, or ‘proprietary’ security (also often referred to as 
‘corporate security’) which may constitute a separate department within a larger 
organisation, servicing the organisation but whose services are not subject to hire by 
others (e.g. store detectives, forensic accountants, security guards etc.). There has also 
been an incremental marketisation of policing in the UK (as in other parts of Europe e.g. 
the Netherlands (cf Van Steden and Jones, 2010: 292-293)) which has seen the police 
become involved more extensively in both the buying and selling of services. While the 
Police Act 1964 allowed police forces to charge for ‘special services’ such as the policing 
                                                                 
78  This includes the provision of guards, mobile patrols, private investigators, store detective s, door 
supervisors, bodyguards as well as security consultative work, private custodial work and the transport of 
cash in transit etc. 
79 This includes the supply and installation of locks, alarms and surveillance devices. 
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of football matches, it was the Police and Magistrates Act 1994 that presented the police 
with an opportunity to enter the marketplace via the contracting out of police officer time 
on a more general basis.  
 
Private policing is generally considered to exist as one element/function (and arguably 
the most conspicuous) of private security. In its broadest sense, private policing can be 
understood to incorporate any policing activity carried out on a private basis (i.e. by non-
police personnel). It may include those policing activities performed by unpaid volunteer 
community groups80 on a commercial or voluntary basis - e.g. citizens’ self-policing 
through ‘responsible citizenship’ (such as traditional Neighbourhood Watch) or through 
‘autonomous citizenship’ (such as vigilantist self-policing and citizen patrol activity) 
(Johnston, 1992). It may also include specialist81  and non-specialist 82  employees in 
private and/or not-for-profit organisations who engage in some police-like activity as a 
part of their duties, private armies, as well as commercial security-related enterprises 
more broadly (for-profit commercial enterprises that provide some aspect of 
security/policing services e.g. hired guards, private investigators, locks and alarm 
companies etc.). However, most commonly, reference to private policing in the literature 
concerns ‘the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services83 (e.g. door 
supervision, manned guarding etc.) whose primary objectives include the control of 
crime, the protection of property and life and the maintenance of order’ (Joh, 2004: 55, 
emphasis added).  
 
A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain the apparent ‘rebirth’ of private 
policing and growth in demand for private security services (Johnston, 1992) in the post 
Second World War period. These can broadly be divided in two theoretical categories: 
                                                                 
80 Not including the Special Constabulary.  
81 Specialist employees in private or not-for-profit organisations (‘in-house’ employees who have specialist 
policing, security or risk-management roles within organisations whose core mission is something other 
than security (e.g. security service officers employed by universities to patrol university buildings and/or 
property, security officers employed by retail establishments as store detectives or by the owners of other 
commercial premises (e.g. shopping malls etc.) Also compliance officers, s ecurity directors and risk 
management personnel. 
82 Non-specialist employees in private or not-for-profit organisations (employees with more general duties 
who are nevertheless asked to pay attention to security issues e.g. insurance adjusters, garage attendants, 
janitors, shop assistants watching for shop lifters, flight crew members observing for suspicious behaviour 
etc. 
83 May also be referred to as commercial security-related enterprises (for-profit commercial enterprises that 
provide some aspect of security/policing services e.g. hired guards, private investigators, alarm companies 
etc.). 
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‘fiscal constraint’ theories and ‘structuralist’ or ‘pluralist’ theories. Scholars of each 
perspective have, generally speaking, sought to variously conceptualise the relationship 
between private security and the public police in terms of the distribution of power and/or  
the division of labour (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Those who advocate the ‘fiscal 
constraint’ perspective have tended to explain the growth of private policing in terms of 
the inability of the state to meet the demands for services, which has led to the private 
sector filling the ‘fiscal gap’. In the case of policing, the steep rise in crime experienced 
by many countries, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, encouraged a rise in demand for 
the services of the public police which has outstripped the resources available and, as a 
consequence, the private sector has stepped in to fill some of the gaps in provision. This 
state-centric perspective is closely linked to public insecurities about levels of crime and 
risk of victimisation which (despite declining or stable crime rates from the 1990s) 
continues to feed demand and bolster the ‘reassurance gap’ in public policing.  
 
From this perspective, private security can be considered a complementary entity in terms 
of its provision of policing and security services. Probably the first (and most significant) 
study associated with the growth of private security as understood by advocates of the 
fiscal constraint approach is Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1972) research as published by the 
Rand Corporation. In particular, this work illustrates the significant role private security 
plays in preventing crime against corporations. It also importantly emphasises the public 
police’s supportive and complementary role in this area of work, promulgating the idea 
of private security being the ‘junior partner’ in such areas of policing. According to this 
theory private security maintains a functional distinction between itself and the public 
police with private security operating as ‘full service providers of visible crime 
prevention’ (Bayley and Shearing, 2001: 19), thus securing its role as the ‘junior partner’ 
of the latter84. In the current study the junior partner theory is utilised broadly to explore 
the extent to which the role being performed by CIs can be considered complementary 
                                                                 
84 With regard to criminal investigation more specifically, evidence would indeed appear to support the 
idea that a ‘glacial drift’ (Morn, 1982) from detection to protection mentality has taken place during the 
course of the twentieth century in respect of private policing more generally, especially when considering 
much of the work undertaken by private detectives (cf Gill and Hart, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). There is indeed 
evidence which suggests the public police lack the skills, knowledge, time and financial resources to deal 
effectively with cases of corporate theft and fraud. As Gill and Hart (1997a: 565) conclude, one of the key 
reasons private detectives are sought is due to the lack of any formal legal provision. Furthermore, it would 
also appear that many large corporate organisations consciously choose not to involve the public police in 
criminal matters due to fear of the impact this may have on company reputation and stakeholder confidence.  
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and/or junior to that of their warranted DC counterparts, both in terms of the tasks they 
undertake and also in terms of their occupational position within the organisation (relative 
to that of warranted detectives). This theory is also applied (along with work by 
Hoogenboom, 1991, 1994) to examine the functional role of private security in relation 
to the public police in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. Specifically, to 
what extent can the use of agency CIs (i.e. CIs who work for the police via contracts 
agreed by their employer e.g. G4S) be considered to be blurring the boundaries between 
the public and the private sectors in regard to the provision of public police investigat ions 
and with that, the complementary position of private security?  
 
Until the publication of Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1971a,b) work, private security had been 
conceptualised as either a potential ‘private army’ or had been dismissed as being 
unimportant. At the moment the liberal democratic perspective seems to dominate both 
UK and US thinking about private security with governments on both sides of the Atlantic 
seemingly viewing the private security industry as a resource that should be developed 
and improved, with active partnerships and strategic work alliances/relationships being 
encouraged between the public and the private sectors. However, as Shearing and 
Stenning (1983) note, assumptions about the relatively subordinate position of private 
security have historically served to marginalise and trivialise emerging discourse and 
questions of accountability, the result being a legacy of ‘soft’ regulation of the sector (in 
the UK particularly). It is on this point of contention that theoretical developments 
regarding plural and nodal governance can be said to have come to dominate popular 
scholarly understandings of contemporary patterns of policing (Bayley and Shearing, 
1996; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Loader and Mulcahy, 
2003; Zedner, 2006). 
 
Advocates of a ‘structuralist’ or ‘pluralist’ perspective however emphasise the 
fragmentation of power as a key precursor to the growing visibility of private security in 
recent decades. Shearing and Stenning (1981) (amongst others cf Wakefield, 2005) have 
attributed the proliferation of private security over recent decades to changes in land use 
and property relations, most notably, the privatisation of public space through the growth 
of ‘mass private property’ (e.g. shopping centres, sporting facilities etc.). Indeed, as 
Wakefield (2005: 529) makes clear: 
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‘Urban space in Britain has been privatised to such an extent that most sectors 
of the population now regularly spend time in publicly accessible spaces 
controlled by private interests. Such spaces are dotted through our towns and 
cities, forming venues for our leisure time (the shopping mall, the leisure park 
or the cultural centre), working hours (the business park or large office complex) 
and the facilitation of travel to other places (the railway station, bus terminal or 
passenger airport)’. 
 
Mass private property is a term which has been used when making reference to those 
facilities which are privately owned but which the general public have access such as 
shopping malls, leisure centres and recreational grounds. The proliferation of mass private 
property - which has been accompanied by increased prosperity with more private 
property and consumer goods to protect and enlarged legal obligations for the protection 
of visitors - has witnessed an ever increasing amount of ‘public space’ which is located 
on private property and policed by private security companies. Through the advent of 
mass private property, private corporations have been provided with the legal space and 
economic incentive to pursue their own policing agendas. This has in turn led to the 
emergence of what has been termed ‘neo-feudalism’ (Shearing, 2001: 211) whereby, in 
some areas, corporate auspices of government have emerged as ‘private governments’ 
(Macauly, 1986) pursuing ‘private orders’ that are often in conflict with state objectives 
(Shearing and Wood, 2003). 
 
According to Shearing and Stenning (1983), the arrival of mass private property has not 
only brought about a change in the ‘hands of policing’ but also in its style and nature: 
‘Policing changed as its location changed’ (Shearing, 1992: 423). Arguably their most 
significant research finding was to draw attention to the distinction between the strategies 
and orientations of private (commercial) security guards (which reflect those of the 
owners of the company) and those of the public police with those of the private guards 
appearing differently moral85 to those of public police. As work by Shapland (1995: 272-
273) has shown, the word ‘crime’ itself may be foreign/less relevant86 to retail companies 
who may prefer the terminology of ‘risk’ or ‘risk management’, ‘loss’ or ‘lost profit 
                                                                 
85  As discussed by Shapland (1995: 272), ‘‘Crime’ has moral connotations and, for most people, is 
indissolubly linked with ideas based on the criminal law and associated with the criminal justice system’. 
In the retail sector the relevance of these moral frames of reference is however less clear (Shapland, 1995). 
One might argue that private companies are responsible to their shareholders, employees and customers, 
and that that is what morality should mean for them, rather than the rather vague public interest criteria for 
the police (which are actually based on governmental and sectoral views). 
86 Stenning (1989) also argues that most business people do not see ‘crime’ as a useful label for dealing 
with the problems they and their business face. 
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opportunity’ or ‘shrinkage’ when referring to instances (or potential instances (e.g. fire)) 
of action identified as impacting on profit margins and the overall financial viability of 
the business (cf Braithwaite and Fuller, 1992). These terms undoubtedly have different 
connotations with regard to the paths which might be followed if a ‘crime’ or ‘lost profit 
opportunity’ should be discovered87. They are also suggestive of a more proactive rather 
than reactive approach to problem-solving or ‘risk management’. Generally speaking, 
private security providers ‘tend to be concerned with loss prevention and risk reduction 
rather than with law enforcement or the detection and conviction of criminals’ (Crawford, 
2014: 174).  In this respect, the growth of private security can be somewhat fundamenta l ly 
linked to the emergence of mass private property (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983) 
and (stimulated by the liberalisation of alcohol consumption and changes in licens ing 
laws) the necessity for public order related security provision which has been spurred on 
by the emergence of the night time economy (Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister and Windlow, 
2003).  
 
This observation regarding the relationship between shifting economic forces and the 
relative weighting of state and private security providers has been central to the 
composition of the nodal governance model (discussed earlier in this chapter in section 
2.2.4) (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader, 
2000; Loader and Walker, 2004, 2006, 2007; Shearing, 1992; Wood and Shearing, 2006).  
Nodal governance theorists contend that it has become increasingly necessary to 
conceptualise those responsible for directing security strategies (auspices) and those 
responsible for delivering security services (providers) in a flexible manner. In regard to 
private security, this means with no set boundaries between the functions of the state and 
private security actors within the security sector. For instance, Bayley and Shearing 
(2001: 3) note that ‘auspices may be either public (governmental) or private (non-
governmental); so, too, may providers’ and as a consequence, ‘they may be combined in 
four ways - public/public, public/private, private/public, private/private’. In this sense, all 
actors in the security sector network, be they public or private, are dependent upon one 
another for the realisation of their objectives - no single actor, in other words, has the 
capacity to exercise a monopoly over security provision. The flexibility provided by this 
                                                                 
87 ‘It has been found that companies do not necessarily rely on the criminal justice system to deal with the 
offenders they uncover - and that calling crimes ‘losses’ and so forth may naturally promote the use of civil 
law (e.g. dismissal, suing to regain money stole through fraud etc.) or internal company measures’ 
(Shapland, 1995: 275) (cf Walker, 1994). 
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distinct theoretical framework has allowed for a growing recognition of the high degree 
of ‘boundary blurring’ which can be observed between the public and the private sector 
and thus, the increasingly complex nature of the public-private divide in policing and 
security provision.  
Traditionally understood and illustrated by reference to the ‘governmental sector’ 
(services provided for all by government and funded through taxation) and the ‘market 
sector’ (consumers purchase services from firms motivated by profit) and considered one 
of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought (Bobbio, 1989), the public-private 
distinction is now widely considered to comprise ‘not a single paired opposition, but a 
complex family of them, neither mutually reducible nor wholly unrelated’ (Weintraub and 
Kumar, 1997: 2). Debates over what constitutes ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ are now 
common within popular discourse on the topic of private policing and security (and have 
been for some time, cf Benn and Gaus, 1983) as scholars have come to recognise that any 
discussion of the issue must first take account of the increasingly indistinct nature of the 
two sectors. Jones and Newburn (1998: 30) describe four key factors which they consider 
of central importance when seeking to conceptualise the two sectors. These are: mode of 
provision (provision provided by the state vs. provision of services through organisat ions 
operating in the open market); source of funding (either through taxation on the public 
side or through payment of fees to the providing body on the private side), the nature of 
the relationship between providers and users (based upon contracts and competition or on 
a monopoly of supply which is frequently provided universally) and the employment 
status of the personnel who deliver the service (many public officials hold special powers 
whereas private individuals have no special employment status). 
Early work by Hoogenboom (1991) for example, examined bodies which are not part of 
state constabularies but which nevertheless undertake ‘policing’ functions. He found over 
40 different bodies in the Netherlands with over 20,000 employees with controlling and 
regulatory powers. Hoogenboom viewed the growth of such bodies as symptomatic of 
the expansion of the welfare state in Western economies, with the ‘welfare complex’ 
beginning to undertake social control functions more usually associated with the 
‘repressive complex’ of the state, (for example, the activities of benefit fraud 
investigators). He predicted the development of a ‘policing complex’ consisting of a 
combination of the official police, these kinds of regulatory bodies (involved in what he 
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terms ‘grey policing’88) and private security firms. In the current study the concept of 
‘policing complex’ is drawn upon in an effort to conceptualise the significance/impact of 
the current nature of CI utilisation on the future of the criminal investigation process. 
Specifically, to what extent might the utilisation of non-warranted CIs - who may be 
employees of private security agencies - be considered evidence of a developing policing 
complex in regard to the provision of criminal investigation in E&W? 
South (1988: 127) had previously suggested the potential usefulness of establishing a 
shared project of social control in which ‘both the public and private contributors 
exchange expertise, key personnel and, importantly, accommodate each other’s shift ing 
parameters of operation and priorities in action’. Crawford et al. (2005: 45) have simila r ly 
drawn attention to the degree of ‘cross-fertilisation’ of styles of policing provision which 
have resulted from the closer working relationship between the police and members of 
the wider policing family. This, it is alleged, has caused a further ‘softening’ of the 
traditional sectoral distinctions with private security becoming increasingly more 
involved in the management of crime as part of their role and through cooperation with 
the police89. Roycroft (2014) has also argued in favour of the development of a ‘blended 
policing’ model, whereby some functions remain the province of the public police (e.g. 
covert surveillance, undercover work, family liaison, emergency response etc.) but other 
activities (e.g. custody duties, transporting prisoners, routine statement taking, managing 
police call centres etc.) maybe undertaken by the private sector or through a collaboration 
of the two (pp192-194). According to Roycroft (2014: 200), a blended model of policing 
provision would therefore ‘see a clear separation between the tasks to be undertaken by 
the public police, those that can be privately contracted and those where there would be 
a collaboration between public and private with a public accountability model’ (p200). 
With regard to the focus of the current study, it is possible that the CI role brings with it 
potential for the further softening of sectoral boundaries thus allowing for the emergence 
of a more blended style of criminal investigation. 
The increasing fuzziness of the distinction between public and private policing bodies in 
many instances has resulted in the emergence of ‘hybrid’ auspices and providers of 
                                                                 
88 Hoogenboom (1991: 18) defines ‘grey policing’ as ‘informal forms of co -operation between different 
social control agencies for which traditional mechanisms of accountability seem obsolete’. 
89 For example, through the adoption of quasi-policing functions, such as passing on information, incident 
reports and CCTV footage to the police or other public authorities and to a limited extent, working beyond 
the geographical boundaries of the private contracted area) (Crawford et al., 2005: 46-48) and the public 
police’s greater emphasis on crime prevention, risk management and proactive policing.  
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security which are now widely accepted to exist as part of ‘amorphous’ assemblages that 
exhibit different degrees of ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ (Dijkstra and Van der Meer, 
2003). Notions of boundary ‘blurring’, ‘grey policing’ and ‘hybridity’ (Hoogenboom, 
1991: 24) have all arisen in an effort to conceptualise the increasingly ambiguous and 
fragmented nature of the contemporary policing division of labour. 
Within such debates, a great deal of attention has - in more recent years - been afforded 
to the degree of ‘privatisation’ of policing which has taken place in the UK and in other 
parts of the Western world (Forst and Manning, 1999; Gans, 2000; Johnston, 1991; 
Prenzler, 2004; White, 2010, 2012) and with that, what has come to be most commonly 
referred to as the developing (and increasingly complex) mixed economy in policing. 
Saunders and Harris (1990: 58) describe privatisation as ‘a confused concept which 
carries many different meanings’. Put most simply, privatisation in its broadest sense 
refers to ‘a process in which government-owned assets or services are wholly or partially 
transferred to private companies’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009: 243). According to 
Johnston (1992) the ‘privatisation mentality’ which took hold in UK government policy 
from the late 1980s onwards90, has encouraged intensifying marketplace developments as 
new commercial opportunities have come to be realised. Johnston (1992) identifies three 
trends in policing which can be variously located under the umbrella term of privatisat ion. 
The first of these is termed ‘load shedding’, where certain areas of policing are 
consciously supplemented or replaced by the commercial security sector. In some 
instances, the police can be seen to have shed themselves of certain functions altogether, 
for example, they no longer escort most cash-in-transit vehicles which they once did 
routinely (Cownie, Bradney and Burton, 2013: 227). In the case of cash-in-transit escort 
and in many other areas of work (e.g. CCTV, searches of visitors), private security has 
stepped in to undertake the policing activity. It should be noted however that Johnston 
also makes use of this term when referring to instances of police actively encouraging or 
‘responsibilising’ third party action, as in the case of neighbourhood watch schemes, as 
well as situations when some police functions are ‘usurped’ by voluntary action.  
A second category of police privatisation is ‘contracting out’ or ‘outsourcing’, whereby 
police enter into contracts with third parties to purchase goods or services from them for 
                                                                 
90 While the concept of privatisation was in use before 1979 (Pirie, 1988), the intensified form in which it 
emerged during the Thatcher and New Labour era was very much a product of the managerialist movement  
which swept through industrialised countries since the 1980s in the drive for greater efficiency in public 
sector management. 
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a fixed/limited duration. In such arrangements, services may still be directed/organised 
by the police but a contractor is used to supply that service. While this has been a 
longstanding and uncontroversial practice in the procurement of ancillary services such 
as cleaning and catering, other areas of police work or the police organisation more 
generally are now increasingly subject to outsourcing. Work by Skinns (2011) for 
example, discusses the growing privatisation (through ‘outsourcing’ arrangements) of 
police custody provision by police forces across E&W. Through outsourcing, whole new 
areas of business are potentially being opened up to the burgeoning private security 
industry91 including those traditional considered ‘core’ areas of police business. White 
(2015: 283-284) attributes the ‘exponential growth’ in outsourcing over the last five years 
or so to the post-financial crisis ‘politics of austerity’ which has seen the pressing need to 
cut public expenditure to level out the budget deficit. Combined with a pro-market 
Coalition government intent on significantly reducing the size of the state, this strategy 
has seen over 20 per cent reductions in the Home Office police budget which were 
initially intended to take place over six years (2010-2016) as part of the government’s 
flagship Comprehensive Spending Review92. Such conditions have thus prompted many 
forces to consider new styles of outsourcing including key services areas (e.g. custody) 
to the private sector on an unprecedented scale in hope of achieving the required savings.  
 
Johnston’s third category concerns the levying of charges for certain police services, or 
‘user pays’ policing, a further form of ‘contractualism’93. Police services can be sold to 
other public institutions as well as commercial interests. In the UK context, one example 
of this could be the expansion of community policing through the sale of additional patrol 
services (including PCSOs) to other public institutions such as local authorities. Such a 
                                                                 
91 This is not just a trend in policing but also extends through the criminal justice system, for example, to 
electronic monitoring and private prison services. 
92 In addition to the original planned 20 per cent cut in central funding proposed for the 2010-2014 period, 
in June 2013, the Coalition government revealed an additional 4.9 per cent central police budget cut in real 
terms for 2015-2016, thereby deepening the already severe financial crisis in the policing sector (HMIC, 
2013: 106). However, as of November 2015 (following the Chancellor’s ‘Spending Review’), further cuts 
to police budgets have since been suspended until 2020. 
93 ‘Contractualism’ in policing is ‘the practice of police entering into agreements (often contracts) with 
third parties (e.g. other public sector agencies, businesses, community organisations and individuals) for 
the purpose of providing goods or services to them or obtaining goods or services from them’ (Ayling, 
2009: 54). While the police have from time immemorial entered into contracts to purchase some goods and 
services from outside their ranks (such as stationery, uniforms, and services such as janitors, and builders) 
new forms of contractualism are now developing in which various services that were previously provided 
from within the police ranks are increasingly being outsourced (e.g. aspects of forensic investigations such 
as fingerprint and DNA analyses, custody and detainee transportation etc.). 
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practice sees the police effectively engaging in active competition with alternative service 
providers such as local authority employed wardens or private security. A further and 
particularly interesting example concerns the financing of the British Transport Police, 
responsible for the policing of the railways and underground rail systems (as well as the 
investigation and prosecution of the vast majority of offences with which they deal 
(Lidstone, Hogg and Sutcliffe, 1980: chapt 7)), provided mainly through charges for 
services made to the private franchises of the rail network. Despite the increased 
pervasiveness of the privatisation mentality since the 1980s94 which saw the Home Office 
propose the privatisation of what were to be identified (by its ‘Review of Core and 
Ancillary Tasks’ (1995)) as ‘ancillary’ tasks, operational policing has, by and large, 
remained largely immune from deliberate policies of privatisation or 
marketisation/commercialisation. However, as can be seen with the provision of custody 
in particular, the rapid growth in demand for private security has witnessed a gradual 
move towards the de facto privatisation of some core areas of policing which has 
significantly altered the conditions of policing and how it is being done. Furthermore, in 
some forces the growing civilianisation of some roles has been largely complemented 
through the formation of strategic business partnerships95 with the private sector. In some 
areas of work such ‘public-private partnership’ arrangements have allowed forces to 
accrue significant financial savings (HMIC, 2013; White, 2014), while at the same time, 
                                                                 
94 Areas of police work suitable for outsourcing were first outlined by the Adam Smith Institute in 1984 
and later reflected in the terms of reference of the Home Office’s ‘Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks’ in 
1995. 
95 These may take the form of unusual staffing arrangements (e.g. the use of agency staff to undertake roles 
previously performed by warranted officers (e.g. call handlers), arrangements enabled through contract 
which usually apply on a fixed-term or open-ended basis) or innovative building/facility developments 
and/or operations for example, a contract for the building/maintenance/operation/management of a police 
custody suite is made available to the open market for tender. The successful bidder enters into a contractual 
‘partnership’ with the public police for the length of term of the contract which may or may not be subject 
to renewal at a later date. These ‘partnerships’ are distinct in both kind and ethos from traditional policing  
partnerships as they rely on a relationship which is based on contractual arrangements and agreements (they 
are structured by relations of exchange usually involving payment for services - price and competition). A 
true partnership refers to two unanimous bodies who work together towards a common goal (which is of 
benefit to them both), they are structured by common purpose, shared values, reciprocity and trust. The 
private sector can be a party to non-contractual partnerships (for example, statutory partnerships and also 
those partnerships between the corporate sector and the police, where they do exist, can be regarded as 'true' 
PPP's) but less often does so. There are also statutory partnerships (e.g. Community Safety Partnership's) by 
which the private sector is  compelled to work with the public sector, formally, on statutory basis. The fact 
that the relationship is based on statutory obligation is of little significance - it is still a partnership as it 
involves two autonomous entities working together towards a common goal (and most importantly one 
which benefits them both); it just confirms that it is a solid partnership and that government really wants 
the two entities tied together. Another good example of this is the statutory need for banks to submit 
Suspicious Activity Report's (SAR's) to the National Crime Agency since the arrival of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002. 
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enabling them to redeploy warranted officers to duties more in keeping with their skills, 
capabilities and legal powers/authority. With regard to the concerns of the current 
research, it is possible that the introduction of CIs may, in some instances, have provided 
the police with a new marketable commodity which may see the expansion (in style and 
scope) of public police engagement with private security in respect of direct investiga t ive 
provision. 
The growing privatisation of security has given rise to what Crawford et al. (2005: 7) 
refer to as a mixed economy of policing in which ‘officers have been joined by a diversity 
of Community Support Officers, neighbourhood and street wardens, municipal rangers, 
private security guards and vigilant citizens’. While some members of this extended 
policing family although technically not police officers, are part of the state system of 
policing (e.g. publicly employed CIs, PCSOs etc.), others such as private security 
personnel and vigilant members of the community are clearly not part of the state 
apparatus. This makes the combined issues of governance and accountability not only 
hugely pertinent, but also the task of disentangling the various tiers of responsibility 
increasingly more difficult. Increasing formal interaction between the public and the 
private sectors in regard to matters of policing and security through public-private 
partnership arrangements has rendered the line of accountability particularly elusive. 
However, given the popularity of plural orders of policing in present-day systems of social 
control - particularly those formal and/or informal arrangements which straddle the 
public-private divide and which have seen the public police effectively lend their 
legitimacy to private providers of security (e.g. through Community Safety Accreditation 
Schemes) - it is arguably ever more important to direct attention towards developing ways 
of connecting them to proper accountability mechanisms, be this to existing democratic 
structures of governance96 (e.g. via links to local councils or Parliament), through fiscal 
accountability mechanisms (i.e. via contracting) and/or through human rights 
accountability mechanisms (i.e. to the rule of law) (cf Crawford, 2006; Loader and 
Walker, 2006, 2007; Stenning, 2009; Van Steden, 2009).  
  
 
                                                                 
96 Arguably, the state is best placed to act as final arbiter is decisions about public security and justice and 
in doing so, is able to ensure equitable, fair, just treatment for all and that security remains a public good 
for all to enjoy equally. 
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As Loader (2000: 324) suggests: 
‘The questions … that have long vexed discussions of police policy and 
(mal)practice in liberal democratic societies press themselves with renewed 
force under the altered conditions of plural policing’.  
 
Indeed, as Lister and Jones (2015: 197) point out:  
‘…if the contested nature of police ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ relations 
gives rise to complex and daunting challenges, they become even more so when 
considering the complex ‘policing web’ (Brodeur, 2010) of public and private 
agencies and actors … Where police - at both the individual and institutiona l 
level - in E&W are rendered accountable through a series of principle-agent 
relationship chains that link them to elected political structures, offering a 
symbolic as well as a functional element of democratic responsibility for, and 
control over, local policing, there is no equivalent apex of authority governing 
plural policing networks’. 
 
The emerging pluralised and marketised policing landscape has rather given rise to ‘a 
more diversified set of horizontal accountability relations’ which together, ‘have served 
to undermine reliance on traditional vertical chains of political accountability which have 
typified the culpability relations most commonly associated with state-based, 
monopolistic formations of policing’ (Lister and Jones, 2015: 197). Increased levels of 
interaction between the public police and private security therefore raise acute regulatory 
challenges (Greve, 2008) which, considering the tendency of privatisation towards the 
outsourcing of ‘frontline’ roles, must now extend beyond traditional contractual forms of 
governance which have characterised typical managerial accountability mechanisms, 
‘relating to costs and outputs, rather than deeper questions of resource allocations, 
priorities and policing styles’ (Lister and Jones, 2015: 197). The instrumental and client-
defined mandate of private security (Shearing and Stenning, 1983) without doubt raises 
concern over the ability of the state (the police) to ensure that public-private partnership 
arrangements in whatever form they may be manifested, remain responsive to and 
considerate of the wider public interest.  
 
The Private Security Industry Act 2001 which established the Security Industry Authority 
(SIA) and the compulsory ‘licensing’ of those working within particular sectors of the 
industry, including static guards, door supervisors, wheel-clampers, bodyguards, private 
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investigators and security consultants97. Employment in these specified sectors requires 
a licence, which is contingent on both training and criminal records vetting. The Act 
makes it an offence to work without a licence or to employ someone without a licence. 
While limited in scope (e.g. significant sectors of the security industry such as security 
systems installers and in-house guards remain exempt from licensing (White, 2010)) and 
arguably amounting to little more than a model of ‘self-regulation’ (Button, 2002), this 
development does indicate an albeit arms-length attempt at regulating and thus 
legitimising some of the activities of the private security industry. It is also arguably 
suggestive of an attempt to improve standards of competence and professionalism in the 
industry as the state concedes to the idea of a networked approach to policing and security 
provision in which the services of private security may (or may not as the case may be) 
be harnessed to advancing the public good. 
 
2.2.6 Summary  
 
This section has reviewed literature relevant to the introduction of CIs in E&W. 
In doing so, it has laid the necessary contextual and theoretical groundwork for later 
discussions of this thesis. In particular, this section has focused on the changing landscape 
and territories of policing and, within that, the rise in presence and significance of private 
security to contemporary policing provision. It discusses how, since before the formation 
of the public police organisation, policing has been operating within a plural context. 
Growing reference to the ‘governance of security’ or ‘security networks’ by various 
scholars draws attention to the renewed significance of such trends for contemporary 
policing provision. However, as this section made clear, recent developments in 
pluralisation have occurred within as well as beyond the police organisation as the 
growing presence of non-police personnel (employed by the police and by other public 
and/or private agencies/organisations) has become ever more apparent. In this sense, CIs 
may represent one of the latest additions to the ever growing policing family and, given 
their potentially hybrid status as employees of private security agencies, may be further 
obscuring traditional distinctions with regard to the role of the police and private security.  
 
                                                                 
97 While provisions are contained within the Act which also allow for the licensing of private investigators, 
at the time of the research private investigators are not subject to regulation by the SIA. 
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The following section will examine the extent to which recent developments in the 
contexts and patterns of policing (most notably, the declining legitimacy of the public 
police and recent pluralising trends) have led to a blurring of the boundaries between 
professionalism and managerialism98 (Dent and Whitehead, 2002: 1) and consequently, 
the redistribution of workloads between professional officers and paraprofessional staff. 
Within the contemporary CID, the ‘professional’ police detective must now negotiate 
his/her role in conjunction with that of a range of ‘others’ including a host of non-
warranted policing paraprofessionals. However, as the following section will explore, 
while CIs may at first blush be conceptualised as paraprofessionals given their intended 
complementary function to that of warranted DCs, in reality, their occupational position 
may in fact be more ambiguous. The following section therefore critically examines how 
recent changes in the contexts and patterns of policing (discussed in this section and also 
in Chapter One) have impacted upon the trajectory of police professionalism in E&W and 
specifically, on notions of professionalism in criminal investigation. 
 
2.3 The Policing Profession - Changing Detective Roles, Identities and 
Professionalism in Investigation 
 
Much has been written in the discipline of sociology on work, occupations, 
professions and organisations. Within this growing body of work profession, 
professionalism and professionalisation have emerged as key concepts. These terms have 
also, in more recent decades, grown in their significance within the field of police studies. 
However, despite their relatively general use, both in colloquial and written form (often 
as a shibboleth), the concepts remain somewhat ambiguously defined, particularly in 
relation to policing. Establishing hard and fast definitions for each of the terms has been 
made even more difficult in recent years with the changing nature of work. Recent 
decades have seen a number of societal and policy developments and changes which have 
in turn led to increased complexities in the contexts and environments for professions . 
Some long established boundaries are becoming blurred. For example, there is no longer 
a clear differentiation between the public and private sectors of professional employment. 
                                                                 
98 In many respects NPM may be viewed as an attempt to reformulate professionalism around managerial 
culture (Evetts, 2003). According to Fyfe (2013: 411), such a move ‘has been facilitated in policing by the 
requirement for police performance frameworks monitoring a range of indicators, from response times to 
detection rates, as a way of distinguishing strong from poorly performing police forces and holding them 
to account’. 
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Private funding is now embedded within public sector work places and the public sector 
is increasingly electing to engage with the private sector, be this through formal public -
private partnership arrangements or simply as a result of new staffing arrangements which 
have emerged as a necessary requirement within contemporary working arrangements in 
the UK (e.g. contracting-out) (Evetts, 2014: 30).  
In E&W the police, like many other professions, have been subject to a rapid process of 
reorganisation and consolidation in recent years (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008) which 
has in turn, called into question the occupational identities and professional roles of police 
officers (Hughes, 1958). Such alteration, it has been alleged, has occurred alongside a 
general ‘loss of faith’ in the police by the British public99 (Reiner, 2010), a trend which 
has also initiated a drive towards ‘professionalising’ the police100. Recent changes in the 
terrain of policing - most notably the pluralisation of policing and the growing 
significance of ‘policing paraprofessionals’101102 - have served to amplify uncertainties 
about the status of policing as a profession and the sustainability of the foundations on 
which the discourse of police professionalism has historically been built. Sworn-officer 
status remains the bedrock of the police ‘profession’ but, as will be discussed in this 
section, entry points and career paths are becoming more diverse, with growing numbers 
of specialist and police staff roles. The result of this has seen the increased blurring of the 
boundaries between professionalism and managerialism (Dent and Whitehead, 2002: 1) 
and consequently, the blurring of occupational identities and increased role confusion 
within the policing profession (Moller and Harber, 1996). 
Guided by research on professions and expertise (for example, Abbott, 1991a, 1991b; 
Freidson, 2001; Evetts, 2013), this chapter examines issues relating to the evolving 
discourse of police professionalism in contemporary policing and investigation in E&W. 
It will explore the extent to which professionalism is changing and is being changed by 
                                                                 
99 Successive waves of the British Crime Survey would appear to testify to this (Jansson, 2008; Roberts and 
Hough, 2005). 
100 Previous policing and security research has explored the professionalisation of the public police (Chan, 
2003; Sklansky, 2011, 2014) and professionalism within police services (Manning, 1997). 
101 In the broadest sense a paraprofessional can be defined as ‘a person who possesses fewer than the 
minimum professional requisites and whose job description involves tasks and duties which were on ce 
performed by the professional’ (Love, 1981: 368). Other areas of work in which paraprofessionals can be 
found operating include law (e.g. paralegals), education (e.g. teaching assistants) and nursing (e.g. health 
care assistants).  
102  See for example, work by Gilling and Hughes (2002) O’Neill, (2014) and Cherney (2004) on the 
professionalisation of ‘community safety officers’ both in the UK and internationally. 
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developments in the contexts and environments of work and the effect these 
developments may be having on traditional understandings of police work and culture. 
Most significantly, this chapter will seek to explore the extent to which the developing 
nature of criminal investigation in E&W can be said to be instigating a renegotiation of 
the boundaries surrounding the role of the warranted police detective and, in turn the 
dilution of professional orthodoxies in the investigative specialism. 
 
 
2.3.1 Defining the Field 
2.3.1.1 The Rise (and Fall) of Professions 
 
Before moving on to discuss the issue of police professionalism and, in particular, 
the impact of recent trends in police modernisation (particularly pluralisatio n and the 
growing significance of police staff) on the ‘detective profession’ specifically, it is first 
important to define the field. What makes a profession different from an occupation? Why 
is professional status so desired? In order to answer these questions a brief appreciation 
of the historical significance of the professions is required. The history of and emergence 
of the professions in Britain is notably peculiar and distinct from that in other parts of the 
world (Johnston, 1982). In continental Europe for example, professionals generally have 
been and are mainly employed in the public sector, closely connected to and controlled 
by state authorities (Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990). By contrast, the Anglo-American 
‘ideal type’ stresses the freedom of self-employed practitioners to control working 
conditions (Collins, 1990) and, with regard to professionalisation, focuses on the 
establishment of ‘private government’ within an occupation rather than on the politica l 
struggle for control within an elite bureaucratic hierarchy as can be seen in Continenta l 
type processes of professionalisation (Collins, 1990). The relative distinctness of the 
‘mixed economy’ 103  British experience owes much to the historical antecedents for 
contemporary professions which, as Macdonald (2000) explains, can be traced back to 
the fifteenth century and the governing capabilities of the Crown and, more specifica l ly, 
its success in securing a unified political order which, in part, relied on the support of 
towns who were in turn rewarded by charters which gave them a measure of autonomy. 
                                                                 
103 As a ‘mixed economy’ Britain may generally be conceptualised as falling somewhere in between the 
extremes of capitalistic, free-market oriented states (e.g. the United States) and state-controlled command 
economies such as that of the former USSR (Perkin, 1996) 
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This balance according to Macdonald (2000: 72) ‘was the basis of a culture in which 
occupations were able to achieve a measure of self-government and, in contrast to more 
centralised and autocratic regimes elsewhere in Europe, were able to defend their 
independence and carry it through to the modern period’104.  
 
As professions such as law and medicine gradually became more organised and further 
established during the pre-industrialisation era – ‘operating with distinct interests, 
memberships and bodies of knowledge and beginning to form a stable and intimate 
connection with training and examination’ (Larson, 1977: 2) - so they began to acquire a 
monopoly, or at least licensure (Macdonald, 2000) in defence of their occupationa l 
jurisdiction105  amidst the transition from a community-oriented to a market-oriented 
society. Within this context, ‘a collective effort was needed on the part of the actual or 
potential sellers of services to capture and control expanding markets’ (Larson, 1977: 10). 
Concern over regulating competition and therefore the terms of access to marks of 
professional fitness thus typified this period of pre-industrial transition; the professiona l 
entrepreneurs of the period were gradually able to secure relative exclusivity in work, a 
central component of this being the ability to solicit state protection and state-enforced 
penalties against ‘unlicensed competitors’106.  
 
Since the early nineteenth century the professions in Britain have gradually developed 
amidst incremental advancement of knowledge through specialisation and developments 
in technology and concomitant differentiation in the division of labour (Larson, 1977: 
xvi). Together, such developments have not only afforded established professions the 
authority to attain a greater level of power and esteem but, as the complexity of such 
knowledge has become apparent, have also allowed for the growth of new professions  
(e.g. accounting, surveying, civil and mechanical engineering). Despite gaining power in 
numbers and societal/cultural importance, a decline in deference to authority over the last 
                                                                 
104  However, the historical roots of most modern-day professions are traceable back to the nineteenth 
century or later, with most professions coalescing in the twentieth century (Jennings, Callahan and Wolf, 
1987).  
105 This agreement has come to be called the ‘regulative bargain’ with the state (Cooper, Lowe, Puxty, 
Robson and Willmot, 1988), in which monopoly of the profession over its area of work is achieved through 
the support of government, usually through licensure of some form (Macdonald, 2000). 
106 The most obvious example of this being the consolidation of the medical profession following  the 
Medical Act of 1858 which established the General Medical Council and the Medical Register, a public list 
of all recognised medical practitioners) (Stacey, 1992; Witz, 1992). Medicine was successful in securing 
state sponsorship for monopolistic control partly because it was able to justify its value within the arena of 
vital concern for individual, community and state (Larson, 1977).    
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50 years or so (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) has seen the professions fall under greater 
scrutiny as unparalleled availability of information following as exponential growth in 
information technology in the past quarter century has rendered their claim of status and 
expertise increasingly open to negotiation. The Thatcher years in particular saw even 
greater scrutiny of the professions (e.g. medicine and teaching in the first two terms of 
office and the legal profession in the third term), focused on challenging the legal 
monopolies of professions and, in particular, on strengthening the public regulation of 
professional bodies (Klein and Day, 1996).  This was often achieved through the 
separation of the professional body from the associated regulatory body for professiona ls 
(e.g. as can be seen with the split between the Royal Colleges/General Medical Council 
for doctors, Bar Council/Bar Standards Board for barristers, Law Society/ Solicitors 
Regulatory Authority for solicitors etc.) which in turn allowed for the emergence of new 
professions (e.g. licenced conveyancers and patent agents) (cf Collins, 2006). Coupled 
with the general retreat of the state (Cook and Stevenson, 1996) - as privatisation changed 
corporate markets and government-business relations in the UK throughout that period 
(Harris, 1999), - the steady rise of legislation and regulation in Western societies during 
this time (cf Majone, 1994) could be interpreted as a backlash against professiona l 
independence/restrictive practices which had become characteristic of professional status 
and which had come to be afforded to the professions in acknowledgement of their 
privileged position of trust (promise of integrity) and discernible knowledge and expertise. 
One key impact of managerialist control (alongside the debateable degree to which it 
improved efficiency) has been the reduction in autonomy for professionals as some of 
their authority has been gradually transferred to managers and administrators (e.g. doctors 
working within the NHS) (Oni, 1996). As Evetts (2013: 1) notes:  
 
‘…increasingly, professionals (such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, social workers 
etc.) now work in employing organisations. For example, lawyers and 
accountants often work in large professional service firms (PSFs) and sometimes 
in international and commercial organisations; pharmacists can be found 
operating within national (retailing) companies; and engineers, journalists, 
performing artists, the armed forces and police find occupational control of their 
work and discretionary decision making increasingly difficult to maintain and 
sustain’. 
 
With regard to the police and their tenuous relationship with professionalism, this may 
also be evidenced in regard to the decrease in autonomy of bearers of the office of 
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constable, for example through the introduction of legislation such as the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) and the Regulation of Investigatory Procedures 
Act (2000) (RIPA) (this issue will be discussed in more detail later in the following 
section). 
 
Despite a general decline in the esteem of the professions during the late twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, the allure of professionalism continues to entice. Indeed, the 
twentieth century in particular has witnessed an increasing trend for occupations to 
identify themselves as professions, and to aspire to characteristics and behaviours which 
are generally regarded as professional with even more ‘new’ professions emerging during 
this period (e.g. journalism, nursing etc.). However, notwithstanding the colourful history 
of the professions and growing body of literature in the sociology of work on the 
development of professional work, the notion of professional as distinct from non-
professional occupation is far from clear; there are several ways in which the phenomena 
of professions and professionalisation may be understood.  
 
 
2.3.1.2 Profession, Professionalism and the Professionalisation of Policing 
 
There is an entire body of academic literature on professions, which naturally 
represents many different ways of thinking about what makes an occupational group a 
profession. As such, there exists no single agreed upon definition of ‘profession’. 
Generally speaking, the concept is used to define a distinct category of occupational work 
and, in the Anglo-American literature, has traditionally been used to represent the 
category of privileged, high status, high income, self-regulating occupational groups (e.g. 
medicine, law and theology) which were seen as callings founded on ethical codes and 
usually focused on serving others (Roddenberry, 1953: 109). While what constitutes a 
profession has arguably changed over time with definitions remaining largely open to 
debate107, the idea of ‘profession’ nonetheless carries with it various connotations about 
                                                                 
107 Understandings of the professions and professional behaviour vary historically and cross -nationally and 
are not fixed to a particular set of occupational tasks or the fields in which they are performed (Scuilli, 
2009). Sciulli (2009: 51) points out how ‘none of these listings of empirical characteristics distinguishes 
professions unambiguously from middle class occupations on any invariant basis, ideal-typical or 
analytical’. Burrage, Jarausch and Siegrist (1990) argue that such a listing provides, at best, a ‘yardstick’ 
from which one group of occupations might be distinguished from others. 
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occupational characteristics, function in society, engagement with the market and other 
occupations, power, status and reward. The issue of whether or not policing can be 
classified as a profession has been addressed by a number of writers over the years 
(Etzioni, 1969; Goode, 1969; Hall, 1968; Rohl and Barnsley, 1995: 237; Vollmer and 
Mills, 1966; Wilensky, 1964) and has presented a troubling issue for many scholars. 
Commentators such as Neyroud and Beckley (2001: 74) have drawn attention to the fact 
that, when approached from a strict taxonomic angle, policing typically falls short of a 
number of the elements widely considered necessary to qualify for full professional status 
(cf Freidson, 1983). The police have traditionally have not been guided by a written code 
of ethics; the body of knowledge they do possess has not traditionally been theory based 
knowledge gained from education and/or resulting in qualifications; they possess a 
dubious degree of professional autonomy (both as an organisation and as individua l 
‘professionals’); and the extent to which they are governed by a professional regulat ing 
body remains subject to debate.  
 
Within the literature, professionalism is vaguely defined 108  as encompassing the 
occupational features of a closed group of specialists who ‘apply abstract knowledge to 
particular cases’ (Abbott, 1988, 8). The idea of closed groups and the notion of abstract 
knowledge are themes which run through almost all publications on the topic of 
professionalism (cf Freidson, 2001; Larson, 1977; Noordegraaf, 2007; Wilensky, 1964). 
All other aspects variably thought relevant to the term however remain subject to debate.  
 
Within the literature, the concept of professionalisation is broadly regarded as the process 
to achieve the status of profession and has been interpreted as: 
 
‘…the process to pursue, develop and maintain the closure of the occupational 
group in order to maintain practitioners’ own occupational self-interests in terms of 
their salary, status and power as well as the monopoly protection of the occupational 
jurisdiction’ (Evetts, 2014: 34). 
 
Efforts to define professionalism have most often resulted in the listing of a number of 
traits considered indicative of the professions and which set them apart from occupations 
(Freidson, 2001: 32; Greenwood, 1957; Moore and Rosenblum, 1970; Niederhoffer, 1969; 
                                                                 
108 According to Lanyon (2009: 248), professionalism is ‘an ideology subscribed to by individuals aspiring 
to professional status within either an occupation or recognised profession’. 
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Wilensky, 1964). Characteristics generally considered indicative of professional status 
have traditionally been based on classical interpretations of professionalism and generally 
speaking, can be considered to include six central elements:  
 
1. a service orientation;  
2. a strict code of ethics;  
3. a degree of theory-based knowledge (usually gained from education and associated 
qualifications);  
4. a high degree of autonomy and professional discretion; 
5. monopoly over services and possession of specialist expertise; 
6. governed by a regulating professional body. 
 
With regard to the first of these core characteristics, the possession of a service 
orientation, Kleinig (1996: 31) describes how: 
‘…the traditional professions of law, medicine, architecture, education, and 
theology … have been thought to offer a valuable public service. Their 
practitioners have provided highly skilled and knowledgeable assistance in 
respect to some of our most important interests - our negotiations with others, 
our bodily integrity, our need for shelter, our intellectual development, and 
spiritual destiny’. 
Miller (2002: 43) similarly attributes to the professions an orientation towards ‘the 
satisfaction of certain fundamental needs, such as justice and health’. With regard to 
policing, most would agree that in a democratic society, policing should have a 
fundamental service orientation although it should be noted that there is disagreement 
about what precisely this is (Waddington, 1999). For example, while law enforcement 
and crime prevention continue as central themes in most accounts of the role of the police, 
the promotion of public safety and order, reducing fear, protecting rights, mediation and 
social engineering can now also be considered central to understandings (Kleinig, 1996: 
23-24; Neyroud and Beckley, 2001: chapter 2). Like policing more generally, definit ions 
of the core role of criminal investigation also vary, ranging from the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence to risk assessment, to the disruption of criminal networks.  
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Regarding the second core characteristic, because services provided by the professions 
are intimately intertwined with people’s most important public and/or private interests 109 
(e.g. their health, spiritual destiny and liberty) and thus require a great deal of 
trust/reliance on ethical integrity (as the services provided by professions are 
characteristically distinct/intangible from goods sold by manufacturers, merchants or 
retailers), professionals are generally governed by a strict code of ethics. It is the 
collective adoption and strict adherence to such a code that is often taken as a sign of a 
vocation’s or occupation’s true professional status (Kleinig, 1996: 33). According to 
Kleinig (1996: 33) efforts to introduce a code of ethics for the police in the UK have ‘been 
largely coincident with endeavours to professionalise the police’. Most recently, the new 
College of Policing, ‘a new professional body for the police service’, has been established 
to advance many ideals commensurate with the move to professionalisation. Amongst 
others, this has included the formulation of a revised Code of Ethics (College of Policing 
online, 2014)110 . However, given the intrinsic relationship between the state and the 
police, it is arguably difficult to recognise any code of ethics which may be promulgated 
by the police as being independent from those core values of the state and which the 
police - as servants of the Crown - are ultimately charged with upholding.  
 
A third characteristic commonly considered indicative of professional status concerns the 
issue of specialist knowledge based on theory and skills that are most often peculiar to 
their profession and are generally thought to be beyond the understanding and/or ability 
of those outside of the profession. Sometimes (and increasingly so), this specialisa t ion 
will encompass those with access to the tools and technologies which are vital in the 
profession (e.g. medical equipment). Often a key component of such theoretical 
                                                                 
109  With regard to criminal investigation, as Westera, Kebbell, Milne and Green (2014: 1) discuss 
‘detectives are entrusted with a serious and onerous role. The investigations they conduct are relied on to 
identify and convict those guilty of inflicting the most serious of crimes’. 
110 The police Code of Ethics was launched on 15th July 2014 as part of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 and sets out nine policing principles and ten standards of professional behaviour 
designed to guide decision making for everyone in policing (College of Policing, Online). Combined with  
the standards of professional behaviour, the Code will encourage officers and staff to challenge those who 
fall short of the standards expected. It is through this Code of Ethics then that professionalism in policing  
(at the level of the constable) is envisaged to be achieved through ‘high expectations’, ‘through laying down 
the law: serving notice that slack performance, unkempt appearance, rude manners and loose ethics will 
not be tolerated’ (Sklansky, 2014: 344). This is the sense in which Peel’s Metropolitan Po lice are often said 
to be the first ‘professional’ police service. The central logic of this form of professionalism is the hope 
that through using the discourse of professionalism as a ‘disciplinary logic’ a network of accountability can 
be created through which autonomous professional practice can be governed at a distance (Fournier, 1999: 
280).  
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knowledge is that such knowledge has been attained through education and qualificat ions 
rather than pure experience. As Kleinig (1996: 35-36) discusses: 
 
‘…the practical expertise of the professional is often said to be embedded in 
theory, in a group of the general principles governing the service, and not simply 
in the practical knowledge and skill of the craftsman … This is what 
distinguishes the architect from the draftsman, the engineer from the mechanic, 
the educated from the merely trained’. 
 
 
In this respect, the police officer has traditionally differed from members of professiona l 
groups because much of the police’s expertise is traditionally accepted to be experience -
based and therefore largely intangible. Indeed, the academic requirement for entry into 
police work has generally been no more than secondary school level education and a short 
period of academy training. However, increasingly police expertise has emerged as 
something which is reflective111 and knowledge-based as opposed to that which relies on 
common-sense, intuition and innate talent (Sklansky, 2014: 345). Recent years have seen 
a notable drive towards greater input from academics who study policing and crime 
control (Neyroud, 2011: 14; Weisburd and Neyroud, 2011) and through the incrementa l 
development of ‘a new more productive relationship with Further and Higher Education 
services’ (Neyroud, 2011: 45)112. There have been significant developments in academic-
police relations over the past twenty years or so, which have taken many different forms 
(cf Johnston and Shearing, 2009; Cordner and White, 2010; Murji, 2010; Fyfe and Wilson, 
2012; Bryant et al., 2013; Engle and Henderson, 2014). Most recently, these can be 
evidenced with regard to changes in the entry requirements for new recruits (Neyroud, 
2011: 85) and in relation to criminal investigation, in the recent introduction of the 
Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP)113 and, to a lesser degree, the input from 
academics in police ‘Murder Manuals’.  
                                                                 
111 The quest to make policing more effective in tackling crime and to enhance levels of accountability and 
legitimacy has driven important changes in the relationship between police organisations and the research 
community (Stone and Travis, 2011). 
112 Discussions around academic-police collaboration have emerged as something of a ‘sub-field’ of police 
studies in recent years (Murji, 2010).  In-service (programmes of study for serving police officers), pre-
service (organised around the training of new recruits), and initial-service (programmes that aim to meet  
the same learning requirements of an initial programme that can be completed prior to joining the police) 
training programmes for officers and recruits are now delivered by a number of universities across the UK 
(Bryant, Cockcroft, Tong and Wood, 2013: 386). 
113 PIP was originally conceived as a major learning and development programme for investigators and 
aims to ensure that officers and staff are trained, skilled and accredited to necessary level to be able to 
undertake relevant investigations. PIP level 2 (and 3) investigators are likely to be delegated their own 
caseload of investigations including those of a s erious and/or complex crime nature (see Schedule 1 of the 
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Fourth, professions are also said to be characterised by a high degree of autonomy and 
professional discretion. The idea that professions have obtained social closure (Murphy, 
1988), a monopoly (Larson, 1977), or jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) over certain tasks and 
autonomy over the performance of these tasks are well-documented characteristics of 
ideas about professional status (Burrage et al., 1990). At the organisational level the 
police maintain a degree of autonomy through the tradition of constabulary independence, 
that being freedom from direction and control by government114  (Lustgarten, 1986). 
Nonetheless, the recent establishment of the College of Policing in place of ACPO and 
introduction of elected Police Crime Commissioners (against the will of the police) could 
be considered evidence of a further shift towards greater (more direct) external regulat ion 
(albeit at arm’s length) by the state. 
 
Police officers also operate a significant degree of professional discretion (i.e. the 
autonomy of the individual professional rather than the autonomy of the professiona l 
body itself) in their day to day interactions and decisions. Discretion is widely accepted 
to be an integral and ubiquitous part of the work115 of police officers which is necessitated 
by the complex and often contradictory nature of the problems faced by officers on a daily 
basis. Indeed, within the context of policing, the law and discretion are considered two 
sides of the same coin (Tata, 2012), with discretion existing as an inevitable corollary of 
legal rules which seek to guide and account for any type of work which is not easily 
amenable to general rules. Discretion is also a fundamenta l aspect of the Office of 
Constable (i.e. that which separates the police officer from the ordinary citizen and 
therefore provides them with the legitimate authority to use force wherever and wherever 
necessary and the right to remove liberty), thus making their role unique within society 
(Lustgarten, 1986). In his recent assessment of ‘professionalism’ in policing, Sklansky 
(2014: 343-354) reflects on the idea of police professionalism as ‘internalised norms’ - 
i.e. when actions guided by occupational pride rather than rules enforced by a bureaucratic 
command structure are used to advance an agenda of integrity. In viewing police 
                                                                 
Serious Crime Act 2007). PIP level 2 accredited individuals may also provide advice and support to PIP 
level 1 investigators involved in volume crime. 
114 This being distinct from accountability which refers broadly to the requirement to account for one’s 
decisions which, since the 1980s in particular, has ensured a sustained and pervasive process of 
organisational reform. 
115 But of course discretion is not unique to the police. As Stenning (2009) noted, discretion pervades 
common law systems of criminal justice at every stage (through arrest, prosecution, trial and sentencing), 
and may be contrasted with the ‘principle of legality’ that supposedly seeks to limit discretionary justice, 
more or less, in many continental European civil law systems. 
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professionalism in this way, Sklansky takes account of the complex and subjective nature 
of police work, recognising the importance of ‘professional judgement’ and, with that, 
the disparate nature of professionalism as it applies to individual officers and to the police 
organisation itself.  
 
While the work of detectives has always been characterised as containing a high level of 
autonomy and information control and low level of visibility (Ericson, 1981), as Ericson 
and Haggerty (1997) point out, such traits may have been exaggerated. Developments in 
communication rules, formats and technologies through which police knowledge is 
distributed (and marketed) in fact make police work highly visible, both to police 
management and to outside organisations (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Furthermore, in 
more recent years, legislative developments (e.g. RIPA, PACE) coupled with a 
managerialist, audit-driven work culture and an increasingly critical public have also seen 
greater restrictions placed on both the level of operational autonomy and degree of 
individual discretion exercisable by individual officers. RIPA has placed statutory 
restrictions on conduct in regard to the interception of communications, surveillance and 
the use of covert human intelligence sources thus, further curtailing the autonomy of 
individual investigators. 
 
Fifth, the notion that professions hold a monopoly over the expert labour market and with 
that, exclusive professional practice of services based on specialist knowledge or 
expertise, is central to several definitions of a profession. Traditionally police work was 
not considered specialist because it was perceived as based on ‘common-sense’ practical 
knowledge which is, to some degree or another, available to all (Kleinig, 1996: 34-25). 
However, police officers are now increasingly required to master complex technologies 
and possess knowledge and expertise in scientific techniques of investigation and, in this 
sense, can be considered highly skilled service providers. Yet viewed in the context of 
plural policing and the ongoing history of police reform and ‘modernisation’ (Savage, 
2007), the police’s market monopoly on their expert services appears to have become 
progressively more tenuous (if such dominance ever was anything but symbolic (Jones 
and Newburn, 2002)) although, so far they retain their monopoly on state supported 
coercive power possessing the capacity and/or authority to use force in any situation in 
which such intervention may be required (Bittner, 1970: 122). Within some areas of the 
84 
 
police service (e.g. specialist units such as financial investigation) the knowledge and 
expertise required may be more like that characteristic of the traditional professional.  
 
Finally, most professions have associated professional bodies charged with setting and 
maintaining standards of knowledge and of entry (e.g. the General Medical Council). The 
establishment of a regulating professional body is widely considered to be one of the 
distinguishing features of the professions and is somewhat inextricably linked to the 
notion of professional autonomy or self-regulation116. While at first blush, the claim of 
professions to self-regulation may seem strange (as Lieberman (1978: 90) contends, ‘We 
don’t ask non-playing members of football teams to referee games involving their teams’), 
it is also unsurprising given the incentive to preserve quality standards (through the 
establishment of restrictions imposed on professionals), thus ensuring the status and 
reputation of the profession.  
 
It is in the feature of self-regulation - through the establishment of an independent 
professional body - that the police’s pursuit of professional status has historically been 
lacking. Both the now disbanded ACPO and NPIA fell short of the required standards 
needed to qualify as a professional regulating body. As Neyroud117 (2011: 48) argues, 
although set up to be a ‘police owned and police led’ body, NPIA was an agency of the 
Home Office (and dependent on it) so ultimately lacked the necessary freedom to act as 
a central professional body for the police. The College of Policing, introduced in 2012, 
which in part replaced the NPIA and advances many of the ideals of professiona lism 
(namely education, training, standards and evidence-based knowledge), was envisaged as 
the new professional body of the police. Indeed, it is envisaged that eventually the new 
College will be replaced with a statutory professional body, a body that will potentially 
‘raise the professional status of police officers and police staff, allowing them to gain 
greater recognition and reward for accredited levels of expertise’ (Home Office, 2012). 
However, while the operational independence of the police has long been considered a 
                                                                 
116 With regard to policing, this being the idea of the police as an operationally independent organisation in 
a similar way to that of the medical or legal professions . 
117 It should be noted that Neyroud’s version of operational independence differs from that promoted by the 
mid-twentieth century American reformers in that it centres on ‘standards of competence and achievement 
administered by a self-regulating professional society, together with a body of accumulated expertise - 
knowledge and best practices - over which the society and its members take collective responsibility’ rather 
than on ‘freedom from political second guessing’ (Sklansky, 2013: 345). 
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‘fundamental principle of British Policing’ 118  (Home Office, 2010: 12), the police 
nonetheless continue to exist as an extension of government control and, therefore, can 
never be independent of it119. While the recent restructuring of the tripartite system may 
‘transfer power back to the people’ and ‘away from government’ (Home Office, 2010: 3), 
it is unlikely to change that fundamental fact. As such, any desire for self-regulation by 
the police is arguably flawed. 
 
A further, and more recent, addition to the criteria of characteristics considered by 
commentators in the field to be indicative of professional status within the context of late 
modernity (Giddens, 1991) and one that is central to modern policing techniques and 
practices and discourses of professionalism concerns the centrality of the narrative of 
‘risk’. For Evetts (2014: 33), professions can also be characterised as:  
‘…the structural, occupational and institutional arrangements for dealing with 
work associated with the uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies … 
Professionals are extensively engaged in dealing with risk, with risk assessment 
and, through the use of expert knowledge, enabling customers and clients to deal 
with uncertainty’.  
 
According to Beck (2006: 33) ‘modern society has become a risk society in the sense that 
it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has 
produced’. This has permeated many areas of work, including police work where the 
management of intelligence and knowledge is now considered to be a crucial aspect of 
the work of policing (Ibrahim and Rowley, 2010: 612). In their book, ‘Policing the Risk 
Society’ (1997), Ericson and Haggerty argue that as society has become more fragmented, 
the focus of police work has shifted from traditional forms of crime control and order 
maintenance towards a more proactive orientation. Such an approach to the provision of 
policing and security by the police has been mediated through the use of surveillance 
technologies designed to identify, predict and manage risks including undertaking risk 
assessments for themselves (e.g. public order policing120) and for others (e.g. in civil 
                                                                 
118 In 2010, a government white paper titled ‘Policing in the 21st- Century: Reconnecting Police and the 
People’ commented on ‘the long held principle of operational independence, where those operating in the 
Office of the Constable are able to make independent decisions on how to use their legitimate coercive 
powers on behalf of the state will continue to remain the cornerstone of the British policing model’ (Home 
Office, 2010: 12). 
119 Policing is inherently political in the sense that it is an institution ‘created and sust ained by political 
processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order’ (Skolnick, 1972: 41). 
120 Strategic threat and risk assessments (STRA) are proactive assessments of risk to public order which are 
undertaken by the police and which usually examine and aim to mitigate risks from individuals or groups 
where there is intelligence that they might have the capability and/or intent to cause disorder in E&W. A 
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emergencies or road traffic accidents). The authors go on to argue that the police should 
be viewed as ‘knowledge brokers’ due to the fact that much of police time is now spent 
gathering and disseminating knowledge of risk to other social institutions concerned with 
security. For Evetts (2002), risk is included as a qualifying characteristic of professiona l 
status within the modern context and is certainly integral to the way policing and ideas 
about professionalism in policing are constructed. 
 
While the ‘core’ characteristics of professionalism discussed above continue to be 
variously drawn upon by commentators and practitioners in their attempts to discern what 
is professional work (e.g. Freidson, 2001), it is now more commonly accepted that 
differences between the professions and occupations exist as differences of degree rather 
than kind. Most writers on the subject of the professions would agree with the opinion of 
Parsons (1968: 536) that ‘the boundaries of the group system we generally call the 
professions are fluid and indistinct’. It has also become increasingly common for attention 
to be focused on discussing the many similarities of the two social forms (Olofsson, 2009), 
with many choosing to subscribe to the definitional stance taken by Becker (1972), that 
is, simply, any work which succeeds in getting itself called such, should be regarded as a 
profession. 
 
Nonetheless, as professionalism endures in its allure in many areas of work121, so do 
attempts to distinguish professions from occupations (Freidson, 2001). The appeal to 
professionalism has been a strong current in the development of the police organisat ion 
in the UK122 and, generally speaking, has been a theme underpinning many of the reforms 
which have been directed at the police in recent decades. Recent societal and policy 
changes have caused increased complexities in the contexts and environments for 
professions which consequentially have led to increased boundary blurring within long 
established areas of professional work. With regard to policing, pluralising trends such as 
                                                                 
STRA is therefore a process by which police forces (individually or collectively) analyse information about 
threats and risks against which they are required to commit resources. 
121 Within contemporary parlance the concept of professionalism continues to be utilised in a variety of 
ways, for example; as a marketing slogan in advertising to attract customers (Fournier, 1999), in 
occupational recruitment campaigns, in company mission statements and organisational aims and 
objectives to motivate employees, in managerial literature including in training manuals, and even 
occupational regulation and control (both internal and external forms). All these are now explained and 
justified as means to improve professionalism in work (Evetts, 2009: 19-20).  
122 The significance of the discourse of police professionalism can also be identified in relation to the 
development of police organisations in other countries. For example, see work by Fleming (2013) for an 
account of the development of the police in Australia. 
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the growth in private sector policing and security providers and processes of 
civilianisation have cumulatively called into question the sustainability of professiona l 
policing orthodoxies - namely the belief of policing as an intuitively learned, artisan craft. 
This in turn has instigated the emergence of a new vision of police professionalism as the 
police seek actively align themselves with many of the traditional characteristics of 
professions in order to assert their jurisdictional monopoly within this new and 
increasingly fragmented field of policing and security provision. 
 
2.3.2 The Discourse of Police Professionalism - The Enduring Allure 
 
Discourses of 'professionalism' have long had a strong resonance in relation to the 
police as an occupational group and, as will be discussed below, are frequently invoked 
to support, or resist, fundamental changes to the ways in which they work. The 
establishment of Peel’s ‘new police’ in 1829 heralded a new era of ‘professional policing’, 
in that it was distinguishable from earlier forms by its ‘specialisation, professionalism and 
publicness’123 (Rowe, 2008: 24). It brought with it a shift from an ‘amateur’ system of 
policing to a ‘professional’ force of constables (Storch, 1999; Reiner, 1985), who were 
centrally controlled, uniformed, empowered by legislation and funded by the state 
(Mawby, 2008)124.  
 
In policing, the discourse of professionalism has been a key driving force behind many 
of the reforms that have been directed at the police in recent years and which have served 
to alter both the shape and texture of policing in E&W. The drive for professionalism has 
been motivated by a complex variety of factors, including aspirational need for higher 
socio-economic status and strengthening police legitimacy (Hallenberg, 2012: 96)125 . 
However, it is also likely to have been influenced by the changing nature and character 
of policing in recent decades. Indeed, if it is the warranted officer who is to be seen as the 
professional, perhaps such developments can also be viewed as a strategic repositioning 
                                                                 
123 The extent to which the establishment of the ‘new’ police marked a sharp break with past practices must 
not however be overstated (Fyfe, 2013: 408). 
124 See section 2.2 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of the history of the police, policing and the 
police detective. 
125 With regard to legitimacy, as Stone and Travis (2011: 14) argue, recent decades have seen greater 
recognition of the fact that legitimacy is not only something which is conferred by the law and democratic 
politics, but is something which must also be earned by the police adhering to professional standards in 
their contact with the public. 
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of the police within their field of influence as the contemporary policing landscape 
becomes ever more crowded? Although significant steps have been made to 
professionalise the police occupation, many of which have been in line with 
characteristics considered indicative of the professions (as illustrated in the previous 
section), the process has been far from straightforward (Sklansky, 2013: 344). It is clear 
from the work of Sklansky (2014: 344) that there is something protean about the nature 
of police professionalism. Clearly, professionalism ‘means different things to different 
people and at different times and serves various purposes’ (Chan, 1999: 5; Fyfe, 2013). 
This is true not just between organisations but within them, with interpretations of 
professionalism also often existing at both the occupational and organisational levels126. 
The commitment to professionalism within the police organisation also varies between 
ranks (Manning, 1977). As Sklansky (2014: 356) notes, such definitional ambiguity can 
easily turn a debate about police professionalism into a debate about semantics. However, 
as Tilley and Laycock (2014: 370) discuss, when we talk of ‘professional policing’ here 
in the UK, generally speaking: 
 
‘…we mean it to refer as in medicine, to the application of an established body 
of knowledge and the completion of high quality work with a considerable 
amount of delegated authority for staff following high standards of professiona l 
ethics which stress personal integrity and public service. A professiona l 
organisation supports this service in valuing equity, non-discrimination and in 
monitoring the work of members to ensure that standards are maintained’. 
 
In his recent ‘Review of Police Leadership and Training’ (2011) Peter Neyroud places 
heavy emphasis on the development of ‘a new and vibrant professionalism in policing’ 
(p14), arguing that the time has now come for the police to move ‘from an organisat ion 
that acts professionally’ to ‘a professional service’ (p11). While the language used 
suggests that there may be something qualitatively different about the emerging style of 
police professionalism compared with that which has gone before, the foundations of 
Neyroud’s ‘formal professionalisation’ can broadly be traced back to older notions of 
professionalism as expertise and self-regulation. Indeed, in Neyroud’s vision of police 
professionalism, the need for which he attributes to ‘the developing nature of the 
                                                                 
126  Evetts (2009: 23-24) defines ‘occupational professionalism’ as ‘a discourse constructed within 
professional occupational groups and incorporates collegial authority.  It involves relations of practitioner 
trust from both employers and clients. It is based on autonomy and discretionary judgment and assessment 
by practitioners in complex cases.  It depends on common and lengthy systems of education and vocational 
training and the development of strong occupational identities and work cultures.  Controls are 
operationalised by practitioners themselves who are guided by codes of professional ethics which are 
monitored by professional institutes and associations’. 
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knowledge requirement and skills development within the [police] occupation’ (Neyroud, 
2011: 45), professionalism can be achieved through the development of a professiona l 
policing body with a responsibility for providing:  
 
‘…clearer standards, a service-owned qualification framework, greater focus on 
professional development across all roles and, as a result, a new more productive 
relationship with other providers such as Further and Higher Education’ (ibid).  
 
Growing interest in police pre-employment training and education over the last five years 
or so127 suggests that while policing continues to fall short of recognition as a ‘regulated 
profession’128 in the UK, an attempt to instigate debate around this issue may be underway.  
 
The persistent pull of professionalism in policing begs the question, why? Why is it that 
occupations such as the police strive to ascend to professional status? What is it about the 
professions that give them their enduring appeal? This is an issue that has been dealt with 
on numerous occasions in the sociological literature on work and professions and, for the 
most part, the allure of professionalism has been attributed to jurisdictional monopoly 
coupled with the degree of social elevation offered to those who wear the mantle (Abbott, 
1988; Larson, 1977). 
 
Manning (1977: 12) argues that the rhetoric of police professionalism ‘is the most 
important strategy employed by the police to defend their mandate and thereby to build 
self-esteem, organisational autonomy and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness’.  
Since its beginning, (and in a fashion comparable to other now well established 
professions such as social work) the police, like many other occupations, have struggled 
‘for an exclusive right to perform certain types of work’, and have found themselves in 
‘constant conflict with other groups over issues of boundaries, clients, resources and 
licensing’ (Weiss, Spiro, Sherer and Korin-Langer, 2004: 288). Like other occupationa l 
groups, the discourse of police professionalism allows the police a discourse through 
which to defend their status from competing interests (e.g. from other occupational groups, 
government and their clients) (Macdonald, 2000; Popple, 1985). 
                                                                 
127 It should be noted that some universities have been offering pre-service training programmes for police 
officers for a number of years now (e.g. Canterbury Christ Church University has had its programme in 
place since 2002 (Bryant et al., 2013: 386)). Furthermore, although arguably connected to the drive for 
increased professionalism in policing, this development may also be representative of the will of 
government to outsource the risk and cost of police training. 
128 A regulated profession is one ‘where access to or practice of a profession is restricted by national law to 
those holding specific qualifications’ (UKNCP, 2015). 
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From this perspective, changes in the discourse of police professionalism can therefore 
be interpreted as efforts by the police to preserve their mandate during periods of socio-
economic and political disorder which potentially threaten their domain. As Chan et al. 
(2003: 6) have argued, ‘The new push for police professionalism may have arisen from 
the need to control ‘police work’ in a climate of jurisdictional competition and 
interagency rivalries’ (Chan et al., 2003: 6). This can be evidenced most clearly with 
regard to changes in the context of policing and security (e.g. the proliferation of specialist 
policing agencies and the expansion and regulation of the private security industry129) and 
in the dominant approaches to policing over recent decades. For example, typically, 
traditional conceptions of police professionalism have rested on three broad concepts: the 
idea that crime control is the dominant function of the police, the belief in the police as 
an objective, efficient and scientifically organised bureaucracy and as a centralised 
organisation independent of local social conflict (Sklansky, 2011: 2). However, the 
uptake of community policing which began in the 1970s marked a fundamental shift in 
understandings of police professionalism and, to a great extent, demonstrated a clear 
rejection of the older notions of police professionalism (Sklansky, 2011; Stone and Travis,  
2011: 8-12). Rising crime rates and failing police legitimacy (furthered by the emergence 
of several high profile examples of police incompetence or mismanagement (cf Neyroud 
and Beckley, 2001) and corruption), necessitated the implementation of a model of 
policing that improved police-community relations and strengthened police legitimacy 
(Tilley, 2003). This in turn, required a reconceptualisation in the discourse of police 
professionalism, from professionalism as the ‘thin blue line’ to professionalism as ‘not 
going it alone’ (Sklansky, 2011: 2). Since then, a more proactive, intelligence- led policing 
approach has emerged, instigating a return to the three central elements associated with 
‘old police professionalism’; it makes crime control the dominant function of the police, 
police tactics and objectives are seen to be more objective and scientific and the 
importance of centralising much of the handling and analysis of data above the 
department level has been emphasised.  
 
                                                                 
129 Private security has increased in status over the last few decades and has, to some extent, also sought to 
achieve a level of professionalism in its work/operations. For example, many private security 
actors/organisations now possess specialised knowledge (often gained  through higher education, 
particularly at the senior level) and possess a level of professional autonomy (e.g. the establishment of the 
Security Industry Authority in the UK). However, whether private security qualifies as a profession remains 
controversial, can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis and is largely dependent upon the degree of 
‘service ideal’ exhibited by the individual/organisation (Hess, 2009: 33-35). 
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As with the arrival of community policing, the emergence of the intelligence-led approach 
coincided with major changes in socio-political and economic context, most notably, the 
arrival of NPM and its associated pressures. More recently still, the planned transition 
from the police service’s traditional post-employment training model to a pre-join system 
which is detailed in both the Neyroud review (2011) (‘Review of Police Leadership and 
Training’) and the Winsor review (2011/2012) (of police officer and staff remunerat ion 
and conditions) testifies to a developing formal style of professionalism which is being 
driven by a mixture of socio-economic and political factors. For example, against a 
backdrop of austerity, pre-employment training provided by further and higher education 
institutions has become increasingly appealing as it shifts the burden of the cost of 
training onto the individual wishing to join the police, something that was recommended 
by Flanagan (2008).  
 
As has already been discussed in this chapter (see sections 2.2.4 - 2.2.5), the changing 
terrain of policing over the last three decades or so has led to increased complexities in 
the varying contexts and environments of police work. Organisational changes, 
specifically changes in the police workforce demographic (namely through the growing 
significance of the private, voluntary and third sectors to policing provision in the UK 
and more specifically, through the buying- in and contracting-out of police tasks to non-
warranted individuals) have led to a blurring or hybridisation130 of the boundaries with 
regard to professionalism in policing and its associated tasks. As in many areas of work 
(e.g. law, medicine and education) the use of paraprofessional personnel by the police has 
increased as decreasing budgets, expanding calls for service and a changing policing 
landscape (necessitating increased specialisation and an increasingly more diverse and 
flexible skills set) have required an increase in both manpower and specialist skills which 
are often distinct from those of officers.  This has in turn instigated a partial shift away 
from the ‘omnicompetence’ model and the growing significance of (non-warranted) 
paraprofessional personnel within the police organisation. Generally speaking, 
paraprofessionals perform similar work to professionals, possessing some of the traits 
broadly considered to typify a profession (Parsons, 1954) namely, the possession of 
specialist knowledge and expertise, a variable degree of professional discretion and a 
service orientation, but essentially without equivalent power and status. It is worth noting 
                                                                 
130 Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008) use the notion of ‘hybridity’ where different strand s of professionalism 
and other organisational principles coexist and co-penetrate each other, producing new hybrid arrangements. 
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that while professionals have always had employed staff (e.g. doctors have nurses and 
receptionists), only some of these auxiliary occupational groups (e.g. nurses) have since 
emerged as professions in their own right. With regard to the central focus of this study, 
the extent to which CIs can be said to be operating in the role of a paraprofessional to 
professional police detectives remains largely unknown. In some areas of work (e.g. 
criminal investigation or patrol), a split-force team model may be developing. However, 
as will be explored in this thesis, processes of modernisation are likely to continue to 
transform long established arenas/dimensions of work within the police (e.g. CID), and 
the police paraprofessional may come to adopt a progressively more established position 
within the organisation.  
 
2.3.3 The Rise of the Paraprofessional 
 
There are an increasing number of policing paraprofessionals operating within the 
police organisation and also beyond it (e.g. street wardens). Initially, through the process 
of civilianisation, non-warranted individuals were recruited to assist police officers in 
their work (see Chapter One, section 1.2.2 of this thesis), freeing them up to return to 
operational and frontline duties such as patrol and investigation (HMIC, 2004: 39-40). 
Within the milieu of NPM and increased demand on the police, civilianisation provided 
a cost-effective solution to the issues of the period. However, as work by Abbott (1998: 
72) illustrates, it is during such circumstances that a profession’s claim to jurisdictiona l 
control over a particular area of work is open to debate and can be vulnerable to claims 
by other occupational groups. In this sense, the growing presence of non-warranted 
individuals within the police organisation could be interpreted as an ‘assault on 
professionalism’ (Freidson, 2001; Krause, 1999) as tasks which were previously 
undertaken by professionals are ‘standardised’ and redistributed to less qualified workers. 
However, as Abbott (1998: 72) goes on to discuss, it is also possible that through the 
creation of subordinate groups that are capable of handling ‘dangerously routine’ 
professional work, professions are able to guard themselves against such vulnerability. 
Guyot (1979: 272) supports such claims suggesting that: 
 
‘A common step in the process of raising an occupation to professional standing 
is the shedding of routine tasks from the occupation and assigning them to 
paraprofessional occupations’.  
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In this sense, the growing use of non-warranted individuals within the police organisat ion 
might also be itself considered a direct attempt by the police to professionalise the 
organisation. However, in more recent years, the role of the paraprofessional has evolved 
and in many areas of work the role of these individuals is progressively encroaching on 
that of professionals. Within the contemporary police organisation, non-warranted 
‘paraprofessionals’ can now be found managing major functional areas of police work 
(e.g. the production and management of intelligence). Furthermore, as has also been the 
case in many other areas of professional work (e.g. teaching, parole, probation), despite 
being initially conceived as providing supportive assistance to professionals, the role of 
policing paraprofessionals has progressively expanded and now (as will be seen in the 
results of this research) includes many ‘frontline’ duties (e.g. patrol and  investigat ion) 
and tasks (e.g. interviewing suspects) considered fundamental to the effective functioning 
of the police organisation and traditionally exclusively police (officer) operational. 
 
Research on the subject of paraprofessional involvement in professional work is extensive 
and has examined areas of work both within the criminal justice system (cf work by Love 
(1981) on the role of paraprofessionals in the parole and probation services and Schindler 
and Brawley (1987) on paraprofessionals in social care) and external to it (cf work by 
Morris (2001) on the developing role of teaching assistants). Study of the expanding role 
of paraprofessionals in policing is sparse and tends to focus on their involvement in patrol 
work (cf O’Neill, 2014). The designation of professional tasks to paraprofessionals, what 
Silvestri and Crowther-Dowey (2008: 147) refer to as ‘‘downward hierarchical theft’, 
where the roles and responsibilities of criminal justice professionals are being handed 
down to those whom professional groups perceive to be relatively under-qualified or 
unqualified and inexperienced people’, raises significant questions about the 
contemporary nature of professionalism within the police organisation. For example, as 
Freidson (2001: 17) argues: 
 
‘…the two most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that 
certain work is so specialised as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required 
training and experience, and the belief that it cannot be standardised, rationalised 
or, as Abbott (1991b: 22) puts it ‘commodified’’.  
 
For the police, the jurisdiction of warranted officers in the ‘core’ areas of police work 
such as criminal investigation is assumed to stem from their specialist knowledge and 
skill in that particular area of work. As Turner (1987) has shown, knowledge is crucial to 
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a profession and central to the struggle by professionals to resist the ‘routinisation’ of 
their work and its fragmentation to groups of paraprofessionals. However, if the work 
being undertaken by paraprofessionals is being directed and managed by the professiona l 
(in the case of the police this would be the warranted officer), does the utilisation of 
paraprofessionals within the police necessarily matter for recognition of the police as a 
profession and of warranted officers as the professionals? Furthermore, while the growing 
use of paraprofessionals in areas of work traditionally considered solely ‘police 
operational’ does raise questions about the nature of the police knowledge base as it has 
been habitually conceived131, this is perhaps only significant to understandings of the 
warranted officer as professionals if the paraprofessional is being afforded autonomy in 
doing/manging their own case and/or undertaking their own enquires. 
 
Within the contemporary CID, the question now is whether detectives should retain their 
position at the apex of the CID hierarchy. Indeed, many of the skills now considered 
essential to the effective functioning of the police, such as analysis and the production 
and management of intelligence, have been ‘in-sourced’ to non-warranted civilian 
specialists (e.g. intelligence analysts). Indeed, according to the 2001 government White 
Paper, Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform, which preceding the introduction 
of the Police Reform Act 2002 in parliament, one of the primary reasons for introduc ing 
CIs was to bolster the specialist knowledge base of the CID:  
 
‘Money laundering, fraud, intellectual property theft, and other crimes are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Information technology and 
communications systems are both the means of crime and its object – and at the 
same time vital investigative tools in the fight against criminals. Too few 
officers currently have the necessary skills to deal with the most complex it 
based crime. Even with more specialist detectives we will not be able to 
guarantee an adequate capacity in most specialised fields. We must be able to 
attract career specialists in these areas to work as part of police investigat ive 
teams. Chief Officers can already appoint civilians from these backgrounds, but 
they are unable themselves to exercise police powers necessary to pursue an 
investigation; and they have limited career opportunities open to them. Civilian 
investigators must be able to function as a full member of a police investigat ing 
team’ (Home Office, 2001: 44).  
 
                                                                 
131 The main skills of police work have been described as ‘craft’ skills, not based on theory, but on the ‘dirty 
work’ of managing the boundaries of respectability (Waddington, 1999). Furthermore, much of that craft 
remains to be validated (Bayley and Bittner, 1984). 
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Competition from private providers has also grown substantially in recent years (Johnston, 
2000) with many now also offering alternatives to several of the police’s core services 
(e.g. patrol, investigation etc.). Together, these developments suggest a blurring and 
hybridisation of occupational and sectoral identities within the police organisation and, 
with regard to criminal investigation, render the claim of detectives to professiona l 
jurisdiction in their work open to debate. 
 
 
2.3.4 The ‘Professional’ Knowledge Base of Detectives  
 
The idea of policing as an intuitively learned craft skill is the central logic 
underpinning much of that which is ‘known’ with regard to the ways and means by which 
police officers investigate crime. This notion continues to be promoted by an ever-
growing body of fictional work on the police which tends to favour depictions centring 
on this old regime ideal. For police detectives, it is this notion of investigation as an 
artisan craft that secures the foundations and legitimacy of their profession as well as their 
occupational identity. The enduring discourse of police professionalism has placed the 
investigative skills of officers under scrutiny, rendering the importance of expert, tacit 
and experiential knowledge and expertise more open to challenge (Olofsson, 2009; 
Verpraet, 2009). 
 
For much of its history, the detective role has been safeguarded from the most pervasive 
of police reforms due to the assumed peculiar nature of the knowledge base from which 
the ability of officers to investigate is traditionally said to derive. The dominance of the 
old regime perspective (i.e. the idea of criminal investigation as an intuitively learned 
artisan craft) has ensured such orthodoxies remained unchallenged allowing the police 
detective an unusual degree of cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986)132 . As 
Kleinig (1996: 34-37) discusses, like police work in general, the defining characterist ic 
of the profession of detective is arguably the possession of special knowledge and 
                                                                 
132 In his ‘Theory of Practice’ Bourdieu distinguishes between four types of capital: economic capital, such 
as money, land, employment; social capital, such as various kinds of valued relations with significant others; 
cultural capital, mainly legitimate knowledge, such as education, of one kind or another; and symbolic 
capital, such as prestige, social class, and social honour (Bourdieu, 1977: 171-183; Jenkins, 2002: 85;  
Thomson, 2008: 67). 
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expertise. However, in the case of the detective, this special knowledge and expertise 
relates to a specific type of police work and is not available to all police officers. 
 
In many respects, detective work can be considered an ‘intellectual specialism’133 in that 
it requires ‘the use of a circumscribed body of knowledge and skills thought to gain 
productive ends’ and encompasses tasks in which discretion or fresh judgement must 
often be exercised if they are to be performed successfully’ (Freidson, 2001: 18). 
Speaking on intellectual specialism, Freidson (2001: 23-24) notes: 
 
‘Whatever the case may be in reality (and that may be a matter of opinion), the 
tasks and their outcome are believed to be so indeterminate … as to require 
attention to the variation to be found in individual cases. And while those whose 
occupation it is to perform such tasks will almost certainly engage in some 
routines that can be quite mechanical, it is believed that they must be prepared 
to be sensitive to the necessity of altering routine for individual circumstances 
that require discretionary judgement and action. Such work has the potential for 
innovation and creativity’. 
 
Like police work more generally, the occupation of a detective, by its very nature, is one 
of social enterprise in that it requires practitioners to be sensitive to the variable and 
diverse nature of their work. Detectives can be said to be creative in that they ‘make crime’, 
using their discretion and knowledge of the field to convert ‘social reality’ into ‘legal 
reality’ (Ericson, 1981). There are competing perspectives regarding the nature of 
detective work and, in turn, in what sense the knowledge and skills used by detectives 
should be conceived. The terms ‘art’, ‘craft’ and ‘science’ are variously drawn upon in 
research to help characterise the process by which detectives undertake their work (cf 
Carson, 2009; Innes, 2003; Reppetto, 1978; Tong and Bowling, 2006). Debate has 
suggested that in undertaking investigative work, detectives may draw on any one to a 
combination of all three of these approaches, with each approach using a different range 
                                                                 
133 From the period of the Industrial Revolution and the publication of Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 
which he used the term ‘division of labour’ to characterise the specialised enterprises of the workers he 
observed, ‘there has been a continuous increase in specialisation in the pursuit and application of complex, 
formal knowledge and technique’ (Freidson, 2001: 21). In characterising the different types of 
specialisation in existence today, Freidson (2001: 23-24) makes the distinction between manual/mechanical 
specialisation (i.e. work which is performed by semi-skilled workers which is routinised, repetitive and 
which has been specifically organised to minimise individual discretion) and what he calls ‘discretionary’ 
or ‘intellectual’ specialisation (i.e. work which encompasses tasks in which discretion or fresh judgement 
must often be exercised if they are to be performed successfully). 
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of skills and accompanying knowledge, which can be both formal and informal in 
character.  
 
‘Some are codified in texts, or otherwise described clearly and systematica l ly 
in the course of training and work and, as such, become ‘explicit knowledge’. 
This information can be formulated in words or symbols and, therefore, can be 
stored, copied, and transferred by impersonal means, such as in written 
documents or computer files’ (McKenzie and Spinardi, 1998: 215) (e.g. 
PACE).  
 
Others, however, can be communicated informally, through an extensive process of 
socialisation and, as such, are tacit in character, ‘remaining unverbalised, perhaps even 
unverbalisable, but in any case not part of a formal corpus of codified texts’ (Freidson, 
2001: 25). The detective makes use of both knowledge dimensions simultaneously in the 
performance of his/her role but it is the more abstract, tacit category of knowledge which 
has arguably ensured the detective a degree of sovereignty with regard to the practice of 
criminal investigation for a considerable period of time. It is also the tacit category of 
knowledge which is referred to as the ‘art’ and ‘craft’ of detective work - the instinct ive, 
experience dependent and culturally approved mechanisms that guide the application of 
knowledge (Tong and Bowling, 2006). 
 
Ericson (1981) and Sanders (1977) argue that the art of policing lies in the ability to read 
criminal behaviour, separate ‘the false from the genuine’ (Sanders, 1977; Ericson, 1981) 
but also in identifying effective and creative lines of enquiry. It concerns intuit ion, 
instinctive feelings and hunches towards problem solving in an investigative capacity and 
is derived from experience of time spent ‘on the beat’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 324), a 
‘gift’134:  
 
‘The depiction of detective work as an ‘art’ aligns closely with the popular 
conception of a detective having innate, non-concrete, characteristics, such as 
intuition and instinct, that training and education can do little for’ (Westera, 
Kebbel, Milne and Green, 2014: 2). 
 
The old regime perspective of the seasoned detective also highlights the notion of 
detective work as a craft which is thought to be rooted in experience gained while ‘on the 
                                                                 
134  See Lioger (1993, 1996) for an interesting case study of French dowsers and their gift. This is an 
individual attribute which cannot be learned in the classroom or routinely acquired by experience and is 
perhaps even divine. 
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job’. Such necessary craft skills are considered to provide detectives with an 
understanding of the role of suspects, victims and witnesses as well as an ability to 
organise a case file in a manner deemed appropriate by the detective (Hobbs, 1988)135: 
 
‘The use of manipulation and negotiation with suspects, victims and witnesses, 
police managers and supervisors to achieve either organisational ends or a form 
of justice considered appropriate by the detective may all be seen as relevant 
characteristics of the craft of detective work’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 324). 
 
 
This depiction of detective as artist and craftsman furthers the belief that detectives 
possess a breadth of innate, non-concrete qualities, many of which only experience can 
provide, as theory in classrooms and books does not help the detective read the streets 
(Simon, 1991; Reppetto, 1978). As Tong (2009: 8) makes clear, ‘The failure of the police 
service to clearly articulate and develop the detective 'art' of investigative decision making 
has led to the belief that only some detectives can be recognised for their brilliance within 
the detective hierarchy’. It is also a central theme safeguarding the detective’s privileged 
status both within the police organisation itself and also within wider society, amongst 
the general public and to some degree, for the state. It is the detective’s practical working 
knowledge of investigation which is considered to afford them the ability to ‘construct or 
redefine a problem that experience or hunch suggests will facilitate a solution or enable 
the application of a preferred mode of problem solving’ (Scribner, 1986: 21-22). As 
Freidson (2001: 25) notes, ‘to solve an abstract problem, one must not only have 
command over the body of knowledge connected with the problem, but also the rules of 
discourse and the capacity or skill to employ them so as to arrive at an acceptable solution’. 
The art and craft of detective work can therefore be understood as a type of skilled 
practical thinking which is marked by flexibility, ‘solving the same problem now one way, 
now another, each way finely fitted to the occasion’ (Scriber, 1986: 21-22). Indeed, as 
Simon (1991: 18) identified:  
 
‘Inside every good detective are hidden mechanisms - compasses that bring him 
from a dead body to a living suspect in the shortest span of time, gyroscopes that 
guarantee balance in the worst storms’. 
 
                                                                 
135 As will be discussed in the following chapter on police culture(s), what  is a successful and acceptable 
solution to an investigation is determined largely by the occupational culture of detectives. 
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A belief in the ‘hidden mechanisms’ that are said to help guide detectives as they go about 
their work is a theme also evident in other areas of investigative work taking place outside 
the police organisation. For example, speaking of the work of forensic accountants, 
Williams (2014: 59-60) notes how: 
 
‘One of the recurring images of forensic accountants circulating in news 
articles and trade magazines is that of the financial sleuth tracking down and 
ferreting out fraud. This professional mythology is bolstered by descriptions 
of accounting as a specialised and well-defined body of expert knowledge 
rooted in specific competencies and skill sets’. 
 
He goes on to discuss how:   
 
‘These claims to expertise combined with the personal attributes of dogged 
determination and an eye for detail are essential to the ‘symbolic capital’ 
(Bourdieu, 1989, 1991) or ‘regulatory authority’ (Reichman, 1992), and thus 
legitimacy, of forensic accounting professions as well as of the industry itself’. 
 
In the crime fighting model of policing, the officers who carry the most symbolic capital 
(i.e. accumulated prestige or honour) are those who bring in the ‘good pinches’ (Van 
Maanen, 1978: 304), who can be trusted to protect others and who have experience or 
rank. With regard to criminal investigation more specifically, the symbolic capital of 
detectives is directly related to old regime ideas about detective work as an inexplic it, 
experience-based and intuitive craft. However, as Williams (2014: 60) has discussed in 
relation to investigators in the field of forensic accounting, what the view of forensic 
accountant as ‘super-sleuth’ overlooks, is how much: 
 
‘These attributes are the product of an extended process of professional claims -
making. It is through this process that accountants have claimed professiona l 
jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) over the practice area of fraud detection and 
investigation defining it in ways that best suit their own professional interest, 
skills, and competencies’. 
 
New visions of policing, such as community policing and problem-oriented policing, 
have introduced alternative sources of social and cultural capital (i.e. knowledge, skills 
and other cultural acquisitions such as educational or technical qualifications) which 
are based broadly on the capability to solve problems, to work with members of the 
community and to provide service and, in this sense, are seeking to change the 
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predominant ‘habitus’136 of the police. In many instances action which is guided by 
habitus ‘has the appearance of rationality but is based not so much on reason as on 
socially-constituted dispositions’ (Van House and Sutton, 1996: 139-140). However, 
due to the inextricable and (with regard to CIs and DCs) often compounded link 
between the habitus and ‘the field’137 (referring broadly to social space in which action 
takes place (Bourdieu, 1977: 72-73)), any change in the habitus of the police must also 
take account of the conditions, values and relational/structural positioning (and power) 
of actors operating within the field itself. As with other physical and social 
environments, the logic of the field in regard to the police is applied differently for 
different individuals, depending on their position (Bourdieu, 1977: 122). With regard 
to the field of medicine, for example, the position of doctors is different from that of 
nurses. With regard to the CID, the occupational position of DCs (as the dominant class 
or ‘players’) may be seen as distinct from that of CIs. However, as will be explored in 
later chapters of this thesis, the nature of the field in which CIs and DCs operate and 
interact (the CID) may be changing. The emergence of a range of new players in the 
form of non-warranted police staff, many of who are performing important (often 
specialist) work as part of their roles, is likely to instigate a renegotiation in the habitus 
of the police with regard to criminal investigation provision including access to specific 
resources in the form of capital (be it symbolic, social, economic or cultural).  
 
Chan (1997)138, who employed Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field in her analysis 
of police cultures, drew attention to how wider organisational and political changes in 
the policing field can influence, and be influenced by, police officers’ habitus. The 
introduction of CIs as part of a longer trend in police workforce modernisation is 
therefore likely to have impacted on detectives’ habitus or ‘feel for the game’ to some 
extent. UK government policy has encouraged a shift away from a ‘general 
practitioner’/omnicompetent model of investigative provision towards increased 
specialisation often involving new technologies and, thus, new types of knowledge and 
                                                                 
136 ‘Habitus’ refers to ‘a system’ of cultural dispositions (determined by past experience) that creates a 
tendency towards certain behaviours and choices (Bourdieu, 1977: 81-82; see also Maton, 2008: 50-52) 
and is arguably the main concept in Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’. 
137 Chan astutely argued (1996: 129-130) that the reasons that ‘apparently dramatic changes’ to a police 
force in Australia failed was because they were directed at the habitus and not the field. 
138 Habitus refers to one’s personal orientation and experiences, a ‘feel for the game’. Chan (1997) refers 
to the policing field as the ‘rules of the game’, and officers use their various types of organisational 
knowledge (their habitus, the police culture) to navigate this field. Thus as field and habitus can be 
changed as well as change each other, police culture is likewise open to modification. 
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expertise. However, as highlighted in the opening chapter of this thesis, there is 
currently a lack of clarity regarding the impact that such changes to traditional working 
practice might be having upon the overall provision of criminal investigation by the 
police and on popular understandings of professionalism in this field.  This is due in 
large part to the ambiguous nature of detective work which, according to traditiona l 
interpretations of the criminal investigation process, relies on innate craft skill and thus 
serves to afford detectives a significant level of cultural authority and jurisdic t ion 
within their area of work139 (Tong and Bowling, 2006).  
 
As budgetary pressures continue to enact organisational restructuring of the police 
organisation, professional boundaries within the police may subsequently need to be 
renegotiated/redrawn. The increasing presence and significance of paraprofessiona l 
personnel within the police is, in some part, suggestive of a decrease in formal role 
demarcations between warranted officers and non-warranted police staff (particular ly 
in areas of work considered ‘core’ to the police function). However, with specific 
regard to the contemporary CID, the presence of paraprofessionals is also recognisably 
symptomatic of the growing need for specialist expertise and knowledge within the 
organisation.  While in some instances CIs may be undertaking work which might once 
have been carried out by detectives, it is likely that many of the roles being performed 
by these individuals have in fact never been the preserve of the detective constable. It 
is in this sense that CIs may in fact be strengthening the CID’s claim to professiona l 
jurisdiction of criminal investigation. However, as will be explored in the following 
section, CI’s absence of foundational knowledge gained from time spent working the 
beat continues to hinder their full admission to the rank of ‘professional’ investigator 
at a cultural level. 
 
                                                                 
139 Within the contemporary milieu of ‘police professionalism’, a shift from a reactive to a more proactive 
approach to policing has seen approaches to criminal investigation and those practices employed by the 
venture become progressively pre-emptive and scientific. This approach has also come to be seen as 
increasingly relevant with the growing influence of forensic science and investigative psychology 
(Westera et al., 2014: 2). Indeed, ‘In the perspective of detective as ‘scientist’ investigators are skilled in  
scientific approaches, crime scene management, the use of physical evidence, investigative interviewing , 
informant handling, offender profiling and managing the investigation process’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 
325). Tong and Bowling (2006: 326) argue that ‘the scientific approach to detective work points to a 
potentially evolving ‘professional’ detective significantly different from the detectives in the past’.  
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2.3.5 Summary 
 
Police professionalism is not a new phenomenon and opinions on whether or not 
it is truly achievable continue to vary. Promoters of any professional model of policing 
maintain that police officers are experts through training, accreditation, education and 
experience and, thus, should be regarded as professionals in every sense of the term. A 
large part of this section was devoted to assessing the claim of the police to professiona l 
status in terms of the characteristics of professions, and I argue that the police can be seen 
to meet most of them to a considerable degree. Recent drives for improved 
professionalisation have, in large part, reflected the police’s desire to improve their 
overall legitimacy; professionalism (in some cases) may offer an antidote to corruption 
and underperformance. However, accompanying (and related to) the decline in police 
legitimacy, more recent years have also witnessed the rising significance of 
paraprofessional personnel working within the police organisation. Faced with budget 
constraints, the paraprofessional employee has emerged (in part) as a potential solution 
to many of the police organisation’s strategic and economic troubles. The development 
of the police paraprofessional role can thus generally be considered to have been 
instigated by two factors. First, there is the need for an increasingly more effic ient 
workforce which has mandated the redistribution of work load between professiona l 
officers and paraprofessional staff. Second, growing recognition of the necessity for 
progressive specialisation within the organisation (in particular, within the CID) has 
required the recruitment of individuals with specialist skills and expertise from outside 
the organisation. However, in allowing for the utilisation of policing paraprofessionals in 
areas of work generally considered to be ‘frontline’ (e.g. patrol, criminal investiga t ion 
and custody), the police have in turn arguably afforded scope for the blurring of 
occupational identities and increased role confusion within the policing profession 
(Moller and Haber, 1996). This issue becomes even more apparent when considering the 
growing significance of private security to public policing provision.  
 
The utilisation of such individuals no doubt raises important questions about the trajectory 
of police professionalism in the coming years; established professional and sectoral 
boundaries may need to be redrawn as the role now being played by ‘unlicensed’ 
individuals within the organisation acts to dilute professional orthodoxies in policing and, 
specifically, in the investigative specialism. This is one of the key areas to be investigated 
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in the current research. At the most fundamental level, the growing utilisation of police 
staff in ‘core’ areas of work such as criminal investigation begs the question, is it in fact 
the police or the task of policing which should be regarded as the profession? While recent 
moves to professionalise policing have largely resulted in the relative dominance of a 
‘credentialist’ definition of professionalism, like Chan et al. (2003: 5) I would argue that 
police professionalism might be best conceived as ‘a multifaceted and dynamic concept’. 
While there is not the space in this thesis to explore this issue in detail, such an idea 
nonetheless draws attention to the complex nature of professionalism in contemporary 
policing and security provision and, within that, who (if anyone) should be considered as 
operating in the role of the professional within the realms of the contemporary CID. 
 
As relative ‘outsiders’ to the occupational world of the CID, CIs must learn the accepted 
‘values, norms, perspectives and craft rules’ that inform conduct and professional practice 
with regard to criminal investigation (Reiner, 2010: 117-118).  However, just as the 
transmission of police culture to new recruits should not be regarded as a one-way street, 
neither should the acculturation process for CIs.  It is considered next how the 
introduction of CIs and the role/s they may be currently undertaking in relation to that of 
warranted detectives may both be affected by and be effecting change in the culture of 
the CID.  
 
2.4 Civilianised Investigations: A Cultural Perspective 
 
‘Cultures are the complex ensembles of values, attitudes, symbols, rules, recipes, 
and practices, emerging as people react to the exigencies and situations they 
confront, interpreted through cognitive frames and orientations they carry with 
them from prior experiences’ (Reiner, 2010: 116). 
 
The closed occupational world of the police has been identified by numerous 
scholars (Bittner, 1967; Crank, 1998; Reiner, 2010; Skolnick, 1994) and is a subject that 
has received mounting attention is recent years (Reuss-Ianni, 1993; Lahneman, 2004; 
Loftus, 2009). In Britain the police are marked by a strong degree of localism and a 
tradition of constabulary independence (Savage, 2003: 172-3). As an occupation 
dependent on mutual support and trust (Barton, 2003: 350), the police possess a deep-
rooted and complex occupational culture. The topic of police ‘culture’, or ‘cultures’ as it 
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has more recently come to be referred, has been a stubbornly reoccurring theme within 
the field of police research for some years now. Since the first scholars cast their 
conceptual lenses onto the police organisation in the 1960s (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 
1966), the role that informal norms and values play in shaping the everyday decisions of 
officers have been the focal point for every imaginable type of literature, film and 
television. The importance of the police and its culture has even been linked to the idea 
of nationhood and collective identity more generally (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003).  Police 
culture has been viewed as exerting influence over the way officers think about and 
interact with the public as well as standing as a robust barrier to reform and the 
implementation of effective accountability measures (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; 
Silverman, 1999). All of this makes police culture a topic of enormous interest for 
researchers.  
 
However, as Loftus (2010: 2) has noted, classic accounts of police culture (Banton, 1964; 
Cain, 1973; Manning, 1977; Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1978; Skolnick, 1966) reflect the 
culture of an earlier-and-different-milieu. It is now essential that researchers of police 
studies extend the cultural lens to the examination of cultural variance which 
acknowledges the growing significance of non-warranted individuals operating within the 
organisation. CIs are but one example of how, within the current climate of austerity, non-
warranted police staff are increasingly being used within frontline police roles 
traditionally considered the preserve of warranted officers (e.g. patrol, custody, 
investigation etc.). As such, these non-warranted individuals are increasingly occupying 
positions in which the role they play inherently influences the strategic direction and 
ultimate success of a ‘job’ and also, the overall legitimacy of the organisation. In recasting 
the cultural lens onto this previously neglected group, I provide a novel insight into how 
police cultures/subcultures shape and are shaped, not only by distinct experiences 
associated with a specific organisational assignment, but also how assumptions, values 
and modes of thinking and acting associated with a distinct police subculture may also 
vary between individuals as a result of their distinct occupational position. 
 
The first part of this section begins with a review of the key literature on the topic of 
police culture providing a platform upon which to empirically explore how CIs might ‘fit’ 
within the traditional ‘detective culture’ in later chapters of this thesis (see Chapter Five, 
section 5.5). Here what is meant by the term police culture is explained, before moving 
105 
 
on to examine how police cultures are transmitted to new members of the occupationa l 
group - a process referred to as ‘acculturation’.  This section then moves on to examine 
the existence of a separate detective culture and how this might be further distinguishab le 
between the plethora of units (and teams) which operate as part of the arena of specialism 
that is the CID. Space is then afforded to exploring relevant literature regarding the 
development of fragmented cultures within the police CID as a result of 
changing/developing contexts and environments of work (specifically in policing) over 
the latter half of the twentieth century. Here attention is drawn to the pressing need for 
researchers to adopt an ever more nuanced approach to the study of police 
cultures/subcultures which acknowledged variation not only with regard to function, rank 
and location, but also with regard to employment status. This section concludes by 
examining the impact the growing significance of private security may be having upon 
established cultures and orientations to work amongst those operating within the 
contemporary police and, in particular, within the CID. 
 
2.4.1 What is Police Culture? 
 
The role that the informal norms and values associated with the rank-and-file play 
in shaping the everyday decisions and practices of officers has long been noted in research 
and reflection centring on the police. Studies which focus on the existence of a discernib le 
police culture have spanned several decades and continue to occupy a prime position as 
a key topic of interest amongst scholars of police studies (Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; 
Holdaway, 1983; Loftus, 2009, 2010; Punch, 1979; Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1970; 
Young, 1991). As Loftus (2010: 1) illustrates, ‘these studies have highlighted the 
usefulness of police culture in understanding the many facets of policing, including how 
officers learn the craft of the job, use their time and interact with different people’. 
Moreover, this extensive body of research has identified a set of recurrent features which 
appear to persevere over time and space. It is now considered cliché to refer to what 
Reiner (2010: 118-132) has described as the ‘core characteristics’ of police culture - a 
sense of mission, action-oriented behaviour and cynicism; suspicion, isolation, solidarity, 
pragmatism and authority; masochism, prejudice and conservatism - a list now generally 
accepted as possessing the status of ‘sociological orthodoxy’ (Loftus, 2012: 1). While 
there is a pressing need for a new analysis of police traits in the light of the many reforms 
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that have occurred over the last few decades, Reiner’s famous typology offers researchers 
a foundation upon which to examine the police culture of a changing world.  
 
Despite the wealth of literature devoted to the topic, police culture remains one of the 
most contested and loosely defined concepts within criminological and sociologica l 
discourse (Chan, 1996: 111). This is not least due to the fact that recent years have seen 
a shift in direction away from understandings of police ‘culture’ and towards police 
‘cultures’ as scholars have come to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of contemporary 
policing provision and extent of diversity within the police workforce. Regardless of this 
difficulty, police culture, ‘cop culture’, or ‘canteen culture’ as it has been variously 
described, is one of the few academic terms to emerge from police studies to enter 
common idiom (Westmarland, 2008: 253). Another problem is that, in recent decades, 
‘police’ and ‘policing’ have become diverse terms, with ‘the policing family’ being 
extended to include a variety of other uniformed officers and police staff (see sections 
2.2.3-2.2.5). Nonetheless, Baker (2007: 322) offers a comprehensive description of police 
culture: 
 
‘It is the shared mentality concerning how the police see themselves, security 
rivals and the public; it is the shared values that motivate and integrate the police 
and sustain their self-esteem; it is the shared assumptions that determine the 
meanings they attach to things and the attitudes they adopt or reject; it is the 
shared organised knowledge about why and how things are done (and of what 
was done before) that provides the model for their habitual actions’.  
 
Since the 1960s research into the police acknowledged the existence of shared 
occupational values and attitudes between officers that influenced their perception of their 
role and in turn, their interactions with the general public (Loftus, 2010). With this in 
mind, police culture is generally understood to be the ‘range of informal assumptions, 
values and accepted practices’, which officers adopt and operate unconsciously and which 
act as a means through which they make sense of, manage and adjust to the strains, 
demands, ironies and contradictions inherent within police work (Chan, 1997: 12; Van 
Maanen, 1974: 85). In ‘Justice without Trial’, Skolnick (1966) argues that the unique role 
and responsibilities held by a police constable combined with the pressures associated 
with their operation within two distinctive working environments - the occupational and 
the organisational - leads to the development of a ‘working personality’ that cannot be 
found in other occupations. This working personality can be categorised as consisting of 
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three key features or ‘coping mechanisms’ - suspiciousness, isolation and solidarity - 
features which arise from the combination of three key strains relating to the nature of 
police work, the constant risk of danger, their designated authority and capacity to use 
force and the pressure to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. Officers must 
negotiate these two policing environments and their associated strains on a daily basis 
and as such, lead ‘something of a schizophrenic existence; they must cope not only with 
the terror of an often hostile and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile even 
tyrannical - and unpredictable bureaucracy’ (Brown, 1988: 9). Bacon (2011: 183) 
therefore likens police culture to an Elastoplast, ‘holding together the organisation and 
supporting officers in the performance of their duties’. It acts not only to guide officers 
in their routine decision making, affording them with practical knowledge and common-
sense understandings of how and why policing should be done in a given situation 
(Manning, 2004: 41), but also provides methods for dealing with strains inherent in the 
work.  
This thesis does not offer a radically new definition of police culture as the understanding 
of the concept adopted by the researcher in this study accords, by and large, with that of 
general academic consensus. However, although the meaning and relevance of the 
concept in relation to CIs will be reflected upon in this thesis in the light of research 
findings to assess whether the culture of CIs is likely to be a variant of an existing culture/s 
identified in previous literature or whether it is something entirely new. Nonetheless, as 
this chapter will discuss, it is now important, considering contemporary policing 
arrangements and given the significance of the roles now performed by non-warranted 
police staff within the police organisation, for understandings of police culture to extend 
beyond the examination of those shared mentalities, assumptions and knowledge 
associated with the warranted officer grouping. The cultural lens must now extend its 
gaze in order to examine potential variance in cognitive and behavioural responses which 
result from the working environments of unwarranted individuals who can now be found 
routinely performing tasks and functions traditionally recognised as frontline roles and 
the sole preserve of warranted officers - most notably, custody, escort and crimina l 
investigation.   
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2.4.2 Acculturation  
 
Reiner (2010) suggests that police culture/s involve a set of shared values, norms, 
perspectives and craft rules, which are shaped through the experiences of those involved 
and the environment within which they work. The ways and means through which police 
culture is learnt by new recruits to the service is a process that begins early in the career 
of a police officer; both Chan et al. (2003) and Sherman (1978) amongst others have 
shown how police recruits are socialised into the profession from their initial training140. 
During these early stages, new officers not only learn the skills necessary to undertake 
their job, but also concurrently learn the norms and values which help them become 
accepted and ‘survive’ within the organisation. Shearing and Ericson (1991: 491) suggest 
that in their ‘street talk’ ‘police officers use stories to represent to each other the way 
things are, not as statements of fact but as cognitive devices used to gain practical insight 
into how to do the job of policing’. As Denov (2004: 71) similarly notes, ‘through their 
routine activities, police use informal verbal exchanges as critical sources of information 
about customs, procedure and departmental lore and to create a way of seeing and being’. 
The occupational culture is said to ‘live’ through such ‘street talk’ which often takes the 
form of jokes and storytelling (Holdaway, 1983, 1997). Through the regular telling of 
anecdotes, values are shared which advise officers on how to view the world and act 
within it (Chan, 1996). As Meehan (1986: 91) suggests: 
 
‘In such common conversational activities such as bitching, bantering, 
complaining and telling ‘combat stories’ officers assemble, disseminate and 
hence create a stock of knowledge about local individuals and situations’. 
 
From his study of trainee officers and new recruits to the police service, Fielding (1988: 
9) infers that officers must: 
‘…translate the formal (by the book) accounts of policing relayed during init ia l 
training into practical accounts which enable them to deal with real situations on 
the street. These practical accounts are learnt during the process of occupationa l 
cultural reproduction, yet are always inflected, more or less, by the officers’ own 
attempts to reflexively construct a unique self-identity’. 
 
                                                                 
140 Research on the common characteristics of the police recruit (cf Reiner, 1978; Van Maanen, 1973) 
suggests that, as a profession which attracts individuals of a similar mind-set (ambitious, conservative etc.) 
and social background, the process of learning the police culture may in fact begin even before officers join 
the service. 
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Despite such evidence, the vast majority of the literature in the field has failed to consider 
the impact of individual actor agency on police culture, although there are some 
noteworthy exceptions. Chan (1997: 74-75) for example, notes how ‘structura l 
conditions’ such as police work and agency: 
‘…do not completely determine cultural knowledge, and cultural knowledge 
does not totally dictate practice. Working within structural conditions of 
policing, members have an active role to play in developing, reinforc ing, 
resisting or transforming cultural knowledge. They are not passive carriers of 
police culture’.  
 
Fielding (1988: 10) similarly considers the individual officer to be the ‘final arbiter or 
mediator’ of the structural and cultural influences of the occupation. While the culture 
he/she is being assimilated into may be powerful, it is nevertheless up to the individual to 
accommodate or resist its influence: 
 
‘One cannot read the recruit as a cipher for the occupational culture. The 
occupational culture has to make its pitch for support, just as the agencies of the 
formal organisation exert their influence through control of resources. The stock 
stories of the occupational culture may be effective as a means of ordering 
perception which maximises desirable outcomes. If they contradict the recruits’ 
gathering experience they are likely to be dismissed’ (Fielding, 1988: 135). 
 
In thinking more specifically about acculturation into the CID, upon exiting the uniformed 
branch and entering the world of the detectives, new detectives are said to exist in a 
‘cultural vacuum’ where they are yet to absorb the culture of the CID (Hobbs, 1991: 599). 
Recruits are then gradually assimilated into the CID culture, with varying degree, through 
‘a quiet system of patronage’ (Young, 1991: 81). In his work, Collinson (1995) found that 
‘big busts’ and other exemplary displays of detective work were embellished and 
savoured in the folklore of the unit as a symbolic representation of what ‘real’ detective 
work (in particularly here, what drug law enforcement) was all about. Once inside the 
CID, ‘the new detective will quickly meld into the departments style, pursuing its rituals 
to form a new link in the tradition of the CID’ (Young, 1991: 81). The extent to which 
CIs can be said to have been melded into the culture of the CID and specifically, within 
the occupational culture/s of warranted detectives is yet to be realised and will be explored 
in Chapter Five. 
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2.4.3 Towards a Nuanced Approach 
 
The idea that police officers have distinct cognitive and behavioural responses as 
a result of their working environment is a theme that arguably emerged in Britain in the 
work of Banton (1964) and Skolnick (1966) and which continued to be expanded upon 
throughout the 1960s and onwards, leading to the emergence of a body of literature which 
focused on the identification of a discernible ‘cop culture’. Reiner (2010), who cites 
Skolnick’s (1966) work as the ‘locus classicus’ for studying police culture (2010: 118), 
adds that like many of the now ‘classic’ studies which followed, Skolnick’s work failed 
to critically reflect on the universal nature of the concept. Furthermore, police studies 
more generally has failed to acknowledge the potential academic worth that could perhaps 
be gained from the examination of occupational cultures that exist outside of the police 
organisation in the wider world of work - in particularly those occupations which exhibit 
similar characteristics to those associated with the police e.g. solidarity, omnipresent 
potential for danger and ‘risk’ etc. (cf work by Kitada (2011) which focuses on the 
occupational culture of seafarers)141.  
Indeed, until relatively recently, understandings of police culture in the UK relied heavily 
on a set of revolutionary ethnographies dating back to this early period which stressed the 
existence of a distinct police culture (Banton, 1964; Chatterton, 1975; Manning, 1977; 
Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1978; Skolnick, 1966). Taken together, this body of work 
constitutes the core foundations of the concept. Arguably142, up until the seminal work of 
Cain (1973), which explored how policing conditions and styles differ between rural and 
city areas, police culture generally continued to be portrayed as a singular, one-size-fits-
all concept - a conception which most notably predates the various ‘transformations’ 
which have taken place within the late modern period and which have had an indelib le 
impact on the police organisation (see section 2.2.4 of this chapter)143.  
                                                                 
141 Indeed, there is much research illustrating how alienation from the public or fellow workers leads to a 
strong sense of solidarity amongst certain occupational groups such as amongst dockers (Turnbull, 1992), 
firemen (Smith, 1972, 2002), miners (Fitzpatrick, 1980), steel workers (Blyton and Bacon, 1997) and high 
steel ironworkers (Haas, 1977). Also in the criminal justice field, there is a growing body of useful literature 
which examines the occupational culture of probation (Mawby and Worrall, 2011) and prison officers  
(Crawley and Crawley, 2008).  
142 It should be noted that Banton’s, ‘The Policemen in the Community’ (1964), which compared policing 
in Scotland to that in the US, provided the foundations on which a move towards a more nuanced approach 
to police culture could built. 
143 It should be acknowledged here however that Reiner (2010: 135) also describes Wilson’s (1968) study, 
‘Varieties of Police Behaviour’, as being the ‘locus classicus’ in considering difference in the styles of 
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Moreover, early conceptions of police culture tended to base their understanding on 
observational studies of uniform patrol officers which may have led to a mistaken notion 
of the pervasiveness of a single, dominant culture (Maguire and Norris, 1992). In more 
recent years however, work by Hobbs (1988), Young (1993) and Westmarland (2001) 
amongst others, have shown that despite sharing a number of what Skolnick (2008: 35) 
considers to be the ‘universal, stable and lasting features’, the police ‘as an organisat ion 
does not possess a ‘common culture’ when viewed from the inside’ (Manning, 1978: 244). 
While generally accepted to epitomise the core pervasive features of police culture, 
Reiner’s (2010: 118-132) ‘core characteristics’ of ‘cop culture’ are now acknowledged to 
vary considerably within and between forces and departments. Nonetheless, these cultura l 
commonalities can still be found in almost all areas of police work and continue to be 
communicated and reinforced in varying degrees according to orthodox conceptions, 
through on-the-job socialisation and they arise as officers adapt to the demands of the job 
(Loftus, 2009: 2).  
Despite the continued significance of these ‘core characteristics’, as Reiner (2010: 118) 
has gone on to suggest, when considering the changing nature of police work, police 
culture can no longer be discussed as being ‘monolithic, universal nor unchanging’ 
(Reiner, 2010: 132).  It has now become essential, as Hobbs (1991: 606) illustrates, for 
researchers to: 
 
‘…tease out variations in policing styles rather than promote the perverse 
practice of identifying similarities across departments, cities, regions and 
countries. The assumption that there is something called ‘police culture’ is at 
best naive, and results in crude generalisation in the quest for common 
characteristics’. 
 
Research-based evidence has shown there to be variance in police culture/s which are 
dependent upon the differing patterns and problems associated with different policing 
environments and ‘the way we do things around here’. Alongside the seminal work of 
Cain (1973), subsequent work from the 1980s onwards also began to formally 
                                                                 
whole police organisations. In his study Wilson distinguishes between three departmental styles: the 
‘watchman’ style which emphasised order maintenance and the patrolman perspective -a style which 
afforded the patrol officer an almost unlimited level of discretion during this pre-bureacratisised, pre-
professionalised period; the ‘legalistic’ style which operated a law enforcement approach attempting to 
impose universalistic standards impartially on all communities; and the ‘service’ style which emphasised 
the police as a helpful service, with officers choosing to caution rather than prosecute (but not ignore) 
(Reiner, 2010: 135). 
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acknowledge the existence of sub-cultural variation within and between police services. 
For example, work by Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) explored the existence of sub-cultura l 
variation between ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ whereas work by Hobbs (1988) 
testified to the existence of a specific ‘detective culture’. Similarly, work by Ericson and 
Haggerty (1997) identified cultural variation between police organisations resulting from 
differences in the concerns and priorities of that particular service. Work by Young 
(1993), like Cain (1973), explored how policing conditions and styles differ between 
officers in rural areas and those ‘in the sticks’, while Innes (2003) and Westmarland 
(2001) identified the distinct culture/s of specialist departments. Such work brought to 
light the need for a reconceptualisation of traditional notions of police culture which have 
concurrently become exposed as outdated, overly deterministic and lacking in flexibility. 
The growing realisation during this period with regard to how variables such as an 
officer’s gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation as well as the type of police work 
officers perform may influence both practice and attitude, has led scholars to move 
discussion away from the existence of one police ‘culture’ and towards the idea of 
multiple ‘cultures’. Indeed, recently emerging literature is replete with discussion of the 
existence of ‘subcultures’ and other terms such as ‘patrol culture’, ‘headquarters culture’ 
and the ‘the cardigan squad’ (Heidensohn, 2003: 569), the latter referring to the ‘soft’ and 
‘fluffy’ perception of the child protection department. In addition, research also suggests 
that at an individual level, existing cultures can be adapted to suit an individual’s own 
identity, circumstances and experiences (Fielding, 1988; Loftus, 2008). This suggests that 
not only does cultural variance exist between different groups/units/forces, but also that 
cultural variation exists at an individual level, between officers within the same 
group/unit/force. 
 
In their edited collection of essays, O’Neill, Marks and Singh (2007) present an assortment 
of the most recent research on the topic of police occupational culture/s and revisit the 
meaning of police culture in the light of key late modern developments in the field of 
policing which have had a dramatic impact on the policing landscape and in turn, the 
cultural ideologies of the police. Key developments discussed in the edited collection 
include: the drive towards better educated officers (Punch); impact of police unions 
(Marks) including black police associations (O’Neill and Holdaway); the development of 
‘nexus’ policing (Marks); and recognition of distinctions between public and private 
police cultures (Singh and Kempa). This welcome addition to the literature offers new 
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insights into police cultures/subcultures which, until now, have otherwise been 
overlooked. Police culture has therefore come to be viewed as being much more 
fragmented, fluid and changeable than it was originally conceived. The existence of 
different police functions (e.g. patrol vs. detective work), difference between levels within 
the organisation (e.g. rank and file, middle management and senior leadership) and 
variation in workforce demographic (e.g. different ethnic or gender groups amongst police 
officers, warranted vs. non-warranted employees etc.), are all potential areas where sub-
cultural variation within the police organisation is likely to exist. While a more nuanced 
approach is clearly beginning to emerge, further empirical exploration in these areas is 
needed. In particular, there is a clear need to further academic enquiry in relation to 
detective work generally and perhaps more specifically, into the existence of cultura l 
variation within the CID in light of recent changes in workforce mix. 
 
However, as Loftus (2009: 188) is right to argue, despite the obvious changes which have 
occurred over the last quarter century with regard to the policing landscape and in turn, 
the cultural ideologies of the police, ‘the manifest continuities with older patterns should 
not be overlooked’. In ‘Police Culture in a Changing World’, Loftus (2009) stresses that 
while policing and the police in the new millennium are markedly different from that of 
earlier generations, the concept of police culture endures because ‘the fundamentals of 
the police role remain unchanged ... the police remain in the unique position of enforcing 
the law in a liberal democratic society’ (2009: 199). 
 
2.4.4 ‘Detective Culture’ and the Criminal Investigation Department - A Firm 
within a Firm? 
 
Joining the CID and ‘moving into clothes’ (Fielding, 1988; Hobbs, 1991) can be 
considered one of the clearest indicators of the existence of multiple cultures within the 
police organisation. Entering the CID has traditionally been considered one of the most 
prestigious of all police advancements not least because it assumes an acceptance at an 
operational level of the exceptional investigative capacity of some officers over that of 
others. It could be argued that this advancement in itself implicitly suggests that there 
may be something special and perhaps more ‘professional’ about this particular group of 
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officers and their knowledge base and accompanying skills set144 . However, despite 
evidence which testifies to the existence of a separate ‘detective culture/subculture’ 
(Hobbs, 1988), to date, markedly few empirically-based studies have been conducted, 
particularly in Britain, into the existence of a specific ‘detective culture’ - although there 
is useful material to be found in the works of scholars such as Sanders (1977), Smith and 
Gray (1983), Hobbs (1988), Young (1991) and Bacon (2011). In ‘Doing the Business’ 
(1988), Hobbs’ renowned ethnographic account of the cultural distinctiveness of 
London’s East End and the work of police detectives in relation to it, Hobbs forwards the 
argument that the form of entrepreneurialism endemic to this specific area represented ‘a 
specific economic and cultural order’ (1988: 197). While detective culture/subculture is 
generally recognised as exhibiting the same ‘core’ characteristics as the general ‘cop 
culture’, research (e.g. Hobbs, 1988; Sanders, 1977) would appear to suggest that some 
aspects are heightened amongst detectives, resulting in a ‘radicalised and concentrated’ 
version of it (Innes, 2003:14). A number of distinguishing features can be drawn from 
this literature with regard to the occupational world of police detectives. The most 
prominent of these features according to Maguire and Norris (1992: 20) include:  
 
‘…even greater secrecy and defensiveness to outsiders (including police 
outsiders), but, in contrast to the ‘solidarity’ of the uniform shift, a largely 
individualistic and entrepreneurial approach in which loyalties are fragmented 
and sometimes restricted to just one or two ‘partners’’.  
 
This is reflected, according to writers such as Hobbs (1988) and Young (1991), in ‘a 
general reluctance to share information, jealous guarding of the names of informants and 
competition to take personal credit (or ‘glory’) for high status arrests or clearances’ 
(Maguire and Norris, 1992: 20)145 .  Suspicion is a fundamental element, a ‘healthy 
attitude or sixth sense’, essential to any police work but which is heightened even more 
so in the world of the detective.  
Another distinctive feature said to be characteristic of detective culture is what Bayley 
(1994: 56) terms the ‘privileges of detectives’. By virtue of being recognised as a 
                                                                 
144 ‘Skill’, according to Freidson (2001: 25), refers to ‘the capacity to accomplish a task, which may be kept 
analytically separate from the substantive knowledge connected with the task itself’. In simple terms, it is 
the specific means by which a task is undertaken. 
145 It would also appear that such tendencies are not new. Wensley (1931: 76) writes of detectives ‘inclined 
to keep themselves to themselves’ and of those ‘with a streak of vanity that impels them to adopt a pose at 
the expense of those who have really done the work’. 
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specialism, investigative work enjoys a higher status than that of patrol. Indeed, as Young 
(1991: 281) has explained, both ‘structurally and symbolically the work of the CID is 
much more valued than uniformed police activity, which can be attributed to the largely 
unquantifiable nature of beat patrol work’. The privileges of detectives include: wearing 
‘civilian’ clothing, being managed rather than supervised and in essence the joining of an 
‘elite club’. The detective role typically affords officers with even lower visibility146 and 
greater autonomy (Ericson, 1981) alongside less direct supervision and a personal case-
load (Irving and Dunninghan, 1993) and, in this way, can indeed be considered as special 
and different to traditional uniformed patrol work. For a significant period of time, 
criminal investigation has been considered a specialism of which only experienced 
warranted officers could partake. As Bayley (1994: 57) notes, both inside and outside the 
police organisation, the work of detectives is considered ‘police work par excellence’. As 
a result of their special status, detectives develop a powerful interest in maintaining the 
status quo and tend to be even more acutely resistant to change (Bayley, 1994). All of this 
makes for an interesting conceptual base upon which to examine the impact of the 
introduction of CIs has had on established cultures, divisions in labour and 
understandings of criminal investigation process within the CID. 
 
From the earliest years of its establishment, the Metropolitan police was said to be ‘a 
divided force’ with rigidly defined functions and the plain clothes CID was considered 
by many a ‘firm within a firm’ (Emsley, 1996: 72-72).  In his short history of the police, 
Rawlings (2002: 176) concluded that such real and imagined structural, operational and 
cultural difference stem from the fact that the investigative function undertaken by 
detectives:  
‘…did not fit easily into the idea of preventative policing in which crime was 
deterred by arrests for petty offences and by the presence of uniformed officers 
on the street. Instead, detectives were secretive and bargained for information by 
paying informants or ignoring minor breaches in the law ... Moreover, while, in 
theory, uniformed officers were meant to be detached from the communities they 
policed, the reverse was true for detectives’.  
 
The ‘entrepreneurial’ role of the detective, bargaining for information through the 
payment of informants, was a trend which continued until relatively recently. Indeed, as 
                                                                 
146 Shapland and Vagg (1988) report that most beat officers see a supervising officer on average only once 
a day. 
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Hobbs (1988) describes, in the East End relatively closed communities in which crimina l 
families were well known, demanded a certain amount of power and even respect in their 
communities which meant a situation which required the detective move within the 
criminal underworld, doing deals to secure information on suspects. For Hobbs (1988: 
205) the CID officer was ‘an autonomous entrepreneur of law and order’ using his 
knowledge of both the art and craft of detective work to conduct his investigations.  
 
The old regime approach therefore affords police culture a fundamental role in shaping 
the investigative process most notably in relation to determining the role played by the 
police, victims and suspects in the minds of officers. What is interesting here is the extent 
to which the art and the craft of detective work still hold contemporary relevance in the 
light of key late modern developments which have changed the face of crimina l 
investigation in E&W. Indeed, in recent years, the shift from a reactive to a proactive 
approach to investigation alongside developments in science and technology (e.g. DNA, 
fingerprinting etc.) has witnessed a move towards understanding detective work as not 
only an art and a craft but also as a science147. The increased value and prominence of 
scientific methods within the investigative process challenge traditional approaches and 
understandings of investigative work and policing more generally. As Tong, Bryant and 
Horvath (2009: 9-10) go on to discuss: 
 
‘In the perspectives of detective as ‘scientist’, there is an inherent expectation 
that many will be able to attain the status of detective, as science can be taught 
to exact principles in the classroom and the workplace. Essentially, detective 
work as a science arguably removes some of the mythical and cultural barriers 
to learning and practising detective work’.  
 
In addition to changing conceptions of the nature of the detective role, portrayals of police 
detectives have traditionally suggested that the CID is a ‘bastion of ‘macho’ values’ 
associated with the hard-working, hard-drinking, fornicating and swearing crime fighter 
(Innes, 2003: 15). Overall, the culture of the CID is commonly referred to as being 
intensely pragmatic, concerned with getting the job done expediently and as being 
underpinned by values which are conservative, masculine and action-oriented 
(Heidensohn, 1992; Holdaway, 1983; Young, 1991). These values are reinforced by a 
                                                                 
147 Unlike the cultural perspectives of detective as artist in which it is implicit that only a chosen few will 
possess the necessary qualities and attributes for the role. 
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much more acute suspicion of ‘outsiders’ and pessimism about human nature, together 
with a heightened awareness of potential dangers and a general sense of social isolation 
(Innes, 2003: 15). While elements of the above characteristics are still likely to exist 
within the contemporary CID, they do so perhaps, in a less conspicuous form. Indeed, in 
their work carried out in the early 1990s, Norris and Maguire (1992, cited in Innes, 2003: 
15) concluded that ‘the trenchant machismo of detective culture is waning’. Nonetheless, 
as Innes (2003: 15) has indicated, while this may be the case, this trend is by no means 
uniform with distinct variation in the pace with which such characteristics are fading. 
 
In his recent work, ‘Investigating Murder’, Innes (2003) offers a unique insight into the 
processes and practices developed and employed by detectives in the investigation of 
murder. Innes’ work introduces a moral dimension to investigations in which detectives 
ascribe moral identities to those with a role in the murder with the victim as ‘innocent’, 
‘good’, ‘worthy’ or ‘morally tainted’ (2003: 197-168)148. This ‘moral career’ approach 
(Innes, 2003: 170) is developed and reinforced through ‘talk’ amongst detectives. Such 
knowledge and ways of working are then passed on through discussion of the various 
motives for, and types of murder, to develop a case narrative which both new and long 
serving detectives can draw upon to aid them in future cases. Overall, while Innes’ work 
raises a number of themes which can be traced across other studies of detective work (for 
example, their suspicion of victim and witness accounts (Simon, 1991), the cachet  
associated with the role of detective and the work they perform (Sanders, 1977), and 
disagreement over the nature of detective work and whether it is better understood as a 
craft or a science (Reppetto, 1978)), he also importantly highlights the difference between 
detective work in general and that of murder detectives specifically.  Innes’ work 
therefore draws attention to the existence of cultural variation within the CID and as such 
provides the empirical foundation on which a more nuanced approach to ‘detective 
culture’ might be developed.  
 
                                                                 
148 However, it must be noted that the idea of the moral character of victims appeared much earlier in work 
by scholars such as Christie (1986) and Miers (1978). In her work into the ‘ideal victim’ stereotype, Christie 
(1986) identifies six key attributes of the ideal victim status: first, the victim is ‘weak’ (female, sick, old, 
very young or a combination of these qualifications); second, the victim was acting ‘virtuously’ i.e. going 
about their legitimate daily business; third, the victim is ‘blameless’; fourth, the victim is ‘unrelated’ to the 
‘stranger’ to the offender (implies offender must be a person and not a corporation for example); fifth, the 
offender is unambiguously ‘big’ and ‘bad’; and sixth, the victim possess the right amount of power, 
influence and sympathy to elicit victim status (cited in Dignan, 2005: 17). Similarly work by Miers (1978) 
has illustrated how notions of victimisation and ‘vulnerability’ have historically been fundamentally shaped 
and determined by politicians and professionals. 
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2.4.5 Beyond Police Cultures - Towards a Multi-Cultural Approach to the CID 
 
In the same way that ‘cop culture’ has been criticised as being a relatively static, 
universalistic term, to speak of one ‘detective culture’ is also perhaps naive, especially on 
consideration of the huge variation in personnel now operating within the CID. Over 
recent decades the CID has become an arena of specialism. Public Protection Units, 
Intelligence Units, Major Incident Teams and Fraud Squads are just a few examples of 
the many specialist units which collectively make up the late modern CID. As such, the 
modern police service can no longer be considered as exploiting the ‘omni-competent’, 
generalist constable ideal. The concept has been abandoned in recent decades in favour 
of specialist functionality and explicitly defined remits (Roberts and Innes, 2009: 339). 
The creation of numerous specialist departments has consequentia lly resulted in a 
multitude of CID subcultures (Loftus, 2009: 85) which Glomseth and Gottschalk (2009: 
3) suggest are affected by the tasks performed. In their survey, Holdaway and Parker 
(1998) identified the existence of cultures within cultures with regard to the CID, with 
child abuse work for example, being regarded as lower in status than other areas of CID 
work. However despite the fragmented nature of the CID, as Bacon (2011: 190) highlights, 
such nuanced academic enquiry remains rare in the UK with hardly any sociologica l 
studies being conducted which examine the distinct experiences associated with working 
in specialist units or of how different crime and disorder problems may affect the mind -
set of an officer or police staff member with regard to how they view their world and 
work149. 
 
In addition to and in many respects an accompanying development of the emergence of 
specialist units, recent decades have also witnessed the arrival of a whole host of ‘new 
faces’ within the CID and police organisation more generally. As noted in Chapter One 
(section 1.2.3) of this thesis, pluralisation (i.e. the growing involvement of an increasingly 
complex array of public, private and municipal bodies in the provision of policing and 
security) has meant that ‘the police now also find themselves within a mandate to work 
in partnership with a wide spectrum of groups and organisations, form highly organised 
and multi-national security companies to local individuals and voluntary community 
security groups’ (O’Neill and Singh, 2007: 2). A significant part of this broad 
                                                                 
149 Innes’ (2003) work which focuses on detective work and the police response to criminal homicide is a 
notable exception, as is work by Sanders (1977) which looked at the work or detectives operating in US. 
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pluralisation of policing has been the civilianisation and privatisation (in the form of the 
‘contracting out’ and ‘buying in’ of officers and staff to and from the private sector) of 
the function.  Non-warranted members of police staff now make up a considerable 
percentage of the police workforce and many of these individuals can now be found 
performing roles and undertaking tasks previously considered police operational (see 
Chapter One, section 1.2.2). 
 
However, despite their growing significance within the police organisation, little 
academic attention has been afforded to this group with regard to the topic of occupationa l 
culture. In ‘An Inside Job’ - a fascinating account of life as a British ‘Bobby’, Young 
(1991: 223) illustrates how police staff (referred to here as ‘civilians’) were frequently 
reminded that they were not police officers. Young also documents what he describes as 
‘the constant tendency to use the term ‘civilian’ in a ‘pejorative or derogatory manner’ 
(1991: 223). In a recent and (to my knowledge) unique piece of research titled, 
‘Civilianising the Blue Code’, Wright (2010) looks directly at both the differences and 
similarities that exist between warranted police officers and police staff in relation to the 
issues of corruption and misconduct. In his research, Wright not only concludes that a 
separate culture exists between officers and staff, but also proposes that the ‘blue wall of 
silence’ may be even more impenetrable amongst police staff. Wright (2010: 353) offers 
two potential reasons for this: first, lack of ethics and integrity training by some services 
may lead to a lack of awareness amongst staff as to the existence of procedures for 
reporting internal misconduct; second, a greater degree of trust and solidarity may exist 
amongst the warranted ranks leading to greater willingness to promptly report instances 
of internal misconduct. While such work not only provides evidence of the existence of 
sub-cultural variation between warranted officers and staff, it also illustrates the 
significance of police staff cultures/subcultures for contemporary police work, 
particularly with regard to police accountability, legitimacy and decision making. Indeed, 
as work by O’Malley (1997: 21) and more recently by Westmarland (2005: 162) suggests, 
despite possessing a clear understanding of professional integrity, officers may still 
continue to place a higher value on their loyalty towards colleagues rather than their own 
honesty150. Work by Wright (2010) also suggests that some elements of traditional ‘cop 
culture’ may perhaps be even more pronounced in the culture of non-warranted staff.  
                                                                 
150  Work by Westmarland (2005: 162) indicates a distinction between the ‘acceptability’ of certain 
behaviours. For example, those actions which amount to ‘acquisitive crime’, such as the taking of money 
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The late modern CID is a knowledge-intensive and time critical environment (Glomseth, 
Gottschalk and Solli-Saether, 2007: 100)151. Within this environment, success is largely 
dependent upon efficient and effective communication and the sharing of knowledge 
(Glomseth et al., 2007). Police culture has been assumed to influence both knowledge 
sharing (Glomseth et al., 2007: 105; Luen and Al-Hawamdeh, 2001) and performance 
(Fraser, 2004) in policing. As has been highlighted previously in this chapter, work by 
scholars such as Norris and Maguire (1992: 20), Hobbs (1988) and Young (1991) has 
shown that unlike the solidarity evident in the uniform shift, the traditional performance 
of ‘detective work’ is shrouded in competition, the jealous guarding of the names of 
informants and a general reluctance to share information. Given recent changes in the 
way in which criminal investigation and policing more broadly is to be undertaken - as 
effectively and efficiently as possible - such feelings, if still present, are a likely obstacle 
impeding the effective sharing of knowledge between officers and staff within the CID. 
The reengineering of the investigative process and the broad application of the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM)152 in recent years has meant that the police organisation now 
operates a business model in all areas of police work - primarily concerning the strategic 
allocation of resources. New practices such as NIM are being seen as a possible way to 
reduce ‘risk’ and efficient and effective knowledge sharing is undoubtedly an essential 
element of the model and one which ultimately determines its overall success. As 
Glomseth and Gottschalk (2009) highlight, the recent economic downturn in the UK has 
meant that policing institutions are experiencing higher demands on performance while 
working within tighter resource constraints, making the relationship between police 
culture and performance even more critical. 
 
Practitioners within the late modern CID can therefore be considered as working within 
a business environment, a development which has required them to adapt their behaviours 
                                                                 
or property, would be reported. However, research suggests that officers would be less likely to report  the 
use of excessive force or ‘bending the rules’ to protect a colleague. 
151 The ‘professionalisation’ of policing in recent years has witnessed the introduction of codes of practice 
and new legislation which must now be adhered too if an investigation is to be successful. For example, 
PACE, placed limits of the length of time an individual can be help in detention and is likely to have 
impacted on the culture of the CID in terms of time criticalness. 
152 Broadly speaking, the National Intelligence Model is a ‘business process’ introduced by the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 1999, which is used by the police organisation to generate 
‘intelligence’ which provides individual police services with strategic direction. NIM allows senior police 
managers to make informed decisions relating primarily to the tactical allocation of resources. The NIM 
allows for greater consistency between police services across the E&W, enables the establishment of key 
crime priorities and targeting of key prolific offenders, and informs the improved management of ‘risk’.  
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and practices in accordance, with officers playing the role of ‘knowledge workers’ 
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 19). This is likely to have had an impact on those 
cultures/subcultures which exist within the CID. As work by Glomseth et al. (2007) has 
demonstrated in relation to officers based within police ‘investigation units’ in Norway, 
the existence of a ‘team culture’ has a significant impact on knowledge sharing in police 
investigations. However, due to a current lack of empirical exploration in the area, the 
level of integration between police staff within such a police ‘team culture’ remains 
largely unknown. This issue becomes even more salient if one considers the level of 
operational involvement and key roles with regard to criminal investigation now being 
undertaken by police staff within CIDs across E&W153. CIs, who operate within mixed 
teams alongside warranted police detectives, can be considered as playing a pivotal role 
in the criminal investigation process, influencing the strategic direction of an 
investigation and in turn, the determination of its ultimate success. However, despite the 
significance of the actions and decisions made by these individuals on a day-to-day basis 
alongside the existence of research-based evidence which testifies to the likely existence 
of police staff subculture/s (Young, 1991; Wright, 2010), very little research exists on 
how these individuals ‘fit’ within existing police occupational and organisation culture/s. 
Chapter One (section 1.3) discussed recent attempts to fill this gap in knowledge and with 
that, to take account of how recent  processes of civilianisation (and privatisation) may 
have impacted on established cultures within the police organisation (cf Skinns, 2011; 
Atkinson, 2013, forthcoming; O’Neill, 2014; Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). However, despite 
growing recognition of this otherwise neglected body of personnel, empirical study on 
the cultural attributes and orientations of this particular group remains limited, 
particularly with regard to the CID. I would argue that this is somewhat remarkable 
considering the significance of the role/s now being played by non-warranted staff and 
the plethora of research-based evidence which bears witness to the intrinsic role informal 
norms and values play in shaping the everyday decisions of officers (Chan, 2007; Innes, 
2003; Loftus, 2009). It is to this end that this research, it is hoped, will be a timely addition 
to the current body of knowledge in the area.  
 
                                                                 
153 Alongside CIs, many other police staff also work within the late modern CID and operate what can be 
considered as ‘key roles’. Amongst others these include Crime Analysts and/or Intelligence Analysts, 
Crime Scene Managers and Disclosure Officers etc.  
122 
 
In addition, similarly little consideration has also be given to the growing body of private 
and ‘hybrid’ individuals working within the police and the particular cultural qualit ies 
and characteristics they bring to the task154. I would argue therefore that the time has now 
come for researchers to extend the cultural lens to better consider those police 
cultures/subcultures which exist not only beyond the police officer, but also beyond the 
police organisation itself. Indeed, within the context of late modernity, policing has 
developed into a more formalised inter-agency occupation with improved cooperation 
between agencies traditionally associated with the public and private sectors (see section 
2.4.6).  
 
The Police Reform Act 2002 marked a watershed in fostering greater engagement with 
private security. The Act introduced Community Safety Accreditation Schemes under 
which individuals from non-police organisations (e.g. local authority employees or 
housing association employees), and often from the private sector (e.g. security guards 
employed within shopping malls), may be accredited with limited powers such as the 
issuing of fixed penalty notices155. The Act also formalised the use of CIs who, as made 
clear in the introductory chapter of this thesis, may also be employees from the private 
sector156. The use of agency CIs undoubtedly brings an interesting dynamic to traditiona l 
understandings of police occupational culture/s which have previously focused 
predominantly on those individuals employed directly by the public police organisat ion. 
In her work Wakefield (2008: 159) illustrates how ‘the diversity of policing subcultures 
extends beyond the public police’157. In this respect, it may now be more appropriate for 
researchers in the field to begin to explore the existence of police subculture/s which 
transcend sectoral boundaries. This also begs the question in relation to agency CIs; could 
                                                                 
154 In her ethnographic study of three private security teams operating within semi-public space (shopping 
malls), Wakefield (2008) compares a number of cultural features of private policing with those ty pically 
associated with the public police (Reiner, 2010: 118-132). 
155 Community Safety Accreditation Schemes give Chief Constables authority to accredit a range of non-
police (including private security guards) who meet a prescribed standard of professionalism with some 
police powers. However, caution should be taken not to overestimate the significance of such provisions. 
For example, data collected by ACPO found that by the end of 2010, across 26 participating forces, there 
were 2,219 accredited persons (ACPO, 2011), most of whom were local authority employed wardens and 
anti-social behaviour enforcement officers suggesting limited support from either the police or the private 
security industry. 
156 Alongside CIs, the Police Reform Act 2002 also formally introduced EOs, PCSOs and DOs. Like CIs, 
each of these new designations can be employed by the police authority directly and can also be 
contractually employed from the private sector. Under to Act, these individuals may also be designated 
with limited police type powers. 
157 The issue of private security occupational culture will be explored in more detail in the following section 
of this chapter. 
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we perhaps be witnessing the formation of a ‘hybrid’ or ‘blended’ police culture which 
exhibits characteristics of both the public police and private sectors in regard to the 
provision of criminal investigation? 
 
It is undeniable that changes in the character and texture of policing in recent years - in 
particular the move towards specialism and emergence of mixed economy staffing - has 
served to encourage variance with regard to the cultures and subcultures that exist within 
the police organisation. However, what has failed to be explored in any great detail within 
existing literature is the extent to which changes in late modern policing arrangements 
have posed any significant threats with regard to established police dispositions and 
practices when it comes to the investigation of crime more specifically. In addition, in 
relation to the detective role more generally, empirical enquiry has largely failed to 
explore the perseverance and continued dominance of individual elements of traditiona l 
detective culture which undoubtedly have been challenged with the arrival of a more 
proactive approach to investigation. In short, the question remains, to what extent do 
traditional understandings of detective culture hold true today in the light of the 
civilianisation and privatisation of the role? Answering these questions is vital if we are 
to develop a more nuanced sociological understanding of what policing culture currently 
looks like in today’s policing climate and each will be explored to some degree in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
However, what is clear is that as the police organisation is forced to adapt to the changing 
and increasingly complex nature of policing within the late modern state, their need to 
rely on the expertise of ‘outsiders’ and unconventional means of staffing will increase. 
However, integrating ‘experts’ and those individuals who have not entered the 
organisation through the traditional route may require a restructuring of the organisat ion, 
for example, ‘growing information technologies has resulted in organisations based on 
networks, rather than more traditional hierarchies’ (Cope, 2004: 198-199). As Cope 
(2004: 199) discusses, ‘For the police, this means recognising the individuals for their 
role, rather than rank, which would require a fundamental cultural shift in how warranted 
and unwarranted roles are conceptualised’. 
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2.4.6 Private Security Subculture(s) 
 
Studies of police work have a long ethnographic tradition which has generated a 
wealth of research on the cultural characteristics of the public police. As earlier sections 
of this chapter have demonstrated (see sections 2.4.3-2.4.5), there exists a diversity of 
sub-cultures within the public police, with differences arising between distinct types of 
police officers (Waddington, 1999). For example, there are variations between rural and 
urban police (Cain, 1973), ‘management’ and ‘street’ cops (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983), 
community constables and officers on routine patrols (Fielding, 1995), specialist groups 
such as detectives (Hobbs, 1988) and officers of different gender groups (Doran and 
Chan, 2003; Silvestri, 2003) and ethnic minorities (Holdaway and O’Neill, 2004), to 
name just a few. In drawing attention to the far from monolithic nature of police 
culture(s), the major contribution of this body of literature has been the uncovering of 
layers of ‘informal occupational norms and values operating under the apparently rigid 
hierarchical structure of police organisations’ (Chan, 1997: 43). This has included the 
identification of negative aspects of an occupational culture that has often been seen ‘as 
both a cause of police deviance and an obstacle to police reform’ (Chan 1997, jacket 
synopsis). Together, this body of work has contributed to a greater understanding of the 
realities of police work which in turn has been important in the evolution of the public 
police. However, while few would deny the significance of this body of work to the 
development of the public police and policing more generally, there is an obvious need 
for new, empirical research which seeks to explore new directions. This has become ever 
more apparent following recent changes in the terrain of policing which have seen the 
emergence of pluralising trends whereby in many Western democratic societies the 
primacy of the police has begun to diminish with the proliferation of alternative service 
providers, prompting a reconfiguration of the policing task around an extended policing 
family (Home Office, 2001). 
Private security has emerged as an increasingly prominent member of this extended police 
family. As nodal governance scholars have sought to illustrate (cf Johnston and Shearing, 
2003; Kempa et al., 2004; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Van Steden, 2007), many of the 
nodes present today in advanced democratic societies are occupied not only by public 
sector institutions such as the police, but also by private sector institutions such as private 
security providers (White, 2012: 92). Furthermore, many of the roles performed by 
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private security actors involve the use of coercive and increasingly punitive measures 
(Monaghan, 2002). However, despite the growing significance of private security and the 
potential impact of its growing presence on our understanding of policing cultures, there 
exist only a limited number of empirical studies of private security officers using 
interviews and observational techniques. Somewhat unsurprisingly, there have been even 
fewer attempts to explore the cultural aspects of security work - ‘aspects that reveal many 
of private security’s defining features’ (Wakefield, 2008: 659). As has been discussed 
earlier in this chapter (2.4.1 and 2.4.3), for the most part, police literature has tended to 
focus overwhelmingly on those occupational cultures which exist within the police 
service, in recognition of the concentration of organisational power amongst the lower 
ranks and thus the social importance of the constable’s role. While some exceptions do 
exist (cf Atkinson, 2013; Button, 2007), the academic lens has rarely extended its gaze 
far beyond discussion which centres on the occupational culture(s) of warranted police 
officers (for example, to contracted private security staff) or furthermore, beyond those 
employed directly by the public police organisation (for example, to police staff). 
Moreover, as Singh and Kempa (2007: 314) explain: 
 
 ‘…the existing literature has tended to address the development of public police 
cultures in isolation from relationships with other security agencies ... In an era 
where academic and practitioner commentators point to the ‘networked’, ‘nodal’ 
and ‘partnership’ orientation of contemporary policing, the study of the culture 
of any of these organisations must also take into account their relationships with 
other actors in the security landscape’ (see further, Wood, 2006). 
 
Recently the role of door supervisors has been subject to increased attention and studies 
in this area have revealed much about the occupational culture of this group of individua ls 
(Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister and Winlow, 2003; Winlow, 2001). The central occupationa l 
characteristics of door supervisors have been identified as including a preoccupation with 
the body (bodybuilding), the techniques of using the body (fighting techniques) and 
discourses including violence (Monaghan, 2002). However, as Button (2007: 154) 
illustrates, the significant structural variance inherent in the role, where they operate and 
the challenges they are faced with, means that door supervises cannot be regarded simply 
as private security officers who work in pubs and nightclubs. As such, research in this 
area paints only a partial picture of security officer culture(s).  
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While empirical studies which examine the roles and occupational culture(s) of private 
security officers more generally are indeed limited, there are a few notable exceptions. 
One of the first studies to address the issue of private security operational practices and 
occupational subculture(s) was that undertaken by Rigakos (2002). In his detailed 
ethnographic account of a Toronto-based contract private security company 
(‘Intelligarde’), Rigakos found that the private security officers assumed ‘parapolicing’ 
identities, responsibilities and attitudes at both the level of rhetoric and practice, with 
many exhibiting a ‘wannabe cop’ mentality. Many of the cultural traits exhibited by the 
private security officers in Rigakos’ study bear resemblance to those core characterist ics 
of police culture discussed by Reiner (2000), in particularly, action-oriented behaviour, a 
sense of mission, solidarity and isolation. He also identified a number of additiona l 
characteristics including status frustration158, a perceived lack of respect from the public 
and the police and hyper-masculinity. Rigakos observed similarities in the way that this 
dominant culture appeared to permeate the private policing organisation in a very similar 
way to that observed in public policing organisations: aggressive cultural traits and values 
were communicated through ‘on-the-job’ socialisation, with storytelling acting as a key 
mechanism through which this socialisation was enabled’ (cf Shearing and Stenning 
(1991) especially for similar cultural diffusion processes within the public police).  
 
Like Rigakos, Button (2007) also identified a ‘wannabe culture’ amongst the private 
security officers he observed in his ethnographic study of two private security firms or 
‘nodes of governance’ - ‘Pleasure Southquay’ and ‘Armed Industries’. However, unlike 
the wannabe culture identified by Rigakos in which private security officers were 
identified as aspiring to join the police, in Button’s study, this tended to be more a case 
of ‘wannabe somewhere else or doing anything else’ (2007: 155). Again, like Rigakos’ 
study, Button (2007) also identified a number of key cultural traits of private security staff 
which bear resemblance to those identified in the growing body of literature on police 
occupational and organisational culture. In particular, these included challenging working 
conditions, feelings of solidarity, isolation and inferiority, suspicion and displays of 
machismo (Button, 2007: 159-167).  
 
                                                                 
158 In their recent work Lofstrand, Loftus and Loader (2015) compared how private security officers in the 
UK and Sweden draw upon occupational culture to deflect scorn and reframe their ‘tainted trade’ as 
important and necessary (cf Loader et al., 2014). 
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In her article, ‘Private Policing: A View from the Mall’, Wakefield (2008) builds upon 
the earlier work of both Rigakos (2002) and Button (2007) to provide a broader 
deconstruction of the security cultures at three research sites (‘Arts Plaza’, ‘Quayside 
Centre’ and ‘City Mall’), each of which involved interviews and observation with security 
officers operating in semi-public space. In her analysis she incorporates the organising 
features of security work and security functions as well as some of the personal 
characteristics of the security personnel in an effort to provide a broader deconstruction 
of security cultures. Like Rigakos (2002) and Button (2007), Wakefield identified 
similarities and difference between the personal characteristics and orientation of the 
police and of the private security officers she studied. Wakefield identified evidence of 
isolation, suspicion, conservatism and machismo. She also identified evidence of an ‘old 
boy’s network’159, that being the enduring influence of the earlier police career of many 
security officers and managing directors leading to the fostering of a more inclusive, inter-
agency relationship between the Arts Plaza and Quayside centre security teams. However, 
she also found a number of cultural features which were markedly dissimilar to those 
exhibited by the police, the most obvious distinction being a lack of solidarity amongst 
security officers which Wakefield attributes to a weaker socialisation process for the 
security personnel in comparison with that of the police. It could also be due to the fact 
that the private sector agency/ies from which private security staff originate, unlike the 
public police, are not an agency of last resort where coercion is central.  
 
Indeed, one of the most significant differences between the culture(s) of private security 
agents and public police officers is the longevity of the career and in turn, their 
commitment to the security ‘profession’. Work by Wakefield (2003), Michael (2002) and 
Button (2007) draw attention to the high turnover of staff and low commitment to the job 
of those working for private security companies. Indeed, as Wakefield (2003: 674) notes, 
most of the security officers over the three sites she visited had served in their jobs for 
less than two years. The site identified as having the lowest turnover of staff (City Mall) 
was also the site Wakefield observed as being the most cohesive. Wakefield also found 
that in one of her research sites (Quayside) the previous shared employment history of 
                                                                 
159 Rigakos (2002) discusses the ways security officers regulate conduct by exploiting ‘old boy’s networks’, 
which allows them to more easily extract sensitive information from the police than security personnel with 
no previous police connections. 
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the private security officers had a significant bearing on the fostering of a more unifying 
culture: 
 
‘At the Quayside Centre there appeared to be a more obvious culture of banter 
and joke playing which, the officers explained, was typical of the local factory 
culture within which many of them had previously worked’ (Wakefield, 2008: 
675). 
 
A number of other empirical studies have contributed to the emerging picture of private 
policing culture, both internationally (cf Manzo, 2004; Micucci, 1998; Singh and Kempa, 
2007) as well as in the UK (cf Wakefield, 2003). Arguably, one of the most significant 
contributions of this growing body of work has been its importance in underlining the 
point that security forces are not necessarily harmonious wholes. As in the case of public 
policing agencies (cf Bayley, 1994; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983), private security 
organisations may also be divided into distinct assemblages that engage and endorse 
distinct worldviews and work styles which are not always consistent with the preferred 
objectives and aims either of the security firm or of the security client. Indeed, as Singh 
and Kempa (2007: 301) illustrate:    
‘There are an ever increasing number of private security firms operating in a 
variety of distinct environments and to differing standards of practice. Security 
officers can be found in armoured cars protecting cash, in shopping centres and 
shops where they apprehend shoplifters, at airports searching passengers and 
their baggage, to officers often working alone guarding factories at night’. 
 
Alongside the significant range in the types of duties undertaken by private security 
officers, other factors are also likely to affect the culture(s) of private security actors. 
These could include, for example, the types of personnel involved (including their 
occupational background), the varying environments in which they operate (e.g. contract 
vs. proprietary security160) security, as well as the subsequent challenges they face as they 
undertake their work.  
 
Earlier work into the police by Reiner (1978) identified the ‘Bobby’, ‘uniform carrier’, 
‘new centurion’, and ‘professional’ models. Other academics have also made attempts to 
construct their own typology of officers based upon their varying cultural orientations (cf 
Broderick, 1973; Brown, 1981; Foster, 2003; Walsh, 1977). The degrees of variation in 
                                                                 
160 Where a private firm has its own security unit ‘in-house’ (Dorn and Levi, 2007: 214). 
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private security work and private security staff mean that there are likely to be even more 
models that apply to security staff. Michael (2002) identified four types of security officer 
largely based upon their employment orientation. First she identified ‘the casual’, usually 
a younger security officer undertaking security on a temporary basis. Second there was 
the ‘time server’, who tended to be an older employee using security work because it is 
often non-ageist in recruitment. ‘The uniformed pensioner’ was the third category she 
discussed. This category included older security officers from the armed forces who were 
using security work to supplement a pension. Finally, there was the ‘police wannabe’ who 
was generally a young security officer oriented towards crime control who intended to 
join the police (Button, 2007: 168).  
 
Other attempts at distinguishing private security officers also exist in the literature. For 
example, McLeod (2002) distinguishes between three types of security officer. The first 
model he called the ‘night-watchman’ or’ warm bodies’. These were low skilled, low 
status security officers - who could not get some of the better paid jobs in society - 
undertaking basic security functions. The second model he called ‘low profile’ or ‘guards 
with blazers’. These officers were found in more prominent locations where interaction 
with the public was required. The officers were more presentable and had more extensive 
security functions, but still saw the job as transitory. They were also more oriented 
towards observing and reporting incidents. The third model was defined as ‘parapolicing’ 
or ‘private law enforcement’. These were characterised by high profile, well trained 
professional security staff prepared to engage in dangerous incidents and they were closer 
in orientation to the police. It is possible that the latter of these security officer types most 
resembles the orientations of agency CIs given their working relationship with the police 
although this remains to be confirmed. 
 
Generally speaking, each of the private security officer ‘types’ discussed above can be 
understood as existing somewhere on a continuum which runs from a ‘watchmen’ 
orientation to a ‘parapolice’ orientation (Button, 2007: 168-172). The former refers to the 
desire to avoid conflict and activities that might put them at risk. These individuals aim 
primarily to observe and avoid interaction wherever possible. The latter has strong 
similarities to the trait in police culture that Reiner (2010) identified as a sense of mission, 
action, cynicism and pessimism. The individuals who fall within this category are 
preoccupied with ‘real work’ which is often more dangerous and involves the use of legal 
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tools161. While useful for illustrating the likely existence of caveats of subcultures with 
regard to the field of private security, for the most part, such cultural complexity (as is 
suggested by the continuum model) tends to be overshadowed principally, by the idea of 
market versus public good mentalities - these being the distinct and often conflic t ing 
rationalities guiding private security and police actors in their everyday interactions with 
one another and with the public. 
 
 
2.4.6.1 For Profit or for Public Good? 
 
There is indeed evidence to suggest that private security encounters with the 
police are often shaped by a set of market rationalities. For example, White and Gill 
(2013: 14) illustrate how private security agents market logic is revealed in relation to 
‘their promotion of business skills in the creation and delivery of security commodities - 
which is directly contrasted with police command structures - and their ability to identify 
and take advantage of profitable opportunities in the process of selling their commodit ies 
to police consumers’. Similarly, it would also be reasonable to assume that the police 
operate in accordance with public good rationalities and there is indeed also evidence to 
support this assumption. For example, Crawford (2006: 463) observed that, rather than 
recasting themselves as ‘equivalent partners’, on occasions when public police actors are 
contracted out to the private sector on a ‘user-pays’ basis, they often assume the position 
of ‘honest broker’ - or independent third parties - in their interactions with localised 
private security actors. However, as this section seeks to demonstrate, this picture is likely 
to be far more complicated: As Singh and Kempa (2007) point out, almost all of the 
functions performed by the public police are now also being performed in some manner 
or to some degree by private security agents, with the private security industry now 
employing a wide array of coercive techniques and in many cases operating punitive 
strategies for controlling crime and maintaining social order.  In the UK, the preventative 
and punitive strategies employed by private security can most often be observed in 
relation to the modification and influencing of an individual’s behaviour and movements 
                                                                 
161 There are a number of legal tools which private security officers may draw upon to assist them in their 
work. Referred to as ‘any person’ powers in legislation, such powers include: the right to ask (e.g. to search 
a bag), the power to arrest (see Chapter Six, section 6.3 for more detail), the power to use force, the right 
to remove someone from private property and the ability to search (with consent) (e.g. as condition of 
access to private property) (see Button 2007: 31-44 for further detail). 
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which, in turn, affect human bodies themselves (e.g. increased surveillance). However, 
as Singh (2005) discusses, other punitive strategies which cause the actual sensation of 
pain can also be identified, for example, barbed wire and electric fences may also be used.  
 
Some years ago, Johnston (1992) criticised the distinction commonly made by scholars 
between ‘loss prevention’ and ‘crime control’ on the reasoning that understanding public 
policing and private security motivations in such a way obscures the increasingly 
complementary nature of the two objectives within an increasingly marketised (i.e. neo-
liberal) political economy. As Singh and Kempa (2007: 299) note, private security 
agencies can now be seen often to market themselves as ‘Security AND Loss Control’, 
providers making a clear distinction between the two motives and in turn, implying that 
they do not view security purely as a matter of loss control. Nevertheless, academic 
discussion continues, for the most part, to assume that private security focuses principa lly, 
if not wholly, on loss prevention. It is only recently that commentators have begun to 
detail the crime control and other coercive responsibilities of private security, resulting in 
suggestions - notably by South (1997) - that punitive measures may now at the forefront 
of private security activities. 
 
Generally speaking, this distinction has been presumed on the basis of findings obtained 
by a number of studies on shop theft and store detectives and which have highlighted the 
loss/crime distinction (cf Ekblom, 1986; Farrington et al., 1993; Gabbard, Montang and 
Leonard, 1986; Shapland and Wiles, 1989)162. Furthermore, Rigakos’ research draws out 
the similarities of Toronto’s ‘parapolice’ to the contemporary public police in functions 
and aspirations. This was particularly evident with regard to the private security officers’ 
apparent commitment to ‘law enforcement ideals - ‘good pinches’’ (2002: 127). Rigakos 
concludes by arguing that ‘private and public can refer to little more than the offic ia l 
designation of the policing service in question’ and that ‘this tells us very little about their 
operations’ (2002: 149, original emphasis). He questions the notion that ‘the public and 
private police’ in late capitalist society have different goals, seeing them in fact as having 
similar roles. In their article, ‘The Transformations of Policing’, White and Gill (2013) 
also raise the issue of public good vs. market rationalities with regard to their effect on 
                                                                 
162 Later research on the growth of mass private property (e.g. shopping malls) has tended to bring out the 
space limited nature of private security staff’s work (i.e. only on their premises) but also draws attention to 
the many different motives and roles which include social order.  
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relations between private security and police actors in Britain. Reflecting on the key 
threads of argument put forward by Bayley and Shearing (1996) in the ‘transformation 
thesis’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003), the authors discuss the extent to which private 
security and police actors do actually have definite rationalities or world views which are 
exclusively based on either public good or market logic. In their article the authors 
contend that, ‘rather than witnessing a marked shift from a public good-orientated system 
of policing to a market-orientated one, we are in fact seeing a complex blurring of 
relations and rationalities, with both private security and police actors drawing upon a 
mix of public and private scripts to inform their actions’ (White and Gill, 2013: 74-75). 
 
In the body of policing literature, it is now commonplace for commentators to make 
reference to studies of cop culture (cf Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010: 115-38) and security 
governance ‘mentalities’ (cf Berg, 2010; Johnston and Shearing 2003: 29-30). The 
ascendance of constructivism (Gergen, 2009) has encouraged commentators to explore 
the likelihood that different social actors possess diverse and variable - as opposed to 
fixed - rationalities when undertaking their day-to-day work. As Crawford (2006: 464) 
remarks, there is consequently a pressing ‘need to develop conceptual parameters for 
thinking about both the publicness of private forms of policing and the privateness of the 
public police’. This is of particular significance to understandings of the culture(s) of both 
the public police and the private security which have traditionally been envisaged in terms 
of the market versus public good rationalities. 
 
White and Gill (2013: 5) also remark how:  
 
‘The majority of the criminology and security governance literature examines 
private security actors from an (often implicit) economic perspective, in which 
they are regarded as market actors whose operations should be framed primarily 
as responses to fluctuations in supply and demand’.  
 
It is therefore somewhat unsurprising that this literature also tends to reproduce the 
assumption that private security actors operate in line with market rationalities. However, 
the limited (but growing) number of those culturally orientated studies which seek to draw 
attention to the rationalities of private security actors suggest that these actors do not 
always draw upon consistent market rationalities to guide their actions. White (2010, 
2012), for instance, has shown how the executives of many private security companies 
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frequently act as political strategists alongside their more conventional role as 
businessmen and, in doing so, seek to align their company’s operations with the popularly 
held expectation that domestic security ought to be provided by state actors as a public 
good (White and Gill, 2013: 5)163. While the authors rightly recognise that most of the 
time, such political strategising is guided by a desire to maximise company profits, they 
nevertheless illustrate the fact that for many private security executives, market and public 
good rationalities are far from mutually exclusive (White and Gill, 2013: 5). 
 
In another recent study Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011) have similarly discovered that 
private security actors often draw upon non-market rationalities in their day-to-day 
activities, observing that: 
 
‘...what is most striking about the way security players spoke about their industry 
in interviews with us, and speak to each other about it in the trade press, is just 
how infrequently they seek to justify its existence and value, or enhance its 
reputation, using principles and arguments drawn from ... the ‘market world’’ 
(Thumala et al., 2011: 297). 
 
Instead, they found, these actors regularly borrow from the symbolism and discourse of 
the public sphere when framing their activities in an effort to legitimate their ‘tainted 
trade’. What is particularly interesting about this research is that, in the view of Thumala 
et al. (2011) these borrowing activities are not driven solely by a desire to legitimate their 
trade to potential purchasers of their products and services, but also by a desire to 
legitimate their trade to themselves. This relates to White’s (2010: 175-6) point that 
private security actors do not exist in an ‘ontologically separate realm’ from those who 
may be considered to have more moral (or at least traditionally moral) concerns about the 
provision of security as a private good. It is perfectly possible for them to share these 
concerns while simultaneously working in the industry - that is, they can be guided by 
divided and internally inconsistent rationalities. 
 
Together, these studies suggest that the lines separating public good from market 
rationalities may be more blurry and overlapping than was initially conceived. They 
                                                                 
163 This issue is further bolstered by the increasing need for large corporations to adopt corporate social 
responsibility policies (cf Kelly, Martin and Johnson, 2010; Sankar and Bhattacharya, 2001). For example, 
in a worldwide survey conducted in December 2005 by management consultants McKinsey, only 6 per cent 
of the 4,238 executives surveyed agreed that the sole purpose of business was to produce high returns for 
shareholders; 84 per cent thought high returns had to be balanced with contributions to the broader public 
good (McKinsey, 2006: 33-39). 
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suggest that far from operating in accordance with clear-cut market rationalities, private 
security actors frequently draw upon a combination of market and public good 
rationalities to guide their actions (cf Berg 2010; Rigakos 2002). Further empirical study 
of private security actor rationalities in any given territory is much needed, as is the effect 
of market rationalities on the public police - particularly given the context of pluralisa t ion 
and increase in partnership working etc. This is particularly true when one considers the 
neo-liberal reform of police institutions in line with NPM principles since the 1980s 
which were designed to inject the logic of the market into police operations (McLaughlin, 
Muncie and Hughes, 2001; McLaughlin and Murji 2001). Without doubt these reforms 
serve to complicate police rationality, as Ayling et al. (2009) remark:  
 
‘...police are facing the singular challenge of being required to function in a 
business paradigm while still trying to provide a ‘public service’ which delivers 
‘justice’ and does so equitably and coherently’ (Ayling et al., 2009: 11).  
 
As such, it is likely that police actors and private security actors do not operate on the 
basis of unified rationalities, but rather operate elements of both. This hypothesis is 
supported by work by Loftus (2010) and Button, Williamson and Johnston (2007) who 
together draw attention to the continuity of the underlying world view of police officers 
which ‘continues to exert considerable influence over day-to-day police work’ (Loftus, 
2010: 3). It is therefore likely that the ‘working personality’ of police officers and security 
officers is one of a dual nature. The dichotomy of market and public good rationalities is 
increasingly likely to be further complicated at an operational level by the growing use 
of agency staff (i.e. those who have been bought in from private security agencies to work 
for the police on a fixed term basis) for which CIs may be one example. These individua ls 
may thus bring with them the market rationalities of their private sector employers but 
their behaviour and thought-process may also be being influenced by wider notions of 
public good and furthermore, the crime control mentality of their public police colleagues 
whom they work alongside. This issue will be explored in greater detail later in later 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
2.4.7 Summary 
 
In summary, this section has discussed literature related to the topic of police 
occupational culture/s. Overall, this section has argued in favour of extending the cultura l 
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lens beyond the study of warranted officers to non-warranted police staff. Despite their 
long-established position in many police forces, police staff groups have been largely 
excluded from existing cultural accounts. Given the context of profound and on-going 
organisational reform and the significance of the roles now being variously undertaken 
by non-warranted individuals, I would argue that the time has now come for greater 
acknowledgement of the impact of non-warranted personnel presence for understand ings 
of police culture/s. It may be that police staff represent a new type amongst the 
‘multiplicity of police culture(s) for understanding the construction(s) and meaning(s) of 
police work and police identity(ies)’ (Silvestri, 2003: 15). As made clear in this chapter, 
increased specialisation and ongoing budgetary constraint has meant that the decisions 
and actions undertaken by police staff may now have significant implications for the 
overall legitimacy of the police. However, with regard to the focus of this study, what 
remains to be identified is the level of autonomy and discretion in decision making which 
is afforded to CIs and with that, the extent to which traditional ‘detective culture’ can be 
said to be facilitating/influencing the way they operate their role.  
  
Furthermore, as discussed in the final part of this section, the advent of the mixed -
economy model of policing provision and in particular, the increased significance of the 
contribution now also being made by private security to public provision policing 
suggests a need to extend focus even further, to the study of ‘policing culture/s’ which 
exist beyond the police organisation itself. Work by White and Gill (2013) (amongst 
others) has drawn much needed attention to the emerging ‘hybridity’ of policing 
rationalities and with that, the merging of occupational and sectoral identities within the 
police organisation and beyond it. While differences in individual orientations to work 
might be distinguishable along sectoral lines they maybe becoming increasing less clear-
cut as the police find themselves operating within a shared policing and security context. 
With regard to the focus of current study, the extent to which the utilisation of agency CIs 
is likely to impact on the public good orientation of investigative work by the public 
police remains to be seen as is a key area of consideration in the current research. 
 
2.5 Concluding Summary 
 
Overall this chapter has reviewed a breadth of literature considered pertinent to 
the introduction of CIs in 2002. It should be clear from the above critical review that, as 
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a topic of discussion, the utilisation of CIs presents a number of interesting issues for 
wider consideration, in particular, how recent pluralising trends may be starting to blur 
long established occupational and professional boundaries both within and outside the 
police organisation. What is clear from the above discussion is that the landscape and 
territories of policing may once again be shifting as the effects of unprecedented cuts to 
the police budget - in particular, on the police workforce, its composition and its relations 
with non-police partner agencies in both the public and private sectors – continue to be 
realised. Such a trying occupational context may serve as a stimulus for experimenta t ion 
that affords or offers possible economies. If viewed strictly in terms of their cost-
effectiveness in relation to warranted detectives, CIs may prove a lucrative investment 
for the police and the CID. Indeed, as police forces face competing pressures to 
maintain/improve efficiency in all areas of their work while also making savings to their 
budget, it is likely that they will use their operational autonomy to look towards more 
innovative means of utilising CIs beyond their primary ‘supportive’ capacity. There is a 
clear potential for ‘mission creep’ to occur within the CI role and this may have serious 
implications for detective’s claims to jurisdictional autonomy and thus, for their status as 
professionals within the police organisation. As in many areas of professional work, the 
division of labour in policing is becoming increasingly more complex as technologica l 
advancements, increased specialisation and need for fiscal stringency necessitate a more 
economically flexible and diversely skilled workforce. The utilisation of CIs therefore 
raises important questions about the trajectory of professionalism in relation to crimina l 
investigation in the coming years. Furthermore, it is likely that the rise in presence and 
significance of private security to contemporary policing provision will serve to redefine 
the role to be performed by professional police officers on the frontline. For detectives, 
CIs may present a potential threat to their claims of professional expertise in the field of 
criminal investigation. They also likely challenge deep-seated assumptions about the 
nature of the detective knowledge-base and, with that, the centrality of the detective role 
to contemporary criminal investigation. 
The final section of this chapter applied a cultural lens to the introduction of CIs and, in 
doing so, has explored the extent to which their utilisation may have effected change in 
established cultures that exist within the CID. Recent changes in patterns of policing 
(most notably, shifts towards greater civilianisation and privatisation) have encouraged 
dramatic changes in the composition of the police workforce, with more specialised and 
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frontline work falling within the occupational remit of non-warranted police staff. The 
intermingling of private and public policing in recent years also draws attention to the 
potential for the overlapping of values and occupational cultures. The hybrid occupationa l 
status of agency CIs in particular raises important questions, not only about the potential 
blurring of boundaries between the public and the private sectors in regard to the 
provision of criminal investigation, but also concerning the impact of such developments 
on the orientations of officers and staff towards their work. It could be that CIs, as a new 
variant of the extended policing family, may be encouraging the formation of dual-
rationalities within the contemporary CID. The overall impact of such blurring on practice 
and, in particular, on the role of the warranted detective however remains to be seen.  
 
Before moving on to discuss the methodology employed in the research, I feel it is 
important, given the breadth of discussion covered in the previous sections, to conclude 
this chapter by drawing the reader’s attention back to the aims and objectives of the study 
which are as follows: 
 
 Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working 
practices, occupational identity and positioning, and sense of value. 
 Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices 
and occupational identity. 
 Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and 
in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective 
investigative practice. 
 Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisa t ion 
of CIs by police forces across the country. 
 Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the crimina l 
investigation process in E&W. 
 
Hopefully this review of the literature has suggested some directions for exploring these 
questions. 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Blumer (1969: 28) defines research methods as being the ‘mere instruments 
designed to identify and analyse the obdurate character of the social world and, as such, 
their value exists only in their suitability in enabling this task to be done’ (Blumer, 1969: 
28). As such, the formulation of a suitable research design164 is an essential part of any 
social research project and one which is determined by the overall research methodology 
adopted by the researcher, which in itself is informed through consideration of the nature 
of the research being undertaken. The study in question adopts a mixed methods research 
methodology and, in doing so, draws upon a number of data collection techniques in an 
effort to answer the central research questions of this thesis.  
 
Through the adoption of a mixed methods approach, the aims of the research are two-fold. 
First, the researcher seeks to capture the ‘social meanings and ordinary activities’ of 
research participants as they are exhibited within a ‘naturally occurring setting’ 
(commonly referred to by ethnographic researchers as ‘the field’ (Brewer, 2000: 10)). 
Second, the researcher aims to broadly map the nature of the deployment and 
demographic of CI use across E&W. For this project, data collection techniques primarily 
included the interviewing of police detectives (DCs) and police staff alongside some 
observation work, both of which were undertaken concurrently as the researcher 
accompanied participants during their daily business both within and outside of the police 
CID. This study was designed to explore the nature of the role played by CIs relative to 
that of warranted DCs within CIDs across E&W. Through the use of a mixed methods 
approach to data collection, as complete a portrait as possible of the world of police 
officers and police staff operating within CID units was constructed. 
This chapter is concerned with outlining the research process and overall approach to 
research utilised by this study, providing some context for clarification of, and 
justification for, each chosen method adopted by the study. This chapter discusses the 
                                                                 
164 In this research the term ‘research design’ is employed in accordance with the definition provided by 
Bryman (2008: 698) which refers to ‘a framework for the collection and analysis of data’. Research designs 
involve the intersection of philosophy (e.g. the theoretical framework and motivation of the researcher with 
regard to the research), strategies of enquiry (e.g. qualitative strategies such as ethnography) (also been 
referred to in the literature as approaches to enquiry (Cres well, 2007), or research methodologies (Mertens, 
1998)) and specific methods (e.g. interviews, experiments, surveys etc.). 
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research settings in which the fieldwork was undertaken, the varying methods of data 
collection employed in the mixed methods approach utilised by the researcher, the 
approach to data analysis employed by the study and also some of the practical and ethical 
challenges faced by the researcher while negotiating her way through the data collection 
process within the closed occupational world of the CID. 
 
3.2 Epistemology and Ontological Considerations 
 
As with any research, it is important to clarify the ontology and epistemology of 
the current study and to reflect upon and provide reasoned justification for the chosen 
approach vis-a-vis competing philosophies, theories and analytical traditions (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980). Generally speaking, epistemology is about ‘how we know what we 
know’ (Crotty, 1998: 8) or ‘the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-
be knower and what can be known’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 201). In the case of the 
current study this may, for example, include ways of ‘knowing’ about the CI role as it is 
understood and experienced by those social actors. Different epistemological positions 
provide different explanations about the nature of reality and are fundamenta l ly 
concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kind(s) of 
knowledge is possible and how we ensure it is adequate and legitimate (Maynard, 1994). 
Epistemology is related to ontology which, broadly speaking, refers to ‘the study of being’ 
(Crotty, 1998: 10) or ‘the nature of reality’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 37). Ontology 
focuses on questions such as ‘whether or not a social reality exists independently of 
human conceptions’, ‘whether there is a single shared social reality or multiple context -
specific realities’ and, ‘whether or not social behaviour is governed by immutable or 
generalisable laws’ (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 11). Every researcher applies their own 
set of epistemological and ontological assumptions when conducting their investigat ions 
and it is important that these are taken into account by researchers when designing and 
undertaking social research. 
Opinions are divided amongst researchers with regard to what constitutes legitimate 
enquiry and warrantable knowledge in specific situations. Indeed, there appear to be two 
generally opposing views. On the one hand there are those advocates of the 
‘experimentalist’, ‘positivist’ approach who posit a general belief in the existence of an 
objective, quantifiable reality. On the other hand, there are those who take a more 
‘naturalistic’, ‘interpretative’ approach, furthering the theoretical belief that reality is 
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complex, socially constructed and fluid. As such, what we know is always negotiated 
within cultures, social settings and relationships with other people. From this perspective, 
validity or truth cannot be grounded in an objective reality (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992: 
15). As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter, a mixed 
methods research design was employed by the researcher in the current study. The 
decision to adopt this research design was informed by the epistemological and 
ontological stance of the researcher alongside primary consideration of the research 
questions, objectives and context (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007; Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003, 2009).  
 
The current study is broadly framed by a post-positivist epistemological stance and is 
rooted in a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 1975; 1998) which argues that choice of 
methods should be dictated by the nature of the research problem. The adoption of a 
critical realist approach allows for simultaneous recognition of the existence of 
knowledge independent of individuals but also the socially embedded and fallible nature 
of scientific enquiry, therefore positioning itself somewhere between 
positivism/objectivism and constructionism/relativism. It is the basic assumption of 
critical realists that an objective, measurable reality does indeed exist but that all 
measurement and observation of that reality is fallible due to the inherently theory-laden 
and biased world views of individuals; science is a social practice and scientific 
knowledge is a social product. Rather, critical realists propose that there is more than one 
way of understanding/perceiving reality, each of which may be equally valid (Lakoff, 
1987: 265). In other words: 
‘Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemologica l 
Interpretivist … our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and 
provisional rather than straightforwardly representational’ (Frazer and Lacey, 
1993: 182).  
 
Critical realists thus retain an ontological realism (there is a real world that exists 
independently of our perceptions, theories and constructions) while accepting a form of 
epistemological constructivism and relativism (our understanding of this world is 
inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint). From a critical 
realist standpoint, as researchers our understandings of these perspectives of reality can 
only ever hope to be more or less correct; some theories approximate reality better than 
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others. The ultimate goal of research therefore is not to identify generalisable laws 
(positivism) or to identify the lived experience or beliefs of social actors (interpretivism); 
it is to develop deeper levels of explanation and understanding. 
 
Like constructivist/relativist thinking, critical realism sees the social world as being 
mediated through social interaction and interpretation and social phenomena as concept-
dependent. However, unlike interpretivism, it does not exclude causal explanation (Sayer, 
2000) choosing rather to acknowledge the existence of causal mechanisms which may or 
may not be observable but which still exist alongside social actors. Mechanisms may 
include things, such as social systems (e.g. cultural, political etc.); social structures (e.g. 
police organisation); and specific interventions (e.g. government legislation etc.) and with 
specific regard to the current research, can be broadly understood to exist as the vehicles 
through which the CI role is experienced and understood by individuals within the police 
CID. 
 
Critical realism offers a robust framework for the use of a variety of methods in order to 
gain a better understanding of the meaning and significance of a phenomenon of interest 
(Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978; Mingers, 2004). As 
this study seeks to provide both breadth and depth of understanding with regard to the 
current use of CIs across the country, the collection of qualitative and quantitative data 
via a mixed methods research design was undertaken and resulted in triangulation taking 
place at the design, method (through ‘connecting’ and ‘merging’ (see section 3.12.1)) and 
interpretive levels. This decision was made for purposes of completeness allowing for 
complementary perspectives and a greater level of detail than could be obtained from 
using either data source alone. The adoption of a critical realist approach by the current 
study has also allowed the researcher to take account of the significance of social context 
(particularly the socio-occupational and organisational contexts and social mechanisms 
present within the CID and within which CIs were located) when building knowledge 
about the reality of the CI role.  
 
The adoption of a critical realist approach has enabled the various ways by which research 
participants interpret their experiences within their given position to be explored 
providing ‘thick description’ of the realities of the CI role (Geertz, 1973). It also enabled 
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focus to be directed at the various understandings that different individuals have, in this 
instance, CI’s and DC’s conceptions of the nature of their role within the crimina l 
investigation process; while at the same time taking account of how associated concepts 
- in this case, for example, how individuals learn how to become ‘professional’ crimina l 
investigators - are viewed and addressed. Furthermore, for this mixed methods study, the 
adoption of a critical realist perspective has allowed for the criminal investigation process 
and subsequently, the role of the warranted detective, to be viewed as a product of 
interpretation. This therefore means that their role may be subject to renegotiation by 
social actors within the CID while at the same time, enabling a view of reality as also 
being that which, to an extent, persists and antedates the participation of particular people 
and therefore shapes their perspectives and so, to a degree, is objective and measurable 
(Becker, 1982: 521). Equally, for the current study, the implementation of a critical realist 
ontology also allowed for breadth as well as depth of enquiry via the administration of a 
semi-structured survey which explored similarity and variation in the use of CIs between 
police constabularies across E&W. This in turn resulted in the collection of both 
quantitative and qualitative data which enabled a more complete picture of the 
phenomenon to be determined. 
 
3.3 Mixed Methods Research  
 
This study employed a mixed methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) research 
design, which broadly speaking, is a procedure for collecting, analysing and ‘mixing’ 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches into the research methodology of a single 
study, in an effort to understand a research problem in a more holistic fashion (Creswell, 
2002). Over the last half century or so, there has been a distinct shift in the social science 
literature towards the promotion of methodological pluralism. The desirability of the 
mixed methods approach has been underscored by the recognition of the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of single method designs. Increasing reference has been made 
in the literature to the emergence of mixed methods as the ‘third methodologica l 
movement’ (an intellectual and practical synthesis) alongside the longstanding discourses 
of qualitative and quantitative research methods. This emerging third paradigm165 has 
                                                                 
165 The use of the term 'paradigm' in this section of the thesis is reserved for ‘the philosophical intent or 
underlying theoretical framework and motivation of the researcher with regard to the research’ (Mackenzie 
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been referred to under many names. Some of these include multiple operationalism 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959), triangulation (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest, 
1966: 3), blended research (Thomas, 2003), integrative research (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), multi-method research (Hunter and Brewer, 2003; Morse, 2003), 
triangulated studies (Sandelowski, 2003), ethnographic residual analysis (Fry,  
Chantavanich and Chantavanich, 1981) and mixed research (Johnson, 2006; Johnson and  
Christensen, 2004). More commonly however, the term ‘mixed methods research’ has 
been used to describe this movement although there is an argument that the broader term 
‘mixed research’, as well as ‘integrative research’, is more appropriate as it does not 
suggest a limitation of mixing to methods only (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, Turner, 2007: 
118). 
 
Several definitions for mixed methods research have emerged over the years. Greene, 
Caracelli and Graham (1989) defined mixed methods research designs as those that 
include at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method. Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) indicated a broader understanding, that being that mixed methods 
research is the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single 
study. However, for the purposes of the current study, mixed methods research is 
understood in accordance with the definition posited by Johnson et al. (2007), that is, 
mixed methods is assumed to be: 
‘…the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration’.  
 
Unlike mono-method research designs which adopt a single approach to research (e.g. 
quantitative approach) and which derive from distinct epistemological and ontologica l 
foundations - that is, each type of research operates with a different set of assumptions 
about the definition of reality (ontology), the acknowledgement of reality or ‘how we 
know what we know’ (epistemology),  and the ways in which reality is understood 
(methodology) (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) - mixed methods designs embrace both 
                                                                 
and Knipe, 2006: 139-205). Others have referred to this as worldviews (Guba, 1990: 17), epistemologies 
and ontologies (Crotty, 1998), or broadly conceived research methodologies (Neuman, 2000). 
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approaches in the construction of research designs based on pragmatism (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998), holism and continuity (Schulenburg, 2007: 2-3). 
 
Several debates or ‘wars’ (Datta, 1994) have raged in the social sciences regarding the 
issue of methodological pluralism. These debates have been instigated by ‘purist’ critics 
on both sides (positivists and interpretivists) and have tended to fall within one of two 
indistinct camps: the general belief in the superiority of one methodological approach 
over the other, and the overall incommensurability of the two research methods due to 
their being derived from fundamentally different epistemological positions (e.g. positivist 
vs. constructivist orientations) - what has come to be termed the ‘incompatability thesis’ 
(Howe, 1988). However, more recently these ‘wars’ have been replaced by a ‘paradigmic 
soup’ (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007) and methodological pluralism has become a 
dominant part of the research landscape.  ‘Pacifists’ such as Greene and Caracelli (1997) 
further the ‘multiple world-views’ perspective i.e. the idea that researchers may use any 
number of philosophical foundations to justify the use of mixed methods. Scholars such 
as Patton (1990), Murphy (1990), Cherryholmes (1992) and Morgan (2007) alternative ly 
advocated a ‘pragmatist’ approach to knowing whereby forced choice between either 
methodological approach is rejected in favour of ‘what works’. Arguably the most 
important consideration prior to designing and conducting a mixed methods study, or 
study of any kind for that matter, is whether the method and associated data collection 
techniques to be employed, best addresses the research problem and the research 
question(s) of the project. The decision to adopt a mixed methods approach in the current 
study was fundamentally based on this logic and on the opportunity it provides the 
researcher to explore and analyse different aspects of a phenomenon (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). In the current research, this relates most obviously to the ability to study the nature 
of the CIs role while also exploring the scope of their use at a national level. 
 
A number of commentators have advocated the mixed methods approach, often choosing 
to list reasons supporting the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Rossman and Wilson, 1985). For example, work by Sieber 
(1973) outlined how such a combination can be effective at the research design, data 
collection and data analysis stages of the research process with the strengths of one 
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approach offsetting the weaknesses of the other166. During the data analysis stage, for 
example, quantitative data can facilitate the assessment of generalisability of the 
qualitative data and can shed new light on dense qualitative findings, providing focus or 
what Fielding (2012: 127-128) refers to as ‘illustration’. Alternatively, during the data 
analysis stage, qualitative data can play an important role in the interpretat ion, 
clarification, description and validation of quantitative results. Teddlie and Tashakkori 
(2003, cited in Hall, 2008: 124) list three key areas in which they argue mixed methods 
are superior to mono method approaches: 
 
1. Mixed methods research can answer research questions that the other 
methodologies cannot - Combining methods enables researchers to access the best 
features of each so they are able to answer a wider range of questions, such as 
confirmatory and exploratory questions, in the same study. 
 
2. Mixed method research provides better (stronger) inferences - Mixed methods 
provide a wide variety of data sources to assist in understanding complex 
phenomena. They enable multiple inferences that complement one another. 
 
3. Mixed methods provide the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of views 
- Inferences from mixed methods can reflect different voices and perspectives and 
this can lead to re-examination of the ways in which the field of study has been 
conceptualised. 
 
Fundamentally, the techniques employed in a mixed methods research design ‘should be 
mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses’ 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003: 16)167. By examining published research, Greene et al. 
                                                                 
166 Quantitative methodologies are weak due primarily to their decontextualizing effect on human behaviour 
and subsequent failure to address the ‘why’ of a phenomenon (Creswell and Plano -Clark, 2007). Similarly , 
qualitative methodologies are often criticised for their level of subjectivity and ensuing researcher bias 
(Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007). It is the central premise of the mixed methods approach that using 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of resea rch 
problems than either approach alone (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007: 35; Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 
1989; Rocco et al., 2003: 21; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), in turn, providing researchers with the most 
informative, complete, balanced and useful research results (Johnston et al, 2007).  
167 It is important to note here the view of some commentators who suggest that far from freeing researchers 
from the restrictions of paradigms and the strife of paradigmatic struggle, mixed methods can actually serv e 
to reinforce categorical differences. Giddings (2006: 195) for example, argues that ‘the use of the terms 
‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ as normative descriptors reinforces their binary positioning, effectively  
marginalising the methodological diversity within them’. 
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(1989: 259) identified five purposes or rationales for the utilisation of a mixed methods 
approach: 
 
1. Triangulation - looks to see if there is convergence, corroboration, correspondence 
of results from the different methods. 
 
2. Complementary - looks to see if there is elaboration, enhancement, illustrat ion, 
clarification of the results with the results from one method with the results from 
the other. 
 
3. Development - looks to see if the results from one method can be used to help 
develop or inform the other method, where development is broadly construed to 
include sampling and implementation, as well as measurement decisions. 
 
4. Initiation - looks to see if there is paradox and contradiction, new perspectives of 
frameworks, the recasting of questions or results from one method with questions 
and results from the other method. 
 
5. Expansion - looks to see if the breadth and range of enquiry can be extended by 
using different methods for different enquiry components. 
 
 
In the current research, data from the quantitative component of the study have been used 
to ‘flesh out’ qualitative findings, providing much needed context and ‘analytic density’ 
(Fielding, 2012: 128). This method is not uncommon in the social sciences (e.g. Clarke, 
2003), allowing researchers greater scope and as such, providing a wider and deeper 
picture of the phenomenon from all angles (Shih, 1998: 633). However, generally 
speaking the quantitative component of the study was utilised as an adjunct to assist in 
the interpretation of qualitative findings, improving the depth and quality of the findings 
as well as any inferences which may be drawn. While not necessarily equal in its 
positioning, the quantitative component also invariably contributed to knowledge 
regarding the phenomenon under study in its own right and looked at CI use across E&W. 
Based on the above discussion and typology of rationales proposed by (Greene et al., 
1989) the current study can be thought to possess elements of triangulation (it seeks to 
extend the scope of enquiry through the utilisation of different methods for different 
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enquiry components), expansion (it also seeks to enhance and elaborate on the findings 
obtained via alternate data collection techniques) and complementarity (it also seeks 
convergence and corroboration of some of the findings). Together these rationales also 
enhance the potential generalisability of findings/conclusions (e.g. extent of utilisation of 
CIs in major crime, quality of training provided to CIs). 
 
According to Creswell, Plano-Clark, Gutmann and Hanson (2003), a number of key 
questions should be addressed by the researcher at the planning stage of any mixed 
methods study. First, the researcher must take into account what sequence he/she wants 
the qualitative and quantitative data collection to be implemented. Data can be collected 
either sequentially (i.e. one data collection method follows after the other) or concurrently 
(i.e. both data collection methods (qualitative and quantitative) are collected at the same 
time). Based on a pragmatic rationale relating the nature of the central research questions 
of this study (see section 3.1), the decision was made by the researcher to adopt a three 
stage sequential approach to data collection. Quantitative data were initially gleaned from 
Home Office generated statistics which detailed the numbers of police staff in operation 
within CID generalist and CID specialist units within police forces across E&W (see 
Appendix 1). This data directly influenced the selection of the fieldwork sites (see section 
3.7) within which qualitative data were then collected via semi-structured interviews and 
observation conducted with CIs and DCs (and a number of ‘others’). This was 
subsequently followed in the final stage of the data collection process by quantitative data 
collection via the sending of a semi-structured survey which was subsequently 
administered electronically (via email) to all of the 43 police constabularies in E&W (see 
Appendix 5). This research study can be considered exploratory in nature as it ‘generates 
information about unknown aspects of a phenomenon’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 
25). Information hoped to be generated in the current exploratory study related broadly 
to: (a) the nature of the role and type of work being performed by CIs within CIDs across 
E&W; (b) how the role being performed by CIs has impacted on the professional ethos 
of warranted police DCs; and (c) what the current situation with regard to the deployment 
of CIs across E&W currently is. As in a traditional sequential exploratory design, the data 
collected in both the initial quantitative and qualitative stages of the research directly 
informed the development of the subsequent stage/s of the research168. Initial quantitative 
                                                                 
168 However, unlike traditional sequential exploratory designs, the current study involved three stages of 
data collection. 
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findings aided the selection of appropriate fieldwork sites for the qualitative data 
collection stage. In the case of the qualitative results, the data collected via the interviews 
and observation aided the construction of the survey carried out in final stage of the data 
collection process (e.g. appropriate terminology and who to address it to). 
 
A second consideration for researchers when choosing a mixed methods design is whether 
or not one research method will have priority or greater emphasis than the other in the 
study (e.g. QUAL → quant169). The qualitative-quantitative continuum presented in 
Figure 1, draws attention to the variable and overlapping nature of mixed methods 
researchers and types of mixed methods research. In the current study the quantitat ive 
components were utilised as adjuncts to the qualitative data as this allowed for both the 
necessary depth and scope of research and the relevance/generalisability of findings. The 
decision to afford priority position to the qualitative component was based first and 
foremost on decisions made as the design phase relating to the best way to address the 
central research questions of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1. Graphic of the Three Major Research Paradigms, Including Subtypes of Mixed 
Methods Research. Johnson, R., Onwuegbezie, A. and Turner, L. (2007) ‘Toward a 
Definition of Mixed Methods Research’, Journal of Mixed Methods Research,  p124. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
169 Notation proposed by Morse (1991). In her system, the main or dominant method appears in capital 
letters (QUAN, QUAL) whereas the complementary method is given in lowercase letters (quan, qual). The 
notation ‘+’ is used to indicate a simultaneous design and the arrow ‘→’ stands for sequential design.  
‘Pure’ 
Mixed Pure 
Quantitative 
Pure 
Qualitative 
Qualitative 
Mixed 
Quantitative 
Mixed 
Qualitative Dominant Quantitative Dominant Equal Status 
Mixed Methods 
Broadly Speaking 
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Third, integration - i.e. when and how to integrate the different data components and how 
they inform one another - must be accounted for. Fielding (2012) argues that the issues 
relating to integration are bigger than simply when it happens: 
 
‘Integration is really the heart of the whole mixed methods exercise because the 
purpose of mixing methods is to get information from multiple sources and so 
the issues in bringing together the information are crucial. It is not so much the 
stage when integration occurs but additionally what types of data are being 
integrated and how we integrate them’ (Fielding, 2012: 127). 
 
 
In the current study data were integrated at the analysis and interpretive and reporting 
stages of the research. Decisions about these things rest fundamentally on our decision to 
implement a mixed methods approach, the general rationale for which has been discussed 
above (issues relating to the integration of data in the current study is discussed in section 
3.12.1 of this chapter). 
 
Fourth, mixed methods studies may be underpinned by a theoretical perspective that 
influences the selection of a particular research design and shapes the research process 
(Creswell, 2003). Some feminist scholars for example, argue that the quantitat ive 
approach is inherently unsuitable170  for research conducted in this field because they 
neglect the emotions of the people being studied (Jayaratne, 1993: 121). The current study 
is underpinned by the junior partner theory (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.5) argued by 
Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972) which, generally speaking, draws a clear line between 
the work of the public and private sectors with regard to the provision of policing and 
security which, according to the thesis, are not in competition with one another in terms 
of the jurisdictions of their work. As was discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, this 
theory is utilised broadly in the current study to explore the extent to which the role being 
performed by CIs (be they employed directly by the police organisation or via contracts 
agreed with private sector agencies e.g. G4S) can be considered complementary and/or 
junior to that of their warranted DC counterparts. Arguably, the most appropriate data 
collection technique which can be utilised to explore this issue would need to involve 
                                                                 
170  Increasingly Women’s Studies has however come to acknowledge that debates which allege the 
unsuitability of the quantitative approach in feminist research may, in reality, be less about the techniques 
of enquiry being unsuitable and are more about academic feminists seeking their own epistemological 
approach in an attempt to ‘professionalise’ their discipline (cf Oakley, 1998: 716). 
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direct communication with active practitioners (i.e. CIs and police officers) (e.g. through 
interviews) as well as time spent by the researcher within the field itself (e.g. observation).  
 
 
3.4 Mixed Methods with the Police - Rationale 
 
The study of the organisation, practice and (sub) cultures of the police has had a 
long and distinguished history in criminology (Chan, 1997; Hobbs, 1989; Innes, 2003; 
Loftus; 2009; Manning, 1977). Although field observation and more specifically the 
adoption of an ethnographic approach is often purported to be the most appropriate and 
fruitful way of gaining an in-depth understanding of day-to-day policing and in 
particularly, the elusive police occupational culture (Punch, 1979: chapter two; see also 
Marks, 2004 and Noaks and Wincup, 2004: chapter ten for further discussion), 
researchers of the police have also made use of other research methodologies which, 
generally speaking, have included the variable mix of formal interviews or questionna ire 
surveys to supplement, or replace, field observation (e.g., Fielding, 1988; Huey, 2007). 
For example, in his longitudinal study of police socialisation, Van Mannen (1975) chose 
to adopt a mixed methods approach which incorporated qualitative interviews, 
observation and also employed the aid of a structured questionnaire to collect data relating 
to the attitudes and experience of new recruits to the police over a five year period. 
 
Chan et al. (2003) similarly sought a mixed methods approach in their longitudinal study 
of the occupational culture and socialisation of recruits in an Australian police 
organisation. The researchers here made use of a mixture of qualitative and quantitat ive 
research methods which included multiple rounds of questionnaire surveys, interviews 
and field observation over a two-year period, together with a ten-year follow-up study. 
Schulenberg (2004) also utilised a mixed methods research design to examine the 
organisational processes that occur in police decision making in Canada. Her research 
design consisted of semi-structured interviews undertaken with police officers and 
statistical and documentary data (obtained primarily from provincial and munic ipa l 
government agencies and the Census). The data gleaned from semi-structured interviews 
alongside relevant documentation (e.g. policies and protocols) formed the primary 
qualitative aspect of the study. Reflecting on the methodological approach adopted by the 
research, Schulenburg (2007) considers some of the key issues that arose when using a 
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mixed methods research design to address police decision making and ponders the factors 
influencing her decision to adopt this research approach. Most notably, Schulenburg 
(2007: 19) notes the influence of the existence of theory and research relating to the topic 
of police discretion which includes both post-positivist and constructivist elements (Doob 
and Chan, 1982; Klinger, 1997).  
In the current study, field observation was supplemented with formal and informal 
interviews and a semi-structured survey on the rationale that this particular combination 
of data collection techniques would provide the most valid and reliable depiction of reality 
with regard to the use of CIs in E&W. The decision to adopt the mixed methods research 
design employed by the current study was also bolstered by two other factors: the 
demanding nature of the work performed by those operating within the units where 
observation was undertaken coupled with the fact that much of that work required 
participants remain office-based for large portions of the day, meant that fieldwork was 
dependent entirely on the availability of CIs and DCs. This meant that observation work 
was inconsistent and restricted to the availability of officers and staff according to their 
line managers. Furthermore, the study necessitated the researcher operate within a 
number of different fieldwork settings over the course of the fieldwork period. This meant 
that the researcher was only afforded a limited about of time in which to develop rapport 
with participants. Together, this meant that an ethnographic approach to enquiry was not 
viable. In ethnographic research, researchers seek to immerse themselves in the fieldwork 
setting, often spending a long period of time with one group of participants. This 
methodological approach is arguably more likely to capture typical behaviour due to 
difficulties associated with keeping up false appearances over time. This is an advantage 
not available for the current study as the decision was made to sample shifts and 
participants to ensure a more representative coverage. The use of multiple sources of data 
was one way to improve the validity of findings. 
Second, in order to meet the fourth aim of the current research - ‘Survey trends and level 
of consistency in the numbers and coordination of CIs across E&W’ - and in doing so, 
provide context to the qualitative component of the study, a semi-structured survey was 
deemed necessary and most appropriate. This data collection technique allowed for the 
generation of a deeper, more inclusive picture of the current use of CIs across E&W, also 
enabling the subsequent identification of patterns and trends in deployment. 
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Alongside the various rationales discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter and those 
considerations given here, the overall decision of the researcher to undertake a mixed 
methods study to explore the role played by CIs within the police CID, is, generally 
speaking, largely based on belief similar to that of Sammons et al. (2005: 221), that 
‘complex and pluralistic social contexts demand analysis that is informed by multiple and 
diverse perspectives. Our conclusions, or rather our ‘inferences’, are therefore stronger 
for having applied a mixed method approach’. 
 
3.5 Reflexive Research  
 
‘Without some degree of reflexivity any research is blind and without purpose’. 
(Flood, 1999: 35) 
 
Reflexivity necessitates the researcher to be aware of his/her effect on the process 
and outcomes of the research and is a concept which is based on the premise 
that ’knowledge cannot be separated from the knower’ (Steedman, 1991) and that, ‘In the 
social sciences, there is only interpretation. Nothing speaks for itself’ (Denzin, 1994). In 
carrying out qualitative research, it is impossible to remain ‘outside’ our subject matter; 
our presence, in whatever form, will have some kind of effect. Reflexive research takes 
account of this researcher involvement and requires researchers engage in explicit ‘self-
aware meta-analysis’ when going about the collection and analysis of data (Finley, 2003). 
Broadly speaking, reflexivity refers to ‘the interpretation of interpretation’ (Alvesson and 
Skolberg, 2000) and generally speaking, requires researchers to reflect ‘on the way in 
which research is carried out and understanding how the process of doing research shapes 
its outcomes’ (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001). However, three key types of reflexivity 
can be distinguished (Anderson, 2008). These are ‘introspective’ reflexivity (Finlay, 
2002), ‘methodological’ reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003). 
 
Introspective reflexivity focuses on the self-awareness of the researcher and can take the 
form of either reflexivity as deliberate and conscious reflection as part of a post-hoc 
rationalisation of events, or, as it did for Schön (1983), can also take the form of 
‘reflection-as-action’, i.e. reflection is incorporated into the everyday activities of the 
research. Methodological reflexivity can be interpreted as a more technically-oriented 
153 
 
type of reflexivity. In other words, focus is afforded to the method utilised in the research 
as well as the role of the researcher. Finally, epistemological reflexivity sets out to 
question the epistemological or meta-theoretical assumptions that underpin the research. 
Consciousness here is not so much of self per se but of ‘becoming more consciously 
reflexive by thinking about our own thinking’ (Johnson and Cassell, 2001: 127).  
 
During the fieldwork period I regularly reflected on my experiences, methods and 
interpretations both while in the field and shortly after leaving. As such, reflexivity most 
often took the form of introspective reflexivity although all three types of reflectivity were 
drawn upon by a researcher at various stages in the research process in an effort to 
improve reflexivity and as such, the validity of the data and clarity of the overall approach 
employed. This approach allowed the researcher to be continually aware of her research 
practices and assumptions, which exposed many of the limitations of sociologica l 
research and afforded a deeper understanding of the researcher’s role in the construction 
of data and knowledge. Furthermore, this approach helped me to develop an acute sense 
of self-awareness which in turn, helped to minimise the negative impact of my subjective 
influence on the researcher context. When analysing and reporting on the findings of the 
study, reflexive field note entries also acted as useful memory aids and allowed for added 
depth to explanations of events set down on paper. 
 
3.6 Research Settings 
 
To study the contribution of CIs to the criminal investigation process and the 
impact the introduction of this group of paraprofessional investigators has had on the 
professional ethos of police DCs and culture of the CID more broadly, fieldwork was 
undertaken sporadically within two English police force areas between April 2013 and 
April 2014. Site selection was informed by the general presence of CIs within each of the 
constabularies targeted for fieldwork in January 2013 as well as through review of 
relevant policy documents available at the time. CI numbers were identified from a review 
of official data collected by the Home Office which detailed numbers of ‘police staff’ 
operating within police CIDs across E&W (Dhani, 2012, see Appendix 1). While many 
forces (including those targeted for fieldwork) had yet to formulate specific cost-saving 
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for the then current and anticipated future cuts to the police budget171 at the time the 
fieldwork sites were selected, limited information was nonetheless available to the 
researcher at this point in time in the form of relevant HMIC reports. In particular, force 
specific summary reports were published from data gathered for the July 2012 report, 
‘Policing in Austerity: One Year On’ (HMIC, 2012). These reports provided an overview 
of the strategies of each force for making the required savings and, while broad in their 
focus, highlighted important similarities and differences in the anticipated approach of 
both forces targeted for fieldwork. In particular, both forces were planning significant 
reductions in their workforce and were anticipating the majority of this change from the 
reduction of numbers of police staff. However, while Newbank planned to increase its 
frontline workforce volume, Shorewick, by contrast, planned to make a significant 
reduction to theirs (above the national average of 6%) (HMIC, 2012: 30). However, there 
were no specific published policy documents on the use of CIs available in the selected 
forces (or indeed, obviously, for other forces) nor documents on the particular reaction of 
police unions or other workforce bodies, at the time of selection of forces. 
The decision to undertake fieldwork within two forces was based on the likelihood of 
variations in the use of CIs at divisional level by each force. For the sake of anonymity, 
pseudonyms of ‘Shorewick’ and ‘Newbank’ have been used in this thesis in place of the 
actual names of the chosen constabularies. Each fieldwork setting was coterminous with 
the geographical boundaries of the district of the associated police force and was primarily 
targeted on the basis of CI presence within the varying (generalist and specialist) CID 
units (see Appendix 1).  
 
Fieldwork commenced in Shorewick at the beginning of June 2013 and ended in April 
2014 and commenced in Newbank in July 2013 and ended in April 2014. Within these 
two locations fieldwork was undertaken within six police CID units and within eight 
distinct teams. Each research site (CID unit) was selected with the assistance of an 
appointed Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) at both Newbank and Shorewick who acted 
as research facilitator throughout the course of the study. A mixture of snowball and 
                                                                 
171 Neither of those forces targeted for fieldwork had made available information/policy documents specific 
to any plans for reductions in CI numbers at the time sites were selected  (provisional documents were 
accessed by the researcher for plans to reduce the number of CIs working in Shorewick MIT). While the 
researcher was made aware of plans to reduce numbers of CIs working at Shorewick during the fieldwork, 
these plans were still in the process  of being formulated (alongside changes in management structure within 
the CID) and, as such, had not yet been finalised at the time of the fieldwork. 
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purposive sampling was used to gather participants during the qualitative stage of the 
research (these techniques will be discussed in more detail in section 3.8 of this chapter).  
 
Being a mixed methods study of a limited number of cases, any inferences drawn from 
the current project are limited in their generalisability to a wider context. However, 
although I remain cautious in making broad statements regarding the representativeness 
of findings, I am in firm agreement with Bowling (2010: 19) that ‘it is the task of the 
social scientist not simply to document and explain patterns of policing in a specific 
village or city but to generalise to all such rural or urban settings simply enough for the 
data collected in one place to provide the basis for descriptive or explanatory lessons to 
be drawn elsewhere’. It is the aim of this study therefore to generate descriptions and 
interpretations that can act as a resource for reader to understand similar situations in 
similar settings. 
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3.7 ‘Newbank’ and ‘Shorewick’ 
 
3.7.1 The Police 
 
The police service in E&W consists of forty-three police constabularies, each of 
which is funded by the Home Office and local authorities through Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs). These police constabularies are comparable, although owing to 
differences in history and territory there are both slight and considerable variations in size, 
structure and resources. For example, all police constabularies share the same rank 
structure with the exception of those based in London (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Police Service Rank Structure 
 Provincial and 
Metropolitan 
Constabularies 
The Metropolitan 
Police Service 
City of London 
Police 
The Federal Ranks 
Practitioners 
Supervisors 
Managers 
Constable 
Sergeant 
Inspector 
Chief Inspector 
Constable 
Sergeant 
Inspector 
Chief Inspector 
Constable  
Sergeant 
Inspector 
Chief Inspector 
The Superintending Ranks 
Middle 
Managers 
Superintendent 
Chief Superintendent 
Superintendent 
Chief 
Superintendent 
Superintendent 
Chief 
Superintendent 
The National Police Chief Council (NPCC) Ranks172 (Previously ACPO) 
NPCC Chair 
Strategic 
Managers 
Assistant Chief 
Constable 
Deputy Chief Constable 
Chief Constable 
Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
Deputy 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
 
 (Adapted from Mawby and Wright, 2008: 34) 
                                                                 
172 Exclusive of British Transport Police (Chief Constable), Civil Nuclear Constabulary (Chief Constable), 
Ministry of Defence Police (Chief Constable), National Crime Agency (Deputy Director General, Director 
General), Royal Military Police (Provost Marshal) and College of Policing (Chief Executive Officer). 
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Both Shorewick and Newbank can be considered typical police constabularies in terms 
of their style of organisation, size and bureaucratic command structure and furthermore, 
for their general valuing of technical efficiency and cost effectiveness. With the exception 
of Shorewick Major Incident Team (MIT) which was force level, each of the other CID 
units within which fieldwork was undertaken were relatively small (15 or less) and were 
located within small rooms based within moderately large stations at Basic Command 
Unit (BCU) level. BCUs (also known as boroughs, districts and divisions) deliver basic 
policing service - patrol, response, investigation and partnership working - within a fixed 
geographical area. Alongside the main force headquarters which houses the strategic 
managers and a number of operational and organisational support departments and whose 
personnel are responsible for monitoring and allocating resources to the BCUs (Bacon, 
2011: 42), each BCU also operates its own headquarters within which the middle 
managers and a number of divisional operational and organisational departments - as was 
the case in Newbank - can be found. Local policing units (based in smaller geographica l 
areas e.g. a village, district or town centers) tasked with delivering response and 
community policing can also be found operating from each BCU.  
 
Likewise, the organisation of the CID in both Shorewick and Newbank was also similar 
to that of most other police constabularies, both employing approximately (at the time of 
study) over 450 individuals (officers and staff) and being divided into a varying number 
of distinct units and teams which were split between BCUs. With the exception of the 
Shorewick Domestic Abuse Unit who were managed by a civilian unit Manager, all CIs 
and DCs working within the various CID units and affiliated teams within which 
fieldwork was undertaken operated under the management of a Detective Sergeant (DS) 
who reported to a Detective Inspector (DI) who reported to the superintendent (Supt) in 
charge of divisional operations. All of the units operated as mixed teams with CIs 
operating alongside DCs and PCs on a daily basis. Given that the CIs were situated within 
an organisational context their world and work featured regular interaction with a range 
of other actors. 
 
The focus of this study was on CIs, the role they play within contemporary crimina l 
investigation and their subjective experiences of the CI role. In Shorewick, fieldwork was 
carried out within five CID units each of which housed a variable mix of CIs, DCs, other 
police officers and other police staff. Similarly, in Newbank fieldwork was undertaken 
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within four units. In total, 23 interviews were carried out in Shorewick and 13 in Newbank. 
Of these, 13 were conducted with CIs at Shorewick and 5 with CIs at Newbank. In total,  
8 DCs173 were interviewed at Shorewick and 5 at Newbank174. Further details of the CID 
units within which fieldwork was undertaken and relevant information on interviewees 
are listed below175. 
 
Table 2. Units within which fieldwork was undertaken  
Shorewick 
CID Unit 
Research Method Number of 
Interviewees by 
Gender 
Total in 
Operational 
Positions 
Total in 
Managerial 
Positions 
Observ
ed 
Interviewed M F 
Reactive Unit 
(Generalist) 
✓  ✓  0 3 2 1 
Major 
Incident 
Team 
✓ ✓ 7 3 7 3 
Economic 
Crime Unit 
(Fraud and 
Financial 
Investigation 
Team) 
 ✓ 0 1 1 0 
Public 
Protection 
Unit 
(Domestic 
Abuse Unit) 
✓ ✓ 2 3 4 1 
Public 
Protection 
Unit (Child 
Protection 
Unit) 
 ✓  1 1 1 1 
Crime 
Management 
Unit 
✓  ✓ 0 1 1 0 
                                                                 
173 Number includes DCs in management roles. 
174 The remaining 4 interviewees were police constables (1 in Shorewick Public Protection Unit, 
Domestic Abuse Team, 1 in Shorewick Crime Management Unit, Diary Team, and 2 in Newbank 
Generalist Reactive Unit). 
175 All of the interviewees were of White British nationality and while the age of CIs in both forces was 
found to range from the late twenties to the early sixties, individual participants were not all asked to 
provide their age.  
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Crime 
Management 
Unit (Diary 
Team) 
 ✓ 0 1 1 0 
Total 
   
23 
 
17 
 
6 
 
 
 
Newbank 
CID unit 
Research Method Total 
Number of 
Interviewees 
Total in 
Operational 
Positions 
Total in 
Managerial 
Positions 
Observed Interviewed M F 
Reactive Unit 
(Generalist) 
✓  ✓ 3 3 5 1 
Public 
Protection 
Unit  
✓  ✓ 2 2 3 1 
Economic 
Crime Unit 
(Fraud and 
Financial 
Investigation 
Team) 
 ✓ 2 0 1 1 
Converter/ 
Diary Team 
✓       
Other CID 
Management 
 ✓  1  1 
Total 
   
13 
 
9 
 
4 
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3.7.2 Gaining and Maintaining Access 
 
For the researcher, gaining initial access to the field proved to be a much less 
arduous task than had been initially anticipated176. Despite occupying the position of an 
‘outsider outsider’ (Brown, 1996) - i.e. the researcher had no personal connection to any 
participant and no official status that would have mandated police co-operation - gaining 
access to the field, both at Shorewick and Newbank fortunately proved to be a relative ly 
straight forward task. After deciding on potentially suitable fieldwork sites177, formal 
letters addressed to the Chief Constable were sent to each force. Two days after the letters 
were sent, a DCI, who was later to become the primary research facilitator at Newbank, 
responded with a request to meet to discuss the research in more detail. A week or so after 
the response from Newbank, a DCI at Shorewick who again, would subsequently act a 
primary facilitator for the research at this site, also got in touch to request a face-to-face 
meeting. Aware of the fact that, regardless of these encouraging initial interactions, access 
had not yet been wholly granted, the researcher prepared for what was anticipated to be 
the inevitable researcher interrogation. However, both of these face-to-face meetings 
were both surprisingly pleasant and informative. Both DCIs volunteered to support and 
facilitate the research and also kindly offered me their own account of CI involvement 
within their individual force. The responsiveness of the police and encouragement offered 
to the researcher by both DCIs at this earliest stage of the study is something for which 
the researcher remains particularly appreciative of. 
 
The researcher credits her positive experience of the ‘gaining access’ hurdle to two key 
factors. First and perhaps most significantly, the time of the research happened to coincide 
with the broad restructuring of the police organisation in E&W. In 2010, the coalition 
government introduced their national Comprehensive Spending Review which placed 
firm expenditure limits on public sector spending. This was, in large part, driven by a 
desire to cut the budget deficit. Part of this review concerns the police whose budget, it 
                                                                 
176 Gaining access to study police officers has notably proven difficult in the past (Marks, 2004; Pogrebin, 
2010; Punch, 2010; Weatheritt, 1986). As Hallenberg, O’Neill and Tong (2016: 113) note, ‘Compared to 
other areas of policing, gaining access to research detectives can be even more difficult due to the sensitive 
nature of the work’. They go on to argue that this is likely due to ‘the special, revered status of detective 
work’ which ‘increases its symbolic value to the organisation and therefore the level of protection accorded 
to it against outsider scrutiny’ (2016: 113). A number of scholars have made reference to the difficulties  
they faced when trying to access the world of detectives (cf Bacon, 2011, Innes, 2003) 
177 Decision was based on review of Home Office data during initial stage of the research (see section 3.3, 
Appendix 1). 
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was intended, was to be cut by 20 per cent by 2014/2015. As such, the police were 
understandably keen to review their current officer/staff deployment in an effort to 
provide value for money - the effects of which I indeed experienced in action during the 
fieldwork. It is likely therefore that the topic of the current study may have sparked the 
interest of senior police managers who perhaps viewed the current study as something 
which might aid in the reviewing of the police staff/officer workforce mix. Second, the 
University of Sheffield is fortunate to boast a long-standing reputation based on an 
enduring commitment to high quality, professional research. I am without doubt that this 
fact helped ‘secure the deal’ for the research. 
 
However, as Reiner (2010) has highlighted, the negotiation of access is not a one-off 
event but rather a continuing process throughout fieldwork. This proved to be the case for 
this research. Although access to initial settings had been secured at senior officer level178, 
as the researcher became more familiar with the layout and structure of the CID, access 
and initial approach was made by the researcher and as such, often required further 
negotiation. This involved, not least, sometimes explaining again the intentions of the 
research and of the researcher. Securing this access sometimes involved ceding a little 
control over the fieldwork. Inevitably, for example, at the beginning of each observationa l 
shift, decisions about which officers the researcher was to accompany tended to be made 
by the Sergeant and/or Inspector on duty. Reallocations to other officers during shifts had 
to be re-negotiated with the same Sergeant and/or Inspectors: 
 
After being asked to explain once again my intention for wishing to visit the unit, 
I was allocated to spend the day with Jess, a CI who had worked within the unit 
for some years. Jess was interestingly introduced to me by the Sergeant as ‘the 
best investigator we’ve got’. 
(Newbank, Observation notes) 
 
Furthermore, formal access to the organisation and relevant CID units certainly does not 
translate into a backstage pass of guaranteed acceptance and assistance by the rank-and-
file. To quote Van Mannen (1978: 311): 
‘Entry into the police system is no guarantee that one will be allowed to remain, 
or, perhaps more to the point, it is no guarantee that one will be able to produce 
useful or enlightening data while there’. 
                                                                 
178 For the purposes of clarity, I use the term senior police officers throughout this thesis when referring to 
any officer rank of Sergeant or above (unless stated otherwise). 
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When in the field, it is impossible to remain a constant researcher and it should arguably 
be the duty of the researcher to view participants as people rather than purely as contacts 
or sources of data to be exploited. Reflecting on her own research, Marks (2004: 881) 
indicates that the personality of the researcher is ‘key to the stories that are told or hidden, 
and the exposure the researcher will be afforded in the everyday lives of those whom 
he/she is studying’. Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, the researcher found herself to 
have more in common with female participants with whom discussions ranged from 
favourite foods to concerns over their child’s school report. However, it was the relative 
willingness of a number of male participants to discuss issues relating to problems they 
were having at work, with colleagues and managers and also, the openness with which 
incidents of a potentially legally and ethically litigious fashion were recalled that was 
most surprising to the researcher179. Having sometimes only spent a matter of hours in 
the company of participants, it would be wrong to attribute this relative level of ‘openness’ 
inclusively to the development of rapport or trust. Rather, it is the belief of the researcher 
that her non-threatening demeanor (e.g. young, female, polite) and communication and 
interpersonal skills helped to facilitate such candidness, alongside a willingness to listen 
to such stories while assuming ‘an open-mouthed expression of wonderment’ (Hobbs, 
1988: 6). 
When in the field the researcher chose to frequently play up her student identity and, on 
occasion, claimed to be far less knowledgeable about the various processes and practices 
of police work than was actually the case. While admittedly, not entirely honest, this 
approach proved particularly lucrative in that it encouraged participants to adopt the role 
of teacher on many occasions and at the same time, also helped reassure participants who, 
despite being initially apprehensive of the intentions of the researcher, eventually came 
to view her as a naive and unassuming student, what Lofland (1971) termed an 
‘acceptable incompetent’.  
The conspicuousness of the researcher within the various units also proved to be a useful 
tool for attracting new participants and data; it did not take long for people to know who 
I was and on a number of occasions, officers and staff actively went out of their way to 
speak with me: 
                                                                 
179 See section 3.13 on ‘Ethics’ for further discussion on this issue. 
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During my visit to Newbank Public Protection Unit (PPU) today I was 
fascinated to see the rapidity with which notice of my presence became spread 
through the department. Alongside the usual stares and hushed conversations 
within the unit, on this particular occasion it appeared that a number of officers 
and staff went out of their way to ‘visit’ PPU to see who exactly I was. An hour 
or so into the fieldwork, a youngish (early 30s) male entered the unit dressed in 
a white shirt and tie with collar number (out of place in the CID where only 
occasionally I had observed a uniformed presence). ‘Oh he’s here again’ joked 
a couple of the officers and staff in the unit. After rebuffing such comments, he 
made his way toward the desk I was sat at next to Jess (the CI that I was 
accompanying that day). ‘Who are you then?’ ‘Where are you from?’ ‘What are 
you doing talking to her?’ and ‘Who’s paying for you to be here?’ were the key 
questions as he began what can only be described as a mild interrogation. After 
five or so minutes of wary conversation and now, seemingly satisfied with my 
answers, he left following a request over the public address system from custody. 
After, I asked Jess, ‘So who was he?’ ‘Oh that was just the Custody Sergeant. 
He’d just come to see who you were. Don’t worry about it, he’s just a nosey sod’ 
she informed me.  
(Newbank, Observation notes) 
 
3.8 Interviews 
 
The study involved a total of 35 semi-structured in-depth interviews which were 
variably spread over the two research settings and between the different CID units. All 
those CIs the researcher came across during the fieldwork were interviewed. Interviews 
were undertaken alongside observation within each research setting over a duration of 12 
months. Interviews were undertaken with a number of individuals who can be broadly 
located within one of five distinct groups:  
 civilian investigators;  
 police detectives; 
 police constables;  
 senior police officers;  
 civilian managers.  
 
For the most part, interviews were undertaken formally (i.e. they were pre-arranged, 
digitally recorded and were aided by the use of a pre-constructed interview schedule (see 
Appendix 4). The rest were undertaken informally (i.e. they were undertaken ad hoc while 
in the field and were not digitally recorded). Interview participants were typically sampled 
purposively, that being, ‘A form of non-probability sampling in which decisions 
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concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based 
upon a variety of criteria which may include specialist knowledge of the research issue, 
or capacity and willingness to participate in the research’ (Oliver, 2006: 245). Decisions 
made about whom to interview were based upon a variety of criteria including specialist 
knowledge of the research issue or context and capacity and willingness to participate in 
the research. Snowball sampling was also utilised by the researcher during interviews and 
observation. Described by Atkinson and Flint (2004: 1043) as ‘a technique for gathering 
research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the 
names of other actors’, this method proved particularly effective in helping to identify 
participants whose opinions and experiences did not necessarily reflect the view 
popularly purported and encouraged by management. Despite its effectiveness as a tool 
for uncovering further participants, the researcher was aware of the limitations of 
snowball sampling, namely, it’s potential to produce a biased sample and results (i.e. a 
sample may include an over-representation of individuals who share similar 
characteristics and viewpoints). 
‘Formal interviews’ predominantly took place in the police station although due to the 
hectic nature of the CID, some were also undertaken while accompanying DCs and CIs 
in the field (e.g. in police cars). These ‘formal’ semi-structured interviews lasting between 
30 minutes and two hours were conducted with both police DCs and police staff of 
varying seniority/rank, yielding further more detailed data. The majority of these 
interviews were recorded using an electronic voice recorder, a strategy which allowed the 
researcher to focus her full attention on the participant rather than on the writing of field 
notes. With the exception of those interviews which took place unexpectedly, upon 
chance meetings or on brief visits to other units, interview schedules were used (see 
Appendix 4). These schedules were relatively loosely structured and consisted of a broad 
range of pre-determined discussion topics as well as specific questions relating to the 
central research aims of the study180 . Interview schedules were piloted on academic 
colleagues, family and friends to ensure questions were clear and functional. Schedules 
and questions naturally evolved during the course of the research process to take account 
of experiences and knowledge gained while in the field and on reflection of data obtained 
                                                                 
180 Specific questions detailed on the interview schedule were not always directly asked in interview and 
thus acted more as prompts for the researcher to redirect conversations centring on the topic headings 
where necessary.  
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from other interviews. This evolutionary process was undertaken by Beardsworth and 
Keil (1992: 261-2) who discuss how, ‘the open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews 
permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by earlier 
interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees’. 
The second form of interview employed within this research occurred alongside the 
generation of data from formal accounts and observation and was that of more informal 
‘interviews as conversations’ (Burgess, 1984). These informal, ad hoc discussions added 
spontaneity and naturalism (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 99-103) to the research as 
the majority of questions were asked during the flow of naturally occurring conversation 
(some of which I consciously instigated or attempted to subtly direct towards a specific 
topic of interest). These relatively ad hoc conversations proved particularly revealing in 
relation to discerning the occupational culture of those officers and staff working within 
CIDs, providing valuable insight into the cultural world of the ‘firm within a firm’ (Hobbs, 
1988). Thankfully, the police officers and staff I was fortunate enough to be ‘shadowing’ 
were more than accommodating with regard to my research, thus allowing me to both 
openly discuss my topics of interest and also offering me the opportunity to uncover new 
areas of interest relevant to the research. However, conscious to maintain my role as 
‘observer-as-participant’ (Gold, 1958), I was mindful of asking too many questions and 
consciously refrained from the asking of probing questions until after a marginal degree 
of rapport had been established. 
Burns (2000) highlights a number of advantages of semi-structured interviews. For 
example, they provide an opportunity for the respondent to explore and discuss their own 
perspective rather than the perspective of the researcher being imposed on the respondent. 
Furthermore, the respondent is also able to interpret the research area and lines of enquiry 
within their own framework of understanding and through their own language which may 
increase the validity of the research process (Legard, Keegan and Ward, 2003) as new 
forms of knowledge are produced or created. Semi-structured interviews can also help to 
promote reflexivity and can be tailored to reflect the experiential context of each 
respondent resulting in a rich data set which, when used in triangulation with other 
methods, can increase validity and help refine the development of themes181 and concepts. 
                                                                 
181 ‘A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents 
some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 83). 
166 
 
Interviews, both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, proved to be an essential component of the 
current study’s research strategy for three key reasons. First, they enabled the gleaning of 
depth of knowledge with regard to the underlying reasonings', values and attitudes held 
by CIs and DCs which could not be obtained through observation alone. Second, as 
identified by Waddington (1999) interviews were a means of comparing participant 
accounts of what they ‘say’ they do, during interview, with what they ‘do’ in practice, as 
measured during observation. Third, undertaking individual interviews enabled CIs and 
DCs to express themselves without the presence of colleagues who might hinder their 
participation and responses.  
It must be noted however, that due to the capricious nature of the CID and inquisit ive 
character of those working within, on a couple of occasions, the researcher was required 
to interview participants in the presence of colleagues which did prove difficult at times: 
I had an interesting experience today during the inadvertent group interview of 
two CIs one of whom was an ex-DC (participant A), the other possessing no 
previous police experience (participant B). The pre-arranged interview began 
with participant A, who, on the topic of non-warranted CI involvement in core 
areas of investigative work, began to discuss an experience he had recently had 
involving a fellow CI who was not an ex-police officer. Participant A recalled 
undertaking a home visit accompanied by said colleague and described how, 
due to what he believed to be his colleague’s lack of previous experience of 
police work, the CI in question did not know how to act when discussions became 
heated during the visit. While recalling this incident, participant B entered the 
room. Having heard from his line manager of my presence he had kindly come 
to offer his contribution. Keen not to refuse additional data, I asked participant  
A if this would be ok and he agreed. As participant B took a seat and asked, ‘So, 
what are we talking about?’, participant A began staring at me intently in what 
I immediately realised to be a semi-discreet effort to communicate his true 
feelings with regard to the arrival of participant B. I quickly realised that 
participant B had in fact been the subject of participant A’s story. I hurriedly 
fumbled a response, something along the lines of ‘Oh, we were just talking 
generally about the CI role and how it differs if at all from what DCs do?’ After 
the interview, I was approached by participant A who continued to ‘congratulate’ 
me on my ability to ‘read’ the situation. ‘I thought you were going to drop me in 
it for a sec there. You did well’ he announced. 
(Shorewick, Observation notes) 
 
Despite the strengths of semi-structured interviews, as with any data collection technique 
there are also a number of inherent disadvantages or associated risks. In particular, this 
relates to the imbalance in power between the interviewer and interviewee. While efforts 
were made to encourage participants to lead the interview and on a number of occasions 
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(familiarity had usually already been established through time spent in observation), as 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) note, the act of questioning alone inherently creates a power 
asymmetry between the researcher and the participant that shapes the knowledge 
produced. Not only does the researcher determine the flow of questions, deciding which 
responses to pursue for elaboration and those to leave, but the interview itself is an 
instrumental dialogue whereby the researcher interprets the interviewee’s statements in a 
way that supports their own agenda.  This unavoidable power differential may have had 
a number of undesirable effects including withholding information, inhibiting the flow of 
conversation and interviewee’s giving socially or organisationally desirable answers - the 
latter of these points was particularly the case in interviews with some senior police 
officers. 
As a result of the time spent in the field during observation, DCs and CIs were more often 
than not, willing to aid my understanding of their role within the criminal investiga t ion 
process via more formal interviewing. I wanted the interviewees to speak as freely as 
possible about the topics under discussion, giving honest and unhindered accounts of their 
experiences and opinions. As a result of this aspiration, interview schedules in reality 
acted more as an aide memoir illustrating a series of directive prompts, ensuring that 
during the course of the interview, conversation did not stray too far away from the key 
issues which the study sought to address in relation to the research aims and objectives. 
The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed me to stick broadly to the questions 
that needed to be answered, while also affording me the flexibility to follow up lines of 
enquiry and discuss topics which had not been anticipated and which arose during the 
course of the observation or interview itself. It also allowed me to probe participant’s 
answers to questions to both clarify issues and elicit more conversation on the topic. The 
semi-structured interview conducted in this way allowed participants the opportunity to 
discuss issues which they felt were significant without the presence and influence of their 
colleagues. DCs were interviewed about their opinion on what makes a ‘good detective’ 
for example, CIs about their experience of their role in relation to their warranted 
counterparts and senior officers and staff about how tasks relating to their investigat ions 
were distributed and organised. 
It is the view of Marks (2004: 870) that interviews ‘may not provide an adequate tool for 
understanding deep-level organisational culture. Assumptions are often not readily 
available to one’s conscious thought and, as a result, one-off interviews can fail to tap 
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into deeper levels of cognition’. As a result, wherever possible, observation was also 
carried out with interview participants in an effort to generate a source of data which 
could be used to corroborate and contradict findings obtained from interviews. 
 
3.9 Observation 
 
The study involved a total of 61.5 hours of observation which were variably 
spread over the two research settings and between the varying CID units. Observation 
was undertaken independently alongside interviews within each research setting over a 
period of 6 months. Periods of observation varied in context, scope and duration; CIs and 
police DCs were observed while in the station - both within the CID unit and police 
custody suite, on home visits with members of the public and during routine, out of station 
inquiries. CIs were observed when working individually for the most part but were also 
observed when working alongside DCs as part of a team within the CID suite. Individua l 
periods of observation were chiefly determined by the availability of participants as 
judged by their line manager (usually, but not restricted to, a DS) - most determinab ly 
whether or not their individual workload and personal working timetable (e.g. annual 
leave) allowed for a visit from the researcher. Variation in the shift patterns alongside the 
nature of the work being undertaken by CIs and the CID unit more broadly also meant 
that time spent in observation could not be carefully controlled. These determinant factors 
along with the capricious and predominantly office bound nature of the work of 
participants selected by the study meant that the number of hours spent by the researcher 
in observation within each unit varied.  
 
Several types of participant observation are identified in the research methods literature, 
the most commonly cited being Gold’s (1958) classification of roles in sociologica l 
fieldwork: 
 Complete participant - the researcher is a functioning member of the social 
setting/ground and his/her true identity is not known to the members. 
 Participant-as-observer - the researcher is a functioning member of the social 
setting/group, but the members are aware of his/her true identity. 
 Observer-as-participant - the researcher is not a functioning member of the social 
setting/group, they observe and interview. 
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 Complete observer - the researcher does not interact with the members of the social 
setting/group. 
 
For the purposes of this mixed methods study, the role assumed during fieldwork was that 
of ‘observer-as-participant’. This decision was based on two key factors: first, since the 
primary concern of the study was to gain an appreciative understanding of the working 
practices, occupational position and the structural contexts under which CIs operate 
within the CID, an observer-as-participant role was deemed most appropriate; second, 
this decision was also made based on issues relating to ethics - the researcher does not 
have the training or expertise needed to operate as a functioning member of the police 
service. Observation is defined in this thesis as ‘the process of learning through exposure 
to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher 
setting’ (Schensul, Schensul and Lecompte, 1999: 91) and is used broadly to refer to the 
supplementary and complementary observational aspect undertaken in the qualitat ive 
stage of the research. 
 
In the role of observer-as-participant, the researcher functions primarily as an observer 
and interviewer and refrains from active participation and participants are aware of the 
researcher’s presence.  After operating this role in his own research, Norris (1993: 126) 
describes how he as the researcher concentrated on gathering two types of data: ‘naturally 
occurring inter officer talk’ and detailed descriptions of how officers handled ‘‘live’ 
incidents’. Although it was not possible for me to act as ‘participant-as-observer’ - 
whereby the researcher becomes a fully functioning member of the social group, but the 
members are aware of his/her identity as a researcher - there were occasions during 
fieldwork when the lines between these two observational role categories became blurred. 
The details and implications of these are discussed later in the ‘Ethics’ section of this 
chapter (section 3.13). 
 
Given the ‘closed setting’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995) in which the study was undertaken, 
while in the field, the researcher role adopted was unavoidably one of an overt nature. 
This approach had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. One obvious advantage in 
that the researcher is able to openly record and discuss any observation with participants 
without potentially ‘blowing cover’. This in turn allows for clarification and the 
documentation of key details which may be forgotten if not recorded in situ. However, 
one major disadvantage concerns the observer effect by which the behaviour of 
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participants alters as a result of the researcher’s presence. This is an unavoidable fact 
inherent in overt observation, particularly that which is conducted within a closed setting 
and is a disadvantage which can only be lessened through time spent in the field and 
fostering of trusting relationships with participants. 
As has already been mentioned, the timing of the project coincided with a major 
restructuring of the police organisation as a direct result of a twenty per cent cut in the 
police national budget as part of the current governments wider Comprehensive Spending 
Review. This, at times acted as a particularly significant fieldwork hurdle, as some shift 
supervisors, officers and in particular police staff became suspicious of the researcher’s 
intention in observing their work. Some participants also expressed their anxiety that the 
researcher might have been a ‘spy’ working for Professional Standards, or some 
performance evaluation project sponsored by management. The researcher’s practice of 
note-taking only added to the paranoia of officers who were concerned about what was 
being recorded.  Much like that described by Chan et al. (2003: 55-6), the researcher’s 
fieldwork experience was varied with officers' and staff reactions to the researcher 
generally ranging from ‘indifference, simple curiosity, genuine interest and support, 
through to suspicion, abrasiveness or rudeness’ (Chan et al., 2003: 55-6).  
Since the research was concerned with delineating the working practices and occupationa l 
position of CIs relative to that of DCs, recordings were made in relation to working 
environments, particular activities and incidents, interactions and conversations between 
CIs and between DCs and other police officers, decision making practices and use of 
discretion and designated powers and emotions, attitudes and values expressed by CIs 
and their DC counterparts. Following the example set by Holdaway (1983: 11), when 
initially in the field, ‘I worked on the basis of the straightforward premise that as much 
as possible should be observed and recorded, even the seemingly routine and 
insignificant’. Broadly speaking, this approach involved the watching and describing of 
formal and informal processes, interactions and routines in which DCs and CIs engaged 
in daily as part of their work. This position was adopted initially under the belief that 
when analysed as part of the bigger picture, even the most seemingly trivial and mundane 
of details may prove important in assessing the complexities of social interaction (Bacon, 
2011: 60). The focus of observation somewhat inevitably shifted as the research 
progressed, from a more general overview, to a narrower focus on the detailed, concrete 
and contextual aspects of the situation (Walsh, 1998). Where practical, the researcher 
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sought to clarify her interpretations of events, actions and interactions with CIs and DCs 
to check for clarity and to increase validity. 
Perhaps the most valuable strength of observation as a technique of social enquiry, 
particularly in the case of the current study, is its allowance for greater researcher 
confidence in the validity of findings when utilised as a supplementary data collec tion 
technique. This issue became clear to me very early on in the research when attempting 
to identify the way in which the roles and responsibilities of CIs differed to those of the 
warranted DC. On paper and very much the ‘official’ understanding (presented in staff 
role profiles), the CI was presented in a ‘deputised’ role to the warranted DC in which 
case file preparation, the reviewing and recovery of CCTV footage and basic statement 
taking (amongst other duties) appeared as key responsibilities of CIs. However, following 
further discussions with DCs and CIs, it quickly became apparent that the role of the CI 
in these settings extended far beyond this narrow remit.  
Observation also afforded the researcher a greater level of sensitivity to context thro ugh 
which the behaviour of participants could be fully mapped out (Bryman, 2008: 466). This 
is of particular significance with regard to the aims of the current research which sought 
broadly to understand how the role of the civilian CI ‘fits’ within the investigation process. 
It is the overriding belief of the researcher that when used alongside other data collection 
techniques in a mixed methods design, observation acts to improve the overall quality of 
data collection and interpretation (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002) allowing for the most valid 
and reliable representation of reality.  
 
3.10 Survey 
 
A survey is a research method which is used to collect information from a selected 
group of people using standardised questionnaires or interviews. While many people 
discuss surveys synonymously with questionnaires, the questionnaire is in reality just one  
part of the survey process. Surveys also require selecting populations for inclusion, pre-
testing instruments, determining delivery methods, ensuring validity and analysing 
results. Nesbary (2000: 10) defines survey research as ‘the process of collecting 
representative sample data from a larger population and using the sample to infer 
attributes of the population’. The decision to employ a survey for the purposes of the 
172 
 
current study was based on three key reasoning’s: first, the survey was intended to provide 
scope to the research enabling limited generalisation of findings; second, the survey was 
intended to generate context to the qualitative findings (interviews and observation); 
third, the survey was intended to provide corroboration of qualitative findings in a number 
of key areas (e.g. for example, issues surrounding training of CIs).  
 
The survey was administered electronically (via email) to the Detective Chief 
Superintendent (DCS) of each of the 43 police constabularies across E&W. Surveys were 
sent along with an accompanying cover note which briefly detailed the purpose of the 
survey, an estimate of the time required for completion, the confidentiality policy and 
contact information of the researcher. This electronic method was deemed most 
appropriate for the requirements of the current study for two key reasons. First and 
foremost, this method is very economical and fast allowing large numbers of participants 
to be surveyed very quickly. Second, in utilising this form of survey, geographica l 
boundaries are no longer an issue, an important consideration for the researcher when 
attempting to engage with all 43 police constabularies across the country.  
 
The semi-structured survey employed in this study (see Appendix 5) was intended to 
collect information relating to the deployment of CIs in across E&W. Due to the range of 
information hoped to be collected by the survey, the decision was made to split the 
questionnaire into two sections. The first section sought general and more specific 
information regarding the use of CIs and was aimed at the DCS of each police force. The 
second part of the survey sought more general, administrative style information on the 
current use of CIs (e.g. number of CIs, contract lengths, contracts held with private sector 
agencies (for the supply of CIs), numbers of CIs designated etc.) and was therefore 
intended for completion by the appropriate member of the targeted constabularies’ HR 
department. It was envisaged that the Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) would 
forward the survey on to HR via email after completing the first section. 
Broadly speaking, the design of the survey followed a number of distinct stages: 
1. Decide what information is required - here the researcher referred back to the 
original research proposal in order to identify the key objectives of study. A 
decision was then made with regard to the type of information that would be 
required in order to fulfil the research objectives. 
 
2. Make a rough listing of the questions - here the researcher roughly laid out a 
comprehensive list of potential questions to be included in the questionnaire.  
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3. Refine the question phrasing - at this stage, questions were refined and where 
necessary, developed so as to ensure they would yield the required information. 
 
4. Develop the response format - it was decided that the questionnaire would be 
predominantly of a closed nature (i.e. the respondent was provided with a pre-coded 
list of answers would be provided) although space was also left for the respondents 
to add verbatim comments where necessary and appropriate. 
 
5. Put the questions in an appropriate sequence - to ensure logic and flow of the 
questionnaire, the ordering of the questions was carefully thought through. 
Questions were separated into two parts so as to gather the most appropriate and 
accurate data. 
 
6. Finalise layout - at this stage, the overall design and layout of the questionnaire was 
assessed for its appropriateness and coherence. Where required question ordering 
was altered and question wording clarified. This included ensuring that the survey 
formatting was both correct and user friendly. 
 
7. Pre-test and revise - this stage enabled the researcher to test initial design decisions 
in practice and, if necessary, the opportunity to make any necessary revisions. 
 
Questionnaires were sent to all of the 43 police constabularies across E&W on three 
successive occasions over a four-month period (September 2014 to December 2014). 
Questionnaires were sent on three occasions in an effort to improve the chances of the 
questionnaire reaching the intended recipient and thus, the overall response rate of the 
survey. Names and contact information (email addresses) of DCSs in each force were 
identified through extensive online searching of relevant news articles and force web 
pages. This information was further supplemented (and confirmed) by phone calls made 
directly to each of the 43 police constabularies. Recipients were requested to complete 
the questionnaire and to return it to the researcher via email as soon as possible. 
 
3.11 Data Recording 
 
The vast majority of data recorded while in the field took the form of field notes. 
Generally speaking, field notes refer broadly to those notes created by the researcher 
during the act of qualitative fieldwork. These notes aid researchers in their ability to recall 
pertinent events, behaviours and other features of an observation setting. Clifford (1990) 
elaborates somewhat on this definition discerning between three classifications of field 
notes: 
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1. Field notes as inscription - textual representations of events as seen or heard in the 
field. Ethnographers here privilege their own interpretive conventions and become 
the singular observer-recorder-interpreter-author of events. 
 
2. Field notes as transcription - concerns the recording of the inscriptions of meanings 
others have. Here researchers privilege the accounts and interpretations of others. 
 
3. Field notes as description - Researcher tries to adopt as neutral a position as 
possible, restricting writing to simply describing the social world as directly 
observed e.g. numbers of people, type of clothes worn etc. This type of field note 
may however, also reflect the inner experiences of the researcher. 
 
 
The researcher acknowledges the value of each of the above stated field note types and 
each method of recording was utilised at various points during the course of the fieldwork. 
In an effort to provide the most accurate representation of events as observed, field notes 
were recorded as near to the time and place at which an event/observation occurred as 
was possible. As such, field notes were written more or less contemporaneously with the 
events, experiences and interactions they describe and recount (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 
2001: 353).  However, in an effort to lessen the impact of the researcher’s presence on 
the behaviour of those being observed, for the most part, field notes tended to be cursory, 
recorded hastily while in situ in the field. These ‘scratch notes’ (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) 
or ‘jotted notes’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 90) frequently took the form of 
abbreviations, key words and word associations that were then utilised as memory 
triggers for more detailed writing of field notes following each period of observation. 
Field notes are therefore inevitably subject to the discretion of the researcher and what 
he/she deems interesting or worthy of annotation. For Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 
142), what is recorded ‘will depend on one’s general sense of what is relevant to the 
foreshadowing research problems, as well as on background expectations’. 
Wherever and whenever possible (usually immediately after observation sessions were 
over or whenever I was left unaccompanied), more descriptive notes were recorded in an 
effort to document a running description of daily life as observed within the researc h 
setting and as reflected upon outside of the research setting. Wolfinger (2002) suggests 
there to be two principal approaches to writing field notes: the ‘salience hierarchy’, in 
which only those issues considered pertinent to the focus of the research are recorded, or 
‘comprehensive note-taking’, in which everything that is observed is systematically and 
comprehensively noted. The researcher’s strategy incorporated some elements of both 
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approaches. From a very practical perspective, it was not possible or always appropriate 
to physically note everything that was occurring within any given context and interaction 
and so, inevitably, some selectivity utilising prior knowledge of literature did occur. For 
example, during fieldwork the researcher became aware of her tendency to look out for 
the ‘core characteristics’ of police occupational culture identified in the classic police 
studies (Reiner, 2010: 118-132). Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, some more 
sensitive observation and core details relating to details major cases for example could 
not be noted down. While the practical realities of fieldwork arguably necessitate 
researchers use their tacit ‘professional’ knowledge to provide a ‘significance filter’ 
regarding what to focus upon during observation and what to make notes about (Tjora, 
2006: 433), it is essential that research is not burdened or blinkered by the ‘preconceived 
ideas’ of the researcher (Malinowski, 1922)182.  
 
The researcher chose to follow a similar schema to that adopted by Mulhall (2002: 311) 
and as such, field notes documented a variable mix of things, ranging from structural and 
organisational features of the setting itself, people, dialogue between officers and staff, 
key/notable events of the day as well my own personal feelings, interpretations and 
criticisms of the observations I had made183. The notes served as a powerful memory aid, 
prompting recollection of events and encouraging a reflexive approach to analysis - how 
the researcher as ‘the instrument’ has affected the direction and focus of data collection. 
All of the jotted in situ field notes along with their more descriptive counterparts were 
organised in securely kept folders and password protected personal computers. 
 
Following the advice of Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995), field notes and interview 
transcripts were routinely analysed contemporaneously with their collection, a method 
known as ‘in-process analytical writing’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 105). Like Emerson et al. 
the analysis of my field notes took three key analytical forms - ‘asides’, ‘commentaries’ 
and ‘in process memos’.  Asides are ‘brief, reflective bits of analytical writing that 
succinctly clarify, explain, interpret or raise questions about some specific happening or 
process described in a field note’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 101). Asides formed the bulk of 
the initial data analysis conducted both while in the field and also in the hours following 
                                                                 
182 The research subscribes to the view that there are no ‘theory -neutral’ facts (Layder, 1998); all researchers 
inevitably approach their research/empirical observations from some kind of theoretical understanding.  
183 The addition of any critical comments and personal feelings on events/observations always took place 
outside of the research setting. 
176 
 
my exit of the research setting, often while the ‘jotted notes’ collected during observation 
sessions were expanded upon. A commentary is defined as ‘a more elaborate reflection 
on some specific event of issue; it is contained within a separate paragraph and set off 
with parentheses’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 102). Commentaries as contained within my 
field notes were both longer and more elaborative than asides and often linked my 
findings to other issues and theory relevant to the research. In-process memos are the 
‘products of more sustained analytic writing [which] require a more extended time-out 
from actively composing field notes’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 103). This third analyt ica l 
form was utilised wherever possible when in the field but most often, took place after 
observation sessions were completed184.  
To ensure the documentation of a complete and accurate record of all that was said, the 
vast majority of interviews were recorded using an electronic recording device. The 
researcher is under no illusion that the electronic recording of interviews is likely to have 
inhibited the flow of conversation and induced self-censorship on some occasions. 
However, given the nature of the research questions and practical constraints of the field 
work, the decision was made to persevere with this method which, in reality, did not 
appear to be a particularly detrimental issue in the current study.  
The use of an electronic recording device allowed the researcher to focus her attention on 
the questions being asked as well as the body language of participants185 allowing for an 
accurate account of what was discussed to be recorded. The quotations that appear 
throughout this thesis are therefore mostly written as verbatim extracts taken from these 
interview transcripts. However, a number are also presented as extracts and interpret ive 
commentaries taken from field notes and therefore reflect more of a précis of what was 
said. On a number of occasions, I contacted participants to clarify various points of 
uncertainty and validate their comments and accounts of events.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
184 Bachman and Schutt (2014: 180) note how ‘It is almost always a mistake to try to take comprehensive 
notes while engaged in the field; the process of writing extensively is just too disruptive’.  
185 Field notes were also taken during the formal interviews to record participant body language and to 
remind the researcher to return to certain issues. 
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3.12 Data Analysis 
 
3.12.1 Triangulation 
 
Triangulation is a term which is used in the social science literature to refer to a 
number of different things. Denzin (1978) for example, outlined the following four types 
of triangulation: (a) data triangulation (i.e. use of a variety of sources in a study); (b) 
investigator triangulation (i.e. use of several different researchers); (c) theory 
triangulation (i.e. use of multiple perspectives and theories to interpret the results of a 
study); and (d) methodological triangulation (i.e., use of multiple methods to study a 
research problem). Denzin also distinguished within-methods triangulation (1978: 301), 
which refers to the use of either multiple quantitative or multiple qualitative approaches 
(e.g. for qualitative data collection techniques such as observation, these mult ip le 
comparison groups (Glaser and Strauss, 1965: 7) could be used to develop more 
confidence in the emergent theory), from between-methods triangulation (Denzin, 1978: 
302), which involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Generally 
speaking, triangulation refers to an approach that uses ‘multiple observers, theoretical 
perspectives, sources of data and methodologies in the study of social phenomena 
(Denzin, 1978: 304). This thesis includes data and method triangulation, but obviously 
had only one researcher. 
The term triangulation will be used in this section to refer to data triangulation, i.e. the 
point at which and strategy used to integrate two sets of methodologically distinct 
research findings. The process by which data integration can be achieved in mixed 
methods studies has been a topic of debate for some time (cf Caracelli, 1993; Fetters, 
Curry and Creswell, 2013; Fielding, 2012) and broadly speaking, is understood to be a 
process which can occur at either the interpretation stage of the study (when both data 
sets have been analysed independently), or at the analysis stage of the study (both data 
sets are analysed concurrently). Generally speaking, approaches to integrate qualitat ive 
and quantitative data take three forms: (1) integrating through narrative-weaving, 
contiguous and staged; (2) integrating through data transformation; and (3) integrat ing 
through joint displays (Fetters et al., 2013: 2142-2143).  A number of techniques have 
been described for the integration/triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research 
findings, which, generally speaking, require researchers to consider where findings from 
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each method agree (convergence), offer complementary information on the same issue 
(complementarity), or appear to contradict each other (discrepancy or dissonance) 
(Erzberger and Prein, 1997; Foster, 1997).  
 
The ‘triangulation protocol’ (Farmer, Robinson, Elliot and Eyles, 2006) is arguably the 
most detailed description of a technique of data triangulation/integration which, although 
developed for multiple qualitative methods, can also be applied to mixed methods studies. 
The triangulation protocol requires the researcher to display findings emerging from each 
component of the study on the same page, in a ‘convergence coding matrix’ (O’Cathain, 
Murphy and Nicholl, 2010). From this, the researcher is then able to identify agreement, 
partial agreement, silence, or dissonance between findings from different components. 
Significantly, according to O’Cathain et al. (2010), this technique for triangulation is the 
only one to include silence - where a theme or finding arises from one data set and not 
another. Some silence might be expected because of the strengths of different methods to 
examine different aspects of a phenomenon, but surprise silences might also arise that 
help to increase understanding or lead to further investigations. The triangulation protocol 
technique moves researchers away from thinking about the findings related to each 
method and towards the generation of ‘meta-themes’ (Farmer et al., 2006) that cut across 
the findings from different methods. Morgan (1998) describes the move towards the 
generation of meta-themes as the ‘third effort’ because it occurs after analysis of the 
qualitative and the quantitative components. 
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Figure 2. Point of Application for Three Techniques for Integrating Data in Mixed 
Methods Research. O’Cathain, Murphy and Nicholl (2010) ‘Three Techniques for 
Integrating Data in Mixed Methods Studies’, British Medical Journal 341: c4587. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second technique for the triangulation of findings relates to what Moran-Ellis et al. 
(2006) refer to as ‘following the thread’. Unlike the ‘triangulation protocol’ (Farmer et al, 
2006) in which data integration takes place at the interpretation phase of the study, this 
triangulation technique takes place at the analysis stage of the research process. It begins 
with a preliminary analysis of each component to identify key themes and questions 
necessitating further investigation. Then the researchers choose a question or theme from 
one component and trace it across the other components - they call this the thread. As 
Moran-Ellis et al. (2006: 54) discuss: 
‘This, in effect, is an analysis led in the first instance by a grounded inductive 
approach but developed through a focused iterative process of data interrogation 
which aims to interweave the findings that emerge from each dataset. The value 
of this integrative analytic approach lies in allowing an inductive lead to the 
analysis, preserving the value of the open, exploratory, qualitative inquiry but 
incorporating the focus and specificity of the quantitative data’. 
 
Finally, in contrast to the idea of data triangulation through the identification of themes 
(e.g. violence, sex, racism etc.), is the idea of triangulation based on the identification of 
cases (e.g. individuals, groups, organisations, geographical areas etc.). Here, all of the 
Following a Thread 
Triangulation Protocol 
Mixed Methods Matrix 
Design 
Data Collection 
Analysis 
Interpretation 
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data is examined at the analysis stage together, in detail and on the basis of each case 
(rather than variables and themes) and can be summarised and displayed in a matrix 
(Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007; Wendler, 2001) along the lines of Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) ‘meta-matrix’. O’Cathain et al. (2010) discuss how the utilisation of 
a ‘mixed methods matrix’ aided their analysis of data obtained from their earlier (2008) 
study, allowing for a better understanding of the relation between types of team working 
and the extent of integration in mixed methods studies in health services research. The 
triangulation/integration of data using this technique allows researchers to pay attention 
to revelations and inconsistencies between different types of data on a single case and 
then look for patterns across all cases in a qualitative cross case analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
As data were triangulated at the analysis and interpretive and reporting stages of the 
research186, methods have therefore been accordingly integrated through ‘connecting’, 
and through ‘combination’ and/or ‘merging’. Integration through connecting occurs 
‘when one type of data links with the other through the sampling frame’ (Fetters et al., 
2013: 6). In the current study, data were integrated through connecting at the init ia l 
quantitative data collection stage with these data being used to determine the fieldwork 
sites for the qualitative data collection stage. ‘Merging data’ (Fetters et al., 2013) - refers 
to the integration of qualitative (in the form of texts or images) and quantitative data (in 
the form of numeric information) through combination i.e. the reporting of results 
together (also referred to as integration through narrative - weaving, contiguous and 
staged). This approach can be achieved in a number of ways for example, by transforming 
one dataset (e.g. counting the occurrence of themes in a qualitative dataset) so that the 
transformed qualitative results can be compared with the quantitative dataset 
(Sandelowski et al., 2009). Finally, this type of integration can also occur through the use 
of tables or figures that display both the quantitative and the qualitative results (i.e. joint 
data displays). When merging, both data types are brought together for analysis. 
 
                                                                 
186 Initial early analysis of qualitative data were undertaken contemporaneously with fieldwork (e.g. during 
observation sessions) and inferences were noted down in field notes. This method allowed for the 
identification of emergent themes while observing which in turn, enabled the researcher to shift her 
attention and focus in ways that fostered a more developed investigation.  
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In the current study, data were also merged through combination and, as such, are reported 
together in the results of this thesis. Having initially organised the qualitative and 
quantitative data in a format based on thematic relevance to allow merging (see following 
section (3.12.2) on ‘Thematic Analysis’), a narrative approach was employed and both 
quantitative and qualitative data described thematically. The specific type of narrative 
integration utilised is weaving, because the results are connected to each other 
thematically and the qualitative and quantitative data weave back and forth around similar 
themes or concepts. The narrative provides intragroup comparisons of the results from 
the scales about opinions that are supported by text from the qualitative database. In this 
sense, the researcher sought broadly to ‘follow the thread’ (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). 
Regarding the ‘fit’ of the quantitative and qualitative data (i.e. the coherence of the 
quantitative and qualitative findings), the integration resulted in an expansion of 
understanding and insight with regard to the phenomenon being studied. The qualitat ive 
comments gleaned from interviews with participants provided information about the 
experiences of CIs relating to various key issues inherent to the role. However, the survey 
data were also particularly illustrative showing disparity in deployment as well as 
polarisation of opinion at a senior level (DCS) with regard to key issues relating to the 
use of CIs in their varying constabularies.  
 
3.12.2 Thematic Analysis 
 
Qualitative data were first analysed in the current study using the method of 
thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) define thematic analysis as, ‘A method 
for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’. In their 2006 
article, Braun and Clarke (2006: 77) describe how ‘thematic analysis is a poorly 
demarcated and rarely-acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method’ and 
go on to present a helpful six phase step-by-step guide for doing thematic analysis. 
According to the authors, the process of analysis starts when the analyst/researcher begins 
to notice and look for patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest in the data - this 
may be during data collection. The method of thematic analysis chosen for this research 
is based on the work of Braun and Clarke (2006) and generally speaking, followed their 
proposed systematic six phase guide (although each stage was not engaged with in a 
straightforward, linear fashion, within the current study):  
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Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with the data.  
Phase 2: Generating initial codes.  
Phase 3: Searching for themes.  
Phase 4: Reviewing themes.  
Phase 5: Defining and naming themes.  
Phase 6: Producing the report.  
 
In the current study, thematic analysis involved a constant moving back and forward 
between the entire data set, the coded extracts of data that were being analysed and the 
analysis of the data that were produced. The first stage of the post-fieldwork analysis 
involved detailed readings of the collected data (i.e. field notes, interview transcripts and 
documentary sources). This allowed the researcher to become fully immersed in the data. 
Transcription of formal interviews, while time-consuming and at times frustrating, proved 
vital to this familiarisation phase (Riessman, 1993) and also greatly aided the second 
phase of analysis. Extensive notes, commentaries and interpretations were first added to 
the margins of transcribed interview transcripts and anything of interest in the field notes 
and documentary sources were also highlighted at this stage. This was a subjective, 
iterative process which allowed the researcher to make judgements about the significance 
of events, behaviours and commentaries (Van Maanen, 1988).  
Braun and Clarke (2006) maintain that the coding process can be done with a data-led 
approach or with a theory-led approach. While coding was initially led by broad themes 
identified in the literature, noted by the researcher during interviews, when listening to 
recordings or during the transcription process, subsequently a data-led approach was 
applied to the transcripts and field notes. While some researchers taking a data-led 
approach work with a grounded theory approach and so advocate tackling the data with 
no prior influences or preconceptions (cf Glaser, 1992), others encourage the use of 
relevant knowledge (Hutchinson et al 2010; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The latter 
approach was taken in the current study, primarily as a literature review was essential in 
identifying an appropriate focus for conducting semi-structured interviews in a time-
limited setting where the researcher would be unlikely to be able to return to conduct 
subsequent interviews. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 163) are right to 
note, it is important to remember that any pre-existing ideas which are drawn upon to aid 
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the coding process ‘do not take the form of prejudgements, forcing the interpretation of 
data into their mould, but are instead used as resources to make sense of the data’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 163). 
Initial codes were then identified. Codes according to Charmaz (1983: 186) act as 
‘shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data’ and refer to ‘the most 
basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a 
meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). The identification of 
codes was undertaken manually and in a systematic fashion, with full and equal attention 
being applied to each data item. After initial coding was completed, codes were also 
assessed for their commonality with other codes and were subsequently matched with 
data extracts from interview transcripts and observation field notes. 
After all data had been initially coded and collated, codes were then sorted into potential 
themes and all relevant coded data extracts were further collated under each theme (see 
Appendix 6, ‘Coding Framework’). As Braun and Clarke (2006: 92) discuss, at this stage 
you are essentially, ‘starting to analyse your codes, and consider how different codes may 
combine to form an overarching theme’. It is at this stage that interpretative analysis of 
the data occurs and arguments about the shape and meaning of the phenomenon being 
examined are made (Boyatzis, 1998). Themes were then refined i.e. each initial theme 
was examined in detail and its strength, significance and distinctness reassessed. Some 
themes emerged as key themes with substantial incidences of the codes from various 
participants and observation field notes. Others emerged as subthemes, relevant to the 
overarching themes. For example, ‘professionalism’ is a key theme of this thesis, of which 
there are various subthemes such as ‘dealing with the public’ and ‘training’. 
Key themes and subthemes were then further defined and refined in an attempt to isolate 
the true essence of the theme.  Although themes had already been assigned working titles, 
the researcher employed the advice of Braun and Clarke (2006) at this point in the 
thematic analysis process and, where necessary/appropriate, further thematic refinement 
and eventual renaming was undertaken. This method of thematic refinement ensured that 
subsequent titles were concise and immediately gave the reader a sense of what the theme 
is about. Connections were then drawn between the themes and subthemes and patterns 
and explanatory theories identified. Although trained and practised in the use of the 
qualitative software program ‘NVivo’, the researcher preferred to manually construct 
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separate thematic documents. These documents contained data that had been broken up 
and reorganised by the researcher in accordance with the themes and subthemes identified 
and were then printed off for further annotation. 
3.12.3 Survey Data Analysis 
 
The data gathered by the survey were analysed via a process of examining the 
returned surveys for correctness and completeness, careful coding and inputting data into 
a database in Statistical Package for the Social Scientists (SPSS) and performing an 
analysis of descriptive responses where appropriate according to frequency distributions 
and descriptive statistics. Univariate analyses of the data were carried out and where 
appropriate, corresponding tables (including frequency tables) and graphs were 
constructed to display results with respect to the research questions and aims and 
objectives allowing for ease of interpretation and understanding. Due to the sample size 
of the survey and nature of the information gleaned by the questionnaire, methods of 
bivariate analysis (e.g. contingency tables) were not deemed appropriate. The coding 
framework for the analysis of the survey data is reflected in the section headings 
contained within Chapter Seven. 
 
3.13 Ethics 
 
The value of research depends as much on ethical veracity as on the originality of 
its discoveries. How can one trust in the findings and results of research if there are any 
doubts about the honesty of the research and integrity of the methods employed? Ethics 
are codes of conduct in research which guide the manner by which research is carried out; 
to ensure the integrity of any findings generated by the research. Like all research 
conducted with human participants, mixed methods studies which involve the utilisa t ion 
of observation and/or interviews, raise a number of significant ethical issues which should 
be considered by the researcher both prior, during and after the research has taken place 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2001).  
In order to ensure research integrity, researchers are obliged and often required to adhere 
to strict ethical guidelines set forward by their academic institution and funding body. As 
such, for this research, the ethical guidelines were determined by the University of 
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Sheffield (academic institution) and the Economic and Social Research Council (funding 
body) and also accorded with those ethical guidelines set out by the British Society of 
Criminology’s code of research ethics. In order to receive ethical clearance to conduct 
research with human participants, the University of Sheffield required the submission of 
an in depth ethics application. This application was detailed and considered the potential 
risks associated with the proposed project and also contained the relevant documents 
which would be given to participants during any empirical work (e.g. participant 
information sheet (Appendix 2) and participant consent form (Appendix 3)). 
One of the key issues covered in the ethics application for the current research concerned 
informed consent and the assurance of confidentiality with regard to any individua l 
participant and organisation involved in the project. The assurance of anonymity and 
confidentiality is an integral part of any research in which the researcher is seeking to 
establish a relationship with participants based upon trust. Before consent was obtained, 
participants were made aware of the subject and purpose of the research to which they 
would be contributing and also, how their anonymity would be ensured. This promise of 
anonymity was reiterated on a regular basis, particularly when the researcher sought to 
instigate discussion around topic areas that had the potential to involve some controversia l 
issues (e.g. occupational culture etc.). Data were made anonymous as soon as possible so 
as to ensure that participants were not directly or indirectly identifiable. Pseudonyms have 
been used in place of participant’s actual names in this thesis and these were randomly 
assigned by the researcher. As the sole researcher working on this study I occupied the 
position of custodian for the data produced during the course of the project. When not in 
my personal possession, the data were physically locked up or stored on a password 
protected USB stick. All the analysis work was undertaken on private and secure locations. 
As required by the Data Protection Act 1998, the data will be destroyed when the project 
is complete. 
While the researcher was not naive to the less than clear-cut and often contradictory 
nature of issues relating to ethics when operating within the field (Murphy and Dingwall, 
2001: 347), the difficulty of this fact was lessened through the adoption of the approach 
advocated by Miller and Bell (2002: 67) - the idea that keeping a constant record of 
decisions made while in the field can act as a good way of safeguarding against sloppy 
thinking and inadvertent overlooking of ethical issues.  
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Norris (1993: 137) argues that conducting research with the police will ‘lead the 
researcher into a quagmire of ethical considerations. Inevitably one is faced with 
contradictory and competing choices and it is impossible to satisfy them all’. Fletcher 
(1966) introduced the concept of ‘situational ethics’, a flexible approach to social research 
ethics which recognises the often complex nature of fieldwork ethics and the 
consequential need to judge ethical standards on a case-by-case basis. On this rationale, 
action depends on the circumstances surrounding such action and no decision is therefore 
intrinsically good or bad. Punch (1986) advocates a reliance on the common sense 
judgements of researchers alongside academic convention and discussion. For the 
researcher, this involved regular (monthly) meetings and conversation with supervisors 
along with additional support and anecdotal advice from other obliging researchers in the 
department. The following sections of this chapter describe some of the ethical dilemmas 
and issues faced by the researcher while in the field. 
 
3.13.1 Informed Consent 
 
It is the widely held belief within social science that research participants ‘must 
consent to being researched in an unconstrained way, making their decision on the basis 
of comprehensive and accurate information about it; and that they should be free to 
withdraw at any time’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 210). With the exception of 
covert observation, whereby the researcher does not make his presence or research 
intentions aware to participants, the obtaining of informed consent is considered of 
paramount significance to the ethical integrity of a study. Information was provided to all 
potential research participants prior to the commencement of the research, ideally in 
writing but otherwise verbally.187 Sufficient time was then provided to participants to 
consider their response. Throughout the course of the study, participants were encouraged 
to ask questions with regard to the role and intention of the researcher. Along with the 
anonymous nature of their participation, the right of participants to refuse and/or 
withdraw from the study was also made particularly clear. Given the fact that I had been 
                                                                 
187 Most police participants were provided with an information sheet (Appendix 2), which informed them 
of the following: who was undertaking and who was sponsoring the research project; the aims and 
objectives of the research project; the reasons for requesting involvement and what partic ipation would 
entail; the right of each participant to refuse to participate in/and or withdraw from the research at any stage 
and for whatever reason; an assurance of strict confidentiality; the contact details for myself. 
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imposed upon the rank-and-file at the behest of management and at a time when suspicion 
of ‘outsiders’ by officers and non-warranted staff was heightened due to police budget 
cuts188 , I felt that it was particularly important to emphasis their freedom of choice 
whenever appropriate. 
When asked for my identity and intentions, I was more than happy to discuss the aims 
and objectives of my research with anyone in the field, although I was rarely asked to 
explain the subject of my study in much detail. On occasions where I was pressed for 
greater detail on the specifics of my project, I opted to explain myself in the most general 
way possible. Like Van Maanen (1978: 34), I did not feel it ‘ethically necessary’ or 
‘methodologically sound’ to divulge some sorts of information relating to the intentions 
of the research. This decision owed much to potentially negative impact ‘revealing all’ 
could have on the validity of findings and in turn, the overall conclusions of the project. 
Roth (1962) suggests that all research falls on a continuum between the completely covert 
and the completely open. Despite the overt nature of my presence within the field, as 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 211) describe, in attempting to ensure the validity and 
reliability of findings, the researcher may on occasion be forced to withhold information 
which may be considered necessary for informed consent. For example, in attempting to 
ensure the consistency of collected data with that of actuality (e.g. interactions which 
occur within the research setting when the researcher is not present), the decision was 
made relatively early on the research design that participants would not be informed 
specifically of my intention to observe the ‘occupational culture’ of DCs and civilian staff. 
This decision was based upon the existence of negative connotations that are associated 
with the term and in turn, fear of altering the behaviour of participants and so providing 
a false (invalid) representation of the social world. However, the level to which this 
withholding of information regarding the nature of my research is ultimately dependent 
upon the extent to which my presence as a researcher becomes accepted and to some 
degree, overlooked. 
                                                                 
188 Chan et al. (2003) face a similar issue with regard to the timing of their study into the socialisation of 
new police recruits which coincided with a major Royal Commission inquiry into police corruption. The 
authors note how this resulted some shift supervisors and officers became sus picious of outsiders observing 
their work (Chan et al., 2003: 53). Apart from concerns about the Royal Commission, the authors also 
discuss how officers were also anxious that researchers might have been ‘spies’ working for Internal Affairs, 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption, or some performance evaluation projects sponsored by 
management. 
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In an organisation such as the police it is physically impossible to obtain informed consent 
from everyone (Punch, 1986). Police officers are busy people and police CID departments 
are particularly busy places. During fieldwork, there were days where I advertently and 
inadvertently observed entire departments (this was particularly the case with MIT). Not 
wanting to disrupt the routines of police work - as well as the flow of the research 
process189 -  in such instances I chose to be selective over who and what I observed and 
who I spoke with. This was an unavoidable reality of the nature of the research setting 
within which the researcher found herself. As a result, not everyone upon whom my 
research was based was fully aware that their actions were being studied. 
 
3.13.2 Potential Harms 
 
When undertaking research involving people there is always a possibility that 
some harm could befall a member of the research process in some way (Bacon, 2011: 76). 
As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 214) note, at the very minimum ‘being researched 
can create stress and provoke anxiety, especially if the research is believed to be 
evaluating one’s work, one’s life and oneself’. This is even more so the case when the 
research is dealing with potentially sensitive topics. Arguably the most effective solution 
to this issue is the development of a researcher-participant rapport (Ceglowski, 2000; 
Goodwin, Pope, Mort and Smith, 2003; Grbich, 1999; Liamputtong-Rice and Ezzy, 2005; 
Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander, 2000; Payne, 1994; Taylor and Bogdan, 
1998). The development of rapport also encourages participant disclosure which is a 
central intention of qualitative research. Concern has been raised by a number of feminist 
authors with regard to the level of disclosure achieved in some research interviews (Finch, 
1984; Oakley, 1981; Reinharz, 1992). Kvale (2007: 28) echoes this point, stating that the 
‘interviewer should also be aware that the openness and intimacy of the interview may be 
seductive and lead subjects to disclose information that they may later regret’. While the 
topic areas covered in this project through both interview and observation with 
participants were not of a particularly sensitive nature, the researcher does recall feeling 
surprised by the willingness of some participants to disclose some information and in 
                                                                 
189 Bell (1977: 59) makes reference to the potentially disruptive effective for the research of the continual 
need to issue ‘some sociological equivalent of the  familiar police caution, “Anything you do say may be 
taken down and used as data”’. 
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turn, how quickly a level of rapport and trust developed. This was particularly the case 
when discussions involved open ‘bitching’ about fellow colleagues (including managers) 
by participants who were aware, would be subsequently interviewed by the researcher at 
a later date and also with regard to the anecdotal disclosure of instances of professiona l 
misconduct on the part of police officers and civilian employees.  
 
On two separate occasions information was disclosed to the researcher of examples where 
officers and civilian employees had acted in a litigious fashion. When discussing the issue 
of designation of powers to non-warranted staff, one CI told of a colleague who, ‘in the 
early days’ (i.e. the years immediately following the introduction of the Police Reform 
Act 2002), unaware of the limits of his powers, had taken to ‘arresting’ suspects outside 
of the police station and bringing them into custody. This, it was alleged, went on for 
around three months before the issue came to the attention of management. Simila r ly, 
upon interview with a police constable, the researcher was made aware of an instance 
when he confessed to having been ‘a bit heavy-handed’ with a repeat male perpetrator of 
domestic violence. What became perhaps the most significant ethical issue for the 
researcher with regard to the latter of these examples, was the fact that, based solely on 
the description of the circumstances provided by the officer, I found myself agreeing with 
his actions. Should I have reported these ‘confessions’ to the ‘appropriate authorities’ and 
in doing so, jeopardise the future of the current research, my career as a researcher and 
perhaps most unforgivably, access to the same/similar field for future researchers in my 
discipline? The answer is of course no. Although it must be said that had I personally 
witnessed anything (stories are not evidence) of a similar nature, particularly with regard 
to the latter of the two examples, my decision would have been different.  
 
As Bacon (2011: 76) points out, ‘At any stage of the fieldwork the researcher can be 
exposed to things that shock their personal sensibilities and cause them to question their 
ethical integrity’. In particular, the often chaotic lifestyles and poor living conditions 
observed by the researcher while on home visits with police officers and police staff left 
me feeling saddened, shocked and sometimes angry. Only twice during the fieldwork did 
I consciously have to suppress my emotions. The first of these occasions was during the 
interview of a child as he recalled in detail the abuse he and his mother had suffered for 
some years at the hands of his alcoholic father - the whole time through which his mother 
sobbed into her hands at the side of me on the couch.  
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The second occasion involved a visit to the home of a lady who I was informed before 
visiting was ‘well known’ to the police for making false accusations and also, as I was to 
discover, for the condition of her home. It was also on this particular home visit that I was 
treated to a taste of police initiation rites: 
 
‘Make sure you take your shoes off won’t you when we go in. It’s important that 
you do that because it makes us cops look bad if we trail mud and shit into 
people’s living rooms. We get them phoning up to complain and then I’ll get 
bollocked’. 
(Newbank, ex-officer CI, (Observation notes)). 
 
After knocking for a good couple of minutes we were eventually invited into the property. 
As I began to remove my shoes as instructed by the CI (ex-DC), I happened to catch the 
smell of dog faeces which, after glancing up to inspect, I realised was coming from the 
living room of the house and more specifically, from the sullied sofa that we were being 
ushered towards. I caught the attention of the officer who had on display a child-like grin. 
Suffice to say my shoes stayed on. While personally challenging, these experiences were 
invaluable to the study, allowing the researcher a first-hand glimpse at the day to day 
realities of the work and culture of CIs. 
 
Most of those fieldwork activities undertaken by the researcher did not carry much in way 
of enhanced risk. For example, a large portion of my observation time was spent within 
police stations, in the various CID units and as such, was not particularly risky - a 
consequence of the nature of the CIs role. However, the researcher does appreciate that a 
few activities did carry an enhance risk, in particular the observation of arrests and the 
execution of search warrants. The police carried out risk assessments on all operations on 
which I accompanied them. Potential risks were minimised in a number of ways, namely 
by only going near the arrestee or entering the premises after they had been secured by 
the police. When on home visits with officers and staff, the researcher was sure to 
maintain close proximity to the participant. 
 
3.14 Summary 
 
This chapter has detailed the research process and overall approach to research 
utilised in the current study. A mixed methods approach has been used to achieve the 
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aims and objectives of the study as it allowed for both breadth and depth of understanding 
to be achieved with regard to the phenomenon being investigated. This chapter has thus 
provided reasoned discussion and justification for the data collection techniques 
employed and methods used to analyse and integrate the collected data and finally, has 
detailed some of the key practical and ethical issues encountered by the researcher while 
undertaking the research. Together with Chapters One and Two, this Research 
Methodology chapter has hopefully provided a substantive foundation to the discussions 
which follow. The findings of the study outlined in the following four chapters (Chapter 
Four-Seven) of this thesis provide a detailed exploration of the realities and challenges 
faced by CIs in undertaking their role in a hierarchically driven and rapidly changin g 
organisational context. 
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Chapter Four: The Police 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is the intention of this chapter to set out an overview/profile of the structure and 
make-up of the CID units visited as they existed when the fieldwork was undertaken. This 
has been done so as to enable the reader to locate the substantive discussions of the thesis 
in their organisational context. Please bear in mind that the CID units discussed below 
may no longer exist in exactly the same form and as I write the reform agenda continues 
apace. 
 
4.2 A General Overview 
 
The CIs encountered during the course of this research project performed a range 
of tasks and occupied a number of positions of varying degrees of authority. CIs were 
identified as being involved in the investigation of a wide range of crimes includ ing 
burglary, assault, domestic abuse, shoplifting, vehicle theft, arson, fraud and homicide 
(amongst others). The capacity with which CIs were engaged in police investigat ions 
differed between force areas and also between units. Furthermore, the degree to which 
CIs were involved in investigations was, for the most part, largely dependent on the type 
of crime being investigated. Generally speaking, tasks identified as being undertaken by 
CIs included: taking complex statements from victims and witnesses, interviewing 
suspects, managing exhibits, undertaking disclosure, preparing case files for court, family 
liaison and risk assessment. CIs were most often observed working in mixed teams 
alongside police detectives and other police officers although the ratio of CIs to officers 
differed somewhat markedly between units. CIs were also observed working alongside / in 
conjunction with other members of police staff including crime indexers and analysts as 
well as in multiagency settings, in particular, alongside social care, domestic violence 
advocate services and charities such as Women’s Aid. CIs were also identified as being 
in direct, regular contact with a number of outside bodies including, the banks, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
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(SOCA)/NCA, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Probation Service190 and Prison 
Service. 
The degree of autonomy/agency afforded to CIs with regard to their role and contribution 
to investigations also varied between force areas and units. CIs in a number of units 
typically worked autonomously on their own caseloads in the same way as their warranted 
counterparts. This appeared to be particularly the case with those CIs working within 
Public Protection Units and Reactive CID. In other units, such as the MIT for example, 
CIs were more restricted in their level of autonomy and the extent to which their actions 
impacted on the strategic direction and overall result of investigations. However, some 
CIs were also observed supervising other CIs and warranted officers with some occupying 
the role of office and/or unit managers and others working as supervisors although in an 
unofficial capacity. The process by which workloads were allocated to CIs differed 
between the different units within each force although generally speaking, this was done 
by a Detective Sergeant (DS) or a civilian equivalent. The degree to which CIs had been 
designated with powers under the provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 
2002 also differed between forces and units, for example, Newbank Public Protection 
Unit (see section 4.5.3) housed CIs who had been fully designated whereas at Shorewick 
MIT (see section 4.4.5), none of the CIs there had been designated. 
Of those CIs identified during fieldwork, retired ex-police generally outnumbered those 
with no previous police experience. Most of those CIs encountered were retired detectives 
although a number had retired as uniformed police officers in more senior ranks includ ing 
retired police Sergeants, Inspectors and Superintendents. Of those CIs who were not 
retired police officers, two were medically retired and a large number had worked for the 
police organisation previously as members of police staff, the most common of these 
being ex-PCSOs and ex-front desk staff. The majority of non-ex-officer CIs encountered 
notably had some previous knowledge and/or experience of the criminal justice arena or 
simultaneously, had experience of working in a field which had afforded these CIs with 
some broad ‘investigative’ knowledge and/or skill. For example, a number of non-ex-
officer CIs encountered who had come from outside the organisation had previously 
worked for the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), HMRC and the Borders 
                                                                 
190 Fieldwork was undertaken prior to the division of the Probation Service into the National Probation 
Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). Under the new arrangement, CRCs  
(which can be outsourced to private sector agencies) manage lower and medium risk offenders leaving the 
NPS which is managed by the National Offender Management Service to deal with the higher risk offenders. 
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Agency. Of all the CIs encountered during fieldwork, all but two were employed on a 
full-time basis and all but two were employed directly by the police organisation on a 
permanent basis. Those not employed on a permanent basis were agency staff working 
for the police for a fixed term via a contract agreed with their employer, the private 
security agency G4S. 
 
4.3 The People - An Overview 
 
Amongst the CIs at Newbank police, there was a fairly even spread of ages, from 
the late twenties to the sixties, while most of those at Shorewick were aged over forty. 
All of the CIs encountered at Shorewick were employed directly by the police 
organisation and all but two were employed by the police at Newbank. The two CIs not 
employed by the police organisation were employed by the private security agency G4S 
but worked for the police on a full time basis. The working backgrounds of the CIs 
identified working at both Shorewick and Newbank were wide-ranging, although most 
had previously worked for the police organisation as either warranted officers or members 
of police staff. Generally speaking, there was a relatively even split between the total 
number of ex-officer CIs and the total number of non-ex-officer CIs identified working 
at both Newbank and Shorewick CIDs. In total, twenty-two of those encountered at 
Shorewick and six of those at Newbank were retired police officers (including two at 
Newbank who had been medically retired). The career histories of ex-officer CIs were 
equally wide ranging including retired DCs, Sergeants, Inspectors and Superintendents. 
In comparison, a total of twenty CIs encountered at Shorewick and seven encountered at 
Newbank were not ex-police officers. Of these, most had previously worked for the police 
organisation in a variety of police staff roles including ex-PCSOs, ex-police enquiry desk 
staff, ex-indexers, HR managers etc. A number of those CIs identified working at both 
Shorewick and Newbank were also new to the police organisation having previously 
worked in a variety of outside occupations. These included, DWP, Borders Agency and 
HMRC. Levels of educational attainment amongst CIs were not routinely explored, 
though it emerged that a number of CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick also 
held university degrees. In all of the CID units visited CIs were identified working in 
mixed teams alongside warranted officers, albeit to varying extents. 
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4.4 Shorewick 
 
4.4.1 Fraud and Financial Investigation Team 
 
The Fraud and Financial Investigation Team (FFIT) was based at a Shorewick 
BCU headquarters and consisted of a total of approximately twenty-two personnel at the 
time fieldwork was undertaken. The FFIT contained a total of fourteen FIs191 and was 
split into two distinct but interrelated units, the first being the fraud squad and the second 
being the financial investigation team (the FI team). The fraud squad was a mixed team 
consisting of five FIs and two DCs. All of the FIs working within the fraud squad were 
retired police detectives who had previous experience of working on investigations into 
financial crime. The financial investigation team was further subdivided into money 
laundering and asset recovery and contained a total of nine FIs. The asset recovery sub-
team was staffed entirely by non-warranted personnel and contained seven FIs, two of 
whom were ex-police officers. The money laundering sub-team was a mixed team 
containing two FIs who worked alongside approximately five warranted DCs. Those FIs 
who were not ex-officers had come from varying related areas outside of the police 
organisation including the DWP and the Borders Agency. One had previously worked for 
the police organisation in an admin role and had a degree in accountancy. At the time of 
the fieldwork, all FIs identified as working within the FFIT were employed directly by 
the police on full-time permanent contracts. 
The FFIT was headed by a Detective Inspector (DI) who was responsible for the overall 
management of the unit as well as its general output and efficiency. Beneath him were 
two Detective Sergeants who were responsible for the allocation of work to each of the 
sub-teams, for the direction of investigations and for overseeing investigatio ns being 
undertaken by their individual teams. The DSs identified within the FFIT were also 
responsible for identifying/maintaining the training and accreditation of personnel within 
the unit as well as the professional conduct of each of the teams/sub-teams. 
The purpose of the FFIT was two-fold; the fraud squad investigated cases to identify 
whether or not anything criminal had occurred and the financial investigation team 
conducted investigations to specifically identify and recover the proceeds of a crime. The 
                                                                 
191 In the current study FIs have been conceptualised as a specialist division of the CI role. 
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role of FIs working within the fraud squad was almost identical to that of their warranted 
colleagues. FIs here were afforded a range of tasks including the retrieval of evidence, 
production and management of exhibits, collation and submission of papers to the court, 
conducting interviews with victims and perpetrators, searching property and seizing 
relevant items. FIs working within the financial investigation team differed from those 
working in the fraud squad in that they did not directly investigate the offence/potentia l 
offence. The role of FIs within the financial investigation team was to investigate the 
extent to which a perpetrator, after they had been found guilty by the court, had benefitted 
from their crime i.e. whether or not the benefit accrued by the perpetrator equates only to 
the value of the charge or if the benefit extends beyond this (e.g. over a period of years). 
These investigations were undertaken by FIs through communication with other relevant 
bodies including the banks and HMRC which was in turn assured by their accreditation 
as FIs and subsequent listing on the Financial Intelligence Gateway. Once the extent to 
which the perpetrator had benefitted from their criminality had been established, it was 
then the task of the FI (and DC) to locate/identify and recover assets belonging to that 
individual which equated to the monetary value or estimated monetary value of the benefit 
accrued by that individual as a direct result of their criminality. FIs in the FFIT were able 
to draw upon a range of powers and provisions afforded to them under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002, Police Reform Act 2002, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 and Finance Act 2007 to aid them in their investigations. These included cash 
seizure powers, restraint powers, confiscation powers, powers to obtain and execute 
search warrants and powers to seize evidence (mainly documentary). FIs working within 
the FFIT were also in regular contact with SOCA/NCA as well as FIs operating in other 
force areas. FIs working within the FFIT could also be drawn upon to assist in a variety 
of other CID investigations for example, missing person cases, kidnappings, murders, 
blackmail etc.  
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4.4.2 Public Protection Unit 
 
Unlike all other units visited during the fieldwork, the Public Protection Unit 
(PPU) at Shorewick was not sited within a police station or a facility that was owned by 
the police. Rather, it was located within the offices of a local authority (council) building 
which was based in one of Shorewick’s BCU areas. Shorewick police shared the building 
with a number of other public and voluntary sector organisations and agencies includ ing 
the Independent Domestic Violence Advocacy Service (DVAs), Domestic Abuse Case 
Workers (DACs), Community Adult Learning Disability Team, the Safeguarding and 
Standards Unit (part of the National Youth Advocacy Service) and social care includ ing 
Barnardo’s social workers. The building also housed a Professional Development Centre 
which could be hired by outside organisations and agencies for staff training purposes.  
The PPU sub-units visited at Shorewick included the Domestic Abuse Team and the Child 
Protection Unit. Investigations undertaken into allegations of rape and sexual assault (of 
adult victims) were dealt with by a specialist force level unit which was located in a 
neighbouring BCU headquarters. The researcher was informed that this unit was staffed 
entirely by (mainly female) warranted officers.  
 
4.4.2.1 Child Protection Unit 
 
The Child Protection Unit (CPU) was relatively small in size taking up one 
medium sized room within the building. At the time visited, the unit as a whole consisted 
of a total of eight members of personnel, all but one of who were warranted DCs. The 
CPU was also split 60/40 with regard to gender with females being the majority. The unit 
was co-located with social care (two social workers). Only one CI was identified working 
within the unit alongside the warranted officers and was employed directly by the police 
on a full-time permanent contract. The unit was supervised by one DS who was 
responsible for the overall management of the team, allocation of work to personnel, for 
the professional conduct and development of the team and for the overall output of the 
unit.  
The CPU was split into two interrelated sub-teams the first being the child abuse team 
and the second being the child sexual exploitation team (CSE). Personnel working within 
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the child abuse team dealt with investigations into the abuse (be this physical, sexual 
and/or psychological) of children, although two officers located there also dealt 
specifically with investigations into the abuse and exploitation of vulnerable adults. The 
CSE team dealt solely with referrals regarding children who were being, or who were at 
risk of sexual exploitation. However, the CPU also dealt with ‘causes for concern’ where 
no crime had taken place. In this sense, the CPU was both a proactive and reactive unit. 
It was reactive in that incidents/allegations of abuse and sexual exploitation which had 
been reported to the police were investigated. However, it was also proactive in that 
through referrals made to the unit by uniformed officers or via social care, 
children/vulnerable adults were identified as ‘at risk’ of abuse and/or sexual exploitat ion. 
It was the responsibility of the unit therefore to work with the relevant agencies to prevent 
future abuse and/or sexual exploitation from occurring.  
The role of the CI working within this unit was proactive in that they were involved in 
preventing the future abuse of children. Following a ‘cause for concern’ referral which 
could be made to the unit via either social care (Sec 47) and/or a uniformed officer (via a 
Gen 117), a ‘Strategy for Protection’ meeting (or STRAP meeting) would be held to 
discuss/review the case and devise an initial intervention strategy. These initial meetings 
were multiagency and were attended by a warranted child protection officer (usually a 
member of the child abuse team), alongside other relevant bodies including social care, 
probation etc. If the terms agreed at the initial STRAP meeting were not met (e.g. parents 
fail to attend parenting classes) or if the child was judged at the meeting to be at risk of 
significant immediate harm, the case would be moved to a ‘Child Protection Conference’. 
If a case proceeded to conference, it would only then become the responsibility of the CI 
identified working within the unit. The primary task of the CI was to investigate the 
criminal history of parents/carers or anyone in immediate, regular contact with the child 
(e.g. mother’s new partner) and, following this investigation, to disclose at conference all 
relevant information (convictions, cautions etc.) held by the police on that/those 
individuals. The CI therefore acted as a representative for the police at these conferences 
and as such, had full access to the relevant police systems including the Police National 
Computer (PNC), the Crime Management System (CMS) and Case Administration and 
Tracking System (CATS). 
The role undertaken by the CI in question was predominantly office based in nature. 
Contact with members of the public was therefore reduced to that which occurred during 
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participation in child protection conferences which were attended by relevant family 
members (and the child where appropriate) and also included those professionals most 
involved with the child and family. This included social care (social worker) who would 
also chair the conference, school or nursery staff, probation officer, health worker/s, drugs 
worker/s, domestic violence officer etc. It was the task of the conference to decide 
whether there were significant risks to a child, what those risks were and what needed to 
be done to reduce or remove those risks. Following discussion, an agreed ‘Child 
Protection Plan’ is put in place. Review conferences would then be undertaken at regular 
intervals to ensure the terms of the agreed plan were being met. The CI identified working 
in the CPU at Shorewick was supervised/managed in the same way as their warranted 
colleagues and was also held to account in the same way. The CI in question had also not 
been designated with powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act  
2002. 
 
4.4.2.2 Domestic Abuse Unit 
 
The Domestic Abuse Unit (DAU) or ‘murder prevention’ team as it was 
colloquially referred to by participants, was relatively small in size taking up a small room 
on one floor of the building and containing only five personnel at the time the fieldwork 
was undertaken. The unit was staffed by a mixed team of warranted and non-warranted 
personnel. These included one police constable, three Domestic Abuse Officers and one 
non-warranted Domestic Violence Manager. The unit was split 60/40 with regard to 
gender with females occupying the majority. All those working within the unit were 
employed directly by the police organisation on full-time permanent contracts. The team 
was supervised by a non-warranted Domestic Violence Manager who was responsible for 
the overall management of the team. The Domestic Violence Manager was also 
responsible for the allocation of work to the team, for the professional conduct and 
development of the team and for the overall output of the department.  
Unlike the majority of other units visited during the fieldwork, the DAU was a proactive 
unit in the sense that it was the role of the DVOs there to conduct risk assessments and 
work with victims to reduce the risk of future domestic abuse and potential domestic 
related homicides. Broadly speaking, DVOs were responsible for putting interventions 
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into place so as to prevent future instances/potential for domestic abuse. The level of 
intervention required and therefore, tasks undertaken by DVOs, were dependent upon the 
risk categorisation of the incoming case. The unit dealt only with cases of domestic abuse 
which had been ‘crimed’ by attending officers through the central Crime Recording 
Bureau. Domestic abuse related crimes were then placed on a DVA risk assessment list 
where they remained until an initial risk assessment using the Domestic Abuse, Sexual 
Harassment and Honour Based Violence (DASH) checklist had been undertaken. Non-
crimed cases were risk assessed by the Central Intake unit (CIU) and crimed cases by the 
DAU personnel. Cases/crimes were assessed as being either, low, medium or high risks. 
The DAU dealt only with crimes assessed as medium or high risks. If assessed as a 
medium risk, DVOs were required to make contact with the victim either via phone call 
or face-to-face contact so as to signpost to other relevant agencies and offer support to 
the victim providing them with an assigned point of contact within the police. If assessed 
as being high risk, DVOs were tasked with investigating the circumstances and situation 
of the victim so as to prevent further harm to the victim and future calls for assistance to 
the police. DVOs were assigned their own victim who they would work with to develop 
an appropriate intervention strategy. This would involve DVOs paying visits to the homes 
of victims to assess their circumstances/situation. 
DVOs also had full access to all relevant police information systems, chiefly, CMS and 
CATS. Personnel within the DAU worked closely with Domestic Violence Advocates 
who were funded by the local council and who, at the time of the fieldwork, were located 
just down the corridor from the DAU team. During the visit the researcher was informed 
that the Domestic Violence Advocates were in the process of being co-located with the 
DAU. DVOs worked with relative autonomy with regard to their assigned jobs, making 
independent risk assessments and devising strategies of intervention for victims. None of 
the DVOs in the unit had been accredited with powers under provisions contained within 
the Police Reform Act 2002. 
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4.4.3 Crime and Incident Team 
 
Located within a BCU level police station in Shorewick, the Crime and Incident 
team (CIT) consisted of over twenty personnel at the time fieldwork was undertaken. The 
unit was staffed by mixed teams of warranted and non-warranted personnel. These 
included police constables and six CIs. No DCs were identified as working within the 
CIT. All six of the CIs identified as working within the CIT were employed directly by 
the police organisation. At the time of the fieldwork however, one CI had been detached 
to reactive CID. The CIT was split into three teams: 1) the Diary Car team was a mixed 
team of around three police constables (usually on light duties) and two CIs. The Diary 
Car team was responsible for the management of victim’s appointments with the police; 
it was the job of the diary car team to attend scheduled appointments which were not 
immediate priorities to take a statement/statements, record a crime and then pass it on to 
the relevant team to be developed. 2) The Prisoner Processing Unit was a team of approx. 
6-10 police constables and two Domestic Violence Officers. This unit dealt with most of 
the detainees (held in custody) who were arrested for less serious or complex offences 
following the handover of investigations from other officers (often the arresting officer/s) 
who were then free to return to patrol and other duties. 3) The CIT support team was a 
team of four CIs and two PCs on light duties. This unit dealt with a range of volume crime 
types including, theft, assault, criminal damage (except with intent to endanger life), 
burglaries, harassment (except involving an element of domestic violence), making off 
without payment and some fraud (unless serious or complicated) and some vehicle crime. 
It was the responsibility of CIT support personnel to develop a case up to the point of 
arrest/interview when it would then be handed over to the relevant unit (warranted officer) 
for conclusion.  
Each of the CIs working within CIT support was identified as having been designated 
with their own individual areas of work. One CI specialised in shopliftings, one (the part-
time CI) specialised in ‘drive-offs’ (making off from a petrol station without payment), 
the third dealt with burglaries and other miscellaneous thefts and the fourth, with assaults. 
When workload was high and/or personnel were off (on annual or sick leave), it was 
common for CIs to take on the additional work even if not directly related to their 
particular area of expertise. CIs were also identified as having, in previous years, been 
asked to take on/be involved in additional and often more serious/complex areas of 
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investigation e.g. fraud. CIs identified working in the CIT support team at the time of the 
fieldwork operated with relative autonomy on their own caseloads for which they were 
solely responsible. Their relative level of autonomy meant that their role often took them 
outside the police station and involved regular engagement in face-to-face contact with 
members of the public including victims of crime. Retrieving CCTV and circulat ing 
images for identification purposes, taking victim and witness statements and retrieving 
and cataloguing any evidence were key tasks undertaken by the CIs identified working 
within this unit. 
The CIT was headed by a Detective Inspector who was responsible for the overall 
management of the unit as well as its general output and efficiency. Beneath the Detective 
Inspector were three Detective Sergeants who were responsible for the allocation of work 
to each of the three sub-units/teams, for the direction of investigations and for the 
overseeing of investigations/work being undertaken by each team. The DSs identified 
within the CIT were also responsible for identifying the training and accreditation of 
personnel within the unit as well as the professional conduct of each of the sub-
teams/units. Those CIs identified working within the CIT were supervised/managed in 
the same way as their warranted colleagues. They were also held to account in the same 
way. None of the CIs identified as working within the unit had been designated with 
powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002. 
 
4.4.4 Generalist Reactive Unit 
 
Located within a BCU level police station in Shorewick, the Generalist Reactive 
Unit (GRU) consisted of approximately fifteen personnel at the time fieldwork was 
undertaken and was almost exclusively staffed by warranted officers. These included 
mainly DCs and some PCs undertaking training to become DCs. Only one CI was 
identified as working within the GRU at Shorewick. This CI was employed on a full- t ime 
permanent contract with the police and had been seconded some months previously from 
CIT (CIT support team). The GRU was split into two teams each of which was headed 
by a DS who was responsible for the overall management of the unit. DSs acted as the 
first point of contact for all incoming jobs and were responsible for the allocation of work 
to their team, for undertaking daily briefings and for the overall direction/management of 
investigations. DSs were also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff and 
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for the professional conduct of personnel. The unit was headed by a Detective Inspector 
who was responsible for the overall management and efficiency of the unit. The CI 
identified working within the GRU was supervised/managed and held to account in the 
same way as their warranted colleagues. The identified CI had also not been designated 
with any police type powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 
2002. 
The role of the CI identified as working within this unit involved a range of tasks and 
responsibilities. These included the taking of more complex victim and witness 
statements, retrieval of CCTV footage and retrieval and cataloguing of any exhibits. The 
CI in question had also been afforded the role of police single point of contact (SPOC) 
for the county Ambulance Service. As the SPOC for Shorewick Ambulance Service, the 
CI was also in regular contact with paramedics, coroners and other criminal justice staff 
(e.g. prison officers). A key part of the CI’s SPOC role involved taking complex witness 
statements as part of a wider serious investigation, usually involving a death (e.g. death 
of an inmate in prison). The CI also possessed the power to complete data protection/data 
sharing requests on behalf of Shorewick Police (and if requested to do so by a warranted 
officer leading the investigation) to share necessary information which might be of 
significance to an investigation (e.g. recordings and transcripts of 999 calls, Patient 
Report Form completed by attending paramedic/s). Following such requests for 
information, it was then the responsibility of the CI to download the requested 
information onto a disk and exhibit it. Alongside statement taking, the CI was also 
primarily responsible for compiling evidence to be presented in court - this involved 
downloading, viewing and documenting hours of CCTV footage which the CI would later 
assemble into a package to be used by officers as evidence in court. This role also meant 
frequent liaison with other members of police staff working in specialist units e.g. ‘Info -
Tech’ team etc. 
 
4.4.5 Major Incident Team 
 
Shorewick Major Incident Team (MIT) was the only force level CID unit 
encountered during the research. The MIT was housed within Shorewick’s main police 
training centre which was owned and managed by the police and was located within one 
of its BCU areas. The MIT was the largest of all the CID units visited with an entire floor 
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of the training centre reserved for this purpose and at any one time, housed around one 
hundred and thirty members of staff.  The MIT investigated all Major Crime within the 
Shorewick area and at the time of the fieldwork, was divided into four separate teams. 
These teams were mixed, consisting of Detectives, CIs and Major Incident Room staff 
(indexers) who were responsible for operating the HOLMES2 (Home Office Large Major 
Enquiry System) computer system (including processing, researching, analysing and 
inputting information onto a database which has been set up to assist in the investiga t ion 
of a major incident. Each team or sub-team was managed by a DS who was responsible 
for the immediate allocation of work to his/her team as well as the general management 
of the team. Above them was a Detective Inspector who was responsible for ensuring 
investigative strategies were communicated and maintained. Senior Investiga t ing 
Officers (SIOs) (usually a Detective Superintendent) occupied the top position in the 
chain of command within the MIT and were responsible for developing the overall 
investigation strategy and outcome of investigations being undertaken by each team.  MIT 
Resource Managers, who might be either police staff or police officers, (alongside SIOs) 
were responsible for the allocation of staff to each investigation team based on the overall 
strategy and requirements set forth by the SIO. 
The majority of operations undertaken by the MIT involved the investigation of homicide 
of a particular complex nature. These were separated into two distinct types or categories, 
the first being category A murder investigations and the second, category B murder 
investigations. However, the MIT was also responsible for the investigation of a range of 
other types of major crime including investigations into offences of kidnap, rape and large 
corporate investigations which might result in serious charges such as manslaughter. At 
the time of the fieldwork the MIT also housed the Cold Case Review team whose 
responsibility it was to review unsolved, historic criminal cases. Although in the process 
of disbandment during the fieldwork due to budget cuts at Shorewick, when visited by 
the researcher, the Cold Case Review team based in Shorewick MIT was small in size 
and consisted of a variable mix of serving and retired police officers (CIs). 
At the time at which fieldwork was undertaken at Shorewick MIT, a total of sixteen CIs 
were identified as working within the unit. Of these, thirteen were retired police officers 
from a range of backgrounds including ex-DCs, a retired Chief Inspector and a retired 
Family Liaison Officer (FLO). Only three CIs identified operating within the MIT were 
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not retired officers instead coming from backgrounds involving a degree of policing 
and/or investigative knowledge or experience. The professional backgrounds of these 
individuals included a former PCSO, a former Department of Work and Pensions 
Investigator and a former private security escort officer. All CIs identified working within 
the MIT were employed directly by the police on full-time permanent contracts. No CIs 
from private security agencies were present within the MIT at the time of the fieldwork 
although the researcher was informed that private security personnel had been ‘bought-
in’ to assist on investigations for fixed (short) periods of time in previous years. 
Due to the often complex and large-scale nature of major investigations, CIs (like DCs) 
were not allocated individual caseloads within the MIT. CIs were rather allocated 
individual tasks/roles as part of the wider investigation which they were required to 
undertake and oversee throughout the entirety of the investigation. CIs were available to 
be utilised on all investigations undertaken within the MIT including category A and 
category B homicides and all other major investigations, although CIs were only involved 
in homicide investigations at the time of the fieldwork. Roles undertaken by CIs within 
the MIT generally mirrored those being undertaken by DCs and included the management 
of exhibits, undertaking disclosure, retrieval of CCTV footage, taking statements from 
witnesses (outside enquiries), interviewing suspects and undertaking the role of FLO. CIs 
were allocated roles by the SIO on the basis of their previous experience/skill-set as well 
as individual performance in previous MIT investigations. On this basis, CIs working 
within the MIT might occupy the same or different roles on each investigation, for 
example, a CI might work as disclosure officer on one job and as exhibits officer on the 
next or as CCTV reviewer on one job and as CCTV reviewer on the next. The extent to 
which CIs were required to venture outside the MIT was dependent largely on the role 
allocated to them on each investigation. One CI was also identified as operating in a 
supervisory capacity, occupying the position of CCTV coordinator for the MIT. 
Given the scale and complexity of major investigations and if relevant to their allocated 
role/task, CIs were also required to engage with other specialist departments. Some 
examples identified included Scientific Support (forensics), Tactical Support (Specialist 
Search and House to House officers) and Hi-Tec Crime staff who were utilised to examine 
computers, mobile telephones and other technical devices. Additionally, MIT CIs were 
also required to engage with local policing teams and neighbouring police forces. None 
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of the CIs working within the MIT had been designated with any of the powers contained 
within the Police Reform Act 2002. 
 
4.5 Newbank 
 
4.5.1 Generalist Reactive Unit 
 
Based in the headquarters of a BCU in Newbank, the GRU was the first unit 
visited during fieldwork at Newbank. The unit was small, consisting of a total of only six 
personnel at the time of the fieldwork and was staffed by a mixed team of warranted and 
non-warranted personnel. These included one DC, two PCs, two CIs and one DS. The 
unit was also split 50/50 with regard to gender. Of the two CIs working within this unit, 
one was employed directly by the police on a full-time, permanent police contract. The 
second CI however was employed via the private sector recruitment agency G4S and 
worked for Newbank police via a contractual arrangement with G4S. The CI who was 
employed on a police contract had previously worked for the police as a front enquiry 
desk officer. The CI employed by G4S was an ex-police detective having recently retired 
from a neighbouring force after serving his full thirty years’ service. One of the PCs 
present within the unit was completing her Professional Development Portfolio (PDP) 
and as such, was in the final stages of fulfilling the process to becoming a DC. The second 
PC working within the unit had been seconded there from the uniform branch on a short 
term basis to help out with high workload and also to gain experience of the type of work 
involved in the CID having expressed an interest to her managers of possibly becoming 
a DC in the future. At this stage however she had not begun the formal process of 
advancement. All personnel working within the unit were employed on full-t ime, 
permanent contracts with the police with the exception of the CI who was employed by 
G4S who was working for the police on a fixed term (6 months) basis. The CIs working 
within this unit were also supervised on the same basis as their warranted colleagues, by 
a DS who was responsible for the overall management of the unit. He acted as the first 
point of contact for all incoming ‘jobs’ and was responsible for the allocation of work to 
the team, for undertaking daily briefings and for the overall direction/management of 
investigations. The DS was also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff and 
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was the person responsible for the overall output of the department as well as the 
professional conduct of his team.  
As with all the reactive CID units encountered during fieldwork, the GRU was fast-paced 
and extremely busy with high workloads. As a generalist unit, the team working here 
were required to deal with a range of crime types, namely, violent and acquisitive crime. 
Some examples observed during fieldwork included, cash machine ram raids, vehicle 
theft, assaults, robberies, an investigation into a suspicious death and burglaries. The role 
of both CIs identified as working within this unit appeared almost identical to that of their 
warranted colleagues; no type of crime and/or task was identified as being specifica l ly 
reserved for undertaking by a detective. Following on from this, tasks undertaken by CIs 
were generally identical to those undertaken by warranted personnel within the unit and 
generally speaking, involved the recovery of CCTV footage, taking statements (simple 
and complex), interviewing witnesses and interviewing suspects. CIs were allocated their 
own caseloads for which they were solely responsible in the same way to that of their 
warranted colleagues. As such, CIs were expected to undertake all relevant investiga t ive 
work on their assigned case and were required to follow these cases ‘from cradle to 
grave’. CIs were also found to be in regular contact with the CPS and other relevant 
members of the criminal justice system such as the probation service. CIs also had full 
access to all relevant information systems including PNC and CMS. 
The role of CIs identified working within this unit involved a lot of time spent outside the 
police station undertaking enquiries. This meant that CIs had regular contact with outside 
bodies such as local council CCTV offices as well as the general public. Enquiries were, 
for the majority, undertaken autonomously by CIs in the same way as warranted 
colleagues although warranted accompaniment was identified as necessary on a couple 
of occasions, for example, when CIs were required to visit prisons in order to charge for 
further offences. Furthermore, each of the CIs identified also operated relative autonomy 
with regard to decision making relating to their own caseloads or jobs. There was no 
requirement for CIs to call in for permission, for example, for the decision not to seize 
CCTV footage. In the absence of the DS, the CI who was employed by the police was 
also identified as largely taking on the role of office manager and supervisor in an 
unofficial capacity, allocating work and advising other personnel on the likely best course 
of action. The CIs identified working within this unit had also been designated by the 
Chief Constable with all of the police powers available to CIs under section 38 of the 
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Police Reform Act 2002. As was the case in the majority of units visited during fieldwork 
within which CIs were identified as operating, no formally acknowledged role profiles 
were available for the CIs working within this unit leaving the distinction between their 
role relative to that of their warranted colleagues somewhat open to interpretation.  
The GRU at Newbank was also co-located with the Convertor Team, previously the 
Volume Crime Team. It was the task of this team to convert all volume crime forensic 
output to detections and hence, convictions. This meant personnel paying regular visits 
to interview offenders in prison and detainees in custody where, through interview, they 
would aim to maximise the opportunities for bringing offences to justice and in doing so, 
reduce the number of unresolved recorded crime incidents. The Convertor Team was 
small in size, consisting of only five members of staff.  At the time of the fieldwork, four 
of these staff members were warranted officers and one was a CI who was employed on 
a full-time permanent contract with Newbank police. When workload in the GRU was 
particularly high, the convertor team would assist on investigations being undertaken by 
GRU personnel. The co-location of the Convertor Team within GRU was also practical 
as the work of both units could overlap which proved quite often to be the case. 
 
4.5.2 Fraud and Financial Investigation Team 
 
The Fraud and Financial Investigation Team (FFIT) was based at a Newbank BCU 
police headquarters and consisted of a total of twenty-four personnel. Within the FFIT, 
CIs were identified as working in mixed teams alongside warranted police detectives. The 
FFIT was further split into two distinct but interrelated sub-units, the first dealing with 
fraud investigations (the fraud squad) and the second, with financial investigation (the FI 
team). The FFIT housed a total of seven CIs, or as they were referred to in the FFIT, 
financial investigators (FIs). The FIs were split between the two sub-units: six within the 
FI team and one within the fraud squad. Of the seven FIs identified working within the 
FFIT, three were retired police officers and four were not. Two of those FIs who were not 
retired police officers had previously been employed by the police organisation as 
members of police staff. One of the remaining two non-ex-officer FIs had previously 
worked for the DWP and the other, for Capital One bank. All FIs identified as working 
within the unit were employed directly by the police on full-time permanent contracts. 
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The structure of the unit was comparable to that identified at Shorewick in that it was 
headed by a Detective Inspector who had overall responsibility for the management 
(including ensuring its overall output and efficiency) of the unit (both teams). Beneath 
him were three DSs, two working on the fraud squad and one working on the FI team. On 
the FI team there was also a non-warranted police manager who like his Detective 
Sergeant colleagues was responsible, alongside the Detective Sergeant located within this 
unit, for the allocation of work to both teams. The primary role of the office manager 
identified working within the FI team was to organise and supervise all administra t ive 
and clerical arrangements within the FI team and generally speaking, ensure the unit ran 
smoothly. Alongside being responsible for the allocation of work, DSs were also 
responsible for overseeing investigations being undertaken by the FFIT and for 
identifying/maintaining the training and accreditation of personnel within the unit as well 
as the professional conduct of each of the sub-teams. As at Shorewick FFIT, the fraud 
squad at Newbank FFIT investigated cases to identify whether or not anything crimina l 
had occurred and the financial investigation team conducted enquiries intended to identify 
and recover the proceeds of a crime.  
As identified at Shorewick, the role of FIs working within the fraud squad was almost 
identical to that of their warranted colleagues. Tasks FIs were required to undertake 
included retrieving evidence, production and management of exhibits, collation and 
submission of papers to the court, interviewing victims and suspects, searching property 
and seizing relevant items. As was also the case at Shorewick, FIs working within the 
financial investigation team differed from those working in the fraud squad in that they 
did not directly investigate the offence/potential offence. The role of FIs within the 
financial investigation team was to determine the extent to which the perpetrator had 
benefitted from their criminal activity (in financial terms). As at Shorewick, financ ia l 
investigations were undertaken by FIs through communication with other relevant bodies 
including the banks and HMRC which was in turn assured by their accreditation as FIs 
and subsequent listing on the Financial Intelligence Gateway. Once the extent to which 
the perpetrator had benefitted from their criminality had been established, it was then the 
task of the FI (and DC) to locate/identify and recover assets belonging to that individua l 
which equated to the monetary value or estimated monetary value of the benefit accrued 
by that individual as a direct result of their criminality. Like those FIs working at 
Shorewick, FIs in the FFIT at Newbank were able to draw upon a range of powers and 
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provisions afforded to them under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Police Reform Act 
2002, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Finance Act 2007 
to aid them in their investigations. These included cash seizure powers, restraint powers, 
confiscation powers, powers to obtain and execute search warrants and powers to seize 
evidence (mainly documentary). FIs working within the FFIT were also in regular contact 
with SOCA/NCA as well as FIs in other force areas. FIs working within the FFIT at 
Newbank could also be drawn upon to assist in a variety of other CID investigations for 
example, missing person cases, kidnappings, murders, blackmail etc.  
 
4.5.3 Public Protection Unit 
 
Based in the headquarters of a BCU in Newbank, the Public Protection Unit (PPU) 
was the second unit visited during fieldwork undertaken at Newbank. The PPU was 
divided into three smaller sub-units. Generally speaking, the first unit dealt broadly with 
investigations into domestic abuse, forced marriage, honour based violence and hate 
crime. The second unit dealt with investigations into rape and sexual assault cases. The 
third sub-unit dealt with investigations into the neglect and abuse of children and 
vulnerable adults. These units were not rigidly defined in terms of investigation/cr ime 
types with some investigations overlapping a couple or even all three of the sub-teams’ 
broad remits. CIs were only identified working within the first of these sub-units which 
predominately dealt with investigations into domestic abuse. This sub-unit, which for 
purposes of clarity will simply be referred to as PPU henceforth, was medium in size, 
consisting of a total of thirteen personnel when visited. The unit was staffed by a mixed 
team of warranted and non-warranted personnel at the time of the fieldwork. These 
included one detective constable, six police constables, four CIs and two DSs. The unit 
was also split 70/30 with regard to gender with the majority being female personnel. All 
of the CIs working within this unit were also female and were employed directly by the 
police on full-time, permanent police contracts. Of the four CIs identified working within 
this unit, two were retired police officers and one had previously worked as a member of 
police staff in a variety of roles. The fourth CI was the only CI to have come from outside 
the police organisation having previously occupied other roles in the wider crimina l 
justice system. All six of the PCs working within the unit were in the process of becoming 
DCs and were waiting to undertake their qualifying examination as part completion of 
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their PDP. The unit was split into two teams which were each headed by a Detective 
Sergeant who acted as the first point of contact for all incoming jobs and was responsible 
for the allocation of work to the team, daily briefings and overall direction/management 
of investigations. The DSs were also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff 
and for undertaking staff Performance Development Reviews (PDRs). The unit was 
supervised overall by a DCI who was responsible for the overall output and efficiency of 
the department as well as the professional conduct of the personnel within. 
Within the PPU, the role of CIs appeared almost identical to that of their warranted 
colleagues; no type of crime and/or task was identified as being specifically reserved for 
undertaking by a DC. However, the researcher was made aware during fieldwork that CIs 
were not currently being utilised in the other two PPU sub-units and as such, 
investigations into allegations of rape, sexual assault and the potential neglect and abuse 
of children and vulnerable adults were arguably reserved for operation by warranted 
officers at the time of the fieldwork. Where identified in operation within the PPU 
however, it did appear that tasks undertaken by CIs were generally identical to those 
undertaken by warranted personnel within the unit and generally speaking, involved the 
recovery of CCTV footage, interviewing witnesses, interviewing victims and 
interviewing suspects. CIs were allocated their own caseloads for which they were solely 
responsible in the same way to that of their warranted colleagues and they were expected 
to follow these ‘from cradle to grave’. As such, CIs were also identified as being in regular 
contact with the CPS and other relevant members of the criminal justice system such as 
the probation service and child protection services. They were also identified as in regular 
contact with staff members from the charitable organisation Women’s Aid who were 
found to be working from an office located within the BCU headquarters, down the 
corridor from the PPU. CIs also had full access to all relevant police information systems, 
chiefly, CMS and CATS.  
The role undertaken by the CIs in this unit involved a lot of time spent outside of the 
station on enquiries and this meant regular contact with victims as well as the general 
public. Enquiries were, for the majority, undertaken autonomously by CIs in the same 
way as warranted colleagues although warranted accompaniment was identified as 
necessary on a couple of occasions. For example, when a suspect suffering acute chest 
pains needed to be accompanied to hospital, the CI had to wait for a uniformed officer’s 
assistance as this was not something she was able to do autonomously as an un-warranted 
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CI. Following on from this, each of the CIs identified also operated relative auto nomy 
with regard to decision making relating to their own caseloads or jobs. There was no 
requirement for CIs to call in for permission from a DS. The CIs identified within this 
unit had also been designated by the Chief Constable with all of the police powers 
available to CIs under section 38 of the Reform Act 2002. As was the case in the majority 
of units visited during fieldwork and within which CIs were identified operating, no role 
profiles were available for the CIs working within this unit leaving the distinction between 
their role relative to that of their warranted colleagues relatively open to interpretation.  
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has set out an overview/profile of the structure and make-up of the 
CID units visited as they existed when the fieldwork was undertaken. This has been done 
so as to enable the reader to locate the substantive discussions of the thesis in their 
organisational context. As described in this chapter, CIs were found to be performing a 
range of tasks and were involved in the investigation of a wide range of crimes includ ing 
those of a serious, specialist and complex nature. However, the capacity with which CIs 
were engaged in police investigations was found to differ between force areas and also 
between units suggesting the existence of local variations in the utilisation of CIs as a 
resource. The degree to which CIs were involved in investigations was, for the most part,  
largely dependent upon the type of crime being investigated suggesting the existence of 
a more well-defined division of labour between CIs and their warranted colleagues in 
some units than in others. While the ratio of CIs to officers differed somewhat markedly 
between units, CIs were most often observed working autonomously in mixed teams 
alongside police detectives and other police officers. As such, CIs observed working at 
both Shorewick and Newbank were afforded a noteworthy degree of autonomy with 
regard to their operational decision making. A number of CIs were also found to be 
undertaking roles which required them to exercise a notable degree of authority over both 
their warranted and non-warranted colleagues although as will be discussed in more detail 
in subsequent chapters, this was not always formally acknowledged by the organisation.  
While the majority of those CIs encountered at both sites were found to be ex-police 
officers, this particular demographic differed between forces with CIs working at 
Shorewick found to be more likely to be ex-officers than those working at Newbank (this 
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issue will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters). The degree to which CIs 
at both sites had been designated with powers under the provisions contained within the 
Police Reform Act 2002 also differed between forces and units suggesting varying uptake 
of the provision by Chief Constables. While only two agency CIs were encountered 
working at Newbank during the time fieldwork was undertaken, as findings presented in 
subsequent chapters will show, both forces were found to have made use of agency CIs 
in the past. 
Overall, CI utilisation at both Shorewick and Newbank was expansive and is indicat ive 
of an uneven uptake of the CI by police forces. Information presented in this chapter 
shows that, on a number of occasions and at both forces, CIs were operating a role which 
requires them to make decisions which could determine the strategic direction and 
ultimate success of an investigation. In many units, the role being performed by CIs went 
beyond that of a member of support staff and, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters, may come to present a significant challenge to the long established 
professional ethos of the detective and prestige of the CID.  
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Chapter Five: The Daily Life of Civilian Investigators 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an empirical account of the role currently being undertaken 
by CIs within the police organisation in E&W and discusses a range of issues relevant to 
their introduction and current use. Drawing upon interview data, field observations and 
personal reflections of CIs during interviews, this chapter offers an empirical account of 
the daily life of those CIs found to be operating within Newbank and Shorewick police. 
This chapter has been divided thematically into five sections. The first section seeks to 
examine how CIs construct and assert their occupational identities within the unit, 
namely, the extent to which the role being undertaken by CIs at both Shorewick and 
Newbank can be considered support. The second section of this chapter examines the 
motivations of CIs for applying for the role, their level of commitment and their impact 
on resilience. The third section explores the degree to which CIs have become integrated 
within the units in which they work and discusses the value currently attached to the role 
by CIs themselves and others. The fourth section seeks to examine the impact of CI 
utilisation on established cultures/orientations to work within the CID. Specifically, this 
section examines the degree to which CIs can be seen to have aligned themselves with 
the traditional cop culture and more specifically, detective culture. The final section of 
this chapter deals with the issue of public perceptions, in particular, concern over the 
impact of CI utilisation on public confidence in the police and the CID and with that, 
detective’s ability to maintain projection of their desired ‘legitimate’ identity. 
 
5.2 Identity and Occupational Position of CIs 
 
In a fashion comparable to that of PCSOs (O’Neill, 2014), when CIs were first 
introduced in 2002, there was a great deal of confusion over what they were meant to do 
within police forces and how they would fit into the CID both practically and cultura lly. 
The perceived failure of the police to adequately communicate information to personnel 
relating to the initial introduction of CIs and their intended role, was frequently reflected 
on by participants at both Newbank and Shorewick and also appeared to be a major factor 
affecting the occupational identity and integration of CIs within the CID at both sites. In 
keeping with the broad national rhetoric surrounding civilianisation, CIs were first 
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introduced to warranted personnel at both sites on the premise of being support staff who 
were envisaged to free-up the time of experienced detectives who could then return to 
frontline tasks. The following quote can be considered typical of the experience of most 
warranted officers with regard to the way the CI role was communicated initially: 
 
When they first arrived we were told that they were just support staff here to 
assist us with investigations doing the sort of lesser tasks if you know what I 
mean, things like CCTV recovery, viewing and cataloguing of exhibits and what 
have you. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
 
In the traditional sense, conceptions of support staff are typically imbued with feminine 
connotations - which arise from the past recruitment of (mainly) female staff to undertake 
‘back office’ clerical and administrative roles - and which stand in stark contrast with 
patriarchal dispositions of officers associated with cop culture and suggest a division of 
labour in which those assigned the support label (in this case, CIs) have little to no impact 
on the main task at hand. However, the power of the performance culture in the 
organisation coupled with congested organisational demands on the police meant that 
CID unit managers were under pressure to use CIs in diverse ways which often stretched 
their remit beyond that which could be strictly considered support. Diverted from their 
primary supportive role, CIs may become increasingly involved in operational police 
work and in tasks associated with the role of a fully-fledged detective. Indeed, in most 
units where CIs were observed working alongside warranted officers, their remit had 
advanced far beyond that which they were initially intended, some to the point that they 
were being utilised in an almost identical capacity to their warranted colleagues. Referred 
to as ‘mission creep’ by Crawford et al. (2005: 45) in relation to PCSOs, the expansion 
of the role of CIs beyond that which they were initially intended was found to be a 
common trend amongst CIs working at both Shorewick and Newbank CIDs (particula r ly 
at Shorewick MIT, Newbank PPU and Newbank GRU192). Skinns (2011: 73) also found 
evidence of mission creep in relation to non-warranted DDOs who, despite ‘origina l ly 
been employed through Home Office funds to drug-test suspects’, in practice, ‘authorised 
suspects’ detention, read them their rights and used force when they were not supposed 
to’. With regard to CIs, this ‘creep’ or ‘drift’ in mission was found to be being encouraged 
                                                                 
192 Although as will be discussed subsequently, the extent to which this was the case at each unit was largely 
dependent upon a range of other factors (e.g. working background of CI). 
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by a mixture of factors. First, some CIs encountered possessed a drive to prove themselves 
to their warranted colleagues and, in doing so, their overall worth to the unit. This drive 
itself was fuelled by a mixture of performance culture within the CID and ubiquitous 
awareness amongst CIs of impending budget cuts and subsequent concern over their job 
security. While not always welcomed, CIs admitted to reluctantly accepting ad hoc 
extensions to their remit/role (not matched by benefits) in an effort to appear ‘keen’ and/or 
‘valuable’ to unit managers (this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six). 
Second, CIs drift in their mission was also importantly encouraged by an overbearing 
pressure on supervisors to manage congested organisational demands and, in doing so, 
ensure organisational outcomes/output within the units. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the 
boundary separating the occupational remit of CIs and warranted officers appeared most 
blurred in relation to ex-officer CIs as the following quote illustrates:  
 
I think the thing with our role is that it’s just sort of grown legs and ran and the 
bureaucracy hasn’t been able to keep up. I don’t think there was much clarity 
with regard to how we were supposed to be used when we first came in. I 
definitely felt like that anyway. But as times gone on and they’ve seen what we 
can do and that we’re capable of doing most of the stuff… It’s just progressed. 
It’s definitely true for us ex-cops because we already have that knowledge and 
those skills so it was easy to see how that role might expand. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)  
 
 
At both Shorewick and Newbank, initial recruitment of CIs had tended to favour the 
recruitment of ex-officers over non-ex-officers. Unlike non-ex-officer CIs who, crucially, 
had never served their time ‘on the street’, ex-officer CIs arguably bring with them a 
wealth of relevant experience and craft skills. Police managers at both sites made 
reference to the perceived advantages in employing ex-officer CIs who were alleged to 
be able to ‘hit the ground running’ and who also, arguably negate the need for expensive 
and lengthy training packages saving the organisation both time and money while at the 
same time, increasing its resources and overall resilience. For some officers, the transition 
from cop to CI was immediate and often resulted in them performing an almost identica l 
role to that which they were required to undertake as a fully warranted officer. As the 
following quote suggests, the recruitment of ex-officer CIs has contributed towards a 
legacy of poor communication about the role at force level resulting in its piecemeal 
implementation which has subsequently led to the ad hoc evolution of the CI role for both 
ex-officer and more recently, non-ex-officer CIs:  
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I think when we first came in they didn’t know what we were about and what we 
were for and how to use us and because some of us were ex-cops that were 
literally, one day there, retired overnight, the next day they were back at there, 
sat at the same desks doing the same job. They literally just went from a cop to 
a CI overnight. So they used that and when we came in as non-cops, they were 
kind of like ‘Well, what do we do with them?’ ‘They’re doing that job (ex-cop 
CIs) so surely they’ve got to do the same job?’ So there wasn’t any sort of clarity 
and they didn’t know what to do, so they just treated us that way and that’s how 
we’ve sort of just gone along and evolved and they’ve just left us to it. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
As evidenced in the above quote, where they were observed working in mixed teams 
alongside warranted officers, much like their ex-officer colleagues, the remit of non-ex-
officer CIs had also often advanced to include many of the tasks traditionally considered 
the preserve of their warranted colleagues. For example, at Shorewick MIT one non-ex-
officer CI had previously undertaken the role of Family Liaison Officer (FLO) and also, 
had acted as second interviewer during a suspect interview. At both Newbank PPU and 
Newbank GRU, non-warranted CIs were also observed interviewing witnesses and 
suspects and were responsible for their own caseloads. 
 
Within the units in which fieldwork was undertaken, the evolving nature of the CI role 
had resulted in a notable degree of disparity between the rhetoric and the reality of the 
role in some units. This somewhat understandably led some participants to question the 
intrinsic nature of the role, namely, the extent to which the CI role can and should be 
understood as one of support: 
Years ago we were called support staff and I always use the phrase ‘we are here 
to assist and support you, not do your job for you’. Because that was the init ia l 
idea behind us, that’s what we were brought in for, to do a lot of inside roles so 
that the officers could be outside on the streets doing the arresting and the 
investigating and we would be on the inside. Since I’ve been here that’s changed 
somewhat and I think we do a lot of their job for them now, rather than 
supporting them.  
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
When we first started, we came in as support staff working with, generally, 
seasoned detectives, ‘I’ll tell you what to do because I’m the seasoned detective’. 
It doesn’t matter what experience you’ve got beforehand like I’m the lead for 
this one ... ‘Give it to the detectives because they’re only support staff’. But then, 
they get to know who you are and what your capabilities are and very soon you 
start getting put into little niches. He’s good at that job and she’s good at that, 
we’ll put them into that. And you realise then that your civilians are quite good 
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at most major roles. The older detectives retire and we’ve got a lot of new 
detectives in, not seasoned detectives, and your finding that we as civilian 
investigators we have now got the expertise in dealing with most aspects, CCTV, 
exhibits, disclosure, statement taking, coordinators, house-to-house 
coordinators, applying for warrants, these are all things that now civilian 
investigators are doing and not the officers. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
When I applied for the job the idea of the investigators was to be a supportive 
role, to assist them, because the detectives usually went out in pairs, taking 
statements and doing inquiries and stuff like that. But the role very quickly took 
on a different direction and we’re now being used in a very similar way to the 
cops. Because they’ve basically realised we’re cheap labour aren’t we? It’s the 
‘three for two’ thing isn’t it; you get three of us for the price of two cops. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
The marked lack of transparency surrounding the intrinsic nature of the CI role had 
seemingly served to provoke a type of occupational identity crisis amongst some CIs and 
some officers. For some warranted officers - detectives in particular - the often equivocal 
remit and occupational positioning of CIs within their unit appeared to cause them to 
question their overall worth as specialists and professionals in their field. As the following 
quote illustrates: 
 
It does make you think sometimes, is it taking away the value of the (detective) 
role so to speak? You know, it’s supposed to be the crème de la crème of police 
work isn’t it, investigation. But then you’ve got people coming in from outside 
and doing it, some, like I said earlier, even interviewing suspects. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
 
For some CIs, the tendency of the organisation to portray/treat CIs as support staff while 
at the same time, allowing their role to evolve to include tasks typically considered the 
preserve of their warranted colleagues, led them to question their occupational position 
within the CID (i.e. the extent to which they considered themselves support staff and how 
they chose to interpret the support label). As the following quotes demonstrate, most CIs 
encountered did not identify with the support staff label: 
In my mind I’m not support staff. Not at all. I do the same work as the DCs here. 
When people ask me what I do I say ‘What detectives do but for a lot less 
money’. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
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I don’t know if you could really call this a support role. I know they (the police 
organisation) do but I’m not sure whether what I do at least can be classed as 
support. Other than actually going out and arresting a suspect, there’s very little 
difference between the roles in here. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
The extent to which participants (officers and CIs) believed the role of CI to be support 
was a central topic of interest explored by the researcher in the current study. Participants 
cited a variety of views on the subject with some seeming to acknowledge and accept a 
more support style occupational position to that of their warranted colleagues within the 
CID:  
 
I wouldn’t say I was junior I would say I was more support. It might be different 
talking to other investigators like, I’ve certainly been asked to contact people 
and take statements from people where I’ve thought, ‘Ooo! Ok’. Go and see a 
consultant and take a statement from him for a suicide. Should I be doing that? 
But then, I can do it. I have to go and think about it but I can do it so I’m 
supporting the detectives in their role. 
 
(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
However, what is important to note is how the notion of support was interpreted and 
understood by individual CIs and how they chose to apply this label to their individua l 
role. Most CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick drew a clear distinct ion 
between the notions of ‘support as junior’ and ‘support as teamwork’. For some, being 
referred to as support staff was implicitly tied up with the idea of the CI role being 
operationally and occupationally lesser or more junior to that of DCs. This interpretat ion 
was undoubtedly linked with the traditional notions/conceptions of support staff as 
fulfilling a peripheral role. For others, the notion of support was understood in rather more 
general terms, as being an inherent aspect of working as part of a team; ‘we all support 
one another’ being a regularly cited phrase. Generally speaking, CIs at both sites tended 
to reject the support label in terms of their role being occupationally junior as this 
interpretation often was not thought to adequately or truthfully reflect the reality of the 
role and the work being undertaken. Indeed, in some instances CIs were found to play a 
role in leading and/or ensuring the strategic direction of investigations with many also 
possessing their own individual caseloads. The following quotes are illustrative of the 
general feeling amongst CIs:  
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No. We’re not support. We’re support to the force because we’re financ ia l 
investigators and we can do things that other police officers can’t do. So I’ve 
always thought that we are a support to the force however, we’re not support 
staff even though we’re officially labelled as ‘support staff’, we have a lot of 
responsibility. 
 
(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI) 
 
No it’s not a support role at all; quite the opposite. And it’s paid as a support role 
as well but it’s not a support role … You are the main investigating officer, 
there’s nobody else. There’s no detective above me overseeing my job and who 
takes the responsibility for my job. It’s on me. Ultimately if I don’t investigate 
it properly it’s on my neck isn’t it, not theirs. 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
Well in my job description and contract it says I’m there to support and assist 
however, the actual, general feeling is not, not at all. It’s not like that in any way. 
Some other departments may be different, they may just assist like homicide for 
obvious reasons, but our role is very much on par with what detectives do. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
However, evidence suggests that the extent to which CIs viewed their role as being 
support is likely to be largely dependent upon their working background. CIs 
interpretation of the support label appeared to show some correlation with their working 
backgrounds and was notably distinguishable between ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs 
at both sites. All of the non-ex-officer CIs encountered rejected the support label in the 
sense of it being operationally and organisationally junior to the role being undertaken by 
warranted officers, choosing rather to apply the term in the more general sense; as 
‘support as teamwork’. However, in comparison, findings suggest that ex-officer CIs 
were more likely to view their role in terms of it being ‘support as junior’: 
I feel that we are obviously junior. We are a junior role. If there was a pecking 
order, we would come way below a DC status. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)  
I think it probably is. I mean certainly in terms of pay it’s a junior role and I think 
a lot of people see it as a junior role. A lot of police officers see it as a role less 
than a warranted officer. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Such findings are also suggestive of the existence of differentia l 
understandings/conceptions of ‘team’ between ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs. Years 
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spent working for the police organisation mean that, for most ex-officer CIs and 
warranted officers, conceptions of team are imbued with broader notions of hierarchy and 
rank structure. In this sense, ‘team’ does not equate to a team of equals working towards 
a common goal but rather, is a team based on clear division of labour and formal power 
relations which fundamentally determine the role one is able to play and places limits on 
the degree to which one is able to contribute. 
 
While findings suggest that ex-officer CIs may be more likely than non-ex-officer CIs to 
view their role and occupational status/position within the CID in terms of ‘support as 
junior’ when compared to that of their warranted colleagues, it is important not to 
overstate the pervasiveness of this trend. It is possible that the changing demographic of 
the police workforce (namely in terms of age) may be driving a change in the attitude and 
opinion towards the role and occupational status/position of CIs and simultaneously, that 
of detectives. The researcher found that in the units with a younger age demographic, CIs 
were generally less likely to be viewed (by their warranted colleagues) and view their role 
as ‘support as junior’: 
They’ve (civilian investigators) been used in here doing what they’re doing now 
really since I joined the CID so for me, they’re just sort of part of the furniture 
if you know what I mean and I think they do a good job … I just view them as 
part of the team really. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, PC (trainee DC)) 
 
No I wouldn’t say I view them as junior. Maybe that’s because I’m younger in 
service though and some of the ones we have here have been doing it longer than 
I have. 
 
(Shorewick, GRU, DC) 
 
A lot of them don’t and certainly a lot of the younger generation of officers see 
it as the same sort of role really … we’re lucky because our SIO is a younger 
SIO and I think he’s very open to the fact that, well if somebody can do the role, 
then let them do it. Whereas you get an older, possibly someone who is nearing 
their thirty years and they think ‘no’, because it’s always been done like that, 
that must be right. They really will resist. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
Second, the willingness of CIs to ascribe the ‘support as junior’ label to their role was 
identified as being largely dependent upon the unit in which they were located and the 
222 
 
nature of the role and type of crime being investigated. For example, when asked the same 
question in interview, an ex-officer FI based at Newbank FFIT explicitly rejected the 
label of support in the sense of it being junior; ‘I am not a supporting officer. I do not 
support other people. I have my own case load same as the detectives and we do the same 
work’. This also appeared to be the general feeling amongst CIs at Shorewick FFIT. As 
the following quote demonstrates: 
 
We’re responsible for submitting our own file papers, we go to meetings with 
council… we have complete responsibility for our jobs in terms of how we are 
going to deal with them and whatever. We’re also responsible for doing restraint 
on peoples’ assets. We have a workload that is individual to us. It’s not 
supportive of somebody else. We have large jobs where benefits can be in the 
millions and we have small jobs which can just be a few hundred quid but we 
are responsible for them. We’re not there just to support. We have the 
responsibility. If you think about barristers and people like that, they take our 
advice in relation to confiscation and financial investigation, and they have to 
because they often haven’t got the knowledge. 
(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI) 
 
Similar sentiments were also expressed by the CI identified working at Shorewick PPU 
CPU: 
I think my role is one on its own. I’m not junior to anybody. I work alongside 
the child protection officer and at the moment I am asking her for her advice and 
I think I always will be because she’s really, really experienced and she knows 
her stuff, but no, I think I don’t view my role as junior and although I’m part of 
a team, I do that on an equal level to everybody else. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
The evidence presented here suggests that the opinions of CIs regarding the extent to 
which their role can be considered support depends somewhat fundamentally upon three 
key issues: whether or not they have responsibility for their own caseloads; whether or 
not the role they undertake is comparable to any other being undertaken by warranted 
officers in their unit; and whether or not the role being undertaken involves specialist 
skills and/or knowledge and accompanying powers and/or privileges that other detectives 
do not possess. It is also demonstrable of the value placed on autonomy and the 
accompanying sense of identity that comes with specialisation and exclusivity. 
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For the majority of warranted officers, the extent to which they considered the CI role to 
be a support role was to be determined on a case by case basis and was dependent largely 
upon the working background and knowledge/skills set possessed by the individual, as 
the following quotes demonstrate:  
There are some people who I’ve worked with who are civilian investigators that 
I don’t see as being support, in fact they had a lot more knowledge in some areas 
than I do about certain things. 
(Shorewick, GRU, DC) 
No. Definitely not. Karen is brilliant at what she does. She knows what she’s 
doing and she does the same as us. It’s definitely not a support role. Not for her 
anyway. 
(Newbank, GRU, PC) 
 
Interviewer:  Do you see CIs here as fulfilling a support role? 
 
Interviewee: No not particularly, I don’t … I don’t really see that they’re utilised 
very differently (to detectives) a lot of the time. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
 
Like lower ranking warranted officers, for police managers the extent to which the CI role 
was to be viewed as support appeared subject to negotiation and was a matter to be 
determined on a case by case basis, and was largely influenced by the working 
backgrounds and/or knowledge/skills set possessed by individuals and, thus, the tasks they 
were able to undertake. This was found to be the consensus of opinion amongst all police 
managers encountered during the fieldwork, as the following quotes demonstrate: 
 
I make sure that we have somebody fully trained doing the witness interviews, 
you know, someone trained to that next level. If it’s ex-police officers (CIs), I’d 
give them that next tier down of taking statements. If it’s people that are new to 
the organisation who haven’t had any of that training, you would probably only 
ever get them to take very basic statements. So it’s more… we don’t do it 
consciously, although we do do it consciously, there’s no pecking order but you 
give people what they’re capable of. I mean you could say that and you can’t say 
it for everybody. Somebody coming from outside in, you might say I wouldn’t 
give them a complex statement to take. However, one of the investigators we’ve 
got came from, I think he was a bank, fraud officer that used to take complex 
statements. So you would give them that. So it’s all on a very personal basis to 
be honest. It’s just knowing your staff and knowing what they’re capable of. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
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No, they (FIs) have got a specialist role, they’re specialists in the same way as a 
Scene of Crime Officer supports an investigation they do a specialist role in it. 
An officer couldn’t do that. Financial Investigators do the same. They support 
investigations but it’s not a support role. 
(Newbank, FFIT, DS) 
 
They did initially come in to support but they have grown and become full-
fledged investigators so we don’t label them as support. They are investigators 
who are attached to the MIT, but if you asked me to say what they did, yeah they 
support investigations because really, there are only four people investigat ing. 
That’s your SIOs. Everyone here (including the DCs) is supporting my 
investigation. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
The ones who work in CID and Financial Investigation, I would say, are 
performing a very similar role. Yes, they’re supporting because they’re part of 
the team but I wouldn’t say they’re just here as a support function. I think they’re 
part of the bigger team. For me, and this is my opinion and a lot of people’s 
opinions now, the majority of them do as good a job as a detective constable and 
do the same job. 
 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
 
Together, the findings presented here suggest that, as with the CID more generally 
whereby rank or formal position is rarely used to define social relations (Corsianos, 1999), 
fine status distinctions based on skill and experience likely exist in the units/teams in 
which CIs were identified working which shape/determine their individual occupationa l 
standing/position193. 
 
 
5.3 Motivation, Commitment and Resilience 
 
There exists a relative wealth of national and international research on the 
motivations for becoming a police officer. Early research on this issue highlighted several 
consistent themes (although primarily based on the motivations of white male officers), 
in particular, the attraction of people with authoritarian personalities - seeking authority, 
power and authority - to the profession (Lester, 1983; McNamara, 1967; Niederhoffer, 
                                                                 
193 This finding is well evidenced in the detective literature (i.e. status determined by skill and the ability 
of officers to undertake tasks with ‘flair’ (Fielding, 1988; Hobbs, 1991). 
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1967; Rankin, 1957). Job security was also often cited in early writings on the topic as an 
important motivator. For example, Westley (1970) found that thirty five per cent of police 
officers in his study cited job security as the number one reason for joining the force (see 
also Lester, 1983). The opportunity to help people and the desire to enforce the law were 
also commonly cited reasons for becoming a police officer (Cumming, Cumming and 
Edell, 1965; Lester, Arcuri and Gunn, 1980). The research also suggested that many 
police officers simply wanted to work in a profession that is perceived as important and  
adventurous and that this was something that they had always wanted to do (Harris, 1973; 
Van Maanen, 1973). In some cases, however, individuals entered policing out of 
convenience or because it was easy (Alex, 1976), while others drifted into the profession 
after failing in other occupations (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Harris, 1973; Westley, 
1970). Recent study on the subject of police officer motivations for entering the police 
has been comparatively sparse, however, research that was undertaken generally confirms 
much of the work conducted in the 1960s and 1970s.  
It would not be entirely unreasonable to assume that the reasons non-warranted 
individuals have for applying to work for the police would be similar to those of their 
warranted counterparts, particularly given the fact that many of these individuals can now 
also be found undertaking tasks considered frontline such as investigative work and 
patrol. Cooper et al. (2006), Johnston (2006; 2007a) and Cosgrove (2011) found that, with 
regard to PCSOs, their reasons for applying to work for the police organisation were also 
based predominantly on altruistic and career reasons, with a general belief in the role 
acting as a ‘stepping stone’ or as allowing them to ‘test the water’ before applying to 
become a warranted officer. 
 
All CI participants encountered during the course of the fieldwork were asked for their 
motivations for applying/reapplying to work for the police as a CI. The reasons provided 
by participants were wide ranging and showed some correlation with both the working 
background and age of participants. The motivations of CIs for applying for the role were 
also notably distinguishable between ex-officer CIs and non-ex-officer CIs at both 
research sites. Ex-officer CIs generally cited three key reasons for choosing to return to 
work for the police. These were: financial need/desire, familiarity with the work and an 
enduring love of the job which was often underpinned by altruistic sentiments.  
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Financial need and/or desire to supplement their police pensions with additional income 
was arguably found to be the primary motivating factor influencing the decision of ex-
officer CIs to re-join the police as CIs. Referred to as ‘double-dipping’ by one detective 
at Shorewick MIT, the re-hiring of retired police officers into non-warranted positions 
within the police organisation appeared to be a common trend at Shorewick and Newbank 
- although a greater percentage of ex-police officer CIs were found to be working at 
Shorewick. The majority of ex-officer CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick 
admitted to a strong financial incentive influencing their decision to reapply to work for 
the police organisation. At the time the research was conducted, all the ex-officer CIs had 
joined the police before 6th April 2006194  and as such, were members of the Police 
Pensions Scheme 1987. Under the old scheme, the earliest date that a police pension can 
be paid is fifty years old. This was however dependent on length of service195 , for 
example, if an officer has thirty years pensionable service, they may retire with an 
immediate pension before the age of fifty. These stipulations alongside the appeal of a 
generous retirement package meant that many of those ex-officer CIs encountered during 
the fieldwork had retired while still relatively young. This was also coupled with more 
recent enforcement of the A19 regulation which allows constabularies to forcibly retire 
officers who have served thirty years on grounds of ill health, age and effectiveness and 
efficiency. In turn, many of those interviewed expressed an overriding ‘need to work’ in 
order to support young families. One ex-officer CI based at Shorewick MIT described his 
reasons for returning to work as being typical of many of his colleagues: 
I mean there’s no secret. I know it’s the same for a lot of ex-cops who come back. 
I retired at 48, I was a boy policeman at 18 and that meant that my thirty years 
was done quite early and I’d still got two boys, one who’d just started at 
university and another one a few years back looking for university. So being able 
to hop over jobs, it gave me financial security and meant that I could help support 
them both. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
I need to work. My daughter graduated from university last year but I’ve raised 
her on my own since she was five years old so I needed to work. 
(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI) 
                                                                 
194 The New Police Pension Scheme (NPPS) was introduced in 2006 at sets the normal minimum pension 
age to 55 and includes a range of modern benefits including surv ivor pensions for nominated unmarried  
partners. 
195 All ranks can choose to take their pensions immediately once they have 25 years’ service and are over 
50 years old or, if they are under 50 and have 25 years’ service, they can take their pensions from age 50. 
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Interviewee: One of my friends, he’s one of them (agency CI); he’s one of the 
civilians that does it. He retired about seven years ago and he’s still at Shorewick 
BCU and he just deals with shoplifters. 
Interviewer: He must enjoy it?  
Interviewee: Needs must I think. He’s going through a divorce so he needs the 
money I think. He needs his money (laughs). 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
However, as the following quote illustrates, familiarity with the work also likely factored 
into the decision making of ex-officers when initially deciding to apply for the CI role 
and was likely to be intimately tied up with financial need/desire:   
I think the bottom line is when we talk about pensions and things like that, the 
bottom line is, I’ll be honest with you, you finish after thirty years and your 
pensions a thousand pound. Now that’s a good amount of money but when 
you’ve finished and you’ve been earning a considerable amount more than that 
you’ve got used to a certain standard of living and when, at fifty-year-old, that’s 
what you’ve got, you’ve got to go out and find another job and people like myself 
who have nothing on a CV apart from being in the police, it means you’re limited 
on what you can do. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
While the issue of money and the need to maintain financial security post-retirement 
proved to be a key driving factor behind ex-officer CIs decisions to re-join the police, a 
number of ex-officer CIs also described feeling simply ‘not ready’ to retire. When asked 
directly for their reasons for choosing to apply for the CI role after deciding to take their 
retirement, for these individuals the primary factor influencing their decision to apply for 
the CI role centred on an overriding love for and fascination with the occupation. This can 
be evidenced in the following quotes: 
 I love it. It is interesting and that’s why I do it and people say to me you know, 
‘You’re a retired Inspector, you can afford to retire’. Yeah, I can but, I always 
said, if I stop enjoying it I will pack it in but until such time when I stop enjoying 
it comes, I’ll keep getting up in the mornings and coming to work and enjo ying 
it. I’m fortunate, I realise that I’m fortunate. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
I wasn’t ready to go. It’s as simple as that really. I felt I was still able to do my 
job and I still had the desire to do my job so when this position came up I thought,  
‘great’. I applied and that was that. 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
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There are just some people who won’t give up. They just love it and they keep 
loving it. 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
Furthermore, it was brought to the attention of the researcher that for some ex-office rs, 
the decision to return to work for the police organisation was also likely fuelled by feelings 
of disillusionment or dissatisfaction with retirement and subsequent difficulty adjusting 
to life as an ‘outsider’ after a long career in the police. It was described to the researcher 
by one participant at Shorewick MIT as being like ‘a kind of grief’. In the following quote 
one CI made reference to the structured/routinised nature of the police and also hinted at 
culture as being defining factors fuelling his desire to return: 
I missed it; the structure and the routine and the stress of it as weird as that 
sounds. I missed the people too and not being part of it anymore. It’s a certain 
type of personality and humour that you don’t get anywhere else. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
This was also later confirmed in interview with a DC at Shorewick:  
I think a lot come back because they miss it. It comes as a bit of a shock to them 
to realise that being a cop is not what they are it’s just what they did. The only 
way I can describe it is being a bit like when soldiers leave the army. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
In likening the police organisation to the army, the DC in the above quote draws attention 
to the comparable degree of social isolation (Van Maanen, 1978) suffered by both officers 
and soldiers with regard to their work and also illustrates how officers typically view their 
job as a vocation. This orientation can make the readjustment officers’ must go through 
as they shed their warranted identity a particularly difficult experience and, as the 
following quote suggests, is likely to be a factor prompting the decision of some ex-
officers to return to work for the police as CIs. 
 
5.3.1 Non-Ex-Officer CIs 
 
While the issue of money was also a likely factor in the decision of non-ex-officer 
CIs when deciding to apply to work for the police, it quickly became apparent that three 
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other factors also likely influenced participants’ motivation to apply: interest in the field, 
familiarity with the work and career progression. Like ex-officer CIs, these driving factors 
were not mutually exclusive and were often discussed synonymously by interviewees 
suggesting that, for the majority of non-ex-officer CIs, their decision to apply for the CI 
position was most likely influenced by a mixture of all three of these factors. 
 
However, when asked directly, the most common reason cited by non-ex-officer CIs with 
regard to their decision to apply for the role centred on a long held fascination with the 
work of the police and specifically, of investigation work. A number of CIs at both 
Shorewick and Newbank described working for the police (not necessarily as a police 
officer) as being something that they ‘had always been interested’ in or had ‘always 
wanted to do’. This was supported by the fact that all of the non-ex-officer CIs identified 
during the fieldwork had previously either worked within the police organisation as 
members of police staff or in a related policing or investigative field outside the police 
organisation (see Chapter Four). The below quote is broadly representative of the response 
provided by the vast majority of non-ex officer CIs: 
I’ve always been interested in the police and how crimes are investigated and 
I’ve got an enquiring mind so when I saw that I could work actually investiga t ing 
crimes and, as it was advertised at the time, ‘support detectives with their 
investigations’.  I thought that’s definitely something I’d like to do.  
(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
For other CIs, the decision to apply to work for the police as a CI was also strongly 
influenced by their pre-existing knowledge of the field and possession of relevant 
transferable skills. As alluded to above, the working backgrounds of many non-ex-officer 
CIs meant that most possessed some discernible working knowledge of policing and/or 
had limited knowledge or experience working in an investigative capacity. As such, for 
many non-ex-officer CIs encountered, the CI role appeared also as a ‘natural progress ion’ 
in their career. This was particularly true of those non-ex-officer CIs who had previously 
worked for the police organisation in a non-warranted capacity and who generally viewed 
the role as a kind of advancement in their career, arguably in a similar way to the way 
uniformed officer are said to ‘move into clothes’ when joining the CID (Hobbs, 1988: 
210). As the following quote demonstrates: 
Before this I worked on the front desk downstairs as a civvie. I enjoyed it but it 
was limited in terms of job satisfaction, whereas in this role, it was sort of a step 
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up for me because I get to deal with actual crime. You feel like you’re making a 
difference. 
(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
When asked directly, most non-ex-officer CIs agreed that they viewed the CI role as a 
career rather than simply another job. This suggests that for some non-ex-officer CIs the 
decision to apply for the role of CI was therefore directly influenced by a strong desire to 
build a successful career with the police organisation. The CI role was therefore viewed 
by the majority of non-ex-officer CIs as part of a longer term strategy to enhance/deve lop 
a career in the criminal justice field. This in turn, was likely informed by an understanding 
of the police as being a notoriously hierarchical and highly bureaucratic organisat ion 
within which possibilities for advancement were considered to be perhaps more 
achievable. As the following quote demonstrates:  
This is my career, you know. It’s what I want to do and I want to do a good job. 
I want to make something of it. I thought there would be more of a chance for 
progression with the police. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
However, for the most part, non-ex-officer CIs described feeling ‘satisfied’ in their 
position as non-warranted individuals working within the CID with many describing how 
the similarity of their remit to that of their warranted colleagues often left them feeling 
‘like a cop anyway’.  The researcher found little evidence to suggest that any of the non-
ex-officer CIs identified working at either Newbank or Shorewick harboured any burning 
ambition to become warranted officers and even less to suggest that this was a pivotal 
reasoning behind their decision to apply for the CI role initially. This contradicts previous 
research on the motivations of other groups of non-warranted police personnel (cf work 
on PCSOs by Cooper et al., 2006; Johnston, 2005) and suggests that CIs are unlikely to 
view the role as being a ‘stepping stone’ to a career as a warranted police officer. That 
being said, one SIO interviewed at Shorewick MIT described how, ‘We do have CIs who 
go on to join the police, so, that’s their prerogative isn’t it’. Furthermore, while none of 
the non-ex-officer CIs encountered during the research overtly expressed a desire to 
eventually join the police as a warranted officer, some non-ex-officer CIs did evidence a 
‘wannabe cop’ mentality in the sense that they were willing to accept ad hoc extensions 
in their work remit. This was found to be particularly the case when such extensions 
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meant that the CI role would encompass more and more of those investigative tasks and 
functions considered core and largely police operational (e.g. interviewing suspects):  
I’ve been asked to assist on suspect interviewing a few times which is fine with 
me because I love it. I love doing that. That’s my favourite bit… I will do any 
role, I don’t mind. It doesn’t really bother me that they’re (officers) on more 
money. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Another non-ex-officer CI based at Newbank PPU also described being asked to assist on 
a recent arson with intent to endanger life investigation that was being led by another ex-
officer CI. She explained how, while feeling somewhat overwhelmed, she ‘loved’ 
working on this particular case due to the fact that it was interesting and allowed her to 
learn and develop new investigative skills which she hoped, ‘might encourage them 
(senior police officers) to give us (CIs) more serious stuff in the future, because they can 
see we are capable of doing it’. Also, in those units where police type powers had not 
been granted to CIs, it was only found to be non-ex-officer CIs who expressed a 
willingness to be designated. In the following quote a non-ex-cop CI based at Shorewick 
MIT describes not only how she would welcome the additional powers but also, how she 
had/was still considering plans to actively seek these out:  
Interviewer: So would being designated with powers be something you would 
be interested in if it was offered to you? 
Participant: Oh absolutely. Yeah. I mean I have actually thought, and it is still a 
consideration of mine, of becoming a Special Constable because then I would 
have the power of arrest and I think it would work in this role but it’s… when I 
look at it, it’s committing the time to it and I think, ‘can I actually do it?’ I don’t 
know and I don’t want to commit to something that I can’t do but it is something 
that I’ve definitely looked at. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Evidence was found to suggest that, despite possessing an alleged valuable wealth of skills 
and experience, ex-officer CIs were more likely to exhibit lower levels of commitment 
and motivation than their non-ex-officer colleagues. This opinion was found to be shared 
amongst warranted and non-warranted participants, both of whom held reservations about 
the enthusiasm of some ex-officer CIs towards the role. When asked for their opinion on 
the recruitment of ex-officer CIs, police managers at both sites made reference to the 
potential issue of low commitment amongst some ex-officer CIs compared to that which 
was perceived to be typically exhibited by non-ex-officer CIs: 
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I can give examples where clearly you’ve got people coming into this 
organisation as investigators from outside the police force who have never 
worked in the police arena, who are absolutely excellent … You’ve equally got 
ex-cops who have come in as civilian investigators that aren’t so good so maybe 
it’s because they’re… It sounds awful but I can talk about two that I’ve got who 
are sort of older, retired cops in their late fifties who are just doing a job to tide 
them over in retirement and clearly they’re not as enthusiastic and as dynamic 
and some younger people who come in at an early level, not from a police 
background, who really want to learn and do a good job. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
We’ve got some rubbish in our MIT and I don’t mind sharing that with you. 
‘Rubbish’ might be being a bit unfair, but we have got some that need more work 
than others and they’re police officers who have come back as civilians. 
Although the cop presents himself in interview to be an investigator as, ‘Well 
I’ve got this background right’, there are a couple of issues that fall out of that. 
The first one is that these are officers who are now financially secure. So the urge 
to be here isn’t that great. So their devotion to duties is not as good as it was 
when they were police officers. We do get that, in other words, people come here 
and then its foot off the gas. It’s, not ‘pin money’ because that’s an awful phrase , 
but you understand the term yeah? It’s just, this is another holiday for them etc. 
and you can see that in the way that they work. 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
While it is likely that some ex-officer CIs may exhibit lower levels of 
motivation/commitment to the role than some of their non-warranted colleagues, 
evidence presented elsewhere in this chapter does not support the presumption of the SIO 
in the above quote regarding the financial security of ex-officer CIs and thus, its causal 
link to low commitment/devotion amongst this group.  
 
The orientation of some ex-officer CIs to their work - namely their lack of motivation and 
reluctance to go beyond that which can be considered support - appeared to cause 
frustration amongst non-ex-officer CIs due to the detrimental effect this attitude/behaviour 
was likely to have for the overall standing of CIs within the units in which they operate. 
The issue of ‘double-dipping’ and its association with poor motivation in particular was 
raised by a number of interviewees at both Shorewick and Newbank. As the below quote 
demonstrates: 
Some of the investigators who are ex-police are lazy because it’s … I think they 
think they’ve had their thirty-year career and they’ve now come back to a job, 
stepped into a role where they’re getting decent money and they are lazy. And 
that’s not just my opinion I mean senior officers will also tell you that. It is 
annoying and it is so apparent and I don’t mean to be speaking about people in 
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that way but it is apparent and I think that brings the role of a CI down and I 
think that makes people view them as ‘Well they’re just turning up for extra 
money. They’ve got their pension and now they’re getting all this money as well’. 
And I think that probably needs to be weeded out … It can be annoying, 
especially if you get paired with that person and they’re lazy and you’re doing 
all the work. It is annoying, yeah. But I think that was the thing. I think when 
MIT was set up, it was all ex-cops who were brought into the role and I think the 
two or three of us (non-ex-cops) are probably the hardest working because it is 
our career. It’s what we want to do, it’s not just that we’ve come to the end of 
our policing career and thought, ‘Oh well, we’ll just do that as well now’. It’s 
what we want to do.  I mean don’t get me wrong, I like these people, they’re nice 
people but you know, when I’ve talked to them and they’ve said, ‘Well, I could 
pack it in next month because I don’t really need the money’ and you just think, 
‘Oh great’. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
For a lot of them it’s a case of, ‘Well my kids are at university so I’ve got to 
support them through university’. Yeah, my daughter’s at university but she’s 
supporting herself, she’s working! Or ‘I’ve got to buy my son a flat’ or ‘I’ve got 
to rent my son a flat while he’s at university so I need to work’. It’s a huge 
difference from me picking my daughter up once a month and paying for her big 
shop at ASDA. So it is … and it does, sought of, stick in the clack a bit that 
people still have that attitude of ‘Oh, I’m coming back to work’ and thinking 
they can just walk back into a job and they’re just doing it to bide their time 
because they don’t want to paint and decorate for the Mrs. That era, the ‘Life on 
Mars’ era, obviously there is still that attitude after thirty years. 
 
(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI) 
 
It’s more the ex-cop civilians who aren’t as interested in working overtime as the 
not-ex-cop ones. Don’t get me wrong, when a job comes in everyone just 
generally does whatever but yeah. For whatever reason, probably not as 
interested … you can understand it though I suppose when people have got their 
pension coming in as well and they don’t necessarily want to work the same 
hours because its advertised, or it was, as a support role … I know the older timer 
ones I’ve got are very much ‘don’t want to stay on overtime’ and you can’t force 
them because that’s what the contract says. They don’t want to put themselves at 
risk which I totally understand. They’ve come to do that support role to keep 
them ticking over in retirement, for want of a better work and I don’t mean that 
nastily but that’s what they’ve done. 
 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
 
While most participants acknowledged that the level of commitment to the role displayed 
by ex-officer CIs was largely dependent upon the individual, for some, the variable level 
of commitment amongst this group was considered endemic of the fact that for most ex-
officer CIs, the role was viewed as a job rather than a career:  
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I still think as an organisation we should be going for people a lot younger than 
that. That’s an easy way out (recruiting ex-officer CIs). Someone that you can 
mould. Because they’re (ex-officer CIs) keen as mustard when they come back 
for a short burst but you know very well that if they were here longer, they’d be 
sat with their feet up and having too many cups of tea and being on the internet 
too long and then fall into that way of life because it’s not a career. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Alongside the issue of potentially differing commitment levels between ex-officer and 
non-ex-officer CIs, a number of participants also drew attention to the valuable 
knowledge-base of both groups and its potential impact on overall resilience of the CID. 
With specific regard to the issue of resilience, in some instances CIs were found to be 
undertaking tasks and/or were involved in the investigation of particular types of crime 
from which police officers had generally withdrawn, such as risk assessment, 
victim/follow up contact work and specific areas of volume crime (e.g. shoplifting, drive -
offs). This in turn meant that CIs had built up a valuable body of knowledge with regard 
to prolific offenders and repeat victims, which also had allowed them to form close 
working relationships with local businesses and third sector organisations. Such 
occupational and operational specialisation had also arguably enabled CIs to ensure both 
high clear-up rates and a consistent high level of service delivery making them a particular 
valuable CID resource. 
 
5.3.2 Agency CIs 
 
When asked to explain their reasons for choosing to apply for the role, both of the 
private security agency CIs encountered working at Newbank GRU expressed 
comparable motivations to those of their ex-officer CI colleagues who were employed 
directly by the police organisation. This can be considered somewhat unsurprising given 
the fact that both agency CIs were also ex-police officers. When asked directly, both 
described their reasons for returning to work as CIs as being motivated by a mixture of 
two key factors: familiarity with the work and financial need. Of the two, financial need 
was clearly the dominant influencing factor with both explicitly citing an overriding ‘need 
to work’, as the following quotes demonstrate: 
The main reason I applied for this job was because I can’t afford not to work. I 
don’t have that luxury unfortunately. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
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I’ve still got young lads and my wife doesn’t work so I need to work. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
 
Like their ex-officer CI colleagues employed by the police, familiarity with the work also 
understandably factored in the decision of both agency CIs to apply for the role and can 
be evidenced in the following quotes: 
This job just seemed like the natural progression for me really. I’ve been a police 
man all my life and I worked as a detective for a large part of it. I’m not sure 
how good I’d be doing anything else. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
It’s not too taxing because I know what I’m doing, other than the systems are a 
bit different here, and they’re a nice bunch of people that I work with so that 
helps. So it was really easy for me to just sort of slot back in. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
 
However, given evidence to suggest that most, if not all agency CIs are also ex-police 
officers, in reality it is likely that a mixture of both financial need/desire and familiar ity 
with the work cumulatively serve to motivate agency CIs to apply for the role in the same 
way as their publically employed ex-officer colleagues. However, unlike their publically 
employed ex-officer CI colleagues, neither of the agency CIs identified explicitly cited a 
‘love of the job’ as being a key factor influencing their decision to apply to work as CIs. 
Both CIs alluded rather to a lack of opportunity for employment with their preferred 
organisation at the time of their retirement which, coupled with financial need, had 
compelled them to enlist with private sector recruitment agencies. As such, both CIs 
viewed their current employment situation as a temporary or transitory measure. For the 
first agency CI, the role was temporary/transitory in the sense that it was being undertaken 
until a full-time permanent position became available with the police organisation:  
Ideally, I want to work for Newbank police again because it’s more stable 
employment. I had a chat with the Chief Super about it this morning actually and 
he said there should be some positions coming up soon so hopefully I’ll get one 
of those. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
 
For the second CI, the role was temporary/transitory in the sense that it was being 
undertaken as a ‘filler job’ until a suitable opportunity became available in the Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency (now National Crime Agency (NCA)): 
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I want to work for SOCA. That’s what I really want to do. So I saw this 
advertised and I knew of people doing this role in the police before I retired so I 
knew what it was about and just figured I can do that until something becomes 
available. 
(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency)) 
 
Scholars writing on the subject of private security have similarly made reference to the 
often temporary/transitory orientation of some private security officers to their role 
(McLeod, 2002; Michael, 2002). Work by Button (2007) and Wakefield (2003) also 
draws attention to the high turnover of private security officers, suggesting low 
commitment to the role. However, while the attitude of both agency CIs encountered with 
regard to their motivations for choosing to apply for the role could, in some respects, be 
interpreted as low commitment and devotion amongst this group of CIs, I would argue 
that it is more suggestive of a desire to become permanent members of the police 
organisation. This issue was addressed by one ex-officer CI at Shorewick and draws 
attention to the importance of the association between belonging and commitment/loya lty 
and with that, occupational diligence:  
I think you’d have a lot more commitment if you’re working for a company or 
an organisation. If I was working here as an agency worker and I went to take a 
statement, I’d take a statement, I’d hand it over, I’d go home and I’d forget about 
it. Whereas if I was employed by that company, I’d have a little bit more loyalty.  
(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Findings presented in this section suggest that feelings of support were not shared across 
the service; some of the initial scepticism towards CIs will remain with officers who do 
not work with them and/or have been in service for a long period of time. This highlights 
the importance of the role which pragmatism plays in the policing occupational culture, 
in that ‘deeper acceptance and adoption of new ways of working and diversificat ion of 
roles within the organisation come from experiencing the benefits first hand’ (O’Neill, 
2015: 84). 
 
5.4 Acceptance and Integration of CIs.  
  
Findings suggest that CIs were providing a valuable contribution to the CID teams 
in which they were located. However, a legacy of poor implementation and lack of clarity 
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about the role had served to fuel anxieties amongst warranted officers regarding the 
impact of CI utilisation on the role and title of detective. Such anxieties had, somewhat 
understandably, had a marked impact on the integration of CIs within the police family 
and the units in which they work. Indeed, when questioned directly on how their role had 
been received by the warranted colleagues, a number of more experienced CIs were able 
to recall specific instances of hostility towards the role of CIs within their unit in the 
months and years following their initial introduction. As the following quotes 
demonstrate: 
 
I was out on a job visiting another division a while back and I bumped into an 
old friend of mine who I got to know when I was a cop. I made the mistake of 
asking whether she had any jobs going in her Prisoner Handling unit. She 
basically said half joking but serious as well, ‘No there f****** aren’t! We don’t 
want any of your lot here taking our jobs’. I couldn’t believe it. And this was 
someone I’d known for years! 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
I’ve heard, I’ve actually witnessed someone shout to a civilian investigator, and 
she was a cop, ‘You’re coming here, you’ve got your pension and now you’re 
taking my overtime’ and going on and on … we don’t come across it as much as 
we did at the beginning but there are some of them that still think that and I think 
a lot of them do still think that. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
No such overt displays of hostility towards CIs were observed during the course of the 
current research and the general consensus amongst CIs encountered at both sites was 
that the level of integration had improved in their unit over time. However, despite 
improvements in relations and a developing sense of teamwork and collegiality between 
CIs and officers, evidence was found to suggest that in some units CIs still only enjoyed 
a marginal level of integration and continued to suffer resistance to their role as a result 
of their secondary civilian employment status. The status of civilian as understood within 
the police has been noted by a number of other scholars as being a significant impediment 
to their integration within the organisation (Atkinson, forthcoming; Loveday, 2007). This 
is not least due to that fact that CIs present a challenge to an otherwise hegemonic 
detective culture which privileges experiential knowledge and traditional old regime 
conceptions of detective work (Hobbs, 1988; Tong and Bowling, 2006). The secondary 
status of CIs was found to be being simultaneously reinforced by the failure of the police 
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organisation to properly acknowledge the true nature of the role now being undertaken 
by CIs. 
 
Generally speaking, CIs appeared to be well integrated within the units/teams in which 
they were identified working within the CID at both Shorewick and Newbank. This was 
aided greatly by the fact that they, like their warranted counterparts, did not wear police 
uniforms and as such, were largely indistinguishable from one another when working 
together within the units.  Most CIs also described a strong sense of collegiality and 
teamwork between CIs and warranted officers. Indeed, when asked for their opinion on 
CIs, warranted officers generally professed their support citing that they viewed their non-
warranted colleagues simply as ‘part of the team’. However, where CIs were identified 
working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers, the degree to which they had 
become integrated was found to differ between Shorewick and Newbank with distinct ions 
generally appearing more pronounced at Shorewick than at Newbank. For example, 
where CIs and officers were identified working in mixed teams at Shorewick (the MIT 
being the exception), there appeared to exist a more distinct separation between the 
activities/role of CIs and that of their warranted colleagues. At Shorewick GRU and CIT, 
CI participants were found to be undertaking a more traditional ‘support as junior’ 
orientation and were charged with a more limited number of tasks, namely, the recovery 
of CCTV, basic witness statement taking and preparing case files for court. At Newbank 
however, the distinction between warranted officers and CIs appeared far less pronounced 
and more open to negotiation.  
 
In units where their role appeared to be most indivisible (such as at Newbank) to that of 
their warranted colleagues (operationally speaking), CIs appeared to enjoy the highest 
degree of integration. For example, at Newbank, CIs and warranted officers were jointly 
referred to under the arguably more inclusive title of ‘investigators’ by police managers 
and, as subsequent sections of this chapter will demonstrate (see section 5.5), the CIs 
working here appeared to display the most notable adherence with dominant polic e 
cultural traits. Furthermore, as an external observer it was clear that individual CIs who 
demonstrated independence, judgement and commitment to the role - key traits associated 
with being an ‘effective detective’ (Smith and Flanagan, 2000) - were more likely to win 
the recognition and respect of their warranted colleagues and feel an integrated member 
of the team than those who did not.  
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However, CIs at both sites felt that the level of integration they were able to achieve 
within the CID was being fundamentally undermined by the continued failure of the 
police organisation to recognise and appreciate the role now being undertaken by CIs ‘on 
the ground’ (this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six).  
The civilian nature of the CI role results in a secondary and, in some respects, outsider 
status similar to that identified by Mulcahy (1995) in documenting the stigmatis ing 
identity of Internal Affairs Officers. These conditions are currently being maintained by 
powerful actors in the fields of policing and politics (like the Police Federation and the 
media) and the weakness or absence of any alternative (or convincing) narrative on how 
effective policing and, specifically investigation, may be achieved. However, the sense 
of ‘otherness’ and, in some cases, inferiority experienced by some CIs was also found to 
fuel a drive to prove themselves and their worth to their warranted colleagues. This is 
comparable to work on trainee detective constables (cf Cassan, 2005; Fielding, 1988; 
Tong, 2004) who have been found to show similar a drive to assert/prove their 
competence in relation to operational work and, particularly, their proficiency in 
managing the art and craft elements of detective work. This was particularly found to be 
case amongst most non-ex-officer CIs, who when asked, admitted to feeling under 
pressure to succeed and prove themselves to their warranted colleagues and managers, as 
the following quotes illustrate:  
 
 
You’ve always got to work that bit harder as a civilian to prove yourself which 
puts you under extra pressure. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
I come up against it yeah, because police officers think they’re the be all and end 
all ... A lot of police officers don’t think like that and you always have, as support 
staff, especially in a supervisor’s position, you have to prove yourself before you 
get respect. There is a big stigma about it and I have had a real battle. 
 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
When we first started me and Julie would run around like blue arsed flies trying 
to get everything done as best as we could, probably because we felt like we had 
something to prove being the only civvies in the officer. I definitely think that 
helped us to be accepted, because they (officers) know they can rely on us to do 
a good job. 
 
(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
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When asked, non-ex-officer CIs in particular generally agreed that they felt under 
pressure to prove the worth and value of their role to their warranted colleagues. This was 
achieved by non-ex-officer CIs in two key ways: for those CIs identified working in units 
where their role/remit was largely indivisible to that of warranted officers (Newbank PPU 
and GRU), only by extending their remit to include more duties did they feel able to 
secure a stronger occupational identity and greater level of integration. For those CIs 
working in units where their role was more clearly defined (namely Shorewick GRU and 
CIT), partial acceptance into the police culture and integration into the organisation was 
achieved through exceeding expectations and through optimum fulfilment of their 
‘support as junior’ status. Both approaches to achieving a level of integration/acceptance 
by their warranted colleagues were further facilitated by the ability of the individual CI 
to demonstrate their value and contribution to crime control objectives.  
 
However, it was proposed to the researcher that for those seeking integration through 
advancement of their role/remit, such efforts may serve only to further marginalise the 
group. Indeed, as the following quotes suggest, achievements of CIs likely draw attention 
to the existence of deficiencies in skills, knowledge and motivation amongst some 
members of warranted personnel resulting in resentment towards CIs. This can be 
evidenced in the following quotes: 
A few years back one of the Sergeants we had here said something to me. She 
wanted to know something about a case, some procedure for it, I can’t remember 
exactly what it was but anyway, she was asking all the DCs and no one knew 
and I did. So I just said, you know, part of the team, I said, ‘Oh, you just need to 
do this and this’. Well, she stood up in front of everyone and said, ‘I can’t believe 
out of everyone in this room I had to get the answer from someone like you!’ 
meaning a civilian. I was so shocked. I felt this big, you know. But I realise it 
was just because I, ‘the civvie’, knew something she didn’t and I think she felt a 
bit put out by it. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
There are a lot of lazy people. It’s a place to hide is the MIT. There are some real 
superb people and there are lots of lazy people who are rubbish. And sometimes, 
invariably, it’s the rubbish people who turn round and have a go which I find 
quite bizarre … I think they can feel embarrassed that they don’t know 
something and that can manifest as bitterness towards us (CIs). 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
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There was somebody only recently who had submitted a forensic application for 
an exhibit who was a detective but had never done the role of exhibits officer 
before so I asked him if he wanted me to look over it for him before he sent it 
off. Well! He goes off, ‘I’m a detective and I’ve got twenty-eight years’ 
experience and I don’t need you to look over it’. So I thought ‘right’, and I let it 
go. And lo and behold, it came back with lots of mistake which, he couldn’t have 
known that because he’d never done the role before. But instead of just saying, 
‘Yeah, would you mind looking it over for me?’... So I thought … I was quite 
pleased actually because it was like, hmmm (laughs). 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
 
Where evidence of latent antipathy and/or resistance to the role being undertaken by CIs 
was identified in the current study, it was generally found to be in relation to one of four 
key areas of concern. Generally speaking, warranted officers appeared most concerned 
with the impact of CIs on overtime availability, their salary, public perceptions of CI use 
and confidence in the police and, at a more fundamental level, on the overall character 
and prestige of the detective role. Furthermore, despite generally professing their support 
for the CI role, when asked directly for their opinion on the utilisation of CIs in their unit, 
it became clear that for some warranted officers CIs were considered most valuable in 
terms of their alleged cost effectiveness and, where divisions were most pronounced 
between the roles, in terms of their potential for freeing up the time of officers. As the 
following quote demonstrates, this view is also likely also shared by some senior police 
managers:  
If money didn’t come into it at all, if you were given a choice you would pick 
police officers because you can do everything with them and they’re very 
flexible. But in terms of balancing your finances and everything to go with it, 
then I think definitely there’s a good place for CIs. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
Moreover, a number of warranted officers also made reference to the perceived benefits 
in employing ex-officers in this role: 
 
I think CIs are very valuable, yes. I mean with ex-cops; I see hardly any 
disadvantages there. It’s a pool of experience and knowledge that’s being tapped 
which makes sense in the current climate. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
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They’re a very valuable asset; like it or not the organisation is under pressure to 
tighten the purse strings in all areas isn’t it so the CIs allow them to do that. 
 
(Newbank, GRU, DC (Observation notes))  
 
Such responses suggest a rather limited appreciation and valuing of the role being 
undertaken by CIs by some of their warranted colleagues and also hint at continued 
resistance, in particular, to the recruitment of non-ex-officer CIs. Indeed, for some 
warranted officers, the recruitment of non-ex-officer CIs appeared to be the biggest cause 
of concern, particularly with regard to fears over how the role being performed by CIs 
may be perceived by the public and in turn, affect public confidence in the police:  
 
How would you feel if you found out the person interviewing the suspect on the 
murder of one of your family members had no proper training or experience 
doing it? You’d be a bit miffed I’d imagine. I know I would be. That is happening 
and I don’t personally think it should be. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
Somewhat unsurprisingly given the serious nature of the work, evidence suggests that 
concern over the impact of CI utilisation on the detective role and title was found to be 
most likely at the MIT. This was arguably due to the fact that investigative work into 
homicide, the most serious and high profile of all violent crime, is also largely still 
considered to be the most prestigious amongst detectives (Innes, 2003). As has been 
demonstrated in the Chapter Four, CIs were found to be undertaking a range of tasks 
within the MIT which included acting as second interviewers in suspect interviews 
alongside a number of other more specialist roles (e.g. as FLOs, search coordinators, 
CCTV coordinators) which were generally restricted to trained warranted officers. Some 
CIs were even found to have previously led suspect interviews at the MIT as the following 
quote demonstrates: 
 
I’ve interviewed as a crime investigator, when you interview a suspect for 
murder which is what we were doing I worked with a DC young in service. We 
were given someone to interview over three days. I did about 13 interviews, I 
cautioned, I did lead all the way through, and he got 25 years. You know, what 
more power do I want?  
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
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CI involvement in suspect interviewing appeared to be the most obvious cause of 
resentment towards CIs within the unit. For the most part, such antipathy appeared to be 
founded on a privileging of experiential knowledge and the resulting craft qualit ies 
traditionally associated with an old regime approach to detective work (Tong and 
Bowling, 2006). This can be evidenced in the following quote: 
 
They’re (CIs) being given key roles, exhibits officer, disclosure officer, 
interviewing. They’re all massive things, massive things for a murder 
investigation, and definitely not support roles …We work on a traffic light 
system here and we’ve been on red now for the last few months so the SIOs and 
Henry (civilian office manager) are under pressure to fill the posts, so you end 
up with civilians doing more than they should to a lot of the time … Interviewing 
suspects is something that I think is completely wrong! They first started using 
them in suspect interviews as second interviewers simply because they ran out 
of detectives. It’s a skill that can only come with experience - how to treat them, 
when to bring things up and when to leave them until a bit later on. Like, I always 
make a point of saying ‘Hi. I’m Helen and I’m the DC who is going to be loo king 
after you today’. It’s things like that. Things that can’t be taught, how to talk to 
them, how to build rapport, shake their hands even if it’s a horrible crime like 
rape or child molestation that you know they have done. It’s just doing the job. 
Not judging them. Being able to spot a way in. Not setting a barrier between you 
and them. It’s important and it’s not something I think they (CIs) should be 
doing. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
Such anxieties are also suggestive of a more fundamental concern, namely, the degree to 
which CI use (particularly the direct entry of non-ex-officer CIs) serves to 
undermine/challenge traditional approaches and understandings of investigative work and 
the centrality of the detective. Furthermore, as Crawford et al. (2005: 60) notes, ‘there is 
a fine line between relieving officers of unwanted duties and taking away police officers’ 
work’. The lack of clarity, at a strategic level, regarding the roles and responsibilities of 
CIs compared to that of warranted officers implies the notion of ‘policing on the cheap’; 
that this new grade of police staff may be replacing fully trained warranted detectives. It 
is in this sense that one ex-officer CI drew attention to the comparable experience of CIs 
to that of Special Constables during their peak of use during the 1960s (cf Gaston and 
Alexander, 2001): 
 
We are the same as Special Constables. I know you’ll not remember it but if you 
could go back to the sixties, Special Constables were hated! Absolutely hated! 
Because they were coming and doing a job that police officers were doing but 
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they weren’t getting paid and police officers were on low pay. I was a Special 
Constable for six months before I joined, that was my way in, so I experienced 
it first-hand. Bobbies hated specials and it’s the same thing now with civilian 
investigators. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
A number of CIs encountered at the MIT also felt that their civilian status limited the 
degree to which they could be viewed/accepted as full members of the police team. This 
can be evidenced in the following quotes: 
I’ve been really disappointed by how people have viewed us as a whole and how 
they’ve spoken about us because I don’t see myself as a CI. I just see myself as 
part of the team. The mistake that they make is that they don’t see us enough as 
part of the team. And that is such a shame. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)  
 
Ever since I first started I’ve not been liked because I’m a civilian. It has got 
slightly better in recent years but as Colin mentioned, only recently when we 
went to (that other BCU), even as an ex-Bobby, you’re a civilian first. You really 
are and I’ve had it all my time because you are ‘only a civilian’.  
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
However, when questioned on whether they felt that a ‘them and us’ culture existed within 
the MIT, the general consensus amongst CIs and warranted officers was that this was not 
the case. As the following quotes demonstrate, pressure on the MIT in terms of workload 
and a collective awareness of the severity of the crimes being investigated was generally 
found to foster a pervading sense of collegiality amongst CIs and officers: 
 
No. It’s definitely not a ‘them and us’ thing because we’re all under one roof and 
we’re all doing one job and everyone knows that when it really is busy it’s all 
hands to the pump and you can’t afford to have an ‘us and them’ culture. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
If you get it wrong here, a murderer can walk free. Everybody feels the weight 
of that including the civilian investigators. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
No. Not at all. We come up against a bit of resistance every now and again but 
it’s not a case of ‘them and us’… I think you quickly learn who to ask because 
there are some officers who, like I said to you, they fear civilian investigators 
because they might take over a policing role. But there are a lot of supportive 
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officers absolutely. A lot of people who are more than happy to work alongside 
you and don’t really treat you any differently. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
This finding is a marked departure from findings of comparable studies into alternative 
police staff groupings. For example, Atkinson’s (2013, forthcoming) study of civilian 
intelligence analysts (CIAs) found that CIAs experience ‘patriarchy, gender order and 
infantilisation’ from warranted personnel when undertaking their role leading to a ‘them 
and us’ cultural dynamic (Atkinson, forthcoming). The subordination experienced by the 
CIAs in Atkinson’s research was similar to that experienced by the PCSOs involved in 
Cosgrove’s (2011) study in which they too suffered hostility to their role from reactive 
officers - although unlike the CIAs, this was considered ‘part of a wider rejection of and 
lack of value associated with community oriented policing within the police culture’ 
(Cosgrove, 2011: 295).  Current findings therefore suggest that CIs may be experiencing 
a distinct employment experience when compared to other members of police staff - 
including those operating in other frontline roles (e.g. PCSOs). This may in part be due 
to the specialist nature of the roles being undertaken by CIs in some forces but may also  
result more generally from their location within the relatively closed world of the CID. 
 
 
5.5 Civilian Investigators and ‘Cop Culture’ 
 
We have a saying here, ‘Why shouldn’t the Chief Super look out of the 
window in the morning? Because he’ll have nothing to do in the afternoon!’ 
(Newbank, GRU, DC) 
 
‘Cop culture’ as it has been referred to (Reiner, 2010: 118), has been 
acknowledged as playing an important role in impeding efforts of civilian police staff 
integration within the police organisation (Loveday, 2007). Cop culture refers broadly to 
that complex of values, beliefs, attitudes, expectations and norms shared between police 
officers - in particular the uniform branch rank-and-file - and which can influence their 
approach to policing and their professional practices (Fielding, 1994; Loftus, 2009; 
Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999). This cop culture ‘is formed in the crucible of a police 
officer’s early and shared experiences of uniformed, street-policing’ (Atkinson, 
forthcoming) and is shaped by both the external occupational milieu and the interna l 
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organisational environment. In the same way as more general police occupational culture 
(Fielding, 1988; Innes, 2003), acquisition of detective culture happens through active 
processing of informal and formal socialisation. As has been discussed in more detail in 
earlier sections of this thesis (see section 2.4.4), CID subculture is assumed to exhibit 
largely the same features as the general cop culture (e.g. mission and action-orientat ion, 
isolation, conservatism, machismo, strong internal solidarity, pessimism, cynic ism, 
suspicion of outsiders, and the institutionalised triad of racism, sexism and heterosexism 
(e.g. Foster, 2003; Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 2010; Young, 1991)), though research (e.g. 
Hobbs, 1988; Sanders, 1977) suggests that some aspects may be heightened among 
detectives  (Innes, 2003).  
 
This section explores the ways in which CIs have attempted to align themselves with the 
traditional characteristics of the police culture in order to promote integration and foster 
a greater sense of value from their role. In the current study CIs at both Newbank and 
Shorewick were found to endorse a number of the above stated ‘unyielding core’ 
characteristics (Holdaway, 2013: 218) to varying degrees. However, observational and 
interview data demonstrated particular adherence to three main characteristics amongst 
CIs, these being: suspicion (Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe; 1994), 
solidarity (Manning, 1995; Paoline, 2003), and a sense of mission and love of action 
(Chatterton, 1983; Holdaway, 1977; Reiner, 2010; Westley, 1970). Generally speaking, 
the degree to which CIs were found to endorse each of these police cultural characterist ics 
was found to depend largely upon a number of key factors: the unit in which CIs were 
located, the nature of their remit and the working background of the individual. In those 
units where the CI role was found to be largely indivisible from their warranted colleagues 
and where their role required them to engage with members of the public, CIs were found 
to exhibit the above stated qualities most obviously. Furthermore, non-ex-officer CIs, 
having never served their time on the street, were limited in the extent to which they could 
participate in cop culture. The characteristics typically associated with traditional cop 
culture were thus found to be much less embedded within the orientations and practices 
of this particular group. 
 
Ex-officer CIs at both sites appeared to demonstrate a number of the characterist ics  
typically associated with the police occupational culture most apparently. While it is 
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important to remember here the issue of individual agency with regard to the degree to 
which individual officers subscribe to the police culture (Fielding, 1988; Loftus, 2008), 
it is likely that many of the associated characteristics are indeed carried over by ex-officer 
CIs to their new role and as such, are likely to form a key part of the occupational culture 
and ‘working personality’ of CIs (Skolnick, 1994). Evidence to support this was identified 
in the current study: 
Yeah, you do hear a lot about this issue of police culture. For me, it’s just part 
and parcel of working in this environment. It does make you suspicious of 
people. It’s definitely something you learn quickly as a cop and it does become 
a part of your personality so it’s hard to shake off. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
One ex-officer CI at Shorewick MIT described police officers as being ‘a different 
animal’ due to what he perceived to be their possession of a different outlook and a 
heightened sense of awareness of the potential for physical harm. When pressed further 
on what exactly he meant by this, the CI in question explained: 
They’re (warranted officers) a different animal … They’re different to people 
out there or anyone I know. Obviously I know a lot of cops and it’s the way they 
think and I think it comes down to, most of the time they see the bad side of 
things and so they’re always very, very careful and always very suspicious. You 
can tell most cops in a pub. A cop will stand at the bar with his back to the bar 
facing the door. He sees everybody that comes in. A good cop should anyway. 
You’ve got to be aware of everything that’s happening around you. I think it’s 
the self-preservation thing, when you’re out on the streets you’ve got to be aware 
of everything around you for protection. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
The wealth of police cultural studies draw attention to the functional benefits of suspicion 
(Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1994) and solidarity (Manning 
1995; Paoline, 2004) as means of coping with the demands of police work. The ad hoc 
evolution of the CI role in many units means that CIs often shared their occupational remit 
with warranted officers and were required to engage in tasks which required them to 
become attentive to suspicious activity and the threat of violence within the situations 
they faced. For some CIs, like police officers, suspicion (Rubenstein, 1973; Skolnick, 
1966) appeared to be an integral component of their role. CIs observed working in roles 
which required them to regularly venture outside of the police station to undertake 
inquiries generally displayed the most obvious suspicious tendencies. Of all the units 
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visited, CIs working within Newbank GRU, Shorewick DAU and Newbank PPU 
appeared to exhibit suspicion most obviously, as the following quotes demonstrate: 
You learn quickly not to take everyone and everything on face value. Things 
aren’t always as they seem and people do lie. It can make you a very suspicious 
and cynical person, but I realise that’s probably a lot to do with the fact we only 
ever really see the bad things people do and we spend a lot of our day getting 
lied to. 
(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
One of the first jobs I had, I remember going to this house to talk to this victim 
who was laid on this bed looking all dishevelled and we were talking about her 
boyfriend who had assaulted her a few days before. Well, they had been fighting 
with each other really, they were known for it. And anyway, she’s saying ‘Oh 
I’ve not seen him since it happened. I’ve got no idea where he is’. And then I see 
two feet sticking out from under the bottom of the bed (laughs). So you always 
have to be thinking whether or not someone is actually telling you the truth 
because there are limits to how much we can help if they won’t help themselves.  
(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
It’s hard to know when someone is telling you the truth and it’s sometimes really 
hard to believe them even when you’re pretty sure they are. Sometimes it’s 
obvious but, like with her (a young female detainee the CI was observed 
interviewing); I’m 99.9 per cent sure she’s being honest there. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
As is the case with warranted officers, suspicion of the public can be considered a 
pragmatic strategy or coping mechanism (Innes, 2003) which CIs may also variously 
adopt to help them deal with the uncertainty, and often, the unpleasant aspects of their 
role and emotions associated with this. Innes (2003) describes how such distancing 
strategies (cognitive and behaviour techniques such as language and cynical humour, 
comparing police work to a ‘game’) help detectives to deal with the stress, pressure and 
emotions linked with the job. For many DCs, their ability to deal with crises and the 
‘ontological insecurities’ (Innes, 2003: 263) they evoke form a key part of their 
professional role and identity. This is also likely to be the case with CIs. Cynical humour 
was also evidenced as being a popular distancing strategy amongst CIs:  
I have to say that working with the Bobbies is the most fun I’ve ever had. There 
is a certain sense of humour that only people who work in this field will 
understand and it’s sick. But that is because of what you deal with, the things 
that you see and the things that you hear every day. You have to deal with it by 
laughing. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
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We all have a laugh here. I think you have to sometimes because, as I’m sure 
you can imagine, it can get a bit depressing dealing with murder nearly every 
day. It sounds strange but you need to make sure you keep a sense of humour 
about it too otherwise things can get to you. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Humour was also found to foster a sense of solidarity amongst CIs and between CIs and 
DCs within a number of the units visited. All of the CIs encountered at both research sites 
said that they felt part of a team and that this team mentality played a pivotal role in 
ensuring job satisfaction and integration of CIs within the unit, as the following quote 
illustrates:  
 
I have never felt like such a big part of a team. You might always feel a little bit 
below everybody else but it’s like a big family in some teams. You work late 
into the night; you sit at a desk for sixteen/seventeen hours a day sometimes. I’ve 
worked overnight, and you’re all sat there, you’re all absolutely shattered, but 
because you spend so much time with one another, you know each other, and 
you get so involved in one another’s lives, that’s why there so many flipp ing 
affairs! But you get to a point where you do know each other really well because 
you’re sat next to somebody for a long time every day and there’s only so long 
you can go without saying, ‘You know, I had a right argument with my other 
half last night’. So I think that’s definitely worth mentioning. There is a bond 
between people. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Feeling like an integral and valued member of a wider occupational grouping 
understandably had a direct impact on the degree to which CIs expressed feelings of 
solidarity and loyalty to their warranted and non-warranted colleagues (as well as to the 
organisation itself). As has been discussed previously in this chapter, CIs at both 
Newbank and Shorewick generally described feeling that their role and contribution was 
valued by their colleagues. While it is true that CIs operated under distinct terms and 
conditions to those contained within the contracts of their warranted colleagues which 
mean they could not be made to work overtime, the strong sense of team work and 
solidarity within each of the units visited between CIs and warranted officers meant that 
this distinction was rarely an issue:    
 
They can tell officers, ‘You’re not finishing at four o’clock. We’re ordering you 
to stay on’. Well at four o’clock if I’m a civilian I can go home. But I never 
would. I wouldn’t dream of it. If my team are staying on because there’s a job, 
unless I really, really have to go, I wouldn’t leave. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
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I always work through my dinner, all the time and I don’t get paid for it. But I’m 
not going to turn around and say, ‘Hang on, I need my thirty-six minutes now’. 
You don’t, you just, no, you don’t. You’re part of the team and you’re needed 
so you do it … We do work a lot of overtime yeah. I mean, last year I think I 
earned nearly £5,000 in overtime, so it was a lot. It depends on the murder that 
comes in really. You can work over time for a week and then it’ll all settle down 
again. It might be a month where you’re just working ridiculous hours and also 
depending on the role you’re given. If you’re suspect interviewing, you can be 
interviewing until midnight for three days. Exhibits officer you tend to work a 
lot of overtime because you’re shuttling things from forensics, back down and 
chasing up results. So yeah, you do. But you don’t have to work it. I think you’d 
be frowned upon if you didn’t to be honest. They can’t make you do it but I don’t 
think you’d be looked upon that favourably because it’s important. At the 
beginning of an investigation it’s important that you get as much done as quickly 
as possible.  
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
No, that’s not the case. You’re part of a team and if I’m needed I’ll always stay. 
Like tonight I’m staying on because I’m needed. 
(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)  
 
However, as evidence presented earlier in this chapter suggests, the sense of solidarity 
and team ethic is perhaps likely to be weaker amongst some ex-officer CIs who may feel 
less obliged to work beyond their contracted hours. However, when asked, none of the 
ex-officer CIs encountered at either research site explicitly stated that they would not be 
willing to ‘stay on’ if the team/unit required this of them. The extent to which police 
managers appeared to rely on the good will of CIs in this respect, while not explored in 
depth in the research, was noted as a potentially important factor affecting the continued 
resilience of CID teams in the light of recent cuts to the police budget. 
In addition to danger and the prospect of hostility from an ever demanding public, CIs 
shared experiences with warranted officers enabled them to have an appreciation of the 
inherent challenges in police work (namely complex case preparation and time 
constraints) and the prosecution of offenders that is not held by individuals outside of the 
organisation. The traditional crime fighting ethos present within the police performance 
culture of the organisation was found to exert a powerful influence upon CI occupationa l 
identities and orientations to the role. Indeed, a number of CIs in the current study 
displayed a ‘sense of mission’ and an action-oriented outlook towards their work, 
although pressure to adopt this perspective was identified most clearly amongst some 
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non-ex-officer CIs who appeared keen to feed into crime control activities and prove 
themselves to their warranted colleagues. While their civilian designation and nature of 
their remit ultimately placed limits on the degree to which CIs could entertain a 
commitment to crime control, CIs did appear to ascribe great pride to their role and a 
number of participants also described feeling that a key tenet of their role was to help 
people and make them feel safe. 
However, in some instances CIs also appeared keen to distance themselves from some of 
the traditional cultural traits associated with officers and in doing so, differentiate their 
individual paraprofessional identity from that of their warranted colleagues. This was 
particularly noticeable with regard to the display of patriarchal attitudes by officers as can 
be evidenced in the following quote:  
We’d been asked to assist another force because they were swamped and a 
detective there criticised us and said, ‘We don’t want you going and asking for 
more actions’. ‘But wait a minute, we’ve got nothing to do!?’, and do you know 
what he said? ‘Well do what we do, have a drive around the centre and look at 
the local talent’. And that was a senior DC that. You can’t go around saying stuff 
like that nowadays. It’s unprofessional. I like to work, I’m a grafter, you know, 
and I think they were shocked when we rolled up, no complaining, just the 
civvies, you know, and we were getting five or six actions out a day. They’ll 
give a Bobby - and it happens in this force - one action per week! 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
The drive of some CIs to consolidate their individual claim to value as independent 
investigators and thus, the overall worth of the CI role to the organisation, helped facilitate 
the rejection of such patriarchal attitudes on the basis of their ‘unprofessional’ nature. 
This particular finding also points to an emerging distinction between the cultura l 
attributes of CIs with those of their warranted colleagues and also draws attention to the 
fact that in some instances, CIs orientations to their work may be strengthening their claim 
to professional proficiency in investigative practice. 
 
5.6 Public Perceptions 
  
Public perceptions of the police rest somewhat fundamentally on the level of 
confidence held by the public with regard to the ability of the police to ensure the 
provision of effective and legitimate policing within a given jurisdiction. While there 
exists a wealth of research on public perceptions of the police relating directly to the 
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issues of confidence and legitimacy (Bradford, Jackson and Stanko, 2009; Innes and 
Fielding, 2002), comparatively little exists on public attitudes and perceptions of the use 
and expanding role/remit of non-warranted staff by the police organisation, particula r ly 
in those areas of police work considered core functions. There does however exist a body 
of literature which has predominately looked to survey public perceptions of, and 
attitudes towards, the growing use of PCSOs since their introduction alongside CIs in 
2002 (Cooper et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2005; Hill, 2010; Johnston, 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Paskell, 2007). Generally speaking, and in a fashion that appears to mirror findings in the 
present study in relation to CIs, the results of such studies suggest a marked lack of clarity 
amongst the public with regard to the role to be undertaken by PCSOs and also, with 
regard to their individual powers. 
 
In the current study CIs felt they were received well by those members of the public they 
encountered during the course of their daily duties. This included victims, witnesses and 
suspects. However, concern over public attitudes towards the ambiguous utilisation of 
CIs and in particular, towards their expanding remit and involvement in more serious 
investigations was cited as an issue of common concern in interview by a number of 
warranted officers at both Shorewick and Newbank. While often based on individua l 
speculative assessments of public perceptions of CI use, generally speaking, most 
warranted officers were generally found to be in agreement that, if given the option, most 
members of the public would choose and, furthermore, expect a warranted officer to be 
investigating their case. This was generally found to be the case amongst detectives in all 
units as can be seen from the following quotes:  
 
I don’t think the public really, if they were given a choice, would really want a 
civvie investigating their case. Definitely not the more serious stuff anyway. 
Would you? 
(Newbank, GRU, DC) 
I don’t think the public really want CIs taking their statement. They want a cop. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
I can see how members of the public might have a problem with CIs. You know, 
you get this ‘policing on the cheap’ thing thrown around in the media and that’s 
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what people see and there’s always a chance they could think that’s what this is. 
And that’s got to reflect badly on the organisation 
(Newbank, PPU, DC) 
I think they’d expect a DC to come. I think that’s what they’d expect but again I 
think if someone went to visit who wasn’t a cop, it would depend on the 
individual as well but I think yeah, there would be expectations that it would be 
an officer ... I think it could be perceived by the public as policing on the cheap. 
I think it’s a difficult one. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
However, as the final quote above indicates, for some warranted officers at least, CI 
competence was often judged on a case by case basis by their warranted colleagues and 
arguably was factored largely upon the personality, experience and working background 
of an individual. Ex-officer CIs were viewed by some warranted officers as being less of 
a threat to levels of public confidence in the ability and capability of the police to 
effectively investigate crime due to their previous experience and knowledge of policing. 
‘Policing on the cheap’ was a phrase regularly cited by warranted officers as well as some 
CIs particularly when discussing their concern over how the expanding CI remit could be 
viewed by the public and the potentially negative impact this could have for public 
confidence in the police’s ability to effectively investigate crime. Concern over the 
viewing of CIs as a type of policing on the cheap by the public also appeared to be 
intimately tied up with the issue of power designation which, it was regularly cited by 
warranted officers and also some CIs, had the potential to negatively impact on the overall 
legitimacy of the police and particularly, CID officers:  
 
I think it’s fine so long as they’re not dressed up to be something they’re not. 
They were supposed to be assisting but then they’re talking about giving them 
certain powers and I think they (police organisation) need to think how that 
might look to the public. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
I don’t know if you’d be minimising the role of the police officer. I don’t know 
... I think it could be perceived by the public as policing on the cheap. I think it’s 
a difficult one. 
(Shorewick, GRU, DC) 
The CIs we have working here have been designated and that works fine and 
there’s never been any instances that I know of where a member of the public 
has said something to them because they’re not a cop. But I can see how in some 
units, giving them powers might come across as a bit like that. I mean, I can see 
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how that might look to the public, like we, as an organisation, are trying to palm 
them off maybe? I don’t know. 
(Newbank, GRU, DC) 
 
Concern over the potential for CI use to be perceived by the public as ‘policing on the 
cheap’ was also raised by police managers at both Shorewick and Newbank. Generally 
speaking, police managers were found to share comparable reservations to lower ranking 
officers with regard to the expanding role/remit of CIs, particularly in those units that 
dealt with more serious and complex crime investigations. This can be evidenced in the 
following quotes: 
 
It’s about perceptions isn’t it? If they sat down and found out the person they 
were speaking to had never been a police officer, has got no police investigat ion 
experience, yeah there could be some negative perceptions from the public, 
potentially. 
 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
I think there could be a concern about the way CIs are being perceived by the 
public. The ones I have here are fantastic and I’ve never had any issues but I can 
see how it might perhaps be more of a concern for colleagues working in the 
MIT for example, where the public might be more likely to expect a warranted 
officer to show up. 
 
(Newbank, GRU, DS) 
I’ve never come across it personally. I can see how some people might think that 
and we of course have to always think about how we as an organisation appear 
to the public. I think it also depends a lot on the unit that they’re working in and 
the way they’re being used. The intention behind CIs was that they were 
supposed to support and assist and that’s ultimately what they should be doing. 
 
(Shorewick, GRU, T/DI) 
 
 
However, in contrast to lower ranking officers, for police managers, concern over public 
perceptions of the utilisation of CIs appeared to be more focused towards their potential 
involvement in leading investigations. For the senior officers interviewed at both research 
sites, the leading of investigations was considered to be something which should only be 
undertaken by warranted officers. However, as the following quotes demonstrate, the 
restriction of the leading of investigations to warranted officers was again only discussed 
in relation to the most serious of crimes, particularly those which fell within the remit of 
the MIT: 
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It’s the public perception of who’s actually doing the job and who’s in charge. I 
think there’s a difference between skills-sets and perceptions. Skills-sets, any of 
my staff could take a job to court, any of them. But perception wise, if I wasn’t 
the SIO and there was someone else that wasn’t a police officer, would the public 
be happy with that? Would you be happy if, and these are the words that have 
been used, ‘We can’t even be arsed to turn out a police officer for a murder’, the 
most serious of crimes? That’s a quote from a talk given by the head of crime 
from another force. He says, ‘If we can’t do that then we’ve lost what we’re 
doing, we’ve lost our way’. And I’ve got to say, even though that quotes not 
mine, I think I agree with it. If the Chief Constable wasn’t the Chief Constable, 
let’s say he’d been superimposed by, I don’t know, the head of Next, I’m not 
saying that the head of Next hasn’t got the skills to be able to do the job I’m sure 
they have, but there is a perception that it needs to be police-led and there will 
be that culture issue. Unless there’s a sea-change to say that the head of the police 
is no longer a Chief Constable, it’s a chief exec. That’s the only time that you 
would change it. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
I think about this from a member of the public’s perception and you’ve already 
said this. Say, one of their really close family members gets murdered and they 
know, and I can think of some very national and recognised SIOs in this country 
that have investigated lots of murders and lots of child murders over the years 
and have got a very good reputation nationally, and you were told they were 
investigating the murder of your close family member. You’d be a lot happier 
than them saying, ‘We’ve just got this chap in who’s come from Boots and who’s 
just joined the police, he’s been here a few months and he’s going to investigate 
your mothers murder’. I’m not sure how that would sit in a … I’m not saying 
that person isn’t a great person but how would that sit? If I was a family member, 
I wouldn’t be happy if that was my mother. You can’t become an SIO overnight, 
you just can’t do it. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
Alongside an awareness of the reservations held by some officers and police managers 
with regard to the expanding role/remit of CIs and its impact on public perceptions, it 
quickly became apparent to the researcher that such concern was central to the decision 
of the organisation to formally restrict the involvement of CIs to certain areas of work and 
within that, certain tasks. Rape was the only crime identified as being solely police 
operational at both Shorewick and Newbank, although at Newbank CIs from the PPU 
were able to assist the specialist rape team with their investigations although none of the 
CIs encountered had ever been asked to do so. When questioned directly on why this was 
the case, an awareness of high levels of concern amongst the public specific to rape and 
serious sexual assault was cited by participants as being a key factor impeding the 
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expansion of the CI remit into this particular area of investigation. As the following quotes 
show: 
I wouldn’t put it past them to try and put it (rape investigation) on me but I doubt 
that they would to be honest with you. I think there’s some concern over the 
public reaction to CIs being involved in rape investigations if they found out so 
at the minute it’s just specialist cops. Like I said I’ve dealt with minor sexual 
offences, minor sexual assaults but not anything like the more serious stuff, no.  
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
Well I’ve dealt with exposures and minor sexual assaults, but I’ve not actually 
taken statements for rape. I think that’s very much still something that the cops 
deal with here. 
(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
For rape, I think they’d (the public) expect a DC to come. I think that’s what 
they’d expect but again I think if someone went to visit who wasn’t a cop, it 
would depend on the individual as well. But I think yeah, there would be 
expectations that it would be an officer. 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
Yeah, I get why they haven’t decided to use CIs there because there’s a lot of 
publicity and public concern over rape. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
However, despite a general appreciation of the apparent tendency of the police 
organisation to restrict the investigation of rape and serious sexual assault allegations to 
warranted officers on the basis of potential negative public reaction, it appeared that even 
this was ultimately subject to the discretion of police managers. As the following quote 
illustrates: 
The problem with a serious investigation such as rape, and there’s a lot of public 
protection around … you’ve got to imagine the training again, you can’t just put 
a CI into it, without the training and the work based experience. I know this 
sounds bad again but, unless they’re an ex-cop who’s come out of that world and 
has come back as a CI, who has had all of that training and experience, then yeah 
you could probably hit the ground running again, potentially, if they’re good 
enough. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
Despite the obvious reservations seemingly held by most of their warranted colleagues, 
when questioned directly by the researcher during interview, none of the CIs encountered 
at either Shorewick or Newbank CIDs described having personally experienced any 
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hostility and/or negative reactions to their presence/use by members of the public. When 
pressed further on the issue of public perceptions towards their use and in particular, their 
expanding remit, some CIs noted how public demand for the police to deliver a rapid 
response and professional service following calls for assistance, was generally thought to 
supersede any concern over the designation of the individual sent by the police 
organisation to investigate their case.  This appeared more the opinion of CIs identified 
working in the units that dealt with lower level crime as can be evidenced in the following 
quotes:  
 
I don’t know. Some people are always going to say ‘No, send a police officer’. 
But in this day and age, most people are just glad that somebody has actually 
turned up and they can tell them what’s happened and as long as you’re from the 
police they don’t care. 
 
(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer) 
 
Nope. Because I think, at the end of the day, if you treat them decently and like 
a victim, with respect, I really think that’s all they’re bothered about. I don’t 
personally think it matters whether you’re in uniform … CID aren’t in uniform. 
I really don’t think it does matter, I think it’s more about how you are with them. 
If you give them confidence that you are going to investigate their crime to the 
upmost of your ability, I think they’re happier with that, personally. 
(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI)  
The opinion of CIs with regard to their views on public perceptions of their role was found 
to depend largely on the unit in which they worked. For example, as in the above quotes, 
CIs working within units where they were found to be contributing to investigations into 
lower level crime types (namely both GRUs and CIT), were less likely to view public 
perceptions towards CI use as a notable area of concern with regard to the issues of public 
confidence and legitimacy. However, CIs working within units where they were observed 
contributing to the investigation of more serious crimes (namely MIT and PPUs) were 
found to be generally more concerned over the expanding remit of CIs and the potentially 
detrimental impact this could have on public perceptions and confidence in the police to 
deal with (and effectively manage) more serious and complex investigations (e.g. 
homicide investigations, rape investigations etc.), as the following quotes show:  
 
I can see why they’re sort of more hesitant to let us be involved in rape 
investigations because it can be such a sensitive and high profile area and you’ve 
got to have the experience and knowledge around public protection which we 
don’t have. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
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I think they maybe need to think more about how that (the interviewing of 
murder suspects by CIs) could look to the families and to the public. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
In a similar way to their warranted counterparts, opinion amongst CIs with regard to public 
perceptions of their role/remit was also found to vary between CI participants and in 
particular, appeared to be divided between ex-officer CIs and non-ex-officer CIs. 
Generally speaking, ex-officer CIs appearing more concerned with the expanding remit 
of CIs on public perceptions of the police and the CID than non-ex-officer CIs:  
 
Yes. Not so much some crimes, but again, I would say it’s down to personality. 
Certainly, we’ve gone back to police officers now, but the Burglary Scene 
Attenders for a long time were support staff. I think some people would say, ‘I’m 
not talking to you. Send really Bobbies’. I personally, if I reported a burglary 
and they sent a PCSO round which can happen, I would be saying, ‘Err no!’ I 
wouldn’t want that. 
(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
For some ex-officer CIs, the limited degree of authority afforded to the role coupled with 
a frequent lack of experiential knowledge gained from policing the streets amongst non-
ex-officer CIs, led to concern over the ability of some CIs (non-ex-officers) to assert 
authority in their encounters with the public. In the following quote one ex-officer CI 
draws upon Reiser’s (1974) ‘John Wayne Syndrome’ mentality, when discussing the 
importance of experiential knowledge in ensuring the overall legitimacy of the police: 
Most investigators are ex-police and have been out there and they know about 
meeting an angry man or angry woman, and it’s how you deal with that situat ion. 
Whereas the investigators who are coming into the service who are not ex-police 
have never come across an angry person, who has threatened them, who they’ve 
had to fight with, who they’ve had to overcome. And it’s just the way you trea t 
people. You’ll find most police officers, although they’re fair, are also firm and 
will not budge. They know exactly what’s got to be done and most importantly, 
how it can be done. If someone’s threatening, it’s very rare nowadays, or should 
I say very rare then, you’d see a cop back down. Your investigators (CIs) that 
come in who are ex-DHSS or other external agencies coming into the police, 
never had that, they back down. And I know we talk about, you’ve probably 
heard of it, John Wayne Syndrome, right, cops tend to have John Wayne 
syndrome - ‘I’m not gonna back down no matter what’. Of course there are times 
when you should back down but, you find your civilian investigators that have 
not been in the police service, will back down instantly. Ex-officers don’t. And, 
those out there, the criminals, see that as a sign of weakness and I don’t think we 
can afford to let them see that. As soon as they realise who they’re talking to and 
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what they’re talking to, their attitude changes and I’ve seen it and I’ve 
experienced it while I’ve been on the MIT. I’ve been out with an investigato r, 
non-police, and myself. This particular lad flared up became very aggressive. 
This other investigator wanted to back off straight away and get out of the house. 
As an ex-cop you’ve come across it before, you talk to them, show them you’re 
not going to back down and they calm down. When we’d finished, this lad would 
speak to me but he wouldn’t even acknowledge the other one. I don’t know 
whether it’s just a respect thing or what. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
In his much celebrated work, ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’, Goffman (1959, 
1990) draws attention to the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations 
presents himself and his activity to others (1990: 9): ‘Within the walls of a social 
establishment we find a team of performers who co-operate to present to an audience a 
given definition of the situation’ (1990: 231). For Goffman, individuals engage in 
performance of self in their interactions with others. Information about an individua l’s 
character is both presented and absorbed through these performances (1990: 13) with the 
result being a desired projection of identity (1990: 15-16). It is in this sense that the non-
ex-officer CI in the above quote can be considered to be spoiling the performance of the 
ex-officer CI and in doing so, is drawing attention to the limited authority of CIs. The 
above quote also thus hints at a potential distinction between the working personalit ies 
and cultural characteristics of ex-officer CIs compared to their non-ex-officer colleagues. 
The ‘buying- in’ of CIs from private security agencies was found to be a common area of 
concern amongst warranted officers and CIs (employed by the police authority) at both 
research sites with regard to public perceptions of the CI role. There appeared to be 
particular concern over how these individuals can and should be held to account and 
subsequently, how the utilisation of these particular individuals might impact on the 
overall legitimacy of the police: 
All of the CIs that have come in from private companies to help out when we’ve 
been busy have all been ex-cops. So they have the experience and they can sort 
of hit the ground running which is what you want. But that doesn’t change the 
fact that it’s still a private company isn’t it that’s getting involved and after the 
Olympics there’s been a lot of negative press around it so I think they (police 
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organisation) have sort of seen that and there’s definitely been a rowing away 
from that a bit now. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
I think the big concern over using agency staff in this role is to do with control 
and how it looks to the public. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
However, the researcher found that where CIs were/had been bought in for fixed periods 
from private agencies, they were generally being used for lesser roles. However, as the 
following statement from a police manager at Newbank shows, the level of responsibility 
and type of role afforded to an agency CI may also depend on the working background 
and experience held by that individual: 
I wouldn’t use them for exhibits and disclosure because they’re long term jobs. 
They would get used for CCTV, witness statements … again it depends on the 
individual and that’s why G4S would send us, really the CVs of the people, and 
often we know them because they’re local ex-cops, so we’d generally look at 
them and say, ‘Oh yeah, that person is really good, that person is really good, we 
know them’. So, again you can pick and choose what you use them for. I mean 
I had a cold case running that needed to be progressed but I didn’t have the staff 
to do it and I had about six investigators that came and worked on that and they 
all left the country for me doing investigations. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
I don’t have a problem with them. They came in, they worked hard, but some of 
them because they were capable, they were getting really key things to do. Real 
proper key areas of work. And again, some of the other DCs got their noses 
pushed out, they were funny about it. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
In addition to the reservations held by some CIs with regard to public perceptions of their 
expanding role/remit, a number of CIs were also keen to draw the researcher’s attention 
towards what they perceived to be inherent benefits associated with the unwarranted 
status. Broadly speaking, the main contention of these CIs was that their non-warranted 
status ensured them a degree of organisational non-partisanship and occupationa l 
legitimacy in the eyes of some members of the public which was not enjoyed by warranted 
officers. The following quotes are illustrative of this view:   
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You judge the situation and sometimes I find that it’s actually beneficial to me 
to tell people I’m not actually a cop. They can respond to you better. You know, 
some people have had bad experiences in the past and some just hate the police, 
there’s nothing you can do about that. So me going in and saying, you know, 
‘I’m not a police officer, I’m just here to take your statement and make sure  
you’re alright’, or, ‘I’m not a police officer but I just need to ask you a couple of 
questions about this incident yesterday’, they can be, not always, but sometimes, 
it can help.  
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
When we go to jobs I make a point of saying I’m not a police officer, because I 
think that might put people at ease sometimes because people have preconceived 
ideas don’t they about police officers sometimes, so yeah I think it’s benefic ia l 
sometimes. 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, non-ex-officer_CI) 
 
I’ve only ever turned up twice when the perpetrators been there and to be honest 
I’ve never had any problem. I think more than a couple of times it’s been the 
victims that have been more scary. Some victims have been quite aggressive but 
they soon come down because they realise … the big point to put across to 
victims, you know if they’ve had a bad time with the police, if the police have 
come and, not because of anything the police might have done but maybe how 
they have reacted to it, they maybe had had a drink and have become quite 
aggressive, they associate us with the police because we obviously work for the 
police but I always make a point of saying that ‘Yeah, I do work for the police 
but I’m not a police officer and I’m all about supporting you. I’m not dealing 
with the crime side of things. It’s just about what we can put in place for you and 
if you want that, then I can help you. If you don’t, then that’s fine’. We can’t 
force them to have that support.  
 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Having sat both sides of the fence, I would say, you got better treatment from 
the public. They could be a bit aggressive with you when you were a police 
officer but when they find out, actually I’m just a statement taker, I’m just 
support staff … for some reason you tend to build up a better rapport with your 
victims and your witnesses because you’re not actually a police officer. So I’ve 
found that they would give you more information sometimes purely because they 
didn’t think you were the cops. They will just chat to you as you. 
(Shorewick, GRU, DC and ex-civilian) 
 
Regardless of the apparent operational benefits of being civilian members of staff, in 
failing to resist the pull of mission creep, in some forces at least, CIs have likely emerged 
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as a new type of ‘policing on the cheap’. In this sense, CIs have the potential to impact 
somewhat detrimentally upon public confidence in the competency of the police to deliver 
effective and efficient investigative provision. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This section has afforded an account of the daily life of CIs at both Shorewick and 
Newbank and has presented some key findings from the current study. This section has 
argued that while CIs play a valuable role within CID units in which they were working, 
their contribution is currently being overlooked by the police organisation. Poor 
communication about the role has resulted in a lack of consistency in CI use between 
forces as well as between CID units. The result has seen the rapid evolution of the 
role/remit of CIs far beyond that which can be considered support. While on the one hand 
the evolving role of CIs might be seen as an innovative and effective use of CIs as a 
resource, particularly given the fact that a significant proportion are also retired-police 
officers, on the other hand it clearly represents a significant degree of mission creep. For 
those keen to establish a career with the police organisation, progressive occupationa l 
drift and boundary blurring was welcomed as it presents an opportunity to achieve a sense 
of professional identity and, in doing so, demonstrates the value placed on autonomy and 
the sense of identity that comes with specialisation and exclusivity in work. For others 
however, this drift was less welcomed, serving primarily to highlight the existence of 
deficiencies in skill, knowledge and motivation and, at a more fundamental level, 
presented a significant challenge to the long established character and prestige of the 
detective role and title. 
 
The motivations driving the decision of CIs to apply for the role were found to be wide 
ranging and differed somewhat between CI groupings (ex-officer, non-ex-officer and 
agency CIs), showing some correlation with working background and age of participants. 
Generally speaking, CIs motivations for applying for the role included: financ ia l 
need/desire, familiarity with the work, interest in career progression, a longstand ing 
interest in the field underpinned by altruistic sentiments and an enduring love of the job/or 
organisation. Overall levels of commitment were generally found to be high amongst all 
CIs encountered although, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, a pervasive 
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sense of insecurity amongst CIs resulting from awareness of imminent budget cuts was 
found to cause low morale and, in turn, likely affected their motivation and/or loyalty to 
the organisation. CIs were generally found to feel valued as part of the team in which they 
worked but somewhat fundamentally, not by the organisation itself. 
 
Despite testimonies of improved relations and a developing sense of collegiality amongst 
CIs and their warranted counterparts since their initial introduction, CIs were found to 
enjoy only a marginal level of integration and continued to suffer resistance to their role 
as a result of their secondary civilian employment status. As a result, the degree to which 
CIs were found to have become integrated within the CID units was fundamenta l ly 
restricted and was found to differ somewhat markedly both between and within 
Shorewick and Newbank CIDs. A legacy of poor implementation and lack of clarity about 
the role had served to fuel anxieties amongst warranted officers at both sites. Such 
anxieties were found to centre on three key issues, these being: the impact of CI utilisa t ion 
on overtime availability within the CID, concern over public perceptions of the role 
appearing as ‘policing on the cheap’ and its potential impact on public confidence, and 
the degree to which CI use (particularly the direct entry of non-ex-officer CIs) serves to 
undermine/challenge traditional approaches and understandings of investigative work and 
the centrality of the detective. As a result, CIs were found to enjoy a secondary and in 
some respect outsider status, enjoying only marginal valuing and integration and limited 
authority. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, these conditions are 
currently being maintained by powerful actors in the field of policing and politics (like 
the Police Federation and the media) and the weakness or absence of any alternative (or 
convincing) narrative on how effective policing and, specifically, investigation, may be 
achieved. 
The civilian designation of CIs means that they are fundamentally limited in the extent to 
which they are able to participate/align themselves with the detective culture. While found 
to depend largely on the unit in which CIs worked, the nature of their remit and working 
background of the individual, CIs in the current study were nonetheless found to display 
notable adherence with a number of dominant police cultural traits. This was particula r ly 
true of those CIs observed working at Newbank where CIs appeared most integrated 
within the teams/units in which they were located and often exhibited the traits of an 
‘effective detective’ from a cultural perspective. This is also indicative of the potential 
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benefits of mixed team working with regard to the integration and acceptance of CIs 
(Allport, 1954). Furthermore, not discounting the issue of individual agency with regard 
to the degree to which officers both subscribe to and endorse the police culture, ex-officer 
CIs undoubtedly carry over to their new role many of the characteristics typically 
associated with police occupational culture. In a marked departure from the findings of 
previous work on the uptake of police cultural traits by non-warranted individua ls 
(Atkinson, forthcoming; Cosgrove, 2011), little evidence was found to suggest the 
existence of a ‘them and us’ culture between CIs and their warranted colleagues. 
Generally speaking, a pervading sense of collegiality was found to exist within the units 
visiting during fieldwork and was founded on a collective sense of mission and awareness 
of unique pressures relating to the degree and nature of the CID workload. 
 
While none of the CIs at either Shorewick or Newbank described encountering any 
resistance to members of the public with regard to their civilian status, a number of 
participants did raise their concerns over the potential for CI use to appear as ‘policing on 
the cheap’. For the most part, such concern was intimately linked to the issue of power 
designation and, to a lesser extent, to private security involvement and its potential impact 
on public confidence in the police. However, for some warranted officers the utilisa t ion 
of CIs - particularly those with little to no previous experience of the peculiar demands 
of police work - in some areas of work was resented for its potential to ‘spoil the 
performance’ of the detective role and the CID more broadly. It is in this sense that the 
professional ethos and identity of the detective is being threatened at a fundamental level 
by non-warranted CI involvement in investigative work traditionally undertaken by the 
CID. This section concludes by arguing that despite clear evidence of progressively more 
receptive attitudes towards CIs and recognition of their value by warranted officers, 
further effective integration and acceptance of CIs requires not simply the reform of 
detective culture, but the transformation of the ‘field’ itself. It is on this basis that 
discussion now shifts to take account of the relationship between CIs and the police 
organisation itself. 
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Chapter Six: CIs and the Police Organisation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Building upon the findings presented in Chapter Five, this section seeks to 
examine the relationship of CIs with the police organisation and thus, explores the range 
of related structural features currently impacting on the employment experience of CIs. 
As was discussed in Chapter Five, while CIs encountered in the current study generally 
professed to feeling valued by their warranted colleagues and line managers within the 
units in which they worked, most admitted to feeling unappreciated by the organisat ion 
itself. This was largely attributed to the perceived failure of the organisation to 
acknowledge at a formal level the role and contribution now being made by CIs. As 
findings presented in this chapter will demonstrate, these conditions are currently being 
reinforced by the police organisation through marked distinctions in pay, training and 
opportunities for progression which, in many instances, do not sufficiently reflect the 
nature of the role being performed by CIs. 
 
The first part of this section explores the related issues of training and career progression 
for CIs and, in particular, explores how the civilian support status afforded to CIs has 
impacted upon the perceived authority and legitimacy of their claims to training and/or 
opportunities for progression. The second section deals with the issue of CI powers and 
examines how inconsistency in the designation of enforcement abilities to CIs by Chief 
Constables between forces may be serving to engender confusion and frustration amongst 
CIs and their police colleagues. The third part of the section considers the issue of CI 
remuneration and draws attention to the perceived inadequacy of current 
framework/structure of pay for CIs in light of their evolving role and remit. The final 
section of this chapter examines how the present conditions of financial restraint and the 
rigidities of the unique conditions which apply to police officers have placed the burden 
of job losses unduly on police staff. It therefore considers the implication of such working 
conditions on the overall employment experience of CIs and furthermore, considers  
evidence which suggests that, in some forces, a move towards reverse-civilianisa t ion 
within the CID may now be taking place. 
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6.2 Training and Progression 
 
 Reflecting the research findings of Bayley and Bittner (1984), Fielding (1988) and 
Van Maanen (1973) in their studies involving police officers and Cosgrove (2011) and 
Cooper et al. (2006) in relation to PCSOs, generally speaking, CIs did not perceive the 
induction training they received as instructive to practice. Instead it was conceived more 
as a means of introducing them to the organisation and providing basic guidance on the 
technical and/or administrative aspects of their role, for example, informatio n systems 
(e.g. HOLMES, CATS, PNC etc.), health and safety, the use of police radios (where 
applicable), first aid, police driver training etc. However, evidence of role specific 
training was also identified in a number of units although this was limited and often not 
task based or related to the practical realities of the role. With the exception of those FIs 
working at Shorewick and Newbank FFITs196, CIs at both sites unequivocally agreed that 
the level of training and guidance they had received for their role was lacking. When 
asked to describe what formal training they had received for the role, the majority of CIs 
described a somewhat sporadic delivery with little obvious consistency between 
Shorewick and Newbank and between the units in terms of their approach to the training 
of CIs. Some CIs described receiving no formal training for their role. This tended to be 
most common amongst ex-officer CIs who, due to their working background were 
presumed already to possess the necessary working knowledge and skills relevant to the 
role. The following experiences can be considered typical of most ex-officer CIs 
encountered: 
 
Training? What training? We haven’t had any. I retired on the Friday and came 
back on the Monday, sat at the same desk doing the same job. 
 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, ex-officer CI) 
 
As a crime investigator training has been appalling. It’s been absolutely 
appalling … I know some people have been on a few training courses but they’re 
only basic ones. I think some have been on an exhibits one and some have been 
on a disclosure, some have been on telecoms. So there are some out there but 
nothing much. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
                                                                 
196 The NCA has responsibility for training, accrediting and monitoring FIs who work in the police service, 
HMRC, DWP and local authorities e.g. Trading Standards. As such, non-warranted FIs receive the same 
level of role specific training as warranted officer FIs. Training is delivered through the Proceeds of Crime 
Centre (PoCC) which is responsible for accrediting and monitoring the performance of all FIs in Englan d, 
Wales and Northern Ireland).  
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As discussed in more detail in Chapter One, at both sites there appeared to be a tendency 
in police organisations to favour the recruitment of ex-officers on the basis that these 
individuals already possess the required training and skills necessary to be able to 
undertake the role. On this logic, ex-officer CIs thus arguably negate the need for 
expensive and lengthy training packages saving the organisation time and money. 
Evidence suggests that in the initial years of CI recruitment following their formal 
introduction in 2002, there likely existed a lack of consideration of the limits of officer re-
deployability and the existence of disparities in skill-sets and knowledge base of officers 
resulting from variations in their previous roles and rank within the organisation. The 
result of this was the early presumption amongst some managers that ex-officer equals 
‘good investigator’. However, as can be evidenced in the following quotes, this was not 
always the case: 
 
I started on the Monday morning. I was given some photocopies by the sergeant 
of burglaries, statements. I went for lunch and came back and was given some 
car keys and told to go take a statement for a burglary at [a Shorewick BCU]. I 
said ‘I haven’t taken a statement for 17 years!’ They just said, ‘you’ll be alright’.  
(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI) 
The mistake was that they perhaps took too many ex-cops on because some of 
them, even some of the ex-cops who they brought back, didn’t have the 
investigative skills themselves. Just because you’re an ex-cop doesn’t mean 
you’re going to be good at this job (CI). We’ve got an Inspector, a guy who 
retired as an Inspector who spent most of his last 15, 20 years working in a 
communications centre. Now he had an important job when he finished in there 
but he didn’t take statements, didn’t deal with members of the public face to 
face, he hadn’t done any of that for years, so you know, he hadn’t got any real 
relevant skills. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
The tendency of police managers to assume the skills and capabilities of ex-officer CIs as 
a result of their ex-officer status alone appeared to have been a common problem 
historically with regard to the recruitment of CIs and in particular, with regard to their 
level of motivation and ability to perform. In the following quote, one ex-officer CI at 
Shorewick draws attention to what he regards to be the ‘mistake’ of the large scale, 
indiscriminate recruitment of ex-officers during the initial years of CI recruitment: 
The mistake that Shorewick made was, they decided to go down the line of, 
we’re going to recruit about 15 in one go, crime investigators that is. Now we 
don’t want to be training people who don’t know what they’re doing, so we’ll 
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look at ex-cops. So they chucked the net out and then if you’d have gone down 
the list, if I’d have gone down the list I’d have probably gone, ‘no’, ‘no’, 
‘maybe’. You’d got people who’d not done a ‘hands on’ role in a CID office, 
some of them never, and others, for 10, 15 years! When you’re recruit ing 
Inspectors and Sergeants, the bottom line is, if they’ve been an Inspector or a 
Sergeant for 5, 10 or even 20 years, they don’t take statements because they’ve 
got somebody to do it for them, they don’t put files in because they’ve got 
someone who does that too. They supervise. So then these guys, and they were 
guys apart from one female Inspector, these guys come here and they’re fish out 
of water and then they’re scared. So when they’re being told ‘we want you to go 
and do this and you to go and do this’, thinking that oh, these are skilled guys, 
you know, they’re ex-detectives or Detective Sergeants or whatever, they’re 
scared to death. They don’t know what they’re doing. So they’re the people then 
who go ‘We’re not paid enough to do that. We’re not supposed to do that’. It’s 
because they haven’t got God damn clue what they’re doing! 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Another participant made a similar remark with regard to the limits of redeployment, 
specifically raising the potential issues arising from the recruitment of ex-officers who, 
previous to their retirement, had spent a long period of time working at divisio nal CID 
level:  
 
If you’ve got an ex-DC who’s been working in divisional CID for years and 
years and years, then coming here, they wouldn’t know … they probably could 
pick it up quite quickly, but they’re not necessarily aware of this department and 
what policies and procedures have changed since they were last trained. And it’s 
not fair to assume that of those DCs either. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
 
However, in the current study no evidence was found to suggest that this presumption of 
competence with regard to the recruitment of ex-officer CIs persists. In fact, when 
questioned directly on the subject, police managers at both Shorewick and Newbank 
demonstrated not only their awareness of the issue but also their commitment to avoiding 
comparable future recruitment problems. At both sites police managers described how the 
recruitment of CIs had, since their initial introduction, progressed so that now only those 
found to possess demonstrable operational skills and an accompanying up-to-date 
awareness of relevant legislative developments are able to ‘make the cut’ as CIs. As 
illustrated by the following quote, recognition of this skills-gap was also found to inform 
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the recruitment of ex-officers from even the most senior of ranks indicating the 
detachment of police managers from the realities of everyday police work: 
 
In the last round of applications that I looked at for CIs coming in, one of them 
was an ex-Assistant Chief Constable. I remember because, I thought, why on 
earth you’d want to come back to work on their pension, I don’t know, but they 
wanted to come and basically be an investigator (CI) and it was exactly that. I 
looked and they’d got no recent relevant experience of taking statements, 
watching CCTV, you know, and all the other stuff with it so, there was no 
assumption there that that person would come and be a good investigator and 
they didn’t get an interview because they didn’t even tick the essentials criteria 
never mind the desirables. 
 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
 
Early attitudes towards the recruitment of CIs coupled with the rapid nature with which 
initial recruitment waves occurred meant that there was little time or recognised need for 
the formulation of an appropriate training package for CIs. The result of this has been the 
ad hoc and inconsistent training between forces and units which is observably dependent 
upon the working backgrounds of individuals and units in which they work. It would also 
appear clear that as patterns of recruitment have progressed to include those with no 
previous experience working as a warranted officer, the need for the development of 
consistent and role appropriate training is now arguably more pressing than has ever been 
the case before. Indeed, evidence collected during the current study suggests that as an 
organisation the police have only taken marginal steps to accommodate the specific 
training needs of non-ex-officer CIs:  
 
When I first came onto the MIT, day one it was like, ‘Right, here’s a pen. Off 
you go’ and it was like, ‘What!? This is murder!’ you know? I expected a training 
package in place but there wasn’t one. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
I did a MARAC training day which was really more of a knowledge day to 
understand what MARAC is about and what the point of it is. Then I’ve had 
some training on basic systems which everyone gets. There’s been no specific 
training on how to deal with victims. Oh and I had a two-day thing a few months 
after I started, a Domestic Abuse Awareness training course which was delivered 
by the council where they showed you a PowerPoint, they talked about the 
different dynamics of domestic abuse and there was a lot of other stuff like team 
building exercise and what have you, then, it was a bit of a suck it and see really.  
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI) 
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When I first started I was sent on an interviewing suspect course, but it was 
cancelled after two days and they just told me I passed it. But I’ve not had any 
how to take statements, PEACE model interviewing, the continuity of exhibits, 
I’ve not had anything like that. I’ve just learnt on the job mainly. Someone will 
show me; hope I get it right. Learning experiences of how it’s gone wrong and 
not to do it again. Just making sure you’re thinking and because we do it every 
day, you just hope you’re getting it right. There are areas that I’m weak at like 
I’m not a very good statement taker; I don’t think I ever will be. I’m not very 
good at continuity of exhibits just because I get a bit confused. Like when we 
had to go for this arson and take swabs. It was like wet swabs, dry swabs, control 
swabs, this, that, the other and I was like ‘Arrgh’. So I did get myself in a bit of 
a tizz but no, it was alright. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
As in the final quote above, a number of CIs encountered at both sites confessed to 
employing a ‘trial and error’ approach to their work and most CIs admitted to learning 
the realities of the role through experience ‘on the job’ and also through informal 
mentoring by warranted or more experienced CI colleagues. While participants at both 
sites somewhat enthusiastically described how efforts had been made in the past to 
implement a formal mentoring system for non-ex-officer CIs, growing budgetary pressure 
and limited resources has meant that this now no longer occurs in a formal capacity. When 
asked for their feelings on mentoring, all non-ex-officer CIs supported the idea and also 
admitted to having one or two warranted colleagues who they tend to ask for advice and/or 
who they would go to for information if needed. Like new recruits to the police, non-ex-
officers learned the realities and necessary skills of policing via experience and in 
observing each other and the working practices of more experienced colleagues rather 
than through the formal training process. This was even more so the case with 
investigative work, much of which, according to proponents of the old regime 
perspective, cannot be taught and requires investigators develop their own ways of 
working and style of operating. Operating within such a partnership therefore would not 
only enable non-ex-officer CIs to learn the craft skills necessary for the role but would 
also mean that CIs would be less likely to make mistakes or jeopardise presentationa l 
strategies utilised by the organisation to reinforce legitimacy, control and, in relation to 
criminal investigation, promote the professionalism of the CID and specialism of 
detectives (Goffman, 1959; Manning, 1997).  
Much of the argument against the use of non-ex-officer CIs relates to the issue of breadth 
of experience and redeployability. Non-ex-officer CIs have not spent time ‘on the streets’ 
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and thus, are limited in their knowledge and skill relating to other areas of police work 
beyond that with which their unit deals. This issue was acknowledged by CIs, as the 
following quote shows: 
 
The people that I work with have obviously done their basic policing, so they’ve 
obviously got a much broader experience of crime than me as my knowledge of 
crime is limited to murder, manslaughter, kidnapping. I don’t know about, well 
I do know about but only because I found out about things like robbery and 
assault. I’ve never been taught those crimes.  
 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
 
However, as mentioned previously in this chapter, this also appeared to be an issue for 
some ex-officer CIs who, despite having spent their time ‘on the streets’, also had to learn 
the relevant procedures, legislation and craft skills necessary for the role of CI, which 
were often specific to the unit in which they had to work. 
 
Evidence was also found to suggest that while the police organisation may be willing to 
accept informal extensions in the CI role/remit, they were not equally as willing to 
acknowledge this at a formal level through the provision of relevant, role specific training. 
For example, at Shorewick MIT, CIs were found to be undertaking the role of FLO 
although only one ex-officer CI (who was also the FLO coordinator for the unit) was doing 
so in an official capacity. As the CI in question explained:  
 
When I retired I was probably one of the most experienced, well I was the most 
experienced, they had a decision. They could have said ‘Right, Barry, you can’t 
do it anymore. Thanks ever so much but we’ll not use your experience, we’ll not 
use you to train anybody anymore’ but they didn’t. They made a decision that 
they would allow me to do it and that meant a change in policy. It’s just been, 
for me, what they’re saying now is, well what they did say was that to be a FLO 
now, you need to be accredited and you need to be a DC because it takes a special 
qualification. I had that qualification from what I’d done before, so they said, 
‘because you were a DC before and you’ve been on detective training course 
before …’ they call it grandfather rights. So you take those rights with you. But 
again that’s just rubbish. There isn’t anybody who couldn’t be trained, it’s a 
simple course; it isn’t difficult. And they always say, ‘Oh, what if you have to 
arrest somebody?’ Well, I’ve never had to arrest anybody. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
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However, as the following quote from another ex-officer CI based at Shorewick MIT 
suggests, while convenient for the organisation, making use of existing skill-sets of ex-
officer CIs arguably set a precedent for CI involvement in Family Liaison work: 
 
He was a longstanding FLO as a Bobby and he retired on the Friday and came 
back on the Monday as a civilian, they moved the goal posts a bit didn’t they, 
and he was allowed to carry on as an FLO. But we weren’t allowed to do it before 
then. Once they let Barry do it they opened the flood gates so to speak. You can’t 
allow one person to do it but nobody else. If I said I wanted to be an FLO they’d 
have to train me up whereas with Barry they don’t. He’s already got it hasn’t he 
which, right or wrong, I don’t know. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Indeed, at Shorewick one non-ex-officer CI had also previously worked as a FLO for the 
MIT on a number of previous ‘jobs’. However, despite having already being assigned the 
role and having the full support of her SIO, the CI in question had been refused formal 
training for the role on the basis of her civilian status:  
 
I wanted to become a FLO, a Family Liaison Officer, and it’s a role I’ve 
undertaken with another FLO as a second FLO with her a lot, and it’s a role I 
really enjoy doing. So I asked, ‘Can I be trained as a FLO?’ My SIO said straight 
away ‘Absolutely, I want you in that role’. But he was knocked back as he was 
told it has to be an accredited PIP detective who does that role. So, I don’t 
understand the reasoning behind it, if I’m honest.  I know one of the arguments 
was well if ... cos quite often in a murder investigation somebody from within 
the family can be responsible or can be implicated and what one of the 
reasonings' was, ‘Well if a civilians doing that role and information’s found out,  
they can’t arrest this person’. But really that’s very similar to if I go and interview 
someone or if I go and take a statement from someone. If they give me 
information that implicates them in that murder, I can’t arrest them, but I can 
make arrangements for them to be arrested. So I don’t really understand that 
argument. And it’s something that I will take further, definitely. I will speak to 
the ACPO lead on Family Liaison investigation because ... I was quite annoyed 
that I was sought of knocked back for that course, especially as I’ve already done 
the role, I’ve been put in a position to do the role … I’ve not really had a proper 
explanation for it … it’s very blurred at the moment I don’t really fully 
understand the reason. But I know it was an ACPO decision which is why I will 
contact the ACPO lead for Family Liaison and just see whether or not there can 
be any movement or not because that’s quite frustrating the fact that I do the role, 
or I’ve done the role in the past, and now I want the training for it but I can’t 
have the training. It doesn’t really make sense. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
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As suggested by the CI in the above quote, it is likely that on some occasions, ex-officer 
CIs were being provided with a more expansive occupational remit as a direct result of 
their working background - in this instance, the role of FLO. This same work was also 
seemingly being denied to non-ex-officer CIs on the basis of their perceived lack of 
training and/or experience. It also suggests a continued observance of, and desire to, 
uphold traditional understandings of detective work which are based on ambiguous 
notions of art and craft. These conditions were thus being maintained by powerful actors 
in the field of policing, in this case, ACPO (now The National Police Chiefs Council 
(NPCC)). This also hints at a developing difference in attitudes towards the use of non-
warranted staff amongst some operational police managers working ‘on the ground’, 
compared to that held by those in the most senior positions of authority within the 
organisation. This can be evidenced clearly in the quote below: 
 
On this particular job at the moment, my FLOs, they’re all police officers but 
normally I’d use civilian FLOs because they don’t need warranted powers for 
that role. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
Despite the arguably frontline nature of their remit and potential for danger and/or 
confrontation often inherent in their role, few of the CIs encountered in the research 
(including those whose role required regular autonomous engagement with members of 
the public) had been provided with any form of self-defence training. Where training in 
self-defence had been provided to CIs it was often only a one-day course and levels of 
competency were not found to be being maintained with consistence at either Shorewick 
or Newbank with any real rigour. At the MIT for example, CIs were required to undertake 
self-defence training annually, although as one ex-officer CI described, ‘it usually starts 
at 9 o’clock and we’re done by lunchtime. They show you videos on how to talk to people 
who are aggressive towards you and that’s your training’ (Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI). 
Furthermore, a number of CIs also remarked upon the inappropriateness of some of the 
training they had received:  
 
Yeah but it was only a one-day thing and it wasn’t appropriate training anyway 
it was for PCSOs. It wasn’t specific enough for us at all! It was highly 
inappropriate the course that they put us on, it wasn’t applicable to us at all so 
we shouldn’t have been there. 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
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Furthermore, where training in self-defence had been provided to CIs, this was often at 
the request of CIs following potentially dangerous and/or intimidating experiences. As the 
following quote from on CI shows:  
 
I asked for self-defence a few years back. I was in a situation in a house … it 
was a Friday afternoon, easy job in quite an affluent area, gorgeous big house 
with big iron gates. Start talking to her (victim), repeat ‘high’ so easy-peasy 
really, everything’s in place. And then she said to me, ‘Last time he was on bail, 
he actually hid in the loft for three days and then came down and raped me and 
beat me’. And I’m sat there think, ‘Holy beeeep!’ At that point I thought if he’s 
in here now, what the friggin hell would I do? How would I get out of here? I 
remember it was near Christmas and I was thinking, right dramatic, ‘Oh my god 
I’m going to die. I’m supposed to be taking my little one to see Father Christmas 
today!’ This is all going through my head because that’s just me being dramatic 
but I did go back to my Sergeant on the Monday morning and say, I would have 
been snookered. If that bloke would have been there and had of come down, 
electric gates were closed behind me, the door was locked because I’d told her 
to lock it because it’s part of the safety planning, you know. No police radio, no 
self-defence training, and that was a big affluent area of (Shorewick BCU) in a 
big posh house. You know, you expect to be pretty safe somewhere like that.  
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
This also raises fundamental questions about the nature of the CI role, specifica l ly, 
whether or not the organisation should be placing CIs in situations which warrant self-
defence training and without also providing them with the accompanying defensive 
equipment (e.g. CS spray, batons etc.). It also suggests that CIs’ civilian status alongside 
a continued perception of the role as support may be hampering the perceived legitimacy 
of their claim to training and/or relevant and necessary equipment (e.g. police radios). 
 
Furthermore, it became clear to the researcher that the provision of training to CIs was 
dependent somewhat fundamentally on the formulation/establishment of a formal career 
structure and opportunities for progression for CIs. This can be evidenced clearly in the 
following quote from one DCI based at Newbank: 
 
The detectives go through the PIP process and there currently isn’t an equivalent 
of that for CIs. You can be signed off as a PIP but what’s the incentive to do 
that? They’re going to be doing the same role anyway if that makes sense 
whereas your police officer, there is an incentive for them to do that because they 
may not be here forever. They might want to get a promotion and move laterally 
or upwards. It’s in their interest to fasten that down. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
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This suggests that until there is a formal career progression structure in place for CIs, 
there will not be an immediate need and/or incentive for investment in their training. 
 
Furthermore, for some CIs, the lack of an established training package coupled with a 
legacy of (largely) indiscriminate ex-officer recruitment was also found to have had a 
marked impact on the degree to which CIs were able to achieve integration within the 
units in which they worked. For example: 
 
My DS sometimes forgets, actually I have no police training, so he’ll ask me to 
do something and I’ll have to be like, ‘I don’t know how to’, and that’s tricky 
because then you’re highlighting what you’re wanting people to forget. Does 
that make sense? So that’s hard sometimes … It can be annoying when you have 
to sort of wave off half of your unit because they’re all going on a training course 
that, really you should be going on too because you do the same role, but because 
you’re a ‘civilian’ … You may as well have a flashing sign above your head. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
For some CIs the differential in training and pay (CI pay will be discussed in more detail 
section 6.4 of this chapter) in particular left them feeling like second class citizens within 
the organisation197. One CI described how she felt ‘let down’ by the organisation with 
regard to its failure to meet the training needs of CIs while continuing to use them in ways 
that went beyond support. Other CIs also described how, while often willing to accept ad 
hoc extensions to their work remit, sometimes they felt ‘abused’ by the organisation for 
similar reasons: 
Yeah, sometimes I do feel a bit like that [abused]. I mean they don’t invest in us 
but they expect the same from us as they do the DC’s. And it does make your 
job more stressful because you kind of hope you’re doing it right … Sometimes 
they give you something like this arson with attempt to endanger life and I was 
like ‘Arrrgh’, you know, ‘What are you doing to me?’ And she (DS) was like, 
‘It’s just criminal damage’. I said ‘yeah but what have I got to do forensically? I 
don’t know what I’ve got to do forensically. Have I got to send this off? Have I 
got do this? Have I got to do that?’ It’s the different things I have to do in relation 
to a serious job like that because I’m sure if CID dealt with it, they’d have 
probably dealt with it differently to the way I did it. I don’t know. So sometimes 
somethings I feel are a bit over my head. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
                                                                 
197 This is supported by work by Atkinson (2013, forthcoming) in relation to CIAs. 
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Training is my biggest gripe … My DS gives me jobs I’m unsure about and 
haven’t had the training for and when I complain she just says ‘You can deal 
with it’. 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
 
Absence and/or lack of training also arguably affords weight to suggestions that CIs 
represent a type of ‘policing on the cheap’ which may in turn also have potentially 
negative effects on public confidence in the effectiveness and/or legitimacy of the policing 
capacity to investigate. Poor levels of training provision for CIs were also intima te ly 
linked to conflicting understandings of the nature of the CI role and, in particular, whether 
or not the role is one of support. As the following quote shows, the CI remit is being 
fundamentally restricted by their lack of training which is in turn, being maintained largely 
by traditional understandings of the CI role as being one of support: 
 
I think I’m always mindful of putting them into dangerous, complex places. So 
for instance, we’ve just had a murder inside a prison. I would feel, rightly or 
wrongly, reluctant to send them into that environment, in terms of dealing with 
people, because we’ve got all of the things about, you know, your self-defence, 
your possession of all of your protective equipment and things, and again, it is 
something that we could do because PCSOs are trained in all of that, but the CIs 
aren’t. So for me in here, I couldn’t use them for certainly a bit part of that 
investigation. 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
As will be discussed later in this section, reluctance on the part of the organisation to 
afford CIs with adequate practical training for their role (including regular refresher 
courses) was also related, at a somewhat fundamental level, to the issue of financ ia l 
constraint. 
 
In a fashion comparable to other non-warranted police designations, for example PCSOs 
(cf O’Neill, 2014), despite in many ways existing as the ‘heir apparent’ to DCs (CIs 
worked in close teams alongside DCs, neither wore uniforms, often used the same radios, 
attended the same briefings, used the same cars and did much of the work of the traditiona l 
DCs), currently CIs faced limited opportunities for promotion and this had a significant 
impact on their employment experience. At the time fieldwork was undertaken 
opportunities for progression at both Shorewick and Newbank were limited to one of three 
options: remain as a CI indefinitely; apply to join the police as a police officer; leave to 
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pursue another career option. While opportunities for what was referred to by managers 
as ‘lateral progression’ were observed (although themselves limited), opportunities for 
CIs to progress vertically were almost non-existent.  
 
That being said, a number of CIs encountered during the fieldwork were found to be 
undertaking supervisory style roles in both formal and informal capacities. For example, 
at Shorewick PPU DA unit, the line manager was non-warranted and performed a 
supervisory role equivalent to a sergeant. At Shorewick MIT, one CI had been assigned 
the role of CCTV coordinator and another, Family Liaison Coordinator. Furthermore, the 
MIT also had a civilian officer manager who (while not engaged in management at an 
operational level) was responsible for the organisation and management of all 
administrative and clerical arrangements within the MIT as well as the allocation of 
available resources to each of the teams. CIs were also observed undertaking supervisory 
style roles in a more informal capacity. For example, at Newbank GRU, one non-ex-
officer CI was considered the ‘acting-up sergeant’ for the unit and in times when the unit 
sergeant was away on training, ill or on leave, the CI in question would take on the role 
of office manager, allocating workloads and or supervising/advising the work/actions of 
less experienced members of personnel (including some detectives). 
 
Despite existing as a key motivating factor in non-ex-officer CIs’ decisions to apply for 
the role, limited opportunities for progression at both Shorewick and Newbank were cited 
by a number of participants as being a potential cause for concern with regard to levels of 
commitment amongst non-ex-officer CIs and also for the overall resilience of the unit. 
The following quote can be considered the typical response of participants when asked 
their feelings on career progression for CIs: 
There’s a young guy here who went to university, he’s 28 and you think, what 
has he got in Shorewick now? There’s nowhere for him to go! … I don’t think 
it’s going to be that long before we start to lose experienced financ ia l 
investigators like Tony who’s a young lad at 28. There’s another guy who’s got 
two young children as well. They’re going to be looking for something else. 
They’re going to want to go to a different organisation where there is a chance 
to move up the ladder, to move up the banding and where there is the possibility 
of supervisors or managers or whatever. It’s a bit different for me because I’ve 
already done thirty years and I might do another 5 or 6 years but I’m happy in 
my role as a financial investigator but it’s not the same for young people who 
are looking to buy a house, they need something to aspire to and we haven’t got 
that here at the moment … It’s been a very difficult time for Shorewick and I 
suppose other forces are exactly the same and are going through the same issues 
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but it’s been very difficult here and I’m not so sure that it’s not going to come 
back and bite them at some stage. 
(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
During the fieldwork Newbank were found to be in the process of trialling a new two tier 
model of CI recruitment. Under the new model CIs would be recruited as either ‘Level 
1s’ or ‘Level 2s’. Level 1 CIs were envisaged to undertake a support style role comparable 
to the way the role had initially been conceived. This would involve tasks such as 
preparing case papers, ensuring file completeness, taking basic victim and witness 
statements, conducting house to house enquiries, securing and preserving forensic (and 
other relevant) evidence, attending court and giving evidence in relation to those aspects 
of any investigation which are within the post holder’s personal knowledge and 
undertaking a case load (where appropriate). By comparison, Level 2 CIs were envisaged 
to undertake the same tasks as part of their role although they would be involved in the 
more specialist areas of investigative work (e.g. domestic abuse) and would also be 
required to undertake more complex victim and witness statements and also conduct 
suspect interviews. Level 2 CIs would also be designated with a range of relevant powers 
under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 whereas those recruited at 
Level 1 would not. Level 2 CIs would also be placed on a higher pay banding than Level 
1 CIs, although at the time the research was undertaken, this had not been decided. This 
new model of CI recruitment was envisaged to provide CIs with an opportunity to 
progress within the role and also arguably lays the foundations for the development of a 
type of hierarchical rank type structure for CIs. One CI interviewed at Shorewick CIT 
described how, upon learning of this new model of recruitment at Newbank, she had 
encouraged her daughter away from recruitment with Shorewick:  
 
 
My daughter has actually just taken a position (as a CI) at Newbank. She wanted 
to apply here (Shorewick) but I told her not to bother because she’s young and 
there’s nothing here for her career-wise. There’s nothing for the younger 
generation in this role at the moment; nowhere for them to progress to. I mean 
for me its fine, I’m not bothered about progression but for the younger ones, 
there’s definitely a ceiling. 
(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
The following quote is also taken from an interview with an experienced ex-officer FI 
who was in the process of leaving Shorewick police in order to work for Newbank: 
279 
 
That’s why I decided to apply for something else and I know when I went for 
my interview and the Chief Inspector said, ‘You must really want to leave 
Shorewick?’ I said, ‘Well I want to be part of something that is going forward, 
not going backwards’. The problem is, if you look now in Shorewick, there is no 
progression for any financial investigators. Previously, because I was a manager 
and then there were financial investigators who were on a band E, financ ia l 
investigators who were on a band D, which were newly, I say new, they’d been 
here probably 2, 2 and a half years, but there was progression for them, for the 
people who were on a D to progress up to an E when somebody left or retired. 
Also, when I retired there was also a civilian manager’s post which is no longer 
there now. So you’ve got to think, what is there?  
 
(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI) 
 
 
For those individuals seeking to build a career with the police as a CI (or ultimately as a 
warranted officer), it is vital that they are offered opportunities to develop within the 
police force, otherwise the organisation will lose the skills and knowledge these CIs have 
gained over the years (possibly to other more forward looking forces and/or 
organisations).  
 
Another possible development with regard to CI progression is the introduction of the 
‘tutor CI’ role parallel to a tutor police officer. Experienced CIs were taking responsibility 
for mentoring and inducting new CIs but with no financial reward and establishing such 
an incentive would seem sensible in dealing with a key disparity between police officers 
and CIs, while also giving CIs a more formalised development opportunity. 
 
Like their warranted colleagues, CIs were entitled to receive an annual Performance 
Development Review (PDR). The purpose of the PDR was to assess an individua l’s 
performance against their current role and determine where development could/should 
facilitate improvements. It is also used to enable line managers to focus staff in working 
towards reaching their full potential, including information in respect of vertical/late ra l 
career progression. Following the publication of Home Office Circular 006/2015, all 
forces in E&W must have an appraisal that allows for officers’ progression through the 
pay scale to be linked to performance. This appraisal process supports the Professiona l 
Policing Framework (PPF) and is currently based on the ‘Assumption of Competence’ 
model - it recognised that the majority of staff, once trained and experienced, usually 
perform their role to a high standard. However, while CIs were able to progress up the pay 
banding/scale each year in the same way as warranted officers, opportunities for 
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progression and training provision were fundamentally restricted and were often 
determined/justified on the basis of the civilian designation of CIs and their alleged 
support role, than on the practical, everyday reality of the role as it was being played out 
‘on the ground’. 
 
 
6.3 Powers 
 
At the time of their introduction, the specific powers of enforcement granted to 
police employee CIs (as outlined under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and 
detailed in Appendix 7) were designated at the discretion of the Chief Constable of each 
force as a means of granting operational flexibility in their deployment. Shorewick and 
Newbank subsequently varied rather considerably in terms of the powers they chose to 
assign to CIs whereby those selected depended on perceived operational needs and senior 
officers’ varying interpretations of the CI role. The discretionary nature with which Chief 
Constables have drawn upon these optional powers in relation to CIs has resulted in a 
piecemeal approach which, in turn, has served to exacerbate inconsistency and ambiguity 
between police forces with regard to CI use and role. 
 
With the exception of FIs who possessed additional role specific powers afforded to them 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002198, only those CIs encountered at Newbank were 
found to have been designated with powers. None of the CIs encountered at Shorewick 
were found to have been designated with police type powers under the Police Reform Act 
2002, although CIs identified working at Shorewick CIT had recently been afforded 
powers to implement direct restorative justice measures and during the course of their 
day-to-day work where appropriate. Where designated (at Newbank), CIs had been 
afforded the complete package of powers at the Chief Constable’s disposal.  However, 
despite the relatively expansive range of powers at their disposal, CIs at Newbank 
appeared to be often unclear about the nature of their abilities as a designated person. 
Indeed, as with their role more broadly, there appeared to exist a distinct lack of clarity 
                                                                 
198 Powers afforded to FIs under the Act (if trained and accredited under section 3 of Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 and if within a category specified in an order issued by the Secretary of State under section 453 
of the same Act) include power to apply for and execute: production orders, search and seizure warrants 
(power expanded to include FIs as part ‘appropriate person’ designation by Serious Crime Act 2007), 
customer information orders, account monitoring orders disclosure orders (Part 8) as well as confiscation 
and restraint orders (Part 2 and/or 4). 
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surrounding the issue of powers amongst CIs and, in particular, the limits of their 
enforcement abilities. This ambiguity was the result of a number of key factors but 
primarily, was considered to have arisen due to poor communication about the role 
following the initial years of CI recruitment at Newbank. However, as the following quote 
demonstrates, the degree of clarity about their enforcement abilities was also found to 
differ between units suggesting discrepancy in awareness of CI abilities between police 
managers:  
 
I think it was different at homicide. I think homicide have always had a list of 
their powers that they can do and I think fraud did but we never did, we kind of 
got overlooked. I don’t know if that was just an administrative thing but it was 
just like ‘Yeah, you can do that, off you go’. So it’s just wing and a prayer I 
suppose, and again I hope I get it right, I hope I don’t get it wrong, have I got the 
power to do that, can I do that can we do this. It’s never properly been clarified.  
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
One CI at Newbank PPU described to the researcher how such ambiguity with regard to 
enforcement abilities of CIs following their initial introduction had led to some rather 
concerning ‘teething problems’: 
 
When we first started, one of the cops who retired one day and started the next 
day was told you can arrest at a police station. So he was getting people to come 
to the station then arresting them. But we haven’t got that power. That wasn’t 
made clear. So he was wrongfully arresting people. But we can’t do that anyway 
cos really under PACE, if someone has come to the station on a voluntary basis 
you shouldn’t really be arresting them. So this ex-cop was in a bit of a flap 
because he’d been wrongfully arresting people. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Under the provisions of the Act, CIs can be afforded the power of arrest on the conditions 
that this provision is only drawn upon by the designated person within a police station 
and, if the individual being arrested has already been arrested by a warranted officer for a 
previous offence. As the following quote demonstrates, it is likely that such ambiguity 
still exists amongst some CIs and also amongst their warranted colleagues resulting in 
only a partial understanding of the conditions restricting a designated CI’s ability to arrest:  
 
Detective: Can you arrest in interview then? 
CI: Yeah. I don’t even have to be in interview. Once somebody’s liberty has 
been taken away and they’ve been arrested, I can arrest over and over again no 
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matter where I am really. As long as they’re already under detention, then that’s 
fine. 
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
 
Unlike warranted officers whose powers are bestowed upon them as part of their status as 
Crown servants under the Office of Constable, powers afforded to non-warranted police 
staff are role specific and thus, are not transferable between roles. However, in discussion 
with some non-ex-officer CIs who had previously worked for the organisation in various 
police staff roles, this fact did not appear to be clear:  
 
I’ve been designated with powers from the enquiry desk, yes but not since. From 
the enquiry desk I’m warranted as a process server, so I can actually report and 
summon. 
(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
I was a PCSO before this so I have my training and powers relating to that but 
we’ve not been designated anything as part of this role, no. 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Evidence was also found to suggest that overlapping legislation affecting the CI role may 
also be causing confusion amongst some CIs with regard to their enforcement abilities. In 
an interview undertaken with two CIs at Shorewick MIT (where none of the CIs had been 
designated with powers under the 2002 Act), both CIs when questioned appeared hesitant 
as to the statutory basis for their enforcement powers, in this instance, their ability to seize 
property: 
 
 
Interviewer: Do you not need to be designated to seize things? 
Interviewees 1 & 2: Nope. 
Interviewee 1: It comes under CPIA (Criminal Procedures and Investigat ions 
Act 1996) doesn’t it? 
Interviewee 2: The way it’s worded in PACE is something like, ‘a police officer 
or designated person or ...’ I can’t remember. I should know it! But it’s worded 
to take account of non-police officers anyway. 
Interviewee 1: If you think there could be something of an evidential nature, then 
you’ve got the powers to seize it. 
Interviewer: Oh right, so that’s under which legislation specifically? 
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Interviewee 1: I think it’s the Criminal Procedures Act. I’m sure that’s what it 
comes under. But if you think something’s evidential you’ve got the powers to 
seize it.  
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs) 
 
Under PACE, section 16 (2), a search warrant may authorise persons199 other than police 
officers to accompany the constable who executes the warrant and seize anything to which 
the warrant relates (2Ab). PACE codes of practice for search and seizure of property 
(Code B, 2.11(c) and Note 3C) also recognise the power of civilians authorised to 
accompany police officers when entering and searching premises under a search warrant 
to exercise the same powers as the police. While these provisions do not allow CIs any 
right to force entry, it does give them the right to be on the premises during the search and 
to search for or seize property without the occupier’s permission. The 2002 Act extends 
many of the powers of search and seizure available to constables under PACE to CIs ‘as 
if he were a constable’. This includes power to apply for and execute search warrants  
under sections 8 and 6 of the 1984 Act, seizure of computer information under section 20 
and also affords CIs the same powers as a constable under section 19 of the 1984 Act with 
regard to general powers of seizure. 
 
Inconsistency in CI use between forces coupled with an ever-present and obvious lack of 
confidence/clarity in the legislative basis for and extent of their enforcement abilities, can 
undoubtedly serve to undermine CI claims to authority in certain situations. This was 
found to be particularly true with regard to awareness and treatment of CIs in the wider 
criminal justice system as the following quote demonstrates: 
 
I had another job when I was sat in court waiting to make sure someone got 
remanded for the safety of the victim and this defending lawyer stood there and 
said, ‘If this incident was so serious, why was the matter not dealt with by a 
specialist firearms or tactical unit? It was not. Was it dealt with by a serious and 
organised crime department? It was not. Was it even dealt with by a DC or even 
by a PC? No. If this matter was so serious, why was it dealt with by a mere 
civilian investigator?’  
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
                                                                 
199 This includes any suitably qualified or skilled person or an expert in a particular field whose presence is 
needed to help accurately identify the material sought or to advise where certain evidence is most likely to 
be found and how it should be dealt with. 
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However, lack of awareness and inconsistency with regard to CI use between forces and 
the limits of their powers can also have the opposite effect in that CIs can imply, or let 
members of the public assume, that they have more powers of enforcement and authority 
than they actually do. This highlights not only the distinction between police ‘power’ and 
‘powers’ with police power reflecting the notion of the police as the embodiment of state 
authority, but also shows how CIs are able to manipulate consent to avoid having to draw 
upon powers that they do not possess. As is implied in the following quotes, in some 
circumstances, CIs may rely upon the public’s lack of awareness of the designation and 
their authority in order to undertake their role: 
  
You don’t necessarily need to know where the line is. If you’re in someone’s 
house and you say ‘right we’ll take that off you’ and you say you can, then you 
can. Who knows more about the law, them or you? And then if I take it and 
then find out I can’t take it I’ll say right you can have it back now (both laugh). 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
With PCSOs it’s different because the public know who they are, they’re in 
different uniforms and it even says it on their backs, P-C-S-O. With us it’s 
different because the cops here don’t wear a uniform. There was an older cop 
here a while back who was transferred from another division to us and it was 
only when I wasn’t asked to go on cuff training that he realised I wasn’t a cop. 
‘I thought you were a cop’, ‘Err, No’ (laughs). So unless we tell them, you know, 
‘I’m not a cop’, how do they know what we can and can’t do. 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
At Newbank CIs had recently been provided with additional powers which included the 
ability to undertake section 18 searches of properties, something which they had 
previously been told they were not able to do. Such periodic changes to CI powers and the 
range of optional powers arguably contribute to a degree of confusion about what they 
can and cannot do, which extends to their police officer colleagues and the public in 
general. One CI based at Newbank PPU told the researcher how the existing lack of clarity 
with regard to CI powers made her job ‘more stressful’ as it meant a need to frequently 
assert authority in situations where her role as CI led her into communication/deal ings 
with practitioners based in the wider criminal justice: 
 
If you go to the wider CJ system we’ve got to start getting respected out there 
too. Getting magistrates to take us seriously is sometimes difficult. It’s important 
that the solicitors know who we are and what we are capable of and what we will 
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do. It is horrible when they’re saying ‘who are you? ‘Oh, a case investigator ’. 
‘Do you have a collar number?’ ‘Yes I do’. ‘And do you have the right kind of 
powers to do this?’ We get that one quite a lot. ‘Can you do that?’ ‘Yes I can. 
Yes, I can and yes I will.’ 
 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
 
Furthermore, it quickly became clear to the researcher that CIs had differing feelings 
towards being designated with powers. There appeared to a notable distinction between 
the working backgrounds of CIs with regard to their feelings towards being designated 
with powers, with ex-officer CIs appearing as most resistant to the idea. As the following 
quotes demonstrate: 
 
No. I personally wouldn’t want powers. I came here to be a support staff member 
not frontline. We don’t get paid enough for that (laughs). 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Absolutely not. That’s not what I signed up for and, that’s the work that the 
Bobbies should be doing. That’s what they’re being paid for otherwise we’re 
doing their job for them.’ 
 
(Shorewick, GRU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
You’re joking aren’t you!?! I’m off to Savers down the road when I’m done, not 
getting paid half the wage to do basically the same job … I know of other forces 
where they’ve given their CIs powers like officers. That’s not support in my 
book, its policing on the cheap and I’m not interested in that but obviously it’s 
different for different people. 
 
(Shorewick, CIT, DC)    
For other (mainly ex-officer) CIs the issue of power designation was somewhat 
fundamentally linked to their feelings on pay and/or the nature of the role and level of 
responsibility being afforded; with power comes responsibility which was something that 
not all CIs were happy to have bestowed upon them. As the following quotes demonstrate, 
not all CIs were keen to be designated with powers: 
Me personally, I wouldn’t want to do that. I’m support staff. If you want people 
to start rolling about with people then let detectives do that. No. I personally 
wouldn’t want powers. I came here to be a support staff member not frontline. 
We don’t get paid enough for that. If the pay reflected that then I’d probably say 
yeah but I can’t see that ever happening. Not for us on MIT. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
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I’m not that particularly bothered about powers or doing anything more than 
supporting because, for example, interviewing suspects, you do work some 
stupid hours. If you’re interviewer, you can be interviewing at 2 or 3 o’clock in 
the morning some mornings. When you’ve got people in custody you’re against 
the clock. It’s very intense being an interviewer and I particularly don’t want 
that. I don’t want that responsibility. Leave that to them who get paid a lot more 
than me (laughs). And it is a very responsible job that. It’s a very specialist role 
and it is very intensive as well, you have to know your legislation. The work they 
have to put in, even though they might just say ‘no comment’ at the end of the 
day, the actual work and the planning that they have to do for interviewing these 
days, which again, is another thing that you never used to get. You never used 
to get interview plans. You used to just go in, sit down and talk to people. Have 
a cigarette and a cup of tea and talk to them and eventually somebody would get 
charged. But now it’s all very professionalised. For me, the pay we get as civvies 
doesn’t match the responsibility of that role so I’m not bothered. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
When discussing the issue of power designation, a number of CIs made reference to ‘any 
person’ powers which are available to all police staff (and members of the public), in 
particular, the power to make a citizen’s arrest and to engage in the reasonable use of 
force (when/where necessary). As the following quotes illustrate: 
I mean obviously you can arrest people as a civilian can’t you? Everybody can 
if someone’s a civilian, but we haven’t been designated any other powers. We 
haven’t got powers of entry or anything like that. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
There’s always the citizen’s power of arrest isn’t there. You’ve always got that. 
So it’s not like we’re completely powerless. 
 (Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
Both the power of arrest and use of reasonable force (without warrant) are indeed statutory 
powers available to any person ‘other than a constable’ which are laid down in section 24 
(4) and (5) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (subsequently amended by 
section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) and section 3 (1) of the 
Criminal Law Act 1967 200 . These of course exist in addition to a non-warranted 
individual’s ability to arrest for breach of the peace under common law. However, while 
                                                                 
200 Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 provides clarification of the operation of 
the existing common law and statutory defences in relation to use of force/self-defence powers. Section 76, 
section 76 (9) in particular, neither abolishes the common law and statutory defences nor does it change the 
current test that allows the use of reasonable force. 
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the law provides general powers that allow any person to make a citizen's arrest, the 
circumstances under which such an arrest may be undertaken are limited. For example, a 
non-warranted individual is only able to arrest where it does not appear reasonably 
practicable for a police constable to make the arrest and the person making the arrest has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such an arrest is necessary to prevent the person being 
arrested from: (a) causing physical injury to himself or any other person; (b) suffer ing 
physical injury; (c) causing loss of or damage to property; or (d) making off before a 
constable can assume responsibility for him or her. 
 
Existing literature has shown how police PCSOs201 and security officers (cf Button, 2007) 
rely on an ambiguous amalgam of designated, accredited, statutory and common law 
powers (amongst others) for aspects of their jobs. However, the apparent confidence with 
which some CIs appeared willing to draw upon such legal tools undoubtedly raises some 
concern about the potentially dubious legality of CI actions in some instances (and 
regularity with which this may be taking place). This, in turn, raises fundamenta l 
questions about both the nature of the role currently being undertaken by CIs in E&W 
and also the extent to which CIs could potentially impact on the overall legitimacy of the 
CID. In particular, it raises fundamental concerns about the potential for misconduct, but 
in a broader sense, also draws attention to the contemporary (and highly civilianise d) 
character of the police frontline. In this sense, the availability and willingness of some 
non-warranted individuals to enforce the law and with that, their authority as enforcers of 
the law, may also serve to call into question the overall competency of the CID.  
 
The capacity of CIs to secure respect and legitimacy from their warranted colleagues is 
hindered at a fundamental level by their lack of shared experience with officers with 
regard to training and initial time spent policing the streets. However, their limited and in 
some cases complete absence of enforcement powers undoubtedly further inhibited their 
integration within the CID, leading to the denial of their legitimacy and credibility as 
investigators in the eyes of some of their warranted colleagues. This was found to be 
                                                                 
201 The range of powers available to PCSOs under the Police Reform Act 2002 differs somewhat from those 
available to CIs, EOs and DOs. Provisions contained within the Act allow PCSOs power to detain an 
individual for a specified period of time, power to search, seize and retain and power to use reasonable 
force (in order to detain a person). Provisions contained within the Act (Schedule 22A) only afford powers 
of detention and use of reasonable force to CIs in respect to individuals detained within a police station. 
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reinforced by the organisation through discrepancies in training, opportunities for 
progression and also in terms of pay and level of job security afforded to CIs. 
 
However, for some the necessity for those working within the CID to be designated with 
powers of enforcement was in itself, subject to debate. As the following quote from one 
police manger based at Shorewick MIT illustrates: 
 
We don’t use our police powers daily here like patrol or custody. Your next 
question is, well why have you got police powers then and why have you got 
people working here with police powers? Someone has to use police powers. 
Yes, we arrested our suspect on this particular investigation but we could have 
imported the arrest, as in we could bring a police officer in to make the arrest. 
Yeah that’s a fair point to do that but we did use it on here because just it was 
easier. But day to day our boys and girls aren’t using warranted powers at all. So 
for that reason they don’t need to have warranted powers. But someone has to 
… There is a time and a place where we want someone to use warranted powers 
and that’s what I call frontline, when they’re having to go out there and use 
warranted powers. Our investigators don’t need to do that. 
 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
While the opinion of the police manager demonstrated in the above quote with regard to 
the need for powers within the CID is likely framed by a view of the work carried out 
within the MIT, it is nonetheless evidence of a shift in attitude amongst some warranted 
officers with regard to their understanding of the police frontline and with that, the role 
of the detective. 
 
6.4 Remuneration 
 
Despite generally citing that they felt valued by their colleagues in the units in 
which they were found operating, most CIs encountered felt that there was a lack of 
valuing and appreciation of their role at force level which could be seen to be reflected in 
their lack of training for the role and opportunities for progression but most specifica l ly, 
in the level of pay they received for the role. One ex-officer CI described how the 
distinction in CI pay compared to that of warranted officers made her feel like ‘the poor 
relative of the office’:  
I feel like part of the family, but a less than equal part. We don’t get treated the 
same, the same privileges. Pay is the best example; we get paid much less for 
doing the same work. 
 (Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)  
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Like other members of police staff, CIs are generally paid according to the local 
employment market rate. In the current study those CIs who were employed directly by 
the police organisation at both sites received a starting wage of around £21,000 - £24,000 
depending on experience and the nature of the role, namely, whether or not the role was 
deemed to be specialist. This is a higher starting rate of pay than that of many other police 
staff, for example, PCSOs, whose starting wage (at the time the study was undertaken) 
could range anywhere between £16,500 to £21,000 and was arguably reflective of the 
prestigious and perceived specialist nature of the work being undertaken by the CID. 
Interestingly, both of the agency CIs encountered at Newbank received a higher rate of 
pay per hour (£14.60) than their publicly employed counterparts. At the time the 
fieldwork was undertaken, DC pay began at around £24,000 and could rise to up to 
£40,000 with pay increments depending upon length of service, experience and skill202.  
 
In addition to their wage, CIs were also found to be in receipt of a range of other pay 
entitlements and allowances which supplement their basic pay. These included shift 
allowances and weekend working pay, equivalent to 22 days annual leave initially (and 
rising to 30 days (depending on service)), on call/standby allowance and a career average 
pension. CIs were also paid at an enhanced rate if asked to swap shifts and only given 5 
days’ notice, a benefit their warranted colleagues were not afforded. Distinctions in pay 
were also found to exist between CIs on the basis of the type of work they were engaged 
in and the nature of their employment status i.e. whether or not they were employed 
directly by the police organisation or whether they were employed via contracts agreed 
with a private sector recruitment agency. For example, CIs working on the MIT were 
found to be being paid a grade higher than other CIs identified working at Shorewick 
suggesting a pay hierarchy between CI roles, a distinction that was found to be 
resented/rejected by other CIs at Shorewick as the following quote illustrates: 
 
I know the MIT investigators are on a grade higher than me, which, that does 
stick in the clack a bit because they get an action plan, go do this, go to them. 
And they’re a grade higher than me, whereas I have to think more.  
 
(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI) 
 
 
                                                                 
202  This was amended following recommendations set forth in the Winsor review (2011/2012) and 
subsequent legislative amendments which link officer pay to type of work/performance rather than length 
of service and assumed skill. 
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A similar structure was also found to be in place at Newbank and proved to be a key point 
of aggravation amongst some CIs, particularly those identified working in the PPU who 
perceived their role to be more frontline in nature, even more so to that of some warranted 
officers. As the following quote demonstrates: 
I don’t understand how they can justify somebody, a case investigator on other 
roles, paying them more money that they do us. The risk attached to the job that 
we do has got to be the highest in the whole force!  
(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI) 
 
Furthermore, CIs who were employed directly by the organisation were afforded sick pay 
- should it be required - whereas agency CIs (at Newbank) were not. Similarly, stipulat ions 
in the contracts of agency CIs meant that they were paid for their lunch breaks (36 
minutes) whereas those employed directly by the organisation were not:  
 
Yeah we get paid overtime which is time and half and on a Sunday its double 
time. But then for things like bank holidays; I wouldn’t get anything extra for 
bank holidays whereas an officer would get extra money, a day back in lieu. And 
when you’re sat there on Christmas Day thinking, I’m getting paid plain time for 
this, what the hell am I doing. I’m sat eating a Pot Noodle while my mum and 
dad are eating Christmas dinner, and the Bobbies next to you on four times as 
much as you anyway because they’re an officer plus the overtime rate plus the 
day back. It’s just doesn’t seem right. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the distinct employment status of CIs 
compared to that of their warranted colleagues was considered by some to be a major 
obstacle impeding their integration within the unit.  As the following quote illustra tes, 
structural differences between CI and officer roles alongside their civilian employee 
status, left some CIs pessimistic as to the extent to which they could become integrated 
within the CID: 
 
 
I think it’s always there. Civilians will NEVER be police officers and will never 
be treated the same as police officers either. I think when the force treats you 
differently to a police officer, and then they expect the same from you without 
giving you the same things as they do a police officer… You know, I’ve worked 
Christmas days, I’ve worked Christmas Eves alongside police officers who have 
been getting 3, 4 times the amount of money I’ve been getting. And I’ve been 
on a normal shift. Even though I’ve come in on a bank holiday, I don’t get paid 
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any extra for a bank holiday whereas a police officer might get 3, 4 times as 
much as they usually would. So they expect you to come in on that Christmas 
Day but they don’t want to give you the same privileges. And I think it will 
always be … when people introduce you it’s always like, ‘Oh yeah, Claire’s a 
civvie’. I’m the civilian that works in this office. And it’s always been like that. 
 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
 
As mentioned previously, a number of CIs encountered were also found to be undertaking 
a supervisory role in both a formal and informal capacity. Even where these roles were 
formally acknowledged by the organisation, in some instances civilian supervisors and/or 
managers were still being paid less than some of the warranted officers they supervised 
and also, less than their publicly employed counterparts. For example, Shorewick DAU 
was headed by a civilian manager who was being paid at a rate both less than that of the 
warranted officer identified working within her team and also less than that of her 
warranted equivalents (Sergeants) in other force areas:   
 
I’d rate Hannah higher than some of the police sergeants I’ve worked with 
because even though she’s not getting paid as much as them which is a detriment 
to the force really because they should be paying her for what she’s worth … 
She’s an asset to the unit because she’s been doing that role for so long, she can 
rattle through assessments like they’re going out of fashion. 
 
(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, police officer) 
 
 
Where CIs were found to be undertaking supervisory style roles in a less formal capacity 
(e.g. at Shorewick MIT (CCTV coordinator and FLO coordinator) and Newbank GRU), 
these roles were not being matched in terms of appropriate pay. This can be evidenced in 
the following quote:  
Keith (Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) - In my role, you are ultimate ly 
supervising staff as a CCTV coordinator. But I get paid no extra money for it. 
The people you’re supervising are getting paid more than you are! Which isn’t 
right? And so from a civilian point of view you cannot be, like you can get 
someone (officer) acting up to be sergeant or acting up to be an inspector, you 
cannot act up to the next role as a civilian. But what they can do is pay you! If 
what you are doing is over and above your role profile, they can pay you what 
they call an honorarium, either on a monthly basis or as a one off payment if it’s 
something that you’ve just done for a short term. Now I’ve been and asked for 
that and said, ‘Right. There’s my role profile. That’s a band E which is the band 
above me and it’s pretty much the same except it says here about supervis ing 
staff and checking staff’s work and this that and the other? Now that’s what I’m 
doing as far as I can see but they wouldn’t let me have it. They said I didn’t 
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qualify for it. Because unbelievably in this force, there are supervisors in other 
places who get paid less than the staff they supervise. Now surely that can’t be 
right?  It’s like have a sergeant getting paid less than the DCs isn’t it? Surely 
responsibility should equate with pay? But no apparently because there are 
others in this force where the supervisors get paid less than those they supervise 
… I’ve said in a meeting with a DI, I’m not doing it anymore. And I basically 
got very bluntly told, ‘You’ll do as you’re told otherwise you’ll be out on your 
ear’ type of thing. So it puts you in a difficult position doesn’t it?  
Mike (Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) - Yeah and when it comes to him re-
applying for his job again who do you think they’re going to pick? ‘Yes sir’, ‘No 
sir’ or ‘three bags full sir’? 
 
The evidence presented above is also suggestive of potential for the abuse of power by 
some senior officers/managers with regard to the CI role. As will be discussed in more 
detail in a subsequent section (6.5) of this chapter, the current research was undertaken at 
a time of significant organisational restructuring and thus, CIs were found to be acutely 
aware of how this would likely impact on the security of their role and position with the 
organisation. As the above quote suggests, in some instances this may have resulted in 
CIs feeling under pressure to accept extensions to their remit which might stretch their 
role beyond that of support without receiving corresponding pay. Furthermore, the 
distinct lack of clarity about the role of CI and absence of up-to-date role profiles within 
a number of the units visited, allowed for a rather substantial degree of operational 
flexibility with regard to the deployment of CIs which may have been exploited to a 
degree by some unit managers. 
 
Unlike their warranted counterparts whose employment conditions (in particular, concern 
over issues relating to their remuneration) are fervently defended by the Police 
Federation, the civilian status of CIs currently excludes them from membership of this 
‘professional body’. They are however able to secure representation through membership 
of trade unions (namely UNISON) (which is prohibited for their warranted colleagues) 
and at the organisational level through the Police Staff Council (PSC)203 who negotiate 
national agreements on basic pay and conditions of service for all police staff and PCSOs 
                                                                 
203 The PSC is the organisation that brings together unions and employers for the police staff workforce to 
negotiate pay and conditions. The PSC represents PCCs, Chief Constables and the Home Secretary of E&W  
and the employees of police organisation. The PSC consists of fourteen members, seven from ‘the 
employer’s side’ and seven from ‘the Trade Union side’ (Police Staff Council, 2015) and was, until 2004, 
referred to under the title of Police Staff Support Council. The national agreements of the PSC are only 
binding if PCCs and Chief Constables agree to incorporate them within the contracts of employment of 
their employees. 
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in E&W (excluding the Metropolitan Police). However, the national agreements of the 
PSC are only binding if PCCs and Chief Constables agree to incorporate them within the 
contracts of employment for their employees. Forces are free to choose to implement only 
certain elements of PSC decisions, or none at all. Furthermore, representation of police 
employees is likely to be further weakened in the coming months and years as marked 
distinctions in employment terms and conditions between officers and staff 
disproportionately affect the job security and bargaining power of police staff. This issue 
will be discussed in more detail in the following section (6.5). 
 
 
6.5 Job Security 
  
During the time fieldwork was undertaken at both Shorewick and Newbank, the 
police organisation was in the midst of a large scale spending review and was facing 
intense pressure to cut its existing budget by 20%. This amounted to cuts of around £2.4 
billion between March 2010 and March 2015. Efforts to accommodate these cuts included 
forces initiating an extensive overhaul of current practices and a large scale, rigorous 
restructuring of the organisation which involved making savings through reducing both 
pay and non-pay costs. Pay savings include salaries and overtime whereas non-pay 
savings may include ‘temporary and agency costs, injury and ill health costs, other 
employee costs, premises, transport, supplies and services, third party payments, and 
capital financing’ (HMIC, 2012: 75-76). As noted by Ellison and Brogden (2013: 63) 
‘such economically- induced ‘downsizing’ [of the scale by which recent (and continuing) 
drives have taken place] has no obvious precedent in modern societies (except, perhaps, 
during wartime emergencies)’. No common standard of cuts exists and there is much 
variation between forces with regard to their individual strategies for cost reduction 
(HMIC, 2012: 27) with some forces appearing to make greater pay savings than others. 
Such variation was also observed between Shorewick and Newbank and will be discussed 
in this section in relation to the issue of CI job security.  
 
As employees of the police organisation, responses provided by CI participants were 
noticeably framed by an acute awareness of imminent budget cuts and thus, the 
impending threat to their job security. Unlike their warranted counterparts who are 
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protected by stipulations in their contracts against redundancy,204 CIs, like other members 
of police staff, remain the only viable option for those police managers tasked with an 
unenviable job of selecting those whose positions were subject to review. This was 
understandably found to have had a significant impact on the day to day working 
experiences and overall employment experience of CIs. A number of CIs at both 
Shorewick and Newbank described feeling ‘let down’ by the organisation and 
‘disappointed’ by the lack of consideration and the perceived appreciation/valuing of CIs. 
As the following quote demonstrates: 
We’ve all been let down recently with the reviews because we’ve taken the brunt 
of it because they can’t get rid of officers. A lot of people have given a lot of 
loyalty to this force and … so when the review came and it was like, well actually 
you’re just a civilian and you’re just a number, then that hurt a bit. I’ve only been 
here 8 years but I worked with people who had worked here 13, 14, 15 years and 
they were made redundant as easy as anything because they were just a number, 
yet they’d worked here longer and had as much if not more experience in this 
particular area than some of the Bobbies. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
The current drive to make substantial financial savings meant that in some instances, CIs 
were being required to reapply for their positions with the organisation. For some CIs, 
this would be the third time in which the organisation had required them re-interview for 
their existing position in recent years. The degree of uncertainty surrounding the stability 
of the CI role was understandably found to be a key factor affecting the day-to-day and 
overall employment experience of CIs and was found to be a common trend at both sites. 
However, anxiety about the future of their role and employment with the police 
organisation appeared most notable at Shorewick whose strategy of cost cutting included 
a more stringent approach to the reduction of numbers of personnel. As discussed earlier 
in this section, this was based on the logic that officers can be redeployed if needed, to 
other parts of the organisation, allegedly improving its overall resilience. However, in 
stark contrast, at Newbank CI recruitment was in fact found to be a key part of the force’s 
                                                                 
204 The relationship of a police constable with their force is regulated by both statute and the common law. 
There is no contract of employment between a police officer and his force which would allow the force to 
terminate the officer’s appointment by giving notice. Instead, the circumstances in which a police officer’s  
appointment may be terminated for those up to and including the rank of chief superintendent, are set out 
in regulations made under section 50 of the Police Act 1996, in relation to misconduct and poor 
performance, or section 1 of the Police Pensions Act 1976, in relation to compulsory retirement on the 
grounds of age, disablement or the efficiency of the force (Winsor, 2011: 182). 
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current drive to ensure cost-efficiency and value for money. Rather than facing 
redundancy, as was the case at Shorewick, CIs based at Newbank were being used to 
replace retiring officers with new recruitment waves taking place during the course of the 
fieldwork. However, regardless of this, some CIs remained apprehensive as to the degree 
to which their role as civilians within the organisation could ever be completely secure:  
Well, we keep getting conflicting messages. We were being told first that we 
were being kept until the Olympics and then we could go so there’s that sort of 
uncertainty. And then I was told by someone higher up that the future of the 
police service is going this way (more civilian recruitment) and you’ve got 
nothing to worry about. But even so, our job descriptions and contracts, they can 
get rid of us a lot quicker than they can a cop but for the moment, cops seem to 
be going at first, the older cops, because of the nature of the money saving, under 
the A19 ruling, so they’re going first. Their contracts are being ended after 30 
years and we’re kind of filling in the gaps left by those who are going. So if it 
keeps going that way, we should be fine but you just don’t know. 
(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
The civilian and employee status of CIs arguably act to maintain a pervading level of 
concern and/or anxiety amongst CIs with regard to the security of their employment with 
the police organisation, particularly within the current climate of austerity. As stated in 
the above quote, the employment terms and conditions contained within CI contracts as 
employees of the organisation were fundamentally distinct from those afforded to 
warranted officers as sworn, independent servants of the Crown. This in turn also likely 
served to perpetuate the secondary status of CIs and their role within the organisat ion 
compared to that of officers. Furthermore, the strategy being employed by Newbank with 
regard to efforts to cut costs raises significant questions about the likelihood of continued 
(and further) mission creep at Newbank amongst CIs. If CIs are to take up roles previously 
undertaken by warranted officers, is it not likely that they will inevitably become drawn 
into work that is beyond their existing remit and which requires additional training? This 
in turn arguably gives weight to arguments that the utilisation of CIs is simply a type of 
‘policing on the cheap’. Evidence presented in this chapter also suggests that a rather 
inconsistent approach to cost cutting may be taking place which will likely result in even 
further inconsistency between police forces with regard to the utilisation of CIs (and other 
non-warranted members of police personnel). 
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Impending cuts were also found to be a key concern for participants in the current study 
with regard to the future resilience of the organisation. As one CI (Shorewick, CIT, non-
ex-officer) expressed during interview: ‘There are just cuts and cuts and cuts and cuts and 
it makes you think, at what point do things start collapsing?’ In stark contrast to the 
approach adopted by Newbank, at Shorewick costs were hoped to be lowered through 
implementing an immediate ban on recruitment (warranted and non-warranted)205  and 
through the large scale removal of individuals (warranted (where applicable) and non-
warranted) from posts. As the following extract from interview with one police manager 
at Shorewick MIT illustrates, the rationale on which this strategy had been devised was 
fundamentally grounded in the perceived need to maintain resilience through the retention 
of multifunctioning, re-deployable personnel: 
When we’ve all sat down and had some sort of consultation about shrinking the 
MIT, you know, we all went, and for the right reasons, with having more officers 
than support staff, whereas under the old structure there were a lot more CIs 
there but because we’ve … I couldn’t tell you the exact numbers, but say if we 
had on hundred and it was 50/50 for instance, we would now be going to 80/20 
because we’re shrinking so small that we need our staff to be multifunctioning. 
We could go to the training but that’s more cost again so you know, we are 
balancing the finances. 
(Shorewick, MIT, SIO) 
 
As one CI discussed, this approach signified a notable U-turn in attitudes and/or approach 
of Shorewick towards civilianisation in recent years: 
It’s the cuts that have thrown things back. When I first started they were 
civilianising loads of roles because they were wanting police officers to be police 
officers. They wanted them to go out and be on the streets and deal with 
witnesses and victims so that it looked like there were more police officers 
whereas there were police officers who before, were being used as typists and 
things. They were getting paid a hell of a lot more than a civilian typist could be 
and they were bringing in a lot of civilians. Now, because of the cuts, they’ve 
got rid of them all and we seem to be going back to the way it was before. 
(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI) 
 
However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, CIs have developed a valuable wealth of 
knowledge and expertise in their role with regard to certain key tasks (e.g. disclosure) and 
also with regard to their working relationships/affiliations with the victims (includ ing 
                                                                 
205  The only exception to this was the recruitment of Special Constables although even this had been 
restricted due to costs of training. 
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businesses), offenders and other local bodies/individuals (e.g. council CCTV operators). 
These networks of communication and trust are valuable to the organisation in terms of 
resilience, efficiency and also in terms of public confidence and satisfaction in the police. 
It is important therefore that, in these trying times, the police as an organisation does not 
discount the significance of the CI role and in turn, does not overlook the potential impact 
of their wide scale removal. Concern over the potentially negative impact of reductions 
in CI numbers were cited by a number of participants at Shorewick with regard to the 
issue of resilience and the value of CI expertise. This can be evidenced in the following 
quote: 
I think as well that the problem at the moment is that it’s all to do with saving 
money without any contingency plan. I think if you look at the MIT teams, they 
got rid of nine or ten retired police officers didn’t they? And then they’re 
advertising for detectives to go in the MIT teams! You’re thinking those people 
(CIs) who they’ve let go were all once DCs or DSs with a lot of experience that 
they were getting for a lot less money than they will be paying a detective. It just 
doesn’t make sense. It’s been a very difficult time for Shorewick and I suppose 
other forces are exactly the same and are going through the same issues but it’s 
been very difficult here and I’m not so sure that it’s not going to come back and 
bite them at some stage. 
(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI) 
 
During the course of the fieldwork undertaken at Shorewick, the MIT was subject to 
review and was in the process of formulating a reorganisation strategy with regard to its 
current structure and numbers of personnel. Once implemented, the results of this review 
would see CI numbers drop from 16 to just 6.  
 
The current climate of austerity and associated methods of financial constraint being 
employed by the police in an effort to satisfy pressure from above meant that private 
security involvement with regard to the provision of CIs had all but ceased at both 
Shorewick and Newbank. This was found to likely be a strategic decision made by the 
Chief Constable of each site: 
We did have agency. We had G4S working with us last year for quite a bit when 
we were inundated but I think the Chief Constable has said this year that were 
not employing any because of the budget cuts. 
(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) 
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Due to the differences in pay and employment conditions between publicly employed and 
agency CIs (discussed above), agency CIs were perceived as less cost-efficient than their 
publicly employed counterparts who were paid less and who, due to added benefits of 
their employment with the organisation - in particular sick pay - were alleged to be more 
malleable with regard to their deployment: 
The problem with CIs is that they have different regulations to police officers 
and I know there’s some issues which I’ve come across, some of the agency staff 
that were on agency contracts, couldn’t do certain jobs, for example I’ve got a 
secure hospital, so there’s a lot of very, very poorly people in there and it can be 
quite a dangerous place to go into and some of the CIs, because we have a lot of 
crimes, that we have to go in there and investigate and incident, a lot of the CIs 
would say, on and agency contract, ‘If we go off sick or get injured as a result of 
something on duty, we don’t get sick pay’. So a lot of the work that I’ve had to 
deal with mine on agency contracts have had to be risk assessed, what they can 
and can’t do. 
(Newbank, DCI) 
 
This suggests that, as part of their remit, CIs may sometimes be being encouraged to enter 
into compromising situations within regard to their safety and/or wellbeing and for which 
they may not possess the relevant training. 
 
Furthermore, a number of participants (warranted and non-warranted) raised their concern 
over the likely impact large scale reduction in CI numbers could potentially have on the 
efficiency by which investigations are undertaken and also, for the resilience of the CID 
overall. A number of participants made reference to the potential emergence of a ‘demand 
gap’ within the CID which would struggle to be filled by DCs alone. This concern was 
found to be being exacerbated by acknowledgement of the fact that, despite the lure of 
pay and prestige, the appeal of ‘moving into clothes’ may not be as pronounced as it 
perhaps once was for some eligible PCs. As evidence presented below suggests: 
They’re having problems recruiting detectives now because none of the younger 
cops want to become DCs because of the unsociable working hours. I don’t 
blame them really. 
(Newbank, GRU, DC) 
Yeah we get paid more (than PCs and CIs) but there are drawbacks to the job 
too (being a DC) that the younger ones are becoming aware of as well like we 
have to work stupid hours if there’s a big job on and you can get called out any 
time of day or night here. If there’s a murder a 2 o’clock in the morning and 
you’re needed you have to go and you might be working over all that week.  It’s 
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not for everyone and I know they’re having some trouble getting young Bobbies 
to want to come and do their training and get their accreditation cos it’s not what 
they want when they’ve got young families. It’s not like it used to be in the ‘Life 
on Mars’ era when most of cops were men and they had wives who stayed at 
home and looked after the kids. It’s not like that anymore so when they’re 
weighing it up; other than the pay it’s not really that appealing for them is it? 
(Shorewick, MIT, DC) 
 
As was the case at Shorewick MIT, busy periods often resulted in the agreement of fixed 
term contracts with private security agencies for the short term supply of personnel and, 
as the following quote describes, in the more recent ad hoc utilisation of special constables 
to assist with CID enquiries: 
 
The murder that came in last weekend, we’re using special constables now. That 
was unheard of twenty years ago! You would never have thought of drafting in 
special constables to do, you know, unpaid work, to do enquiries. They’re 
assisting on house-to-house enquiries, where you would normally have police 
officers going round knocking on doors asking questions, it’s now special 
constables that are doing that. So the financial constraints are just, everything is 
just cutting down, cutting down. We’ve got to do it but whether the investigat ion 
is going to suffer ultimately, only time will tell. 
(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) 
 
Furthermore, should numbers of CIs continue to decline through strategies of reverse-
civilianisation in some forces as pay savings take hold, it is somewhat inevitable that 
warranted DCs will resort to taking on even greater workloads which in turn will likely 
impact upon the quality of service and efficiency of the CID overall. It is also likely that 
more specialised work including work whereby CIs have come to build up a degree of 
expertise and/or social capital (as was seen particularly at Shorewick CIT), may be 
absorbed by those less qualified/knowledgeable and/or with inefficient training in that 
particular area of investigative work. This was found to be the case during fieldwork at 
Newbank:  
 
We’ve had it recently where some of those in process of becoming DCs but who 
have not yet passed their exams are being used to investigate rape cases! But 
that’s just the kind of pressure we’re under here. 
(Newbank, GRU, PC (trainee DC))  
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This finding is similar to that identified by Chatterton (2008: xii) in a report conducted 
on behalf of the Police Federation and in which he concluded that trainee detective 
constables (TDCs) are frequently ‘not treated as trainees, are given a full crime-load 
immediately (sometimes before they start their course) and they are not mentored as well 
as they should be’. Conflicting organisational demands coupled with increased budgetary 
pressures renders both warranted and non-warranted personnel vulnerable to mission 
creep and boundary blurring. However, the current nature of austerity is such that ‘staff 
cuts relate not to essential competence by civilians but according to pragmatism and 
local/organisational politics’ (Brogden and Ellison, 2013: 62). This of course then begs 
the question, who will (and can) be drawn upon to conduct that ‘civilian work’ in the 
future? Furthermore, as discussed previously, civilian employees do not have the same 
defined trade association influence as do officers through their membership with Police 
Federation. ‘Nor can they be identified in public mythology as crucial to ‘the fight against 
crime’’ (Brogden and Ellison, 2013: 70). Together, these factors place the CI on the 
wrong side of the frontline and with that, their role in a precarious position within the 
CID.  
 
6.6 Summary 
 
There is no doubt that CIs have added valuable capacity to CID teams and, in 
terms of the work that CIs do, they have had a great deal to offer the organisation and the 
public. The CI role has come a long way since its introduction and CIs are now involved 
in a myriad of investigative activities as part of their remit. However, the role of CI 
continues to be undermined at a fundamental level by the police organisation leaving CIs 
feeling undervalued and unappreciated by the organisation as a whole. The civilian 
designation of CIs fundamentally limited their pay, training and opportunities for 
progression which also served to perpetuate their secondary status within the CID. 
Furthermore, continued lack of clarity about the role/remit undoubtedly allowed 
managers a rather substantial degree of operational flexibility with regard to CI utilisa t ion 
which is likely currently being maintained by the organisation as a strategy of coping with 
high levels of demand. While noteworthy efforts were being made in some police forces 
(Newbank in the current study) to clarify the role in light of organisational restructur ing 
and provided CIs with regular, appropriate training for the role, in too many instances  
practical training remained ad hoc and secondary to administrative training. In choosing 
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to make use of CIs in ways that go beyond that which can be considered support without 
providing adequate training, the organisation was arguably opening itself up to potential 
scrutiny by the wider CJS and media. Furthermore, CIs were limited in their opportunit ies 
for promotion and this has had a significant impact on their employment experience 
resulting in some CIs feeling unfulfilled and unchallenged in their role.  
 
At different levels of the organisation, police forces need to confront the often unintended 
signals sent out that police staff such as CIs are less valued or less capable than their 
warranted colleagues. Debates regarding the extent to which it remains necessary to have 
two different sets of terms and conditions within the police service, namely police officers 
governed by national statutory regulations and police staff members established by 
locally determined contracts, are likely to continue in the coming years 206 . There is 
arguably a need to move away from the current twin-track approach to the recruitment, 
training and progression and towards the development of more structured and flexib le 
career pathways for CIs both within the role and within the wider police organisat ion. 
Doing so would foster a sense of value for CIs which, in turn, would work to enhance the 
quality of service and the performance of the CID. Furthermore, if CIs are to be utilised 
as more than support, formal consideration/recognition should be given to this with regard 
to appropriate remuneration and powers/protection. A ‘harmonising’ of officer and staff 
pay would help to improve long-term commitment to the role and would also serve to 
further consolidate CI integration within the units. The Chief Constable’s ability to 
implement a range of optional powers seemed to engender confusion and frustration for 
CIs, the public and police colleagues and served to perpetuate inconsistency with regard 
to CI use between forces. Like the CI role more generally, a marked degree of ambiguity 
was found to exist with regard to the enforcement powers of CIs amongst participants at 
both Shorewick and Newbank which, if left unaddressed, has the potential to impact 
significantly on the overall legitimacy of the organisation.  
 
At present, forces do not have the same range of instruments at their disposal with regard 
to the management of officer workforce as they do with police staff workforce. Of 
necessity, these differences in treatment place disproportionate burden on police staff 
                                                                 
206 Winsor (2012: 19-20) recommended that in the near future, police officer and police staff terms and 
conditions of employment should remain separate on the basis of discretion and personal responsibility 
although they may move closer together over time. 
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members whose employment can be much more easily terminated. This imbalance in 
conditions of service could lead to reverse-civilianisation in some areas (as appears to be 
the case at Shorewick), where officers are moved into jobs which were previously done 
more efficiently and, in many cases, to a higher professional standard, by skilled and 
experienced police staff. To indiscriminately remove CIs would be a detriment to the CID 
and wherever possible, CIs numbers need to be maintained to retain the gains made. 
Evidence presented in this chapter also suggests that a rather inconsistent approach to 
cost-cutting may be taking place which will be likely to ultimately result in even further 
inconsistency between police forces with regard to the utilisation of CIs. 
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Chapter Seven: Survey Findings 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
To achieve breadth of understanding with regard to the utilisation of CIs and also 
provide additional context to the qualitative component of this study, data obtained from 
the qualitative stage of the study were supplemented by data gathered by a semi-structured 
survey. This chapter presents and analyses the results of the survey (with chapter sub-
headings reflecting the coding frame used to analyse the survey data), highlighting 
findings of particular interest in relation to both the qualitative data gathered during 
fieldwork and also, in relation to the overall aims and objectives of the research (see 
Chapter One, section 1.1). The survey (see Appendix 5) was administered via email and 
was addressed to the Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) of each of the 43 police 
constabularies across E&W. As such, data collected and presented in this chapter reflect 
a top down, management view of life and thus, findings are not necessarily comparable 
to those presented in chapters Five and Six. The survey was broadly intended to assess 
the deployment of CIs between police forces and aimed primarily to gauge the 
consistency of current practices with regard to their numbers and use across the country. 
The survey was also intended to corroborate and/or discredit where relevant data gathered 
from the qualitative stage of the study and in doing so, aimed to assess the typicality of 
CI use in E&W and thus, the potential generalisability of the study’s overall findings.  
Questionnaires were sent to each force on three separate occasions over a two-month 
period. This was done so as to ensure the best possible rate of response for the survey. In 
total 15207  questionnaires were returned from 14 of the 43 police forces nationwide 
providing an overall response rate of 33 per cent. The 14 forces that volunteered their 
participation in this part of the study were as follows: Avon & Somerset, Bedfordshire, 
Cumbria, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Northamptonshire, 
Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Suffolk, Sussex, Warwickshire and West Mercia. It 
is also important to note that all of those police forces who responded were based in 
                                                                 
207 Three questionnaires were returned from Sussex, one for each of its subdivisions: Brighton and Hove, 
East Sussex and West Sussex. Data from Warwickshire and West Mercia were reported and returned 
together on one questionnaire.  
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England and as such, survey findings are not necessarily representative of CI utilisa t ion 
within Welsh police forces. 
Of the 14 police forces that responded to the survey, data provided by four (Sussex, 
Hertfordshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia) required additional noteworthy 
interpretation. The reasons for and details of this are as follows:  
 
 Sussex returned three individual questionnaires, one for each of its subdivisions : 
Brighton and Hove, East Sussex and West Sussex. For ease of analysis, data from 
each questionnaire returned from Sussex were combined and were reported simply 
as Sussex’s general response. Where relevant information provided by each sub-
division has also been reported individually in this chapter and this has been made 
explicit where necessary. 
 It is important to note that data provided by Hertfordshire in response to the 
questionnaire also included information pertaining to the deployment of 10 CIs who, 
at the time the survey was undertaken, worked in collaborated units such as Major 
Crime which covered Bedfordshire, Cambridge and Hertfordshire. Data therefore 
may not be entirely representative of Hertfordshire as an individual force. 
 At the time the survey was undertaken, Warwickshire and West Mercia 
constabularies were involved in a strategic operational alliance and as such, data in 
relation to the deployment of CIs within each of these forces were largely combined 
and reported in one questionnaire. For the purposes of analysis and also, to ensure 
the most accurate reporting of the survey data, data supplied by Warwickshire and 
West Mercia in relation to Section One of the questionnaire were interpreted as 
being the inclusive response of both forces. This is however with the exception of 
Section Two of the questionnaire in which both Warwickshire and West Mercia 
were able to provide force specific data with regard to numbers and contract terms 
of CIs working at both these forces. As such, where n=13 forces in this chapter, this 
is where Warwickshire and West Mercia have been reported as combined. Similar ly, 
where n=14, this is where both these forces have been reported individually. 
 
With these acknowledgments in mind and owing much to the scoping nature of the study 
and overall aim of the survey, brevity is favoured in this chapter; the main role of these 
data was to substantiate where necessary and provide context to findings obtained in the 
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qualitative stage of the study. Findings of the survey are structured around the following 
topics or themes which arose from the results:  
 Extent and nature of CI utilisation;  
 attitudes of management towards CI utilisation; 
 accountability and management of CIs; 
 engagement with the private sector. 
 
As stated previously, data collected by the survey were intended primarily for descriptive 
purposes. However, it was originally envisaged that should a response rate of 50 per cent 
or higher be achieved, inferential statistics may also be used to draw conclusions relating 
to the generalisability of findings. As the overall survey response rate for the 
questionnaire did not reach 50 per cent (it was 33 per cent), descriptive statistics were 
used to analyse the data, providing an overall summary of findings. Findings presented 
in this chapter are supported by relevant statistical commentary and where appropriate, 
by tabulated and graphical description.    
 
7.2 Numbers of CIs 
 
A key aim of the survey was to try to assess the degree of consistency with regard 
to numbers of CIs currently working within police forces throughout the country and in 
doing so, address research objective four of the study: Explore the degree of consistency 
with regard to CI deployment and utilisation between forces. All 14 of those police forces 
that responded to the survey stated that they currently employed CIs within their 
individual force, although as Figure 3 illustrates, an obvious degree of inconsistency was 
found to exist with regard to the numbers of CIs working within the participating forces.  
 
10 of the 14 forces that responded to the survey were able to provide exact numbers of 
CIs working within their individual force at the time the survey was undertaken. While 
unable to provide exact figures, both Hampshire and Kent constabularies did make 
available approximate data suggesting large scale utilisation of CIs in both these forces 
(see Figure 3).  Two forces (Avon & Somerset and Northamptonshire) declined to provide 
information relating to specific numbers of personnel and thus, have not been included in 
the subsequent analysis and findings presented in this section.  
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Of all the police force areas surveyed, Cumbria was found to employ the fewest number 
of CIs with a reported total of six. The force with the highest exact number of CIs was 
Warwickshire with a total of 67, followed by Nottinghamshire who, at the time the survey 
was undertaken, employed a total of 61 CIs (a mix of public and private sector agency 
personnel). 11208 of the 14 forces surveyed stated that their force employed part-time CIs. 
Of those forces that were able to provide exact numbers of CIs209 working on part-time 
contracts in their force (a total of eight forces), 37 out of a total of 329 CIs working at 
those forces were found to be employed on a part-time basis suggesting that the vast 
majority of CIs were employed on a full time basis. The mean number of CIs found 
working within those police forces that chose to provide information in response to this 
section of the survey was 51. Findings are therefore generally indicative of the wide scale 
and inconsistent usage of CIs by police forces across the country. They are also perhaps 
suggestive of varying approaches/strategies of coping with the practical realities of 
policing post-spending review in E&W.   
 
 
 
                                                                 
208  Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Nottinghams hire, Suffolk, Sussex, South 
Yorkshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia. 
209 Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Hertfordshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Sussex, Warwickshire, West 
Mercia. 
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Figure 3.  Numbers of CIs identified working within participating police forces  
 
Figure 1 - Numbers of CIs identified working within participating police 
constabularies 
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7.3 Types of Work and Tasks Undertaken by CIs 
 
The survey also intended to gauge whether there was any discernible consistency 
with regard to the types of work (areas of investigation) and specific tasks CIs were 
required to undertake between forces. Of the 14 police forces that responded to the survey, 
12 said they had role profiles for CIs working within their individual force suggesting 
that the CI role may be being informally negotiated in the other forces. Gloucestershire 
was the only force to explicitly state that it did not hold role profiles for CIs at the time 
the survey was undertaken. Kent answered ‘don’t know’. As is evidenced in Table 3, 
findings suggest that the type of work being undertaken by CIs in police forces across 
E&W was wide ranging and are also suggestive of wide scale CI involvement in key areas 
of investigative work. 
Findings from the survey show CI utilisation was most concentrated in four key areas of 
work: ‘burglary’, ‘fraud’, ‘rape and sexual assault’ and ‘theft’. In comparison and as 
evidenced in Table 3, CIs were least likely to be involved in ‘kidnapping’, ‘child abuse’, 
‘arson’ and ‘murder’ investigations. At Hampshire CIs were also identified to be involved 
in ‘paedophile online investigation’, ‘economic crime investigation’ and ‘road traffic 
death investigations’ suggesting CI involvement in proactive investigative work. Findings 
are also suggestive of a high degree of CI involvement in rape and/or sexual assault 
investigations; in 10210 of the 14 forces that responded to the survey, CIs were found to 
be involved in this particular area of work. However, it was made explicit to the researcher 
in the response provided by Sussex that CIs working in this force were restricted to 
involvement in ‘over clothing sexual assault’ cases and were not involved in rape 
investigations. As such, the researcher acknowledges that data presented in this section 
in relation to CI involvement in ‘rape and sexual assault’ investigations may be slightly 
misrepresentative of the true nature and extent of CI involvement in the investigation of 
this particular crime type. However, data collected by the survey and presented in this 
section are nonetheless suggestive of large scale CI involvement in sensitive and 
specialist investigations. Collected data are also indicative of notable local variances in 
CI utilisation in regard to operational practice between forces and in particular, of 
                                                                 
210 Avon and Somerset, Cumbria, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Suffolk, Sussex and Warwickshire and West Mercia. Warwickshire and West Mercia are reported 
combined in this section) and thus, make for a reported total of 13 forces/cases in Table 3 and Table 4.  
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differential attitudes/orientations towards CI involvement in the more serious crime 
investigations by some senior police officers and managers. 
 
 
Much like the types of work CIs were found to be most regularly involved in, survey 
findings also show a rather expansive range of tasks which CIs may be required to 
undertake as part of their role. The range and extent of CI engagement in certain tasks 
can be seen in Table 4. ‘Taking statements’ and ‘Exhibits management’ were the most 
common tasks CIs were found to be most regularly undertaking. Tasks CIs were less 
likely to be involved in included ‘HOLMES (data set analysis)’, ‘Prisoner Processing’ 
and ‘Indexing’. The lesser extent of CI involvement in ‘HOLMES (data set analysis)’ and 
‘Indexing’ was generally anticipated given that these particular tasks would largely only 
be undertaken by CIs (and warranted officers) working on large scale, major incident 
investigations such as serial murder and serious frauds. CIs were found to be equivalently 
likely to be involved in the interviewing of victims and suspects although the provision 
of the task of interviewing generally was found to differ between forces. For example, a 
Types of work Number of responses 
(forces) 
Per cent of cases (%) 
(forces) 
Burglary 11 85 
Fraud 11 85 
Rape and Sexual Assault 10 77 
Theft 10 77 
Domestic Abuse 9 69 
Drug Offences 9 69 
Robbery 9 69 
Serious Assault 9 69 
Murder 8 62 
Arson 7 54 
Child Abuse 7 54 
Kidnapping 5 38 
Total: n = 13 
Table 3. Types of work CIs were identified as being engaged in  
 
Figure 2 – Frequency Table – Types of work CIs were identified as being engaged in  
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total of nine of the forces that chose to participate in the survey211 stated that CIs working 
within their individual force were involved in the interviewing of victims. Of the 
remaining five forces, Cumbria noted CI use only with regard to victim interviewing, 
whereas for Suffolk by contrast, CIs were only used only in relation to suspect 
interviewing. South Yorkshire, Kent and Gloucestershire stated that they did not use CIs 
for interviewing purposes.  
 
 
Participating forces were also asked to provide details of any other types of crime and/or 
tasks which CIs working within their constabulary were involved in undertaking and 
which were not listed on the survey. South Yorkshire, Bedfordshire and Hampshire each 
provided information describing a number of areas of work in which CIs were also 
regularly involved. These can be found presented in Table 5: 
 
 
 
                                                                 
211  Avon & Somerset, Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire, 
Nottinghamshire, Sussex, Warwickshire and West Mercia. 
Tasks undertaken Number of responses 
(forces) 
Per cent of cases (%) 
Taking statements 12 92 
Exhibits management 11 85 
Suspect interviewing 9 69 
Victim interviewing 9 69 
Disclosure 9 69 
Prisoner Processing 8 62 
Indexing 8 62 
HOLMES (data set analysis) 7 54 
Total: n = 13 
Table 4. Tasks CIs were identified as being involved in 
 
Figure 3 – Numbers of CIs identified working within participating police constabularies 
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Participating 
Force 
Additional types of work 
South Yorkshire ‘Telecommunication data enquiries, training, CCTV trawl, recover 
and viewing, accompany warranted officers on both enquiries and 
execution of warrants’. 
Bedfordshire ‘Volume crime offences’. 
Hampshire ‘We have one who is a family liaison officer, surveillance loggist, 
RIPA, communications data applications, intelligence 
profiles/searches, CCTV coordinator’. 
 
Participating forces were also asked to provide information as to any areas of work where 
CIs were not currently in use in their constabulary and in which they would likely be of 
benefit if introduced. Police representatives from Suffolk, Gloucestershire and Sussex 
each provided information in response to this question.  Details of these findings can be 
found presented in Table 6 below:  
Table 6. Areas of work in which CIs were not found to be being currently used but 
which their use could be beneficial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings suggest that at the time the survey was undertaken CIs were not in use within 
the CID in Suffolk, Gloucestershire or Sussex. All three forces made explicit reference to 
the CID (and key areas of investigative work undertaken by the CID e.g. rape and sexual 
assault) as being one particular area in which CIs would likely be of benefit if introduced 
(see Table 6 above). These findings are suggestive of a persistent and high level of 
cultural resistance to CI utilisation (and progression/development) by the CID specifica l ly 
in some forces. This was also corroborated by additional comments made by one survey 
respondent: 
Participating 
force 
Areas of work not listed 
Gloucestershire ‘Murder investigations and general assistance to CID’. 
Suffolk ‘CID, rape and serious sexual offence investigations, domestic abuse 
teams’. 
Sussex ‘Advanced interviewing’. 
 
 
  
 
Participating 
force 
Areas of work not listed 
Gloustershire Murd r vestigations and gen ral assistance to CID. 
Suffolk CID, Rape and serious sexual offence investigations, Domestic Abuse 
teams. 
Sussex Advanced Interviewing. 
 
 
  
Table 5.  Additional types of work CIs were found to be involved in 
 
Figure 4 – Additional types of work CIs were found to be involved in 
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A good interviewer does not have to be a warranted officer. I have some first 
rate investigators who knock the spots off some of my warranted officers 
regarding interview skill. Uniform colleagues recognise this - the real cultura l 
resistance to civilian investigators and them being PIP 2 accredited (detective 
trained) comes from CID.  
 
Finally, participants were also asked to provide information relating to any areas of work 
in which CIs could be considered to be operating a supervisory style role in their force. 
Participants from seven forces were able to identify such areas of work. Details of these 
can be found listed in Table 7. While some forces were more specific than others with 
regard to the information they were able to provide in response to this question, it is clear 
that in at least seven of those forces that responded to the survey, CIs were afforded duties 
which extended their role beyond that of a purely supportive nature. 
 
 
Participating 
Force 
CI supervisory work 
Northamptonshire ‘Lead investigator digital images’. 
South Yorkshire ‘Specialist role (CCTV/exhibits, disclosure) rather than 
supervisory, i.e. they may manage strategies but not staffing’. 
Suffolk ‘There are CI supervisors managing teams in the Custody 
Investigation Unit’. 
Avon & Somerset ‘The role of 'police staff' is fully integrated at all levels of the 
constabulary from the ground, to all supervisory levels to the 
most senior level’. 
Kent ‘There are a number of supervisory roles where CIs are 
employed. These are too numerous to list here but include 
supervision of the telephone crime investigation bureau, 
supervision of the image recognition unit (which includes 
CCTV) and forensic crime scene investigation supervision to 
name but a few’. 
Hampshire ‘CCTV coordinator’. 
Sussex (East) ‘Yes, police staff supervisors. They supervise crime work on a 
team; they make case disposal decisions and supervise general 
investigations ensuring traction with enquiry’. 
Sussex (West) ‘We already employ civilian investigators as supervisory 
officers called case directors who oversee mixed civilian/police 
teams to investigate volume crime’.  
Sussex (Brighton 
and Hove) 
‘I have 3 investigators (they are all retired police sergeants) and 
they supervise police officers and staff investigators (including 
their investigations)’.  
Table 7. Supervisory style work 
 
Figure 3 – Numbers of CIs identified working within participating police constabularies 
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7.4 Powers 
 
Survey findings suggest that of the 14 forces that responded to the survey, at least 
12 Chief Constables had chosen to designate CIs working within their individual force 
with various powers contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 (see Appendix 7). 
Cumbria and Kent both declined to provide any information with regard to the extent of 
their CIs enforcement abilities and thus, are not included in the results presented in this 
section. Unfortunately it is not possible to know with certainty the basis of Cumbria and 
Kent’s decision not to provide information in response to this question; the decision of 
both forces not to respond could be indicative of their forces’ decision not to designate 
CIs working within their constabulary at the time the survey was undertaken, or simply 
that participants were unsure in their response212. Furthermore, and as made clear in the 
introductory section (7.1) of this chapter, results (from Section One of the questionna ire) 
for Warwickshire and West Mercia were combined and thus, have been both analysed 
and reported as such in this section.  
Of the 12 forces (11 respondents) that chose to provide information in relation to the 
designation of their CIs with limited powers (question 5), 10 indicated that CIs working 
within their individual force had been designated with the power ‘Access and copying 
evidence seized by constables’. Nine of the 12 forces that responded to the question on 
CI powers also stated that CIs working within their force had been designated with 
‘General power of seizure’ making this the second most common power afforded to CIs. 
Seven respondents stated that CIs working within their force had been designated with 
the ‘Power to enter and search after arrest’. A total of six forces stated that their CIs had 
been afforded the following powers: ‘Power to apply for a search warrant’, ‘Power to 
arrest at a police station for another offence’ and ‘Power to request an arrested person 
to account for certain matters’. Finally, ‘Extended power of seizure’, ‘Power to transfer 
persons into custody of an investigating officer’ and ‘Access to excluded and special 
procedure material’, were found to be the least common powers afforded to CIs with four 
forces (Avon & Somerset, Hampshire, Nottinghamshire and Sussex) indicating the 
designation of their CIs with all three of these powers.  
                                                                 
212 Participants were asked to ‘leave blank’ any check boxes they were unsure of re powers designated to 
CIs (see Appendix 5). 
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As can be seen from the results presented in Table 8, the extent to which individual forces 
(Chief Constables) were found to have made use of such provisions appeared rather 
inconsistent. At both South Yorkshire and Gloucestershire, CIs were only found to have 
been afforded the power of ‘Access and copying’ whereas at Avon & Somerset and 
Hampshire constabularies, CIs were found to have been designated with the full range of 
powers available. Findings are also suggestive of localised variations in the operational 
and enforcement abilities/capacities of CIs even where they had been designated. For 
example, it was made explicit that at Sussex (East), CIs were only able to make use of the 
power of ‘Enter and search after arrest’ - which had only recently been afforded to CIs 
working within this force - when accompanied by a warranted officer. It may be that 
individual force and/or BCU policy/practice is placing limitations on the operational 
capacity of CIs resulting in the types of tasks they are required to undertake being 
fundamentally restricted at the ground/operational level. 
 
 
Powers Number of responses 
(forces) 
Per cent of cases (%) 
(forces) 
 
Access and copying 
evidence seized by 
constables 
10 83 
General power of seizure 9 75 
Power to enter and search 
after arrest 
7 58 
Power to apply for a search 
warrant 
6 50 
Power to arrest at a police 
station for another offence 
6 50 
Power to request an arrested 
person to account for certain 
matters 
6 50 
Power to transfer persons 
into custody of an 
investigating officer 
5 42 
Extended power of seizure 4 33 
Access to excluded and 
special procedure material 
3 25 
Total: n = 12 
 
Table 8. CI power designation 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
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7.5 Improvements in CI Contribution and Opinions of Management 
 
This section presents findings obtained by the survey in response to questions 7, 
8 and 15 which sought to identify the working arrangements of CIs and detectives and  
the opinion/attitude of police managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs by their force.  
CIs were identified as working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers in 11 out of 
14 police forces that responded to the survey. As made apparent earlier in this chapter, 
findings suggest that CIs were not in use within the CID at a number of forces at the time 
the survey was undertaken and therefore, did not work alongside police detectives. This 
fact was made explicit by one police manager respondent in his/her response to question 
7 and is suggestive of existing cultural divisions and also of a limited degree of career 
progression/development for CIs in some forces: 
They work alongside uniformed officers. I think CID would see that as a step 
too far and would resist at all costs. My investigators are viewed as a valuable 
part of the team and it works really well. So much so that the force has recognised 
their contribution and have increased the number working within volume crime 
investigations. My view would be - PIP 2 accreditation and train the best as 
advanced interviewers. CID won’t like it but tough, it makes sense and creates a 
positive workforce. 
 
For question 8, participants were presented with a total of six proposed measures aimed 
at improving the overall contribution of CIs to the performance of the constabulary. 
Participants were then asked to select all that applied. With the exception of Cumbria and 
Warwickshire and West Mercia who declined to provide any information, of the 11 forces 
that did respond, 10 agreed that ‘Improvements in training’ would in fact improve the 
overall contribution of CIs. Bedfordshire was the only force to explicitly disagree with 
the statement. Eight of the 11 forces that responded to this question agreed that ‘More 
responsibility to be given to civilian investigators’ would improve the overall contribution 
of CIs and performance of the constabulary overall. However, Avon & Somerset, Kent 
and Hertfordshire constabularies all disagreed with this statement. Only two of the 11 
forces that responded to this question agreed that ‘Improvements in equipment’ would 
improve the overall contribution of CIs. Seven out of the 11 forces that responded to this 
question felt that ‘Greater recognition of civilian investigators in the constabulary’ would 
positively benefit the contribution of CIs working within their constabulary. Four of the 
11 forces felt that ‘Improvements in management’ would improve the contribution of CIs. 
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Finally, four of the 11 forces that responded to this question also agreed that ‘Greater 
cooperation between police and civilians’ would positively benefit the contribution of 
CIs and performance of the constabulary overall. 
Question 15 (Section One) of the questionnaire sought to gauge the personal 
views/opinion of police managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs within their 
constabulary. Participants were presented with a series of Likert scale style response  
questions and were asked to indicate their level/degree of agreement with 10 statements 
(see Table 9) on a five-point scale basis with 1 = ‘Strongly agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly 
disagree’. Participants were also afforded the option to mark ‘N/A’. In accordance with 
assurances made to forces and as detailed on the information sheet which was sent in 
accompaniment to the survey (see Appendix 5), names of individual participants and 
participating constabularies that chose to provide information in response to this question 
will not be made identifiable in this section.  
Participants expressed a range of opinion with regard to their feelings on CI use within 
their constabulary and specifically, in their extent of agreement with a number of the 
specified statements. All 14 forces that responded to the survey chose to provide 
information in relation to this question although police managers from five participat ing 
forces chose not to provide any information or marked ‘N/A’ against a number of 
statements. The anonymised results of the survey are displayed in Table 9.  In some 
instances, additional useful information/conclusions can be confidently inferred from 
such a response. For example, despite both claiming to have CIs working within their 
force, two police managers marked ‘N/A’ against the statement, ‘The CID is more 
efficiently run as a result of employing civilian investigators’ - suggesting that CIs may 
not be working within the CID at either of these forces at the time the survey was 
undertaken. A further police manager also stated that it was ‘too early to respond’ to this 
particular statement (statement 2) suggesting that CIs may have only recently been 
introduced to the CID at this particular force. Two respondents also stated ‘N/A’ in 
response to statement 4 - ‘The use of civilian investigators free up detectives to perform 
frontline duties’ - perhaps suggesting a more rigidly defined division of labour (and tasks) 
between CIs and detectives working within this constabulary. One of those same police 
managers also chose to mark ‘N/A’ in response to statement 8: ‘There is scope in my 
constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators’. This supports 
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earlier data provided by this force in relation to the question, ‘Do your CIs work in mixed 
teams alongside warranted officers?’, the response for this question being ‘No’. 
For ease of analysis, where forces failed to provide information for any statements, the 
decision was made to code these responses as ‘N/A’. Rather than indicating his/her 
opinion response to the statements as requested and specified by the researcher (on a five-
point scale basis with 1 = ‘Strongly agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly disagree’), one police 
manager chose to indicate their response as ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The decision was made to 
code these responses as Agree and Disagree as it is not possible to gauge the degree of 
agreement and/or disagreement from this response. Responses provided by police 
managers at each Sussex division have not been included in the analysis presented in this 
section of the chapter. The decision to exclude Sussex from the analysis was based on 
concerns relating to assurances of anonymity made to respondents in respect of their 
individual responses to question 15. However, it can be said that data provided by Sussex 
in response to this question did demonstrate general consensus of opinion amongst 
managers working within this force. As such, only data collected from 13 forces (12 
respondents) are presented and analysed in this section213. 
 
Statement Strongly 
Agree  
Agree   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree  
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
N/A  
1. Most civilian 
investigators do a 
good job 
5 7  0 0 0 0 
2. The CID is more 
efficiently run as a 
result of employing 
civilian 
investigators 
1  3  6 0 0 2 
3. There is a serious 
need for civilian 
investigators, no 
matter how serious 
the offence 
1 5 2 3 0 1 
                                                                 
213 Responses provided by the police manager for Warwickshire and West Mercia were combined (as per 
the returned questionnaire) and are reported as such in Table 9. 
Table 9. Opinion of management – CI utilisation (number of responses) 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
 
Figure 7 – Frequency table – CI power designation 
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4. The use of civilian 
investigators frees 
up detectives (and 
uniform 
constables) to 
perform ‘frontline’ 
duties 
2 4 4 0 0 2 
5. Civilian 
investigators with 
specialist skills are 
needed for jobs 
within the 
constabulary 
5 4 2 1 0 0 
6. Civilian 
investigators 
should be 
‘contracted in’ 
from outside 
agencies 
0 1 4 3 4 0 
7. The main reason 
for using civilian 
investigators is that 
they are cheaper 
than detectives 
4 4 3 0 1 0 
8. There is scope in 
my constabulary to 
better integrate 
constables and 
civilian 
investigators 
1 6 3 1 0 1 
9. The training of 
civilian 
investigators in my 
constabulary could 
be improved 
1 6 2 3 0 0 
10. Civilian 
investigators are 
an essential part 
of the modern 
criminal 
investigation 
process 
2 6 2 1 0 1 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, responses to statement 6 - ‘Civilian investigators should be 
contracted in from outside agencies’ - show a rather substantial degree of differ ing 
opinion amongst police managers. Most participants were found to disagree with this 
statement to some extent with four respondents stating that they ‘Strongly Disagree’. A 
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total of four police managers were found to ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ with the 
statement suggesting perhaps that respondents may feel that agency CI use is 
necessary/required on some occasions but not always, or simply that participants were 
yet to make up their mind on the issue. Only one police manager stated that they agreed 
with the statement. The statement with the greatest degree of discrepancy between police 
managers with regard to their extent of agreement was statement 7: ‘The main reason for 
using civilian investigators is that they are cheaper than detectives’. Four of those police 
managers that responded to this question ‘Strongly Agreed’ with this statement while 
only one stated that they ‘Strongly Disagreed’. The police manager at this force also chose 
to provide additional information in support of his response: 
Yes, they are cheaper BUT it is not just about that. It is about creating a skilled 
mixed workforce who delivers. Civilian investigators can be better interviewers 
and better at prisoner processing than some of my warranted officers. 
 
These findings are particularly suggestive of the existence of varying (and potentially 
hostile) attitudes to CI utilisation and also differing degrees of valuing of the CI role by 
police managers. 
Police managers from six forces agreed to some extent with statement 3: ‘There is a 
serious need for civilian investigators, no matter how serious the offence’. Three 
managers however stated that they disagreed with the statement suggesting that in some 
forces, CIs may continue to undertake a more supportive style role. This is maintained by 
data provided by individual forces in response to question 3 (types of investigations CIs 
were found to be involved in) and to some extent by fieldwork findings at Shorewick.  
A total of nine police managers indicated that they agreed to some extent with statement 
5: ‘Civilian investigators with specialist skills are needed for jobs within the 
constabulary’. This is the second strongest overall affirmative response to the listed 
statements and suggests that in some forces, CIs are likely to be being recruited on the 
basis of their existing skills and specialist knowledge. Only one respondent was found to 
disagree with this statement. 
Seven police managers agreed to some extent with statement 8: ‘There is scope in my 
constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators’. Only one 
respondent stated that they disagreed with this statement suggesting that cultural divis ions 
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may in fact continue to exist within some forces with regard to CI use and working 
arrangements in relation to their warranted colleagues. This is further supported by 
additional information provided by one police manager respondent: 
We must ‘break’ the culture within the CID re the use of civilian investigators 
and see mixed teams conducting investigations. 
 
The majority of police manager respondents were also found to agree to some extent with 
statement 9: ‘The training of civilian investigators in my constabulary could be improved’. 
This is generally corroborative of findings from the qualitative stage of the study in 
relation to training and career development for CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank. 
However, three of those police managers also stated that they disagreed with this 
particular statement suggesting differential attitudes towards CI utilisation and training 
provision between forces. It is also likely to be suggestive of a potential lack of awareness 
by police managers of CI utilisation ‘on the ground’. Respondents from the two remaining 
forces neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 
A total of eight of those police managers who provided information in response to this 
question stated that they agreed to some extent with statement 10: ‘Civilian investigators 
are an essential part of the modern criminal investigation process’. Only one police 
manager was found to disagree with the statement. This is suggestive of 
acknowledgement on the part of police managers with regard to the economic necessity 
for CIs and, taking into account responses to statements 5 and 7, is also potentially 
reflective of the need for investigators with specialist skills and an increased valuing of 
the applicability of specialist knowledge and skills-sets which may have been developed 
outside of the police organisation.  
 
7.6 Supervision and Training 
 
All of the participating forces214 provided information relating to the supervision 
of CIs working within their constabulary. CIs were found to be supervised most often by 
either a Sergeant or a Detective Sergeant (depending on the unit) with CIs found to be 
being supervised by either one in all of the forces that responded to the survey (see Table 
                                                                 
214 Warwickshire and West Mercia reported in this section as combined. 
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10). However, this was also found to be dependent on the unit in which CIs were located. 
In three of the forces that provided information (Suffolk, Kent and Sussex), CIs working 
in certain units could also be supervised by non-warranted (civilian) investiga tor 
supervisors on a day to day basis. For example, at Kent CIs were supervised by CI 
supervisors in both the ‘Civilian Investigation Bureau’ and ‘Image Recognition Unit’. 
However, those working within the Major Crime Unit were supervised by a Detective 
Sergeant suggesting the existence of clearly established divisions in the management of 
CIs at some forces which was likely to depend on the severity of the crime being dealt 
with. 11 of the 13 forces that responded to the question stated explicitly that the role of 
CI line manager also fell to a Sergeant or Detective Sergeant (depending on the unit). 
However, at Suffolk ‘Civilian Police Supervisors’ and at Sussex, non-warranted 
‘Investigator Supervisors’ and/or ‘Civilian Case Directors’, were also found to act as line 
managers for CIs. At Nottinghamshire the role of line manager for CIs was undertaken 
by an Inspector or Detective Inspector. With the exception of Kent and Bedfordshire, both 
of whom responded with ‘don’t know’, the 11 remaining forces were able to confirm that 
their internal complaints procedure also applied to CIs employed directly by the police 
organisation.  
 
Participating 
Force 
CI supervision (day to day) CI supervision (line  
manager) 
Avon & Somerset  Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
Bedfordshire Sergeants (prisoner handling, 
uniform) 
Sergeant 
Cumbria Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
Gloucestershire Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
Hampshire Detective Sergeant or Sergeant 
(although while being tutored i.e. 
until independent, their tutor will 
likely take on this role.) 
Detective Sergeant or 
Sergeant 
Hertfordshire Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
Kent Depends on unit. Detective 
Sergeant (major crime), Civilian 
Investigation Bureau (Civilian 
Investigator Supervisor who are in 
turn supervised by Detective 
Depends on unit – 
mixture of Detective 
Sergeants/Sergeants and 
Civilian Staff 
Supervisors. 
Table 10. Supervision of CIs 
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Inspector). In the Image 
Recognition Unit (Civilian 
Investigator Supervisor whose line 
manager is also a Detective 
Inspector). 
Northamptonshire Detective Sergeants or Sergeants Inspector and/or 
Detective Inspector 
Nottinghamshire Detective Sergeant/Sergeant Inspector and/or 
Detective Inspector 
South Yorkshire Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
Suffolk Detective Sergeant or Police 
Supervisor (civilians) 
Detective Sergeant or 
Police supervisor 
(civilians) 
Sussex (East) Supervisors - either Sergeant or 
Police Staff Supervisor 
No information provided 
Sussex (West) Both Police Supervisors and 
Civilian Case Directors 
Both Police Supervisors 
and Civilian Case 
Directors. Civilian Case 
Directors are accountable 
to Inspector rank. 
Sussex (Brighton 
and Hove) 
Investigator Supervisor or a 
Sergeant 
Investigator Supervisor or 
a Sergeant 
Warwickshire and 
West Mercia 
Detective Sergeant Detective Sergeant 
 
Of the 13 respondents who chose to provide information in response to this question, 11 
explicitly stated that their CIs were provided with some form of induction training in 
order to prepare them for the role (Question 10). Cumbria and Gloucestershire were the 
only forces to state explicitly that they did not offer new CI recruits any formal induction 
training for the role at the time the survey was undertaken.  
Data obtained by the survey show an inconsistent approach to training between 
participating forces with some forces demonstrating a better established and/or more 
comprehensive training programme for CIs working within their force than others.  
Evidence suggests a variable mix of role specific (‘instructive to practice’) and more 
general (‘introduction to the organisation’) style training for CIs although as was found 
to be the case at Warwickshire and West Mercia, it may be that some forces continue to 
assume the suitability of ex-officers for the role. Those forces that answered affirmative ly 
to the question, ‘Are the CIs working in your constabulary required to undertake any 
induction style training for the role?’, were asked to provide specific details of the 
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training afforded to CIs within their force at the time the survey was undertaken. Of the 
11 forces that did state that their CIs were provided with training in preparation for the 
role, 10 of those (the exception being Northamptonshire who were ‘unsure’ as to the 
details of the training provided to CIs in their force) were able to provide additional details 
which are presented in the table below (Table 11): 
 
Participating 
Force 
Training Elaboration 
South Yorkshire ‘Specific training bespoke to the elements of major crime i.e. 
disclosure in line with Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, 
Home Office Large Major Enquiry System awareness, exhibits 
etc. as part of the general integration into the major crime team as 
per all staff. Supported both in major crime and district by master 
class events and street skill training, access to National Centre for 
Applied Learning Technologies (online learning programmes) 
and other bespoke training provided by the force on an as required 
basis’. 
Nottinghamshire ‘Initial - 4-week training programme - covering health and safety, 
professional standards, theft, burglary, exhibits, safeguard ing, 
domestic abuse, sexual offences, criminal damage, road traffic, 
anti-social behaviour, harassment, fraud, robbery IT systems and 
data. PEACE (planning and preparation - engage and explain - 
account clarification and challenge - closure - evaluation) 'free 
call model', interviews, hate crime, self-defence and crimina l 
attempts, Hepatitis B jabs. For some CIs later on - As above also 
including Model of investigations, adversarial system, crime 
scenes, public order, witness interviews/structure, child 
protection, vulnerable adults, file build, suspect interviews, role 
of legal advisor, special warning bad character evidence. The 
initial Level 2 attendees have a development programme portfolio 
in line with PIP accreditation for detectives. This is being 
introduced in force and currently College of Policing is reviewing 
all aspects of investigation, role profiles and training 
requirements’. 
Bedfordshire ‘Induction course that involves witness/suspect interviews, file 
building and local procedures’. 
Suffolk ‘We have created an induction pack and provide in house as well 
as learning and development supplementary courses’. 
Avon & Somerset ‘Training appropriate to the role which is diverse’. 
Kent ‘Law training, procedure relevant to the role’. 
Hertfordshire ‘Legal powers, PIP standards, risk assessment’. 
Hampshire ‘Weeks 1-3: Introduction to the force, pocket notebooks and force 
IT systems and airwaves, conflict management, custody and riles, 
role of Police Staff Investigator and designated powers, role of a 
tutor and completion of police staff investigator development 
Table 11. Details of CI training 
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portfolio, law - points to prove/offences (theft and robbery, 
burglary and aggravated burglary, criminal damage, taking 
without consent, vehicle interference, fraud, assaults, public 
order, offensive weapons and bladed articles, sexual offences, 
drugs), core investigative doctrine, cautions/significant 
statements/special warnings, Proceeds of Crime Act codes of 
practice, forensic awareness, house to house, searching, 
intelligence interviews and intelligence management, giving 
evidence at court, identification procedures, communicat ions 
enquiries, interview records/transcripts, Criminal Procedure and 
Investigation Act and disclosure.  
Weeks 4-5: victim and witness interviewing, suspect 
interviewing’. 
Sussex ‘Week 1: Admin, types of offences, ‘points to prove’, theft and 
burglary, Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers of search and 
seizure, disposal options, file building, criminal damage, assaults,  
exhibit handling, drugs offences and drugs awareness. 
Week 2: PEACE co-operative (witness) theory, PEACE witness 
practical, PEACE un-cooperative (suspect) theory, PEACE 
suspect interview practical, statement writing. 
Week 3: Personal safety training, National Strategy for Police 
Information Systems (NSPSIS), victim personal statements, 
criminal justice system, investigation scenarios and custody 
procedures, special measures, tutorials, crime and intelligence 
management system intel - creating intelligence logs, giving 
evidence’. 
Warwickshire & 
West Mercia 
‘There is initial induction training, mainly to familiarise the 
investigator with the local IT systems. Most are ex-police officers 
and bring their previous skills and training with them’. 
 
7.7 Private Sector  
 
Participating forces were asked to provide some specific information relating to 
the extent of their engagement with private sector agencies for the supply of CIs. Of the 
14 forces that responded to the survey215  13 (93 per cent) provided information in 
response to this particular set of questions (Part 2b, Questions 19-22). Northamptonshire 
was the only force that declined to respond to this question. Avon & Somerset and Kent 
both stated ‘Don’t know’. Of the 13 forces that did respond, three (Gloucestershire, 
Hertfordshire and Nottinghamshire) stated that their constabulary held a contract/s with 
a private sector agency for the supply of CIs at the time the survey was undertaken. 
                                                                 
215 Warwickshire and West Mercia were able to provide force specific information in response to this 
question and thus, have been reported as two separate forces in this section. 
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Nottinghamshire was found to employ the largest number of agency CIs at a total of seven 
whereas Gloucestershire and Hertfordshire both employed a total of three each.  
The typical length and type of contract for agency CIs was also found to vary between 
each force with Gloucestershire employing agency CIs on a fixed period of six months, 
Nottinghamshire at a typical length of twelve weeks and Hertfordshire on an ‘open ended’ 
contract basis. Both Nottinghamshire and Gloucestershire stated that they held contracts 
with Adecco and Hertfordshire with Reed (at the time the survey was undertaken). Two 
of those forces (Gloucestershire and Hertfordshire) stated that they had held contracts 
with private sector agencies for the supply of CIs in the past. This included the addition 
of past contracts held between Gloucestershire constabulary and Servoca. Two forces 
(Avon & Somerset and Kent) responded with ‘Don’t know’ to this section of the 
questionnaire meaning that it is possible that agency CIs may also have been in use within 
both of these constabularies at the time the survey was undertaken, although this is not 
possible to know for certain. 
 
Name of 
participating 
force 
Total 
number 
of 
agency 
CIs 
workin
g at 
force 
(at time 
of 
survey) 
Contract/
s held (at 
time of 
survey) 
Contract
s held (in 
the past) 
Name/
s of 
private 
sector 
agency 
(at the 
time of 
survey
) 
Name/s 
of 
private 
sector 
agency 
(in the 
past) 
Typical 
length 
of 
contrac
t held 
Gloucestershire 3 Yes Yes Adecco Adecco, 
Servoca
. 
6 
months 
Hertfordshire 3 Yes Yes Reed Reed Open 
ended 
Nottinghamshir
e 
7 Yes Yes Adecco Adecco 12 
weeks 
 
All three forces that made use of agency CIs at the time the survey was administered 
and/or in the past (Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire and Nottinghamshire) also provided 
information relating to the types of work agency CIs were required to undertake within 
Table 12. Private sector engagement 
ert 
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their constabulary. Nottinghamshire was found to make the most expansive use of agency 
CIs who were involved in ‘Burglary’, ‘Domestic Abuse’, ‘Rape and sexual assault’, 
‘Serious Assault’, ‘Child Abuse’ and ‘Robbery’ investigations. Gloucestershire was 
found to use agency CIs for comparatively fewer types of crime investigations. These 
included ‘Domestic Abuse’, ‘Fraud’ and ‘Murder’. Hertfordshire was found to make use 
of agency CIs in ‘Rape and sexual assault’ investigations only although the respondent 
for this force stated that agency CIs might also work within the Public Protection Unit 
and specifically, were involved in ‘the management of sexual offenders’.  
Of the three forces found to hold contracts with private sector agencies both at the time 
the survey was undertaken and in the past, two (Nottinghamshire and Gloucestershire) 
were able to confirm that their constabularies internal complaints procedure also applied 
to agency CIs working within their force. When asked whether or not their agency CIs 
had been designated with powers, all of the forces that participated in the survey 
responded with either ‘No’ or N/A’. There was evidence of hostile attitudes towards the 
utilisation of agency CIs by some senior officers, as the following quote from one 
respondent shows: 
Not to my knowledge. We have employed them ourselves and long may that last. 
The thought of money making private companies making profit from 
investigating crime is something I find unacceptable and immoral. 
 
7.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented empirical findings obtained by a semi-structured 
survey which was undertaken during the second quantitative stage of the study. As stated 
in the introduction to this chapter, findings presented in this chapter are reflective of the 
top-down view of life and CI utilisation as observed and understood by senior police 
managers. Nonetheless, findings do go some way to demonstrating the breadth of CI 
utilisation across the country and also reveal a number of interesting points worthy of 
further consideration.   
Arguably the most significant observation that can be made on reflection of the findings 
presented in this chapter is the sheer prevalence of CI utilisation. While generally 
speaking little consistency was found to exist with regard to the number and types of work 
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and tasks CIs were found to be undertaking, the fact remains that CIs were found to be 
working in all of those forces that responded to the survey and often in large numbers. 
Furthermore, CIs were found to be involved in the investigation of most types of crime 
including the investigation of more serious offences including assault, rape and murder 
(although to varying extents). They were also found to be undertaking a range of specialist 
areas of investigative work such as fraud and child abuse suggesting that the kind of 
investigations that would have once been reserved for officers working within the CID 
are now also been given to CIs. Together, data provided in relation to both the types of 
work and tasks CIs were involved in at the time the survey was administered also suggest 
that CIs may be undertaking a variable role within forces; local variations in CI utilisa t ion 
mean that in some forces the nature of the CI role may be more representative of that of 
a member of ‘support staff’ than in others. In forces where the CI role was more in keeping 
with that of ‘support staff’ or where CIs were restricted to the investigation of low level 
volume crime, the results suggest that this is likely to be being maintained by cultura l 
resistance to CIs, in particular by the CID. 
While the extent of CI designation with powers was also found to differ somewhat 
substantially between participating forces, survey findings are nonetheless suggestive of 
the large scale uptake of the provision by Chief Constables across the country. Coupled 
with findings relating to the tasks being undertaken by CIs and the fact that CIs were more 
likely to work in mixed teams with warranted officers, such findings are also indicat ive 
of potentially large scale blurring of warranted and non-warranted roles. With regard to 
the supervision and training of CIs, data from the survey suggests that CIs were most 
likely to be supervised by a Detective Sergeant and/or Sergeant (depending on the unit in 
which they work). However, in some forces they might also be being supervised by non-
warranted (civilian) supervisors suggesting potential opportunities for CI progression and 
also for their involvement in leading investigations. Data obtained by the survey also 
evidence the undertaking of similar supervisory style roles by CIs in a number of forces 
although these may not have been formally recognised and/or satisfactor ily 
acknowledged in terms of pay in all forces. Training provision for CIs was also found to 
differ somewhat significantly between those forces that responded to the survey with data 
showing an inconsistent approach to training between participating forces. Some forces 
were found to operate a more well established and/or comprehensive training programme 
for CIs working within their force than others with evidence suggesting a variable mix of 
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role specific (‘instructive to practice’) and more general (‘introduction to the 
organisation’) style training for CIs.  
Where the opinion of individual police manager respondents was sought in the 
questionnaire (questions 8 and 15, see Appendix 5), participants provided a range of 
views suggesting a variable (yet generally positive) mix of attitudes towards the 
utilisation and training of CIs by senior officers. Findings in relation to these questions 
were also suggestive of a potential lack of valuing of the extent to which the CI role has 
developed as well as a concurrent lack of awareness by police managers of the role being 
played by CIs ‘on the ground’. It was also clear from police manager responses that a 
general recognition of the need for CIs with specialist skills is likely to exist along with 
better scope to integrate CIs and warranted officers. Finally, evidence presented in this 
chapter is also suggestive of limited engagement with private sector agencies with regard 
to the supply of CIs which is likely to be being resisted by some forces and, in some 
instances, rather successfully by the CID. 
Overall, the survey was successful in its primary intention of providing context to the 
qualitative findings presented in earlier chapters. This chapter has demonstrated not only 
wide-spread and inconsistent utilisation of CIs between police forces across the country, 
but findings are also indicative of the fact that CIs may be operating a role that extends 
far beyond that of a ‘junior partner’. Many of the kinds of investigation that once would 
have been given to CID (and to detectives) are now being given to CIs. This suggests a 
sharp break with the past and indicates that CIs may indeed have a large ‘foot in the door’ 
in respect of their position as investigators within the contemporary CID. These issues 
and their potential implications for criminal investigation provision and for warranted 
detectives will be explored in greater detail next, in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussing the Role of the CI: A Shift in the Terrain 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
I have in this thesis endeavoured to provide an original contribution to knowledge 
by producing an authentic account of CI utilisation as it was at the time the research was 
undertaken. In doing so - and in the absence of any previous empirical research 
documenting the experiences of CIs - this exploratory study has endeavoured to inform 
extant debates on the civilianisation of core areas of police work by exploring the world 
and work of an otherwise unknown body of police personnel. By drawing upon extensive 
fieldwork and relevant literature, this thesis offers a theoretically and empirica l ly 
informed insight into the contribution being made by CIs to the contemporary crimina l 
investigation across E&W. After setting the scene in Chapter Four, Chapters Five to 
Seven explored in considerable detail the occupational and organisational milieu in which 
CIs were found to be operating. Within these chapters the analytical themes that emerged 
from the analysis were outlined and discussed and were supported through reference to 
the primary data gathered during fieldwork. This final chapter will provide a much 
broader discussion of these findings and their implications for our understanding of 
emerging (re-emerging) patterns of policing and in particular, what can be inferred from 
current practices with regard to the utilisation of CIs about the future of crimina l 
investigation and the detective role and title.  
 
In this section I want to consider in more detail the extent to which the role being played 
by the CI has impacted upon organisational and occupational dynamics within the CID. 
In doing so, this chapter will draw upon relevant theoretical works (see Chapter Two, 
sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.4) - in particular those of Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972), 
Hoogenboom (1991) and Bourdieu (1977) - in order to reflect upon the potential 
implications of CI utilisation on the detective role and the future character of crimina l 
investigation. The deployment of CIs can - and will throughout this chapter - be 
considered in the context of extant debates concerning the socio-cultural significance of 
the police (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1970; Freiberg, 2001; Goldsmith, 2005; Innes, 2004; 
Loader, 1997; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Manning, 1997; Skolnick, 1966; Walker, 2000) 
and police organisational change (Bradley, Walker and Wilkie, 1986; Chan, 1996; 1997; 
Manning, 1977; 1979; Punch, 1983; Wood, 2004). The discussion that follows provides 
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reflections on the current utilisation of CIs, explores the potential future trajectory of the 
CI role within a climate of economic austerity and examines the potential impact of CI 
use on the contemporary criminal investigation process. Consideration is also given 
throughout this chapter to the central research questions and aims and objectives of this 
study which were stated initially in Chapter One and which are as follows: 
1) What is the role being undertaken by civilian investigators working in police forces 
across E&W? 
2) To what extent can civilian investigators be considered to be performing a junior 
partner role when compared to the role of warranted detectives? 
 
 Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working 
practices, occupational identity and positioning and sense of value. 
 Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices 
and occupational identity. 
 Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and 
in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective 
investigative practice. 
 Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisa t ion 
of CIs by police forces across the country. 
 Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the crimina l 
investigation process in E&W. 
 
8.2. The Wrong Side of the ‘Frontline’? 
 
This study has demonstrated that CIs have a different experience of police work 
and of working within the police organisation than that of warranted police officers. At a 
fundamental level the limited authority and restricted enforcement abilities of CIs placed 
somewhat inevitable limits on their sense of value and status within the units in which 
they worked. As seen in Chapter Five, it also reduced their capacity to engage in the 
dominant detective culture within the CID and thus, restricted the degree of integrat ion 
they were able to achieve. For the most part CIs felt valued by their colleagues within the 
units in which they worked but not by the police organisation itself. This was largely 
attributed to the perceived failure of the organisation to acknowledge, at a formal level, 
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the role and contribution now being made by CIs. As findings presented in this thesis (see 
Chapters Five and Six) suggest, these conditions are currently being reinforced through a 
twin-track approach to the pay, training and opportunities for progression which are 
currently being afforded to CIs and which, in many instances, do not sufficiently reflect 
the nature of the role being performed in practice. 
 
Preceding chapters of this thesis have presented evidence to suggest that a move towards 
the civilianisation of the detective role is indeed taking place on the ground in some police 
forces in E&W. The prevalence of CI utilisation by police forces is perhaps one of the 
most striking features of this research and reflects recent changes in the socio-polit ica l 
context in which the police, like other public sector organisations, have been subject to 
increased scrutiny and reform (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4). Concerns have long been 
expressed about the cost-effectiveness of the police, and the introduction and permissive 
evolution of the CI role was itself firmly circumscribed by their usefulness to police 
budgets, as well as for their allowance for operational specialisation and overall 
expeditiousness of the CID. Introduced with a view of supporting the work of detectives, 
CIs were originally conceived as the junior partners of their warranted colleagues and 
thus, were envisaged as undertaking a complementary role. However, as discussed in 
detail in Chapters Five and Six, the power of the performance culture in the organisat ion 
is such that CIs were found to have become increasingly utilised in tasks outside of their 
support role and remit, providing evidence of mission creep (Caless, 2007).  
 
Diverted from their primary supportive role, CIs have subsequently become increasingly 
involved in frontline police work and in tasks traditionally considered as requiring the 
specialist and peculiar skills-set of a detective. In many cases, the evolution of the CI role 
had resulted in a notable degree of blurring between the CI designation and that of 
detectives. This meant that a marked degree of disparity existed between the role as it was 
initially conceived (and often, how it was still defined on paper e.g. in role profiles) with 
how it was actually being effected ‘on the ground’. The result of this was that, as 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, in some instances CIs were being drawn into types 
of work and/or duties for which they had received little to no formal training and in which 
their personal safety and/or emotional wellbeing was sometimes being compromised. 
Furthermore, despite persistent political rhetoric/parlance suggesting otherwise (Green, 
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2013), CIs were found to have been afforded a marked degree of agency and autonomy 
with regard to their role with some occupying the position of supervisors and/or CID unit 
managers. While not always found to be being formally acknowledged and/or financia l ly 
recompensed by the organisation, in this sense, CIs were commonly being afforded 
responsibility for determining the strategic direction and ultimate success of 
investigations including those of a more serious and complex nature. Together findings 
suggest that, in terms of their duties at least, CIs had often adopted a role more 
representative of an equal partner than that of junior partner. 
 
The ability of organisations to change and make decisions is bounded by their context 
(Clark, McLoughlin, Rose and King, 1988; Nee, 1998; Pettigrew, 1987; Wischnevsky, 
2004). Features related to the police organisation itself may help to explain the variation 
in the utilisation of CIs across forces. Indeed, alongside the notable prevalence of their 
use, the research also identified a significant degree of inconsistency with regard to the 
deployment of CIs between forces across the country. Work by O’Neill (2014) suggests 
this to be a trend much in keeping with the sporadic deployment of PCSOs who now, in 
many respects, can be considered the paraprofessionals of police patrol. A number of 
subtle variables can be considered as having given rise to such striking variance in CI use; 
first, at a fundamental level the enduring principle of constabulary independence means 
that, in effect, 43 police constabularies continue to operate in 43 different ways. In this 
sense, the utilisation of CIs can be viewed as the latest development in a historic trend of 
inconsistency in civilianisation. Second, the nature of police funding is such that leve ls 
of reliance upon central government contribution differs somewhat markedly between 
forces, the result being that while some forces were confronted with 10 per cent budget 
cuts, others had to produce more than 25 per cent savings (HMIC, 2013: 28). Third, not 
all forces had the same amount of ‘fat to trim’, with annual force expenditure per head of 
population ranging from £150 to £250 (HMIC, 2013: 36)216. This was particularly found 
to be the case at Newbank which, in comparison to Shorewick, was a much ‘leaner’ force. 
Fourth, as noted by Gill (2013), senior police officer attitudes towards civilianisation - in 
particular non-warranted involvement in core areas of police work - continue to vary 
                                                                 
216 For example, Lincolnshire Police who were facing a relatively modest 16 per cent funding gap as a result 
of the Home Office budget cut were already an extraordinarily lean force with the lowest annual expenditure 
per head of population and the lowest total workforce numbers per head of population across all forces 
(HMIC, 2013: 36, 153). 
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considerably, ranging from ‘embracers’ and ‘pragmatists’ to ‘sceptics’. This was also 
found to be a prime variable on which the decision to circumvent utilisation of agency 
CIs was premised at Shorewick and was also a key factor encouraging discrepancy in 
enforcement abilities afforded to CIs between forces. Fifth, like other members of police 
staff, CIs were introduced on the assumption that they would free-up warranted officers 
from duties and tasks not requiring their expertise and/or powers of enforcement, who 
could then return to the frontline. Although no fixed definition exists, frontline officers 
and staff are generally considered as being involved in the public crime-fighting face of 
the force. This includes neighbourhood policing, response policing and crimina l 
investigation (HMIC, 2011: 15). Police managers were also found to vary somewhat in 
their understanding of the term frontline and its applicability to CIs who in many instances 
were found to be performing a highly comparable if not identical role to that of warranted 
officers. 
 
Without doubt, increasing marketisation, policies which enhance and embrace the idea of 
multi-agency collaborative working and an economic climate in which the biggest 
spending cuts since the Second World War are being felt across the public sector imply 
testing times for the police organisation and those professionals/paraprofessional working 
within. Warranted police detectives face multifarious challenge, not purely in terms of 
how they execute their role, but fundamental questions around their values, sense of 
salience and professional identity: provoking questions around what it means to be an 
effective detective in the 21st century. Similar to Silvestri’s (2003: 2) analysis of women 
in leadership positions in the police, the utilisation of CIs can be viewed as ‘both a symbol 
of and indeed a measure of organisational change [italics added]’. The CID like many 
other areas of the organisation can be presented as a ‘shifting arena’ in which new and 
existing organisational territories and occupational boundaries are being redrawn as 
warranted officers struggle against emerging new ‘players’ within the existing ‘field’ for 
access to specific resources and associated capital (Bourdieu, 1977; Jenkins, 2002: 84). 
The result has been the emergence of a more complex set of identities and working 
practices217 within the CID, meaning that the current situation is more dynamic and fluid 
than is often suggested by fixed organisation charts and job descriptions.  
                                                                 
217 The multi-agency nature of the contemporary CID (for example, as can be seen with multi-agency public 
protection arrangements in relation to serious and sexual offenders and joint working arrangements between 
the police and other public and/or third sector workers including the co -location of social workers within 
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Emergent new professional identities have allowed new forms of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1990) to enter the fray which may be considered symptomatic of clear 
diversification of the workforce and the dilution of pre-existing binary (CI/DC) task based 
divisions within the CID. Indeed, in those forces in which fieldwork was undertaken, CIs 
and DCs were found to be constantly renegotiating the divide with regard to the ‘core’ 
elements of their work as they each struggled to maintain a degree of ‘ownership’ over 
their role and thus, their occupational identity. Furthermore, in many areas of work the 
CI and detective role had ‘blended’ (Whitchurch, 2009) to the extent that what can be 
described as a freewheeling approach to investigations had developed, paving the way for 
the rise a more broadly defined and conceived ‘professional investiga tor’ role. Drawing 
upon Bourdieu’s (1990) celebrated work on the relations between ‘habitus’ (cultura l 
knowledge) and ‘field’ (structural conditions), what is clear from the findings presented 
in this study is that social/power relations within the CID were changing as ‘professiona l’ 
warranted and non-warranted investigators struggled to affirm their respective positions. 
Within this shifting terrain, access to specific resources was the aim of the game as CIs 
struggled to accumulate valuable social, cultural and symbolic capital in the form of 
valued relations, specialist skills and/or experiential knowledge and prestige.  
 
The use and subsequent evolution of the CI role marks a noteworthy shift in the terrain 
with regard to the undertaking of criminal investigations to an extent which is 
unprecedented in the history of the CID. The use of CIs (as with other police staff working 
in the CID e.g. intelligence analysts, crime scene examiners etc.) has also created new 
spaces and professional spheres of activity in which warranted officers have little stake 
and/or where they have, over time, relinquished their claim. With monopoly over duties 
and knowledge as key to recognition as a professional (Abbott, 1988), in some cases the 
CI’s jurisdiction appears to have been firmly secured as their technical and tacit 
knowledge and increasingly diverse skill-set have provided specialist expertise. It is now 
clear that in order for the modern criminal investigation process to be effective, it must 
draw upon a varied range of expertise which may also be gleaned from other sectors than 
policing and/or agencies/areas of ‘professional’ work. For example, risk assessment, 
fraud and/or financial crime investigations and investigations into child exploitation and 
                                                                 
the child protection teams and Domestic Violence Advocates within public protection units) coupled with  
the  move towards an increasingly more scientific and proactive approach to investigation has seen the 
arrival of a host of new ‘players’ within the CID. Such developments have, in part, helped to solidify the 
broadening remit/orientation of the contemporary police ‘service’. 
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abuse are areas of work in which it is entirely possible to develop applicable and 
transferable skills and expertise in professional arenas which exist outside of the police 
organisation. CIs therefore may bring with them new bodies of knowledge that challenge 
the traditionally perceived hegemony of professional expertise held by detectives - 
although somewhat crucially, this may only be true with regard to non-ex-officer CIs. 
The limited transferability of such specialist expertise extends the claim of CIs (in some 
instances) to cultural and economic capital within the police organisation and often to an 
extent which is not necessarily attainable by their warranted counterparts. In this sense, 
CIs (as with the civilianisation process as an aspect of the police organisation more 
broadly) have become ‘institutionalised’ within the units in which they were located in 
that their use has seemingly come to be considered both necessary and appropriate for the 
overall efficiency and legitimacy of the contemporary CID (Kostelac, 2008; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: 26). 
 
Where CIs were not able to legitimate their claim as fully fledged ‘professiona l’ 
investigators, alternative means of achieving such status were often sought e.g. adopting 
prescribed cultural characteristics of police DCs. Although largely dependent on the unit 
in which they were located and nature of the role being undertaken, for the most part the 
‘working personality’ of CIs generally reflected that commonly associated with DCs 
(Skolnick, 1966). Given the often overlapping nature of their remits, such cultura l 
characteristics also acted as a pragmatic strategy or coping mechanism (Innes, 2003) for 
CIs and, like their warranted counterparts, formed a key part of their professional role and 
identity. CIs displayed an obvious ‘sense of mission’ and generally possessed an action-
oriented outlook towards their work which aligned with the traditional crime fighting 
ethos of the police organisation. While exerting a powerful influence over CI occupationa l 
identities and orientations to the role generally, pressure to adopt a crime control-oriented 
perspective was most clearly observed amongst non-ex-officer CIs who appeared keen to 
engage with this approach in an effort to prove their value to their warranted colleagues. 
By ‘proving themselves’ to be competent and trustworthy or through the acquisition of 
experiential knowledge, CIs were able to absolve themselves of their civilian status to a 
certain extent. Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter Five, in some instances the 
civilian status of CIs was found to afford them a degree of organisational non-partisanship 
and occupational legitimacy in their interactions with members of the public and in this 
sense, also enabled them to convert their occupational deficit to a valuable advantage.  
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Police managers at both forces maintained the firm belief that unlike CIs, warranted 
officers were able to ensure a fixed degree of operational flexibility and resilience within 
the CID. The reality of this popular conviction however is subject to question and will be 
considered in more detail later in this chapter. Nonetheless, the supposed degree of 
operational flexibility believed to be offered by warranted officers was posited on two 
key factors; first, a pervasive awareness was found to exist amongst managers with regard 
to the perceived potential strategic benefit of having a body of personnel whose contracts 
place limits on their degree of operational agency (e.g. officers can be ordered to remain 
on duty if needed whereas police staff cannot). Second, the alleged functiona l 
redeployability of those officers working within the CID was also frequently referred to 
by police managers when discussing the value of and distinction between warranted 
officers and CIs (this will be discussed in more detail subsequently). The latter of these 
known ‘facts’ was itself grounded in the notion of operational omnicompetence (Stelfox, 
2009), a belief which was found to afford officers a great deal of added value as a resource 
when compared to CIs. CIs by contrast were considered to be more unyielding in terms 
of their potential for relocation within the CID and between units and thus, were often 
regarded as less desirable from a strategic point of view. While managers and officers 
saw the value of CIs in terms of their alleged cost-effectiveness and specialist expertise 
(in some cases), CIs were fundamentally limited in terms of the degree of integration they 
were able to achieve within the units in which they worked by their status as ‘civilians’. 
For those CIs with no prior policing experience, this was further bolstered by their 
perceived lack of experiential knowledge of the field and thus, their concomitant 
illegitimacy as ‘professional’ investigators within the organisation.  
 
With the exception of ex-officers, CIs had not undergone the same process of screening 
and training as their warranted colleagues and, perhaps most importantly, had not served 
their time ‘on the streets’. For managers and officers, it was the procurement of this 
valuable experiential knowledge which ultimately afforded warranted officers 
preferential status over CIs. While undoubtedly of value, the centrality of this body of 
practical ‘craft’ knowledge and experience to the undertaking of effective detective work 
remains subject to debate and/or clarification. The perceived legitimacy of CIs was also 
further (and somewhat fundamentally) undermined by the fact that, as ‘civilians’, their 
actions and/or judgements when operating in the field were not supposed to be predicated 
on the same degree of independence and impartiality as officers. As bearers of the ‘Office 
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of Constable’ and servants of the Crown, officers are bestowed a status of neutrality which 
presupposes integrity and diligence in judgement beyond that afforded to ordinary 
‘employees’. However, with regard to CIs, the issue of their operational independence 
and thus, their theoretical legitimacy and accountability as ‘law enforcers’ was less 
implicit. This issue was further complicated when considering the ad hoc fashion through 
which CIs can - and indeed were at Newbank - be afforded an extensive range of police 
type powers of enforcement comparable to those afforded to warranted constables. While 
the powers afforded to CIs (by the 2002 Act) did not extend to arrest (outside of a police 
station) and/or the use of force, they did afford CIs a degree of agency with regard to their 
operational decision making which had the potential to impact directly on the perceived 
legitimacy of the CID. 
 
Furthermore, the potential value of this ‘base’ knowledge and experience was often 
bolstered by an implicit belief in its enabling of the redeployablity of officers. While 
theoretically possible, the ease with which detectives can be redeployed in practice, to 
undertake other areas of investigative work within the CID, may be being overstated in 
some instances. To view detectives as a homogenous, redeployable resource on the basis 
of their warranted status and implicit within that, their wide-ranging experient ia l 
knowledge, is to perhaps overlook the increasingly complex, multifaceted and specialised 
remit of the contemporary CID. Nevertheless, the crucial fact remains that, unlike CIs, 
warranted officers are trained in the use of force and, because of police development, are 
also generically trained to undertake public order duties (to Level 3)218. They can be called 
upon (at any time) to aid in the quelling of urban unrest and, most fundamentally, remain 
the only body of individuals who possess the capacity to engage in the open-ended and 
legitimate use of force (both violent and incapacitating) in any given situation (Bittner, 
1970). With this in mind, it could indeed be argued that while CIs may in some instances 
be undertaking roles and duties which place them far outside the territory of the 
paraprofessional, in terms of their organisational/occupational position and value as a 
resource, CIs by their very nature must somewhat inevitably acquiesce to a junior partner 
                                                                 
218 Level 3 public order training is the lowest level of public order training given to all police officers in 
E&W. It is part of the basic training package provided to constables during their initial training period.  As 
well as facilitating peaceful protest, this training covers cordon work and how to implement other police 
tactics. Officers trained to Level 3 are not routinely trained and are considered the police’s reserve in the 
event of serious disorder. Officers can be trained to subsequent levels (Level 2 and Level 1) to deal with 
serious disorder and are provided with more specialist training on the use of impactful tactics (e.g. use of 
armoured Land Rovers). 
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status. However, I would argue that this may only be the case in so far as arrest and 
violence are necessary for investigation. For the most part the power to deprive an 
individual of their liberty most commonly occurs at one of two stages in the investiga tory 
process; either at the initial stage, in the period immediately following committal of the 
offence, or at the culminating point of an investigation when a suspect has been identified. 
At both points (and with the exception of arrests made by DCs during voluntar i ly 
questioning at a police station), the initial arrest of a suspect is most commonly made by 
a uniformed officer. Indeed, as evidence presented in Chapter Six suggests, not all kinds 
of investigation necessarily require investigators - whether warranted or non-warranted - 
to routinely enforce the power of arrest and/or engage in the use of force. Furthermore, 
the significance/importance of having DCs who are trained to assist in the management 
of large scale disorder is also debateable. Both the likelihood and overall viability of DC 
deployment to deal with incidents of disorder is likely (in some cases) also being 
overstated. This raises the related questions: is public order training needed by those 
working within the CID? Would the adequate provision of self-defence training be 
sufficient for their needs? Is the ability to arrest a fundamental requirement of those 
undertaking ‘detective work’ within the CID? While important for consideration in the 
light of the findings of this study, the word limits of this thesis do not allow for a more 
thorough consideration of the potential significance of these questions here. However, 
what the findings of this study appear to suggest is that in many ways, the role played by 
the warranted officer in the criminal investigation process may in reality be more 
representative of a powerful allegory than an irrefutable prerequisite of the crimina l 
investigation process.  
 
For the most part, the ‘professionalism’ of detectives and their assumed hegemony219 over 
the criminal investigation process is grounded in tradition and the legitimising ‘myths’ of 
‘art’ and ‘craft’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006). In the current study, the currency of these 
traditional notions/processes of detective work were found to being maintained by 
powerful actors/groups in the field of policing (namely ACPO but also The Police 
Federation) whose concern over the utilisation of CIs was seemingly motivated less by 
rational/technical concerns with improving effectiveness and efficiency and more with 
how their deployment might affect the perceived sovereignty of the detective role and 
                                                                 
219 At least so much as in the cultural sense. 
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title. As an organisation the police are of course responsive to the institutiona l 
environment (Bittner, 1970) or ‘surround’ (Goffman, 1974) which, according to 
institutional theorists such as Scott (1995), is composed of powerful ‘sovereign’ groups 
such as the media, politicians, public action groups and other influential external forces. 
These sovereigns control important resources for organisations, including not only 
tangible resources such as money but also less tangible resources such as legitimacy, 
reputation and prestige. From this perspective, organisational attributes can be viewed as 
‘manifestations of powerful intuitional rules which function as highly rationalised myths 
that are binding on particular organisations’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 343).  
 
Furthermore, for the most part understandings of the police have been based on normative 
assumptions about the way things are and should be done. Drawing upon Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic power, such assumptions can be considered to rest largely on 
preconceived durable dispositions - what Bourdieu (1990: 52-65) terms ‘habitus’ - that 
incline people to think in certain entrenched ways about the role and nature of the police 
and police work. According to Loader and Mulcahy (2003: 42), these dispositions operate 
at the level of what Bourdieu often refers to as the ‘doxic’220, or at that of what Gouldner 
(1976) terms the ‘paleo-symbolic’221. In the case of the British police, they suggest that 
these predispositions ‘habitually and unquestionably lead people to construe the 
connection between crime, social order and policing as obvious, natural and something 
that ‘goes without saying’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 43). In many respects, the same 
can be said about detectives and their ‘ownership’ of the criminal investigation process. 
The relative ‘obviousness’ of the connection between crime investigation, the CID and 
the warranted detective is reinforced on a routine basis by a litany of idealising and 
eulogising media portrayals (Loader, 1997) and within the police itself, has become 
‘institutionalised’ to the point that its significance is rarely discussed or subject to 
definition and/or challenge by alternatives (Zucker, 1983). As a ‘core’ part of the work 
of the police, criminal investigation represents a position of notable significance with 
regard to lay sensibilities and popularly held dispositions about the police and their role 
within society. Within this, ideas about the role of the detective run deep within the 
                                                                 
220 The interplay between the habitus and the field - the collective knowledge of the social life of the field 
which, by its very nature, is intuitive, internalised and serves to both ‘generate and delimit people’s attitudes, 
perceptions and practices’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 42). 
221 Refers to the ‘restricted communicability’ of such beliefs and sentiment, but speaks as well (in a fashion 
that eludes Bourdieu) of the emotionally compelling character of that which seems to be at stake - what 
Bauman (1990: 43) nicely refers to as ‘the feeling which precedes all reflection and argument’. 
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collective national consciousness and occupy a salient position within conceptions of the 
‘police force of the imagination’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 315).  
 
Of course, popular media portrayals of policing and detective work in particular continue 
to ensure populist perceptions of the police’s reputation and degree of prestige. This 
particular sovereign body also plays a noteworthy role in determining the authority of 
detectives as ‘experts’ in their field. The taken-for-granted idea that there is a natural 
connection between the detective and criminal investigation (as there is also often 
assumed to be between crime, social order and policing in a more general sense) is 
reinforced on a daily basis in the narratives of most police procedurals (Sparks, 1992; 
Colbran, 2012). Through these, popular discourses about detectives and their role are 
produced/reproduced and help to project a particular view of the world which accords by 
and large with that which is (to some extent) coveted by the British public. However, CI 
utilisation, at a fundamental level, contests the established ratio of indetermination222 to 
technicality223 with regard to the practising of detective work; CI use arguably raises the 
‘technical’ profile of the criminal investigation process (Robinson, 2003: 594). It 
suggests, furthermore, that the ‘performance’ of the detective role and associated skills 
may in fact be something which can be taught to ‘outsiders’ who may be new to the 
organisation. However, as the current research shows, this continues to be framed by 
cultural perspectives of detective work and the degree to which individual CIs were able 
to satisfactorily demonstrate the necessary ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1993) and were 
judged to exhibit a crime control orientation. Nonetheless, civilianisa tion within the CID 
has exposed the detective profession to competition from deputies in the form of 
paraprofessional CIs - a threat that was found at both sites to be being further amplified 
by developments in information technology, the growing centrality of science to 
investigative procedure and the delineation of key tasks/duties necessary for PIP 
accreditation.  
 
As key players or ‘sovereigns’ within the institutional environment in which the police 
must operate, the collective opinion or ‘national mood’ (White, 2015) of the British public 
                                                                 
222  Indetermination refers to ‘Those aspects of practice that are based on specialist knowledge, its 
interpretation and the use of professional judgement’ (Robinson, 2003: 594). 
223 ‘Technicality’ is a theoretical construct that derives from the work of Jamous and Peloille (1970) which, 
in the context of professional practice, refers to those aspects of the work which can be prescribed, 
‘programmed’ or subject to routine practices. 
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ultimately must factor into the operational and strategic decision making of police 
managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs. In this sense, CI utilisation poses new 
challenges for the police organisation in terms of their ability to maintain their ‘image’ - 
particularly that of the CID - and thus their legitimacy while at the same time ensuring 
fiscal stringency and an appropriate degree of specialisation. Continuing to allow CIs and 
their role to expand and be involved at an operational level which is comparable to the 
detective in the investigation of crime risks going against the accepted, appropriate and 
‘correct’ way of doing things and thus, has the potential to impact negatively on the 
legitimacy of the police as a whole. That being said, it may also be true that in allowing 
for the expanding use of CIs, the police may also be strengthening their claim to 
‘professionalism’ in investigation (in some areas at least). Given the often specialised and 
‘scientific’ nature of the work/tasks being undertaken by some CIs224 as part of their role 
- in particular, those involved in fraud and financial investigation - their use could actually 
serve to bolster the image of police legitimacy. Furthermore, CIs confuse the established 
point of entry into the CID and to some extent, lessen the degree of prestige associated 
with ‘moving into clothes’ (Hobbs, 1991). While the research found that CIs had only 
been afforded limited opportunities for career progression, their current position within 
the CID undoubtedly offers the potential for the development of an ascendant professiona l 
trajectory for CIs which, given the recent move to direct entry for police management, is 
indicative of the emergence of possible new future points of entry into the detective 
‘profession’225.  
 
Together, these findings suggest that a change in the cultural tide may be taking place 
with regard to the undertaking of criminal investigation and the CID. Indeed, in the 
current research negative sentiment towards the utilisation of CIs was mostly found to be 
confined to the ‘old guard’ with most (particularly younger) officers, themselves 
possessing varying degrees of experience, conveying mixed views about CIs which 
broadly ranged from outright support to relative ambivalence. This suggests a change in 
                                                                 
224  Like CIs, other members of police staff have the potential to render positive attributes for crime 
investigation (e.g. role of Crime Scene Investigators in forensic work). 
225  The Inspectorate’s 2004 report, ‘Modernising the Police Workforce’, made comprehensive 
recommendations to establish a framework in which best use could be made of non -warranted staff. The 
report acknowledged the existence of a prevalent ‘second class status’ amongst non -warranted individuals 
working within the organisation and proposed this be addressed by such means as clear career pathways 
for all staff and the possibility to move between warranted and non-warranted posts (HMIC, 2004; Loveday, 
2006: 116; Savage, 2007: 123-126).  However, such plans have yet to be realised. 
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the ‘doxa’ of officers with regard to their understanding of the role and status of CIs 
within the units in which they were located. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in many 
respects CIs by their very nature are spoiling the performance of detectives with regard 
to media inspired popular perceptions of their role within the CID (Goffman, 1959). In 
doing so, CIs are inadvertently revealing what some might regard as one of the last 
remaining bastions of ‘professional territory’ within the police to be a deeply embedded 
figment of the national imagination.  
 
With regard to CIs, inadequate training and insufficient experiential knowledge has the 
potential for mismanaged performance which in turn, poses a significant threat to the 
legitimacy of the CID. This threat is made more apparent through the plain clothes nature 
of the CID itself. As such, greater importance/reliance is placed on the manner by which 
the ‘personal front’226  of CIs is maintained; in order to ensure that their role is not 
discredited by their warranted colleagues and, most importantly, the public, CIs must 
project a degree of authority which, given their ‘civilian’ status and absence of and/or 
limited enforcement abilities afforded to them, is often of greater significance than the 
collective performance given by detectives.  
 
The notion of CIs as ‘junior partner investigators’ implies a degree of ‘policing on the 
cheap’; that these new pioneers in investigatory practice may be replacing fully trained 
warranted officers through a ‘cut and paste’ style approach to civilianisation which 
threatens the job security of police officers (Crank, 1989: 167). However, as the current 
research has demonstrated, civilianisation now means more than simply the transfer of 
police tasks to non-warranted staff, but more generally the increased importance of the 
role now being played by these individuals within the police service (Jones et al., 1994: 
166). As has already been mentioned, CIs possessed personal autonomy, were responsible 
for determining the strategic direction of investigations and were found, in many cases, 
to have developed a specialist knowledge base and skills-set which afforded them high 
degrees of cultural and social capital within the units in which they worked - although 
this may also be due in large part to the fact that, unlike warranted officers, CIs were able 
to stay in the same role/area of investigation for longer periods of time. Nonetheless, in 
this sense then the role being performed by CIs in practice was often far from that which 
                                                                 
226  Goffman (1959: 24, 27) draws attention to the significance of the ‘personal front’ - consisting of 
appearance (e.g. uniform, insignia of office) and manner (e.g. demeanour, authority) - for the identity of 
the performer and thus, for the ‘collective representation’ of the individual/group performance. 
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can be considered junior and in many instances, CIs had emerged as professiona l 
investigators in their own right. This suggests that while the cultural and symbolic 
significance of the warranted officer remains firmly entrenched within the crimina l 
investigation process, the locus of operational responsibility for the undertaking and 
ultimate success of investigations has now, in many instances, extended beyond the 
warranted officer to CIs.  
 
 
8.3 Cost-Benefits and the Private Sector 
 
 
Alongside the alleged cost-benefits associated with the recruitment of CIs, the 
popular uptake of the role by forces as was shown by the results of the survey (see Chapter 
Seven, section 7.2) was in part also motivated by the degree of economic freedom it 
provided police managers, particularly with regard to the desired number of personnel 
working within the CID at any given time. To some extent CIs as a resource provided 
forces with the opportunity to expand their workforce (and at the same time, distribute 
the CID workload) for fixed periods of time during spells of high workload. Forces were 
able to contract in CIs from private sector recruitment agencies to ‘assist’ officers (and 
those CIs employed directly by the police organisation) with investigations and this 
provision had been adopted at both Shorewick and Newbank. CIs were, in this sense, 
conceived as a marketable commodity by managers who often viewed agency CIs as an 
emergency pool of resources from which ‘extra bodies’ could be drawn at times of high 
demand. Despite the recent U-turn in police budget cuts announced by the Chancellor 
George Osbourne in the wake of the 2015 terror attacks in Paris (HM Treasury, 2015: 2), 
the drive for fiscal restraint is nonetheless likely to continue to loom large over future 
debates about CI utilisation and the CID workforce more broadly, both in terms of its 
composition and relations with non-police agencies and private security227 . In many 
respects, CI utilisation offers police managers a new platform for experimentation that 
affords or offers possible economies. Indeed, for some police managers, it offers 
justification of hastening private sector involvement as a means of making cost 
efficiencies in the CID in the face of considerable cuts in police budgets. However, 
findings from the current study suggest that at present, a notable degree of caution is 
                                                                 
227 For example, grant settlements announced for forces in December 2015 do not accommodate planned 
increases in national insurance, pay and pensions are predicted to impact the force from 2016 onwards.  
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likely being maintained by individual forces with regard to their recruitment and decision 
whether to make use of CIs from private security agencies. Nonetheless, within the 
current financial climate, the pull of the private sector is likely to become more acute; as 
mentioned in more detail in Chapter Six, officer contracts curb the ease with which their 
employment can be terminated making the lure of fixed term private engagement ever 
more appealing in the coming months and/or years. 
 
Discussions with police managers at both sites showed that the decision to recruit only 
ex-officers as CIs from private sector recruitment agencies was based predominantly on 
two key logics which can be broadly grouped under two headings; economic logics and 
rationality logics. First, the recruitment of only ex-officer CIs from private sector 
recruitment agencies owed much to the perceived expediency through which they could 
be made operational; ex-officers were envisaged to be more economical in that they were 
perceived to be able to ‘hit the ground running’ with regard to their extant knowledge and 
experience of the police organisation, its procedures, practices, various computer systems 
and, most importantly, the law. Indeed, police officers and CIs in the research frequently 
pointed to the importance of PACE 1984, Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 
1996 and Criminal Justice Act 1988 legislation in informing their decision making in 
relation to their operational abilities and practical judgements. In an equally practical 
sense, recruiting ex-officers as CIs theoretically negate the need for relevant training thus 
making this body of men and women more desirable from an economic (cost-effect ive) 
point of view. However, managers also posited their preference for ex-officer agency CIs 
on the basis of their rationality which, despite their current status as employees of private 
security agencies, was alleged to be fundamentally rooted in an ingrained ‘public good’ 
orientated approach to policing. This, it was presumed, made the use of agency CIs more 
palatable for currently serving officers and also for ACPO who, at the time the research 
was being undertaken, retained influence over the development of police policy and 
organisational structure. Perhaps more significantly, the recruitment of ex-officer CIs 
from partnering agencies was also believed to make the police’s engagement with private 
security less ‘risky’ in terms of the potential for errors in judgement/procedure which 
could in turn be extremely damaging for the legitimacy of the CID. 
 
Together the findings presented in this thesis suggest that, while private security may 
appear to have gained a firm footing in the practice of public criminal investigat ion, 
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currently this arrangement is only being allowed at arm’s length with responsibility for 
overall control and management of investigatory practice remaining firmly ‘anchored’ to 
the state (Loader and Walker, 2006). Findings from the research also suggest a separation 
may be taking place between those who authorise (strategically manage) investigat ions 
and those who ‘do’ them with the state retaining its position as the primary authority in 
the enforcement of the law. Furthermore, under the current regulations only CIs who are 
employees of the police organisation may be designated with powers suggesting the 
existence of clear dividing lines between the ‘role’ of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ police 
employee.  
 
Nonetheless, in its broadest sense the utilisation of agency CIs suggests a broadening 
recognition and appreciation of private security for its potential utility as a broker of 
operationally eligible staff and, with that, a potential strengthening of the public-private 
interface with regard to operational policing and criminal investigation more specifica l ly. 
It also undoubtedly begs the question: to what extent might private security come to be 
involved in the provision of criminal investigation in the future? Formal (statutory) 
linkages between the public police and private security already exist in regard to the 
provision of operational policing. As Johnston (2007b: 290) points out, the Police Reform 
Act 2002 makes the accreditation of commercial security companies ‘a key element in 
the project to establish a ‘police extended family’, such partners being conceived as key 
partners in the future delivery of what Brodeur (1983) has called ‘low policing’’. The 
Act’s allowance for the designation of powers to CIs (along with PCSOs, DOs and EOs) 
also marks a potential ‘test-bed’ for the designation of powers of enforcement to non-
warranted police employees operating ‘core’ police roles. That being said, further 
extension of any such provision to private security employees working for the public 
police would require not only a more cognisant understanding of how existing intra -
organisational modes of accountability might take into account these novel policing forms, 
but also, a fundamental shift in cultural attitudes and sensibilities towards private security 
companies228. However, though the recently reported U-turn on cuts to police budgets 
(which have been ‘ring-fenced’ until 2020) appear as if they will not lead to cuts to 
individual forces, they still may. Many police forces continue to suffer the effects of the 
                                                                 
228 White (2010) provides a detailed history of private security in Britain from 1945 onward and reveals the 
decades-long obdurate refusal by the Home Office to recognise the significance of private security industry. 
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final tranche of savings229 and individual forces may be required to allocate some of their 
funds to a central pot to combat things like terrorism (HM Treasury, 2015; May, 2015). 
This prompts the related question: can police forces continue to bridge their current (and 
future) funding gaps without turning to outsourcing and private security230? Indeed, as 
the following quote by Home Secretary Theresa May (taken from a speech delivered at 
the Police Reform Summit on 8th December 2015) suggests, it is likely that the police will 
still need to find significant savings in the years to come: 
 
‘…to those who think the Spending Review gives you breathing space to relax 
the reforms we started five years ago, you could not be more wrong … I can tell 
you now that - just as you had planned to do a month ago - every force will still 
need to make savings year on year. The overall policing budget is protected. But 
not the wasteful and inefficient spending that we all know still exists. Because if 
we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead, and if we are to ensure money is 
well spent, then further changes will need to be made. So this settlement is not a 
reprieve from reform. It does not let you off the hook or mean you can slow the 
pace of change. Nor does it insulate you from the need to make further 
efficiencies. Quite the opposite. Now - more than ever before - there is no excuse 
not to deliver. Instead, we must redouble our efforts, force a more urgent pace, 
and deliver a more radical and more sustained period of police reform than we 
saw even in the last Parliament’. 
 
(May, 2015) 
 
 
Drawing upon the ‘multiple streams’ approach originally advanced by Kingdon (1984) in 
relation to policy development - and most recently applied in relation to the 
‘privatisation’231 of policing in the UK by White (2015) - it could be argued that current 
trends towards the civilianisation and subsequent ‘privatisation’ of aspects of the 
detective role may be more appropriately conceived as the result of the recent alignment 
of three key concepts: the ‘politics stream’ (national mood and party ideology), ‘problem 
stream’ (sudden events, pressing indicators or feedback) and ‘policy stream’ 
                                                                 
229 Particularly following the Coalition government’s announcement in 2013 of an additional 4.9 per cent 
central police budget cut for 2015/2016 (HMIC, 2013: 106) which has, in part, been fulfilled. 
230 Given the increasing number of official initiatives designed to support police privatisation, particularly 
through outsourcing, (e.g. the National Audit Office (NAO) in collaboration with HMIC has recently 
published ‘Private Sector Partnering in the Police Service: A Practical Guide’ (NAO/HMIC, 2013)), it is 
difficult to imagine a future in which a more cooperative relationship between private security and the 
public police does not develop.  
231 In his application of the term ‘privatisation’ - this being the selling off of public services to the private 
sector - White (2010: 3) draws attention to the need for scholars writing in the field of policing to make the 
clear distinction between ‘outsourcing’ and ‘privatisation’, the latter suggesting a far more extensive degree 
of market penetration than has usually been under consideration in the policing sector. 
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(acceptability and feasibility of options available). Together these three ‘streams’ 
presented fast moving police ‘entrepreneurs’ with an unprecedented ‘window’ of 
opportunity with regard to outsourcing of ‘core’ areas of police work to private security. 
However, as acknowledged by White (2010: 3), the power of ‘police fetishism’ (Reiner, 
2010: 3) endures as the legacy of the liberal state-building process, which emerged out of 
the early enlightenment political thought and continues today, ensures that most citizens 
in today’s liberal democracies are from an early age, socialised into thinking that policing 
functions ought to be delivered by the state. Such a rationale has ensured a pervasive 
degree of latent (and antagonistic) national scepticism with regard to the way by which 
the logic of the market conspicuously enters into the policing sector which has in turn, 
served to limit the degree of market penetration. While it is safe to say that the G4S 
Olympic fiasco coupled with the ‘anti-privatisation’ manifesto pledges put forward by 
PCCs during their first election (Crawford, 2013: 184) might have derailed the 
‘privatisation’ initiative in the short-term, it did nonetheless demonstrate the manner in 
which contemporary British society has seemingly come to accept the pivotal reliance on 
the private sector in delivering security - as well as the precarious nature of public opinion 
with regard to the spectre of privatising police functions.  
 
Findings presented in previous chapters of this thesis suggest that, in the light of such 
developments, the window of opportunity and thus, the national mood with regard to 
privatisation may in fact be shifting once again. The utilisation of agency CIs can perhaps 
therefore be considered within broader debates about how the economic laws of supply 
and demand are decisively shaped and limited by the moral and political values attached 
to policing and security in liberal democracies (cf Loader, Goold and Thumala, 2014; 
Thumala et al., 2011; White, 2010, 2012). It could be that the utilisation of CIs, in 
particular agency CIs, remains a step too far away from the police force (and detective) 
of the national imagination. Indeed, for some, the market also has a more emotiona l 
impact, shaking their understanding of how the world around them is constructed. As 
Loader (1997: 6) comments, ‘rendering the police symbolically less important to the 
maintenance of social order may for many require a significant re-organisation of the self’. 
As such, the market for policing frequently encounters a form of cultural resistance which, 
at any given point in time, may range from diffuse ambivalence and unease to open 
hostility (White, 2015). Such feelings generally coalesce around an antagonistic critical 
discourse which is rooted in ‘a determination to stop money from undermining the 
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guarantee of equality that is foundationally associated with the good of security in liberal 
democratic polities’ (Loader et al., 2014: 8-10). In the cultural sense then, the market 
remains very much the junior partner to the public police and, given the deep-rooted 
nature of cultural resistance to any degree of market involvement in policing (the products 
and services on offer are generally regarded as being second best to comparable ones 
delivered by the police (cf Audit Commission, 1996; Crawford et al., 2005; Rowland and 
Coupe, 2014)), it is difficult to envisage a time in the near future where these well-
established dynamics may alter. 
 
However, with regard to the police’s engagement with private security in the broader 
sense, as predicted by Crawford (2013: 174):  
 
‘The contemporary confluence of ‘electoral answerability’ in the form of the new 
governance of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and ‘fiscal austerity’ 
could prove to be a volatile mix; resulting simultaneously in pressures upon 
greater private sector involvement in the delivery of police services’.  
 
 
This may or may not involve a renewed interest in the potential feasibility of outsourcing 
the frontline (White, 2015: 293). The apparent institutionalisation of government support 
for outsourcing coupled with ongoing budgetary constraints and the absence of any recent 
high profile media debate surrounding police privatisation suggests that a second - and 
perhaps even more pervasive - police outsourcing window may be about to open (White, 
2015: 296). The use of agency CIs denotes a degree and style of engagement with private 
security at a level which is unprecedented in the history of the English police. However, 
while it is indeed important to recognise the significance of using employees of private 
security agencies to assist at an operational level in the undertaking of public police 
investigations, it is also important to note that this is fundamentally distinct from 
‘outsourcing’ (as has been the case with some peripheral functions e.g. HR or finance); 
agency CIs somewhat fundamentally remained under the command of the warranted and 
in this sense, current arrangements reflect only peripheral private sector engagement 
(although this may be staring to occur at the margins of the function232).  Nonetheless, the 
                                                                 
232 For example, from April 2013 individual police forces were no longer required to deal directly with 
fraud investigations. Reports of fraud are now instead made and/or will be passed on to Action Fraud, a 
specialist one-stop-shop for advice and reporting of fraud and cybercrime which was set up in 2009. 
Following reporting of an alleged fraud made to Action Fraud, victims are given a crime reference number 
and their case is passed on to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) which is  run by the City of 
London’s police. Action Fraud is a quango which is run by Broadcasting Support Services (BSS). BSS is a 
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nature of their involvement in public police criminal investigation perhaps calls for a 
reconceptualisation of the parameters of investigative work not just in terms of the role 
of detective, but also in terms of its potential for strengthening the interface between the 
public and the private in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. It points to a 
developing appreciation of the potential role of the private sector in the delivery of 
policing at an operational level and with this, the shifting focus on the role of  the nation 
state and centrality of ‘stateness’233  in relation to investigatory provision. Indeed, as 
Crawford (2013: 185) has suggested, we may now be standing ‘on the brink of a possible 
new dawn in relations between private security and the public police in Britain (at least 
in some police force areas)’, a development which may (or may not) have significant 
implications for criminal investigation as ‘a public good’.  
 
With the previous discussion in mind, the extent to which the utilisation of CIs can be 
considered evidence of an emerging ‘policing complex’ (Hoogenboom, 2010) in regard 
to the undertaking of criminal investigation remains to be seen. The utilisation of agency 
CIs suggests a degree of formal integration/collaboration between the public police and 
private security in relation to criminal investigation. It lays the foundations for the 
potential emergence of a ‘hybrid’ style investigator whose employment status and 
working orientations blur long established boundaries between the public and the private 
sectors in relation to the provision of criminal investigation. While academic work 
(McManus, 1995) has long demonstrated the existence of well-established organisational 
relationships between the police and private security firms - at least at the tactical and 
operational levels - such arrangements have rarely extended to the private investiga t ive 
sector specifically. However, as argued in Chapter Two (sections 2.2.5 and 2.4.6) this is 
not to assume that such associations do not exist - they do, especially on an informal basis. 
Indeed, in their analysis of the investigative services sector in the UK, Gill and Hart 
(1997a, 1997b) demonstrated that many private investigators are in fact former police 
officers, a number of whom admitted to occasionally benefitting from information 
                                                                 
private not-for-profit organisation whose call center employees provide advice to victims and screen calls 
to report fraudulent activity before passing those cas es which fulfill pre-set criteria on for investigation by 
the NFIB. 
233 According to Sparrow (2014: 4) the concept of ‘stateness’ ‘reflects the view that only state (civic) 
institutions can be trusted to provide security while judiciously balancing the multiple and often conflicting 
rights of different groups or individuals’. From this perspective, ‘only state (‘civic’) institutions can be 
trusted to reflect the broad societal values required to carry out such functions. The particular interests of 
private clients and the for-profit motivations of commercial providers will inevitably distort the public 
agenda to some extent’ (Sparrow, 2014: 9). 
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supplied, both legitimately and otherwise, by the ‘old boy network’ (Rigakos, 2002) - 
what Hoogenboom (1991) refers to as ‘grey policing’. Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
in a criminal justice system which for more than a decade has been dominated by 
‘partnership’ and ‘multi-agency’ models of provision, little if any, consideration has been 
given to the enhanced role of private investigators.  
 
The scope for future collaboration and/or more formalised cross-fertilisation is further 
bolstered when one considers the current Government’s plans to extend regulation via the 
statutory licensing of various private security agents (through the SIA) to private 
investigators234 (Home Office, 2013). This proposed legislative development gestures a 
degree of formal recognition and approval of the private investigation industry by the 
state and suggests the emergence of the status of private investigator as a ‘protected title’ 
(Home Office, 2013: 9). Establishing standards for qualification and conduct through 
licensing ensures that the private investigative sector is afforded a degree of governmenta l 
quality assurance which, in turn, ensures the industry a marketable stamp of approval. It 
also affords the investigator credibility and goes some way to legitimising the role of the 
private investigative sector in the view of the public235. It is of course only possible to 
offer tentative speculation as to the likely effectiveness of the proposed measures both in 
terms of ensuring a degree of standardised, ethical practice and also, in terms of raising 
the overall standing of private investigators in the minds of the public and the police. 
However, the regulation of such a complex enterprise is no trivial matter and it would be 
somewhat ironic if, should greater police engagement with private security with regard to 
the provision of investigation be realised, so too were long-held suspicions about state 
‘snooping’ and fears about society under surveillance. 
 
In many respects the use of CIs, in particular those contracted to work for the police from 
private sector recruitment agencies, signals the potential for developing new frontiers in 
policing and specifically, in the provision of investigative practice. It points to dramatic 
changes in the ‘architecture’ of the CID and shifting attitudes of the public police towards 
engagement with private security at an increasingly operational level. The police do have 
                                                                 
234 Regulation of private investigation activities was anticipated to come into force by the end of 2015 
(Home Office, 2013) however, at the time of writing this thesis, the private investigative sector continues 
to enjoy no formal regulation in the UK. 
235 It also instigates a renewed trust in the ability of competitive markets to sort out the ‘good’ from the 
‘bad’ providers. 
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a great deal to gain from an increased professional relationship with private security in 
regard to the provision of criminal investigation. Indeed, in a society which is increasingly 
preoccupied with pre-emptive risk based thinking (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 3), the 
private sector could prove useful. While the contemporary conditions of policing paint a 
rather bleak picture of the future of the CI in the immediate term, the style and texture of 
their utilisation has no doubt laid the foundations for a more exhaustive style of 
outsourcing/contracting-out of operational level investigative work to the private sector. 
This has of course already occurred in regard to forensic services and it is not entirely 
unreasonable to envisage a time in which police detectives come to further share their 
‘business’ with private security. However, while there is certainly a case - arguably now 
so more than ever before - for such matters to be debated, it is vital that within these 
debates rigorous regulation remains the quid pro quo of any extended involvement of 
private investigative firms in public policing. This is for two key reasons. First, while 
corruption occurs in both the public and the private sectors, the penalties for corruption 
for those engaged in private investigative activities are far less severe than for those 
operating in the public sector. This means that there currently exists less of an incentive 
and/or stringent consideration of the ways through which potentially corrupt practice can 
be effectively prevented and/or addressed in the private sector compared to the public. 
Second, without any thorough system of inspection in place, the scope for incompetence 
is undoubtedly greater in the private sector than is the case in the public. Barring 
contractual obligations and reputational harm, the incentives for the private sector to 
ensure consistency in its operational effectiveness and accuracy are much less clear than 
those in the public sector. Furthermore, even in those parts of the criminal justice 
apparatus in which the private sector is subject to regular systematic review/inspec tion 
on a comparable basis to the public (e.g. as is the case with HMIP inspections of privately 
run prisons), concerns over the potential for ‘corner-cutting’ and malpractice remain 
perhaps more plausible. With this is mind and given the nature of the task at hand, I would 
argue that the need for greater forms of accountability is nowhere more imperative than 
with the provision of criminal investigation (Gill and Hart, 1997a: 563). 
 
 
 
 
351 
 
8.4 Concluding Thoughts and Some Words of Warning 
 
This research has examined the contribution of CIs to the contemporary crimina l 
investigation process and, with that, the extent to which their role can be conceptualised 
as that of a junior partner to warranted detectives. While it was never the intention of this 
study to decide whether the utilisation of CIs is a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing, I can say with 
some confidence that CIs have come to play an important role within the crimina l 
investigation process and upmost caution should be exercised by those now 
contemplating their future with the organisation. Current rhetoric surrounding the use of 
CIs and their working relation with detectives assumes a clear division of labour and 
subsequent level of certainty and stability which, in reality, often does not exist in 
practice. Recent proposals by Government to amalgamate the CI role/title (along with 
that of DOs and EOs) under the inclusive civilian designation of ‘Policing Support 
Officer’ (Home Office, 2016) suggests an ongoing lack of understanding and appreciation 
of the often specialist and far from complementary nature of the work now often being 
undertaken by CIs ‘on the ground’. The practical reality is that the divide between CIs 
and DCs in terms of their duties and responsibilities is by no means hard and fast and, 
furthermore, is subject to regular change/negotiation. In many areas of investigative work 
CIs have emerged as expert investigators in their own right, possessing valuable skills 
and expertise which may not be contained within the ‘tool kit’ of the warranted officer.  
 
What is patently clear from the findings presented in this thesis is that the CI designation 
has grown in significance since its initial introduction, both in terms of their overall 
number and also the roles and responsibilities now often being regularly afforded to these 
individuals. Despite pointing to the widespread and arguably institutionalised nature of 
CI use suggested by findings presented in Chapter Seven, there exists a striking degree of 
inconsistency in CI utilisation between forces which is only set to be exacerbated in the 
coming months and/or years, as financial pressures are likely to continue to alter the shape 
and character of the contemporary policing landscape. CIs are not warranted officers and 
should not be treated as such; CIs are well placed to provide an important complementary 
role in the contemporary criminal investigation process. While these are indeed 
challenging times for the police service, if best use is to be made of CIs then the 
temptation for mission creep should be resisted and managers should avoid using CIs as 
a ‘means of coping’ with financial restrictions, however this may manifest. Faced with 
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conflated organisational demands and tight budgets, one can surely sympathise with the 
situation in which many Chief Officers and PCCs now find themselves. Few would envy 
the difficult decisions that must now be made if the police are to ensure their continued 
legitimacy and financial solvency in the years to come. However, the fact remains that 
substantial savings must be made and regardless of the fact that CIs may in fact be more 
effective (both in terms of their cost-effectiveness and efficiency) in some areas of 
investigative work than warranted DCs, their civilian status continue to render them (as 
is the case with police staff more generally) a viable option for budget reduction.  It would 
however be somewhat bitterly ironic if, in their drive to ensure their continued 
effectiveness, the police failed to anticipate the potentially significant detrimental impact 
of large scale reverse-civilianisation on the overall efficiency and legitimacy of the 
organisation.  
 
What is very clear from the research findings presented in this thesis is that it is no longer 
possible (if it ever truly was) to think of criminal investigation purely in terms of what 
detectives do. While it was far from the intention of the research to diminish the standing 
and enduring centrality of detectives to the investigatory practice - their wealth of 
experiential knowledge and ‘craft’ skills remain, without doubt, of enduring value - 
findings do draw attention to the valuable contribution now also being made by non-
warranted individuals. This is of particular significance to those ‘frontline’ areas of work 
now being performed by non-warranted individuals and in which officers have a limited 
role and/or where they have all but relinquished their claim. For example, in the current 
research, control and management of risk assessment and investigation of domestic abuse 
had, by and large, fell to non-warranted CIs. This was also found to be the case with some 
types of acquisitive crime - in particularly shoplifting - in which CIs had, over time, 
accumulated a wealth of knowledge and social capital which enabled them to process 
investigations in a notably expeditious fashion.  
Furthermore, while detectives are undeniably aided in their work by a valuable reserve of 
experiential knowledge, so too have CIs come to learn the investigative trade. While it 
remains imperative that the value of experiential knowledge and the significance of the 
elusive detective ‘art’ is not overlooked, the fact remains that detective skills includ ing 
craft knowledge can and indeed is being taught (and learned) by individuals who are new 
to the organisation and/or practice of policing. CIs developed and/or gained a range of 
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important and highly valuable skills and abilities during the course of their employment 
- to a greater or lesser degree depending on the nature of their role. A key argument of 
this thesis is that much of what is currently being done by warranted detectives is now 
also being done by non-warranted CIs. While this is by no means the case in all forces, it 
is not possible to conceptualise CIs purely in terms of undertaking a support role and, 
with that, as operating the position of junior partner to detectives in an operational sense. 
The findings presented in this thesis therefore not only bring to light the significance of 
the roles now being undertaken by non-warranted individuals within the contemporary 
police organisation, but also draw attention to the changing face of criminal investiga t ion 
across E&W. Findings also point to a separation between those that authorise (and 
strategically manage) investigations and those that do them with responsibility for ‘doing’ 
being somewhat dubiously split between ‘professional’ and ‘paraprofessiona l’ 
investigators - the latter of whom may or may not be employees of the private sector.  
The utilisation of CIs has potentially significant implications for the future of the crimina l 
investigation process which, by and large, has remained an activity which is synonymous 
with the role and title of the warranted detective. It undoubtedly suggests that the role 
may be ‘opening up’ to individuals who may not possess the level of experient ia l 
knowledge and/or ‘professional’ recognition which, traditionally speaking, has been 
associated with ‘moving into clothes’ (Hobbs, 1991). In this sense then, the utilisation of 
CIs arguably paves the way for direct entry into the CID and the role of detective. The 
current use of CIs also points to a greater degree of blurring between the public and the 
private sectors with regard to the provision of criminal investigation at an operational 
level. The utilisation of agency CIs undoubtedly lays the foundations for the 
establishment of new more formalised channels of communication and potential avenues 
for greater strategic collaboration between the public police and private investiga t ive 
sector. The apparent ‘hybridisation’ of criminal investigation - as with policing more 
generally - undoubtedly brings to light important questions about the linkages between 
legitimacy, authority and state power (Crawford, 2008: 175). Alongside the likely impact 
of CI utilisation on the manner in which the public symbolically invest in the police and, 
with that, the image of the detective, the utilisation of agency CIs also draws attention to 
the increasingly muddled nature of the public-private interface in policing provision. This 
issue is given more weight when considering the fact that through current arrangements 
the police are, in effect, lending their legitimacy to non-police providers through such 
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public-private partnership arrangements. Simultaneously, while provisions allowing for 
the designation of powers to CIs does not currently allow for their affordance to agenc y 
CIs, the transfer of limited public powers beyond those of the ordinary citizen to non-
warranted police actors also undoubtedly raises central issues about the legitimate basis 
of authority and - should these be extended to agency CIs in the future - the distinctiveness 
of the police ‘brand’ (Crawford, 2011: 175-176).  
 
While findings presented in this thesis suggest that currently, the use of agency CIs is 
largely restricted to low level investigative work, the potential for this be expanded in the 
future is apparent. Whatever the future for CIs and private sector involvement in public 
policing, the public police will have an important role to play in influencing future 
arrangements and in making sure those arrangements serve the public. It is arguably the 
responsibility of the police to look ahead - to not just mourn the part/s of traditional police 
function that might be ‘lost’ to the civilianising and privatising agendas of the twenty-
first century, but also, to be prepared to explore new, potentially fruitful avenues of 
practice and the legitimate role to be played by private security with regard to 
investigative provision. This will, in turn, undoubtedly require the police concern 
themselves not only with the need for more effective co-ordination of diverse policing 
efforts, but also that developing practices/arrangements ensure an equitable distribution 
of security in a manner which can be rendered accountable and harnessed to the public 
good.  
While the emerging skills gap within the contemporary CID also undoubtedly influenced 
the formulation of the CI role in its initial form (Mawby and Wright, 2008: 237), the 
overarching justifications for the introduction and subsequent evolution of the CI role 
were managerialist. CIs were thought to offer a more time and cost effective means of 
investigative provision that would ultimately free-up warranted police detectives to spend 
more time undertaking frontline duties requiring their peculiar skills and powers. The 
extent to which the association between civilianisation and value for money has been 
realised in practice was not the focus of this study and remains to be seen, as does the 
relationship between civilianisation and performance - although compelling evidence of 
its potential does exist (Independent, 2009; Skinns, 2011). Nonetheless, at both Newbank 
and Shorewick and most of those police forces that responded to the survey, police 
managers were keen to stress the value of CIs and were unanimous in their assertion that 
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their introduction had generally had a positive impact upon the overall efficiency of the 
units in which they were operating. However, as evidence presented in Chapters Five and 
Six in particular has shown, in many instances CIs have now emerged as expert 
investigators in their own right, often operating an almost identical role to that of their 
warranted detective colleagues. This suggests that, far from fulfilling a support role which 
is complementary to that of warranted detectives, in many instances, CIs have been 
allowed to emerge as a new type of ‘policing on the cheap’. In affording CIs a role 
comparable to that of the ‘professional’ police detective while at the same time continuing 
to allow for the current twin-track approach to the recruitment, training provision, 
remuneration and promotion of CIs, the police run the very real risk of damaging not only 
their legitimacy as providers of efficient and effective criminal investigation, but at a 
more fundamental level, their claim to professional authority in their field. 
 
It is therefore of priority that the police organisation now considers ways to clarify the 
current division of labour and in doing so, address the blurring of CI and detective roles. 
Given the legacy of poor implementation and uneven uptake of the CI provision by 
individual forces, this, I would propose, could be most effectively addressed through the 
development of a model of CI utilisation which allows for the transferability of the role 
between forces. This could be realised through establishing a degree of consistency in 
terms of the training and opportunities for career progression for CIs at the national level. 
This would in turn help not only to ensure a consistent employment experience for CIs, 
but would also undoubtedly allow for their better integration and improved 
recognition/appreciation from the organisation and wider criminal justice system.  In this 
sense, there is arguably a need to move towards the development of a more flexib le, 
osmotic career pathway for CIs. It is suggested that, of priority, the organisation develops 
a dedicated career development strategy for CIs which provides real opportunities for 
lateral career progression - something which currently is only being offered to CIs on an 
informal and/or ad hoc basis.  
 
Evidence presented in Chapter Seven shows that in many forces CIs were operating 
‘supervisory style’ roles and, based on the findings of this research, all effort should now 
be directed at developing a national recognised and transferable system of portfolios for 
CIs which is of appropriate equivalence to the PIP undertaken by warranted detectives. It 
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is only fitting that if detectives are becoming policing professionals, that these 
professionals are supported by a team of recognised and capable paraprofessionals. This 
development would help to foster a greater sense of value for CIs which in turn, would 
help to improve quality of service and the overall performance of the CID. However, 
findings presented in this thesis suggest that current conditions are being maintained by 
both powerful actors in the field of policing and the police organisation itself, both of 
which have ensured that the burden of austerity has been disproportionality placed on 
police staff whose employment can be much more easily terminated than that of their 
warranted colleagues. Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that in some instances at 
least, this imbalance in conditions of service is leading forces towards a trend of reverse-
civilianisation which, in the case of CIs (and many other police staff roles), has potentially 
huge implications for both the future effectiveness and efficiency of the police 
organisation overall. 
 
The research therefore questions whether the contribution currently being made by CIs to 
the contemporary criminal investigation process is being fully appreciated by the police 
organisation? There is no precedent for the current cuts to the police budget and as such, 
no telling of the potential impact the removal of CIs will ultimately have on the provision 
of effective and efficient policing. As with police staff more generally, CIs are currently 
being viewed as a dispensable resource by the organisation and I would argue that this is 
neither fair nor appropriate. CIs have a great deal to offer the police in terms of their 
varying skills and/or knowledge of the field. However, beyond their immediate efficacy 
as a resource, CIs also present the police with a valuable opportunity for experimentat ion; 
they offer the police the chance to do things differently and in a way which may prove 
both economically and operationally beneficial. In their current form CIs are undoubtedly 
best placed to provide complementary assistance to warranted detectives however, for 
those who wish to progress, consistency in training coupled with the formulation of clear 
pathways for progression remain key. Such developments would improve the level of ‘job 
satisfaction’ and sense of value CIs were able to derive from their role, but also, would 
help to resist the somewhat inevitable and potentially damaging pull of mission creep. 
 
Criminal investigation now exists as ‘a highly complex’ endeavour which ‘spans a 
massive range of activities requiring a similarly extensive range of skills and 
competencies in those taking up the challenge’ (HMIC, 2004: 173). The contribution now 
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being made by CIs is significant both in terms of the scale of their use as demonstrated 
by the findings of the survey (see Chapter Seven, section 7.2), but also with regard to 
their valuable breadth of expertise which may or may not be born out of time spent 
working within the police organisation. Omnicomptence is no longer a viable option for 
the police but I would argue that this is nowhere more apparent than in the CID. The 
complex and diverse nature of crime coupled with the contemporary ‘scientific’ and 
technological basis of investigative work negates the practicality of this vision. 
 
This leads us to question why omnicompetence is so desirable and whether or not it is 
something that we actually want (and need) in regard to criminal investigation. I would 
argue that, rather than focusing on the significance and nature of DCs experient ia l 
knowledge (which undoubtedly remains important), with regard to the provision of 
contemporary investigation, it may matter somewhat more significantly that those 
undertaking the role of ‘investigator’ have the relevant and necessary specialist skills to 
be successful. As with experiential knowledge, the acquisition of specialist skills and/or 
expertise takes time. In this sense, I would advise strongly against any hurried or ill-
considered moves towards the removal of CIs from the police in the coming months/years, 
the potentially detrimental impact of which is currently being overlooked as financ ia l 
pressures continue to bite. 
 
However, when considering the future of CIs and the criminal investigation process in 
the broader sense, the enduring cultural power of the super sleuth should not be 
underestimated. The police detective - much like the Dixonian ‘Bobby on the beat’-  is a 
deeply embedded symbol of British policing which itself, is so iconic that it has been 
harnessed as a key part of the cultural myth of ‘Englishness’ or ‘Britishness’. This 
mythologising further strengthens the role of the DC as a tool to sustain frameworks of 
legitimacy and consent for policing and, in particular, for the CID. As with policing in 
the more general sense, doing things differently in respect of criminal investigation means 
more than transforming how we understand the police ‘frontline’. It will also require 
challenging long held and deep-seated assumptions about the nature of detective work, 
challenging established cultures, spaces and divisions in labour in respect of policing and 
specifically, of criminal investigation. The enduring climate of austerity may see further 
ambiguities arise in regard to policing roles and added blurring of professional boundaries 
in the provision of criminal investigation more specifically. What is clear from the 
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findings presented in this thesis is that criminal investigation is changing, with greater 
dependence on the skills and expertise of non-warranted members of personnel. Disputes 
over the title and role of ‘detective’ are likely in the coming years as recognition of the 
proficiency of CIs is likely to call into question the continued legitimacy of warranted 
detective’s claims to professional jurisdiction in respect of criminal investigat ion. 
However, the police’s less than uniform response to the ‘politics of austerity’ means that 
the future trajectory of the CI role remains largely uncertain. These are indeed challenging 
times for the police and for policing more generally. While difficult decisions must no 
doubt now be made, it is of upmost importance that any such decisions relating to crimina l 
investigation also take account of the significant and valuable contribution now also being 
made by CIs to contemporary criminal investigation. 
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Appendix 1A – Police Staff Data (Table) continued 
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Appendix 1B – Police Staff Data (Functions Definitions) 
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Appendix 4 - Interview Schedules 
 
Appendix 4A: Interview Schedule (CIs) 
 
Opening:  
A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands] 
My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of 
Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak 
to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are 
currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their 
use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more 
broadly. 
 
B.  (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about 
the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I’m doing at 
the University of Sheffield. I’m undertaking some research which looks at how 
civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, 
how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the 
introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.  
 
C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is 
completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any 
questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your 
responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in 
any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the 
future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do 
you have any questions about the research project? 
 
(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a 
little bit about you and your background if that’s ok?) 
 
A. (Topic - General information) 
Q1)    How long have you worked in the CI role? 
 What brought you to the role? 
 What kinds of things influenced your decision to apply to become a 
CI? 
 
Q2)  When you initially applied for the CI position, can you recall what kinds of 
attributes and/or experience the organisation was looking for in applicants? 
 Investigative and/or knowledge/experience etc.? 
 (If can’t recall) What types of knowledge/experience did you 
already possess (any stand out experience)? 
 
 
B. (Topic – Changing workforce structure/demographic) 
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Q3)   (If long serving CI e.g. ex-officer CI) In your opinion, has the police organisat ion 
changed in the time that you’ve worked for them/within the organisation? 
 In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilianisat ion, 
privatisation, partnerships), practices, focus? etc.) 
 Has the investigative process specifically changed a lot in that 
time? 
o In what ways? 
 
Q4)  (If ex-officer CI) – Did you ever encounter CIs as a warranted officer? 
 (If yes) How did you feel about their introduction at the time? How 
did others view them? The same/differently? 
 
Q5)  (If long serving CI e.g. ex-cop) Has your role developed at all since you began 
working at this force? (e.g. tasks and duties afforded to CIs) 
 
 
C. (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role) 
Q6)  (If not already covered in response to question 1) In your own words, could you 
explain the role you play within the unit? 
 What specific duties/responsibilities do you undertake on a day to 
day basis? 
 (If particularly specialist area e.g. fraud) – What kinds of 
investigations are you involved in? 
 Are there any types of investigation or any tasks which you would 
not be involved in?  
o Why? 
 
Q7)  In your opinion, what are the marked differences between your role as a CI and 
that of a warranted detective/officer? 
 In terms of roles and responsibilities? 
 In terms of ‘professionalism’? 
 
Q8) Is there a level of role blurring between warranted officers and CIs? 
 How? In what areas/ways is this most obvious? 
 How do you feel about that? 
 
Q9)  (If not fully addressed in response to question 6) To your knowledge, in what 
capacity are CIs being used in your force/unit? 
 What categories/types of crime are they involved in? 
 What roles/duties are they afforded (e.g. in other units)?  
 To your knowledge, are there any tasks/duties CIs at your force are 
not involved in/able to undertake? 
Q10)  In your opinion, are there any types of crime that CIs should not/cannot be 
involved in? 
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 (If yes) Why? 
 (If no ) Why not? 
 
Q11)  In your opinion, are there any marked advantages to employing ex-officers as CIs?  
 Any disadvantages? 
 
Q12)  Are there any notable advantages to employing people from ‘outside’ the 
organisation, who have never worked for the police before, as CI? 
 Any disadvantages? 
 
D. (Topic – Public/Other agencies’/organisations’ perceptions of CIs) 
Q13)  Has your non-warranted status ever proved to be an issue when dealing with 
members of the public? 
 In your opinion, are there any areas of investigative work that you 
think the public could have a problem with CIs undertaking/be ing 
involved in? (e.g. rape, murder/most serious crime types) 
 
Q14)  Does your role require you to have any interaction or regular communication with 
other units or outside bodies (e.g. banks etc.)? 
 (If yes) What does that interaction involve? 
 How do other units/outside bodies respond to you as a CI? 
 
E. (Topic –Private sector involvement and designated powers) 
Q15)  Do you know of any CIs working at your force who have come from private sector 
agencies (currently and in the past)? 
 (If yes) In what units/areas of investigation are they being used? 
 For what tasks/roles 
 Which agencies? 
 Ex-officers or not? 
 
Q16) How do you feel about the police organisation potentially ‘buying-in’ CIs from 
the private sector? 
 
Q17) How do you feel about being (or the potential for you to be) designated with 
powers similar to those of warranted police officers? 
 (If not currently designated) Is this something that you would 
like/welcome? 
 
 
F. (Topic – Detective skill – art, craft science?) 
Q18) (If ex-officer CI) - In your opinion, is detective work and the accompanying skill-
set needed to be successful in the role something which can be taught to people 
with no previous police investigative experience? 
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 (If yes) Is there anything unique about the personality of the 
people? 
 (If no) Is there something unique about the personality/skills of 
detectives? What? 
 
Q19) Do you think there’s potential for ex-officers (particularly ex-detectives) to be 
afforded more leeway in terms of the types of responsibilities they are afforded 
and the types of things they are allowed to do? (E.g. suspect interviewing?) 
 (If yes) How do you feel about that? 
 Is there a taken for granted assumption that ex-cop means good 
investigator? 
 (If yes) Has that changed at all (over time)? 
 
G. (Topic – Training and progression for CIs) 
Q20) Did you receive any training when you started the role? 
 What did this training involve? 
 Do you feel that the training you were provided with was 
enough/appropriate for the role you are undertaking? 
 
Q21) Is there much opportunity for promotion/progression in your role? 
 E.g. is there a supervisory/team leader rank? 
 
 
H. (Topic – Occupational status of CIs) 
Q22) Do you feel valued in your role? 
 By your colleagues (warranted and non-warranted) 
 By the organisation as a whole? 
 
Q23) I’m interested to know if you consider the role you play and your involvement in 
investigations as being ‘junior’ to that of detectives? 
 What does junior mean to you? 
 
Q24) On the same issue, would you also consider your role to be that of a member of 
police support staff? 
 (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support? 
 (If no) Why not? 
 
I. (Topic – Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’) 
Q25)  Is there a good sense of team spirit within the unit/team in which you work? 
 How much do you feel that CIs are viewed as part of the team 
within the unit? By warranted detectives? By line 
managers/supervisors? 
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Q26)  Have you ever experienced any resentment/animosity from your warranted 
colleagues in this unit or in any other units/forces you’ve worked at? 
 (If yes) what was the nature of this? 
 How does this make you feel? 
 Has this improved at all (over time)? 
 
Closing: 
A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or 
think is important or that you’d like to talk about?  
B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have 
taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given 
me is very valuable to the current study. 
C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need to 
clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line? 
D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again. 
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Appendix 4B: Interview Schedule (DCs) 
  
Opening:  
A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands] 
My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of 
Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak 
to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are 
currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their 
use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more 
broadly. 
 
B.  (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about 
the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I’m doing at 
the University of Sheffield. I’m undertaking some research which looks at how 
civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, 
how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the 
introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.  
 
C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is 
completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any 
questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your 
responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in 
any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the 
future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do 
you have any questions about the research project? 
 
(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a 
little bit about you and your background if that’s ok?) 
 
A. (Topic - General information) 
Q1.  How long have you worked in the DC role? 
 What made you decide to join the CID in the first place?  
o What kinds of things influenced your decision to apply to 
become a DC initially? 
 
B. Topic - Changing workforce structure/demographic) 
Q2.  In your opinion, has the police organisation changed in the time that you’ve 
worked for them/for the organisation? 
 In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilianisat ion, 
privatisation, partnerships), practices, focus? etc.)  
 Has the investigative process specially changed a lot in that time? 
o In what ways? 
 
Q3) (If working for police organisation before 2002) When do you first recall knowing 
of CIs? Working alongside them?  
417 
 
 What did you think of them then/their initial introduction? 
 Has your opinion changed? 
 
Q4) Has the role being played by CIs developed at all since you began working at this 
force? (E.g. tasks and duties afforded to CIs) 
 
C.  (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role) 
Q5) To your knowledge, in what capacity are CIs currently being used in your force? 
 What categories/types of crime are they involved in? 
 What roles/duties are they afforded (in your unit and in other 
units)? 
 To your knowledge, are there any tasks/duties CIs at your force/in 
your unit are not involved in/able to undertake? 
 
Q6) (If not addressed in response to question 5) In your opinion, are there any types 
of crime that CIs should not/cannot be involved in? 
 Why? 
 
Q7) (If not sufficiently covered in response to question 5 and 6) In your opinion, what 
are the marked difference between your role as a warranted detective/officer and 
that of a CI? 
 In terms of roles and responsibilities? 
 In terms of ‘professionalism’? 
 Are there any areas whereby the role of DC and that of CIs can 
become blurred in your force? Where? 
 How do you feel about that? 
 
D. (Topic - Opinions on power designation and training for CIs) 
 
Q8) How do you feel about CIs being designated with powers similar to those of 
warranted police officers? 
 Any advantages? 
 Any potential issues? 
 
Q9) What is your knowledge of/opinion on the current level of training CIs receive 
before taking up the role? 
 Was the training provided enough/appropriate to the role? 
 
E. (Topic - Public/Other agencies’/organisations’ perceptions of CIs) 
Q10)  Do you know of any CIs working at your force who have come from private sector 
agencies (currently and in the past)? 
 (If yes) In what units/areas of investigation are they being used? 
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 For why tasks/roles 
 Which agencies? 
 Ex-officers or not? 
 
Q11) How do you feel about the police organisation potentially ‘buying-in’ CIs from 
the private sector? 
 Any advantages? 
 Any disadvantages? Potential issues? 
 
Q12) How do you feel about CIs potentially being designated with powers similar to 
those of warranted police officers? 
 Do you think there are any issues that may arise from that? 
 
F. (Topic - Detective skill - art, craft science?) 
Q13) In your opinion, is detective work and the accompanying skills needed to be 
successful in the role something which can be taught to people with no previous 
police investigative experience? 
 Is there something unique about the personality/skills of 
detectives? What? 
 
Q14) How do you feel about the recruitment of ex-officers as CIs? 
 Any advantages? 
 Any disadvantages? 
 Do you think ex-officers (particularly ex-detectives) are given 
more leeway in terms of the responsibilities they are afforded and 
the types of investigative work and tasks they are able to undertake 
(e.g. interviewing suspects)? 
o Is there a taken for granted assumption that ex-officer 
means good investigator? 
o (If yes) Has that changed at all (over time)? 
 
G. (Topic - Occupational status of CIs) 
Q15) To what extent would you say that CIs make a valuable contribution to the    efforts 
of the unit/team? 
 Is there contribution valued by everyone (officers, managers, the 
organisation?) 
 
Q16) I’m interested to know if you consider the role being played by CIs in your force 
to be that of a member of police support staff? 
 (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support? 
 (If no) Why not? 
 
Q17) On the same issue, would you consider the role being played by CIs in your unit 
to be junior to that of warranted police officers? 
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 (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand junior? 
 (If no) Why not? 
 
H. (Topic - Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’) 
Q18)  Is there a good sense of team spirit within the unit/team in which you work? 
 How much do you feel that CIs are viewed as part of the team within the 
unit? By warranted detectives? By line managers/supervisors? 
 
Q19)  Do you think there could be any feelings of resentment/animosity from warranted 
officers working in this unit (or in any other units/forces you’ve worked at) 
towards CIs? 
 (If yes) Why? For what reasons? 
 Have you ever been witness to or heard of this happening? 
 (If long serving DC) Has this improved at all (over time)? 
 
Closing: 
A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or 
think is important or that you’d like to talk about?  
B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have 
taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given 
me is very valuable to the current study. 
C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need 
to clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line? 
D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again. 
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Appendix 4C: Interview Schedule (Senior Officers/Managers) 
  
Opening:  
A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands] 
My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of 
Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak 
to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are 
currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their 
use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more 
broadly. 
 
B.  (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about 
the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I’m doing at 
the University of Sheffield. I’m undertaking some research which looks at how 
civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, 
how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the 
introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.  
 
C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is 
completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any 
questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your 
responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in 
any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the 
future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do 
you have any questions about the research project? 
 
(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a 
little bit about your role within the unit if that’s ok?) 
 
A.  (Topic - General information)  
Q1)  How long have you worked in police management?  
 What brought you to your current role originally? 
 What did you do before? 
 What are the main challenges of your role? 
 
B.        (Topic – Changing workforce structure/demographic) 
Q2)   In your opinion, has the police organisation changed in the time that you’ve worked 
for them/within the organisation? 
 In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilianisation, privatisat ion,  
partnerships), practices, focus? etc.) 
 Has the investigative process specifically changed a lot in that time? 
In what ways? 
 
Q3) Do you recall when CIs were first introduced? 
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 (If yes) How did you feel about their introduction initially? 
 Has your opinion changed at all in that time? 
 
 
C.  (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role) 
Q4) In what capacity are CIs being used in your unit? 
 What categories/types of crime are they involved in? 
 Are there any types of crime investigation work that CIs are not/cannot 
be involved in in your unit? 
 Why? Why not? 
 
Q5)  Has the role being undertaken by CIs changed/developed in your unit since their 
initial introduction/since you took up this position? 
 (If yes) What factors have contributed to this development?  
 Have any issues arisen due to this? 
 
Q6) In your opinion, what are the marked differences between the role of your DCs 
and that of CIs? 
 Are there ever any occasions where the CI and DC role can become 
blurred in practice? 
 (If yes) How/where/when? 
 
D.  (Topic – CI demographic) 
Q7)  What are some of the types of experience and personal attributes that you would 
look for in candidates applying for the CI role?  
 
Q8) Have any/all of your CIs been designed with police type powers under section 38 
of the Police Reform Act 2002? 
 As a manager, how do you feel about CIs being designated with 
powers similar to those of warranted police officers? 
 Any issues that arise from this? 
 
Q9) How do you feel about the police organisation ‘buying-in’ CIs from the private 
sector? 
 Any advantages? 
 Any potential issues? 
 
Q10)   Roughly, what is the ratio of ex-officers to non-ex-officer CIs working in your 
unit? 
 
Q11) How do you feel about recruiting individuals to work as CIs from outside the 
police organisation (who have never worked for the police organisation before)? 
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 Are there any advantages/disadvantages to recruiting CIs from 
outside the police organisation/who have never worked for the 
police organisation before? 
 
Q12)    How do you feel about recruiting ex-officers to work as CIs? 
 What are the advantages/disadvantages to this? 
 
D. (Topic - Detective skill – art, craft, science) 
Q13) (If not addressed in response to question 12) In your opinion, is detective work 
and the accompanying skill-set associated with those undertaking this role 
something which can be taught to people who do not have a police background? 
 How about those who have investigative experience from outside the 
police organisation? 
 Is there any part of the investigative process which cannot be taught? 
 
E. (Topic - Occupational status of CIs) 
Q14) I’m interested to know if, from a management perspective, whether you consider 
the role that CIs are currently undertaking in your unit to be junior to that of 
warranted detectives?  
 (If yes) What does junior mean to you? 
 
Q15) On the same issue, would you consider the role your CIs are undertaking to be 
that of a member of police support staff?  
 (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support? 
 (If no) Why not? 
 
F.  (Topic - Training) 
Q16) How do you feel about the nature/type of initial training the police organisat ion 
provides CIs when they first arrive? 
 Do ex-officer CIs also go through the same training process and non-
ex-officer CIs? 
 (If No) Why not? 
 Is the training they do receive appropriate/enough to prepare them for 
the role? 
 Do ex-officers also receive this or any other ‘refresher’ style training?  
 
G. (Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’) 
Q17) Finally, as a manager, I’m interested to know if you’ve ever come across any 
resentment towards the use of CIs in your force by warranted members of staff? 
 Any staff ever reported incidents of resentment/hostility towards CIs? 
 Potential for this to happen in the future? 
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Closing: 
A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or 
think is important or that you’d like to talk about?  
B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have 
taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given 
me is very valuable to the current study. 
C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need to 
clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line? 
D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again. 
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Appendix 5: Survey 
 
Exploring the Role of Civilian Investigators Working within Police Forces across  
England and Wales? 
You are being asked to take part in a survey as part of a doctoral research study which seeks to 
explore the role currently played by civilian investigators within police forces across England and 
Wales. Since their formal introduction as part of the Police Reform Act 2002, the use of civilian 
investigators has rapidly developed within police constabularies across the country. However, there 
currently exists a diversity of practice and an accompanying lack of information with regard to the 
way these individuals are being used between constabularies. It is hoped therefore that this survey 
will provide an important evidence base from which the police and others can see how civilian 
investigators are being deployed across the country. The research, which is being funded by the 
Economic Social Research Council, is being conducted by Lindsey Rice (BA, MA) who is a doctoral 
research student currently working at the University of Sheffield and has received full ethical 
approval from the University of Sheffield Ethics Committee. The study is being supervised by 
Professor Joanna Shapland and Dr Layla Skinns. 
You have been invited to take part in this due to your knowledge with regard to staffing information 
and the structure and operation of the Criminal Investigation Department within your police 
constabulary. Your participation is entirely voluntary. Providing 
you have all the relevant information to hand, it should take less than 30 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. This research is strictly anonymous in that names of individual participants will 
not be made identifiable in the research. Names of participating constabularies will however be 
made identifiable, except for in question 15. This decision has been made on anticipation of the 
potential benefits for police constabularies in sharing this information with one another (allowing 
for the generation of a substantial evidence base from which constabularies can compare their use 
of civilian investigators with other constabularies nationally). 
 
The information you provide is of great value to the study in question and will be used in the fina l 
thesis write-up. It may also be used in subsequent academic publications. After the study has ended, 
all related information and data will be deleted as soon as possible. At the end of the research, a 
summarised report of the study’s overall findings can be obtained from Lindsey Rice whose contact 
details are given below. If you would like to know more about this study, please contact Lindsey 
Rice on 07734359955 or ljrice1@sheffield.ac.uk.  
Ideally, this survey should be completed by the Detective Chief Superintendent. 
 
Job title/s and or rank of participant/s:   Click here to enter text. 
Name of police constabulary:  Click here to enter text. 
Date:  Click here to enter date from the drop down menu. 
 
Section 1. (To be completed by the Detective Chief Superintendent or whoever is most 
appropriate) 
 
425 
 
1. Do you currently use civilian investigators within your constabulary?   Click here to select 
an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
2. To your knowledge, have you ever used civilian investigators within your constabulary?  
Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
3. What types of investigative work are civilian investigators currently involved in at your 
constabulary? (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, please 
leave blank.) 
Burglary                                    ☐            Kidnapping                                                      ☐ 
Domestic violence/abuse          ☐            Rape and sexual assault                                   ☐ 
Arson                                        ☐            Theft (including theft of a motor vehicle)       ☐ 
Fraud                                        ☐            Serious assault                                                  ☐ 
Drug offences                           ☐            Child abuse                                                      ☐ 
Robbery                                    ☐            Murder                                                             ☐ 
 
If any others, please state. Click here to enter text. 
 
4. What tasks do your civilian investigators undertake? (Please select all that apply by clicking 
the relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank.) 
Taking statements                       ☐                    Suspect interviewing                                ☐ 
Victim interviewing                    ☐                     HOLMES  (Data set analysis)                 ☐ 
Disclosure                                   ☐                    Prisoner processing                                   ☐ 
Exhibits                                       ☐                    Indexing                                                    ☐ 
 
 
If any others, please state.  Click here to enter text. 
 
5. Have any of your civilian investigators been designated with any of the following powers 
under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002? (Please select all that apply by clicking the 
relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank .) 
 
Access and copying evidence seized by constables                                            ☐ 
Power to apply for a search warrant                                                                    ☐ 
Access to excluded and special procedure material                                            ☐      
Power to enter and search after arrest                                                                 ☐       
Power to arrest at a police station for another offence                                        ☐ 
Power to request an arrested person to account for certain matters                    ☐ 
General power of seizure                                                                                     ☐ 
Extended power of seizure                                                                                   ☐ 
Power to transfer persons into the custody of an investigating officer                ☐ 
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6. Can you identify any areas of work where civilian investigators are not currently in use in your 
constabulary and in which you feel their use would be beneficial? Click here to select an 
answer form the drop down menu. 
 
If yes, please elaborate.  Click here to enter text. 
 
7. Do your civilian investigators work alongside warranted police detectives in mixed teams? 
Click here to select an answer form the drop down menu. 
 
8. Which, if any, of the measures below do you think would improve the contribution of civilian 
investigators to the performance of your police constabulary? (Please select all that apply by 
clicking the relevant boxes. If no improvements are necessary, please leave blank and move to 
question 9.) 
 
     Improvements in training                                                                  ☐   
     More responsibility to be given to civilian investigators                  ☐      
     Improvements in equipment                                                              ☐     
    Greater recognition of civilian investigators in the constabulary       ☐  
     Improvements in management                                                           ☐   
    Greater co-operation between police and civilians                             ☐ 
 
9. To your knowledge, are civilian investigators currently working within your constabulary able 
to perform supervisory style roles? (E.g. CCTV coordinator etc.)?  Click here to select and 
answer form the drop down menu. 
 
If yes, please elaborate. Click here to enter text. 
 
10. Are civilian investigators who work for your police constabulary required to undertake any 
initial or induction training relevant to the role?    Click here to select an answer form the drop 
down menu. 
Briefly, what does this cover?  Click here to enter text.  
 
Accountability  
11. Who supervises the day to day work of civilian investigators? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
12. Who occupies the role of line manager for civilian investigators in your constabulary? 
(E.g. who does their review?)  
Click here to enter text. 
 
427 
 
 
 
13. Does the internal complaints procedure in your constabulary also apply to civilian 
investigators who are directly employed by your constabulary? Click here to select and 
answer from the drop down menu. 
 
14. Does the internal complaints procedure in your constabulary also apply to civilian 
investigators who are employees of the private security agencies but who work for your 
constabulary as agreed in contract?   Click here to select an answer form the drop down 
menu. 
 
15. This section of the questionnaire seeks your personal view with regard to a number of   key 
statements.  
 
The names of constabularies as well as individual participants will NOT be made  
identifiable in this section. 
Please select by clicking the appropriate box 1 – 5 from the drop down menu next each 
statement with 1 being ‘Strongly Agree’ and 5 being ‘Strongly Disagree’. If any of the 
statements are not applicable or you would prefer not to say, please mark as such.  
1. Most civilian investigators do a good job.  Please click here to select an answer from the 
drop down menu. 
                                                                                      
2. The CID is more efficiently run a result of employing civilian investigators.   Please click 
here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
                                                                                                                                                    
3. There is a serious need for civilian investigators, no matter how serious the offence. 
Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
4. The use of civilian investigators free up detectives to perform ‘frontline’ duties. Please 
click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.     
                                                                                                                                                                   
5. Civilian investigators with specialist skills are needed for jobs within the constabulary. 
Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
6. Civilian investigators should be ‘contracted in’ from outside agencies. Please click here 
to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
7. The main reason for using civilian investigators is that they are cheaper than detectives.   
Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
8. There is scope in my constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators. 
Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
9. The training of civilian investigators in my constabulary could be improved.  Please click 
here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
10. Civilian investigators are an essential part of the modern criminal investigation process.  
Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu. 
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Section 2.  (If you are unable to provide the answers to the following questions yourself, please 
could you forward the survey to an appropriate member of HR or Business Force  
Manager for completion) 
2a) General Questions 
16. How many civilian investigators currently work in your constabulary? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
17. Of these, how many part-time civilian investigators currently work in your constabulary?  
Click here to enter text. 
 
18. To your knowledge, does your constabulary hold any official job description/role profiles 
for civilian investigators in any of its CID departments?  Click here to select an answer from 
the drop down menu. 
 
2b) Private Sector Involvement 
 
19. At the moment, does your constabulary have a contract(s) with a private sector agency for 
the supply of civilian investigators?  Click here to select an answer form the drop down 
menu. 
                   
a) Which private sector agencies? 
   Click here to enter text. 
b) What is the typical length of contract(s) for individual civilian investigators employed by 
private security agencies in your constabulary? (E.g. 6 months, 1 year, open contract). 
Click here to enter text. 
c) What types of crime are those civilian investigators employed by private security agencies 
involved in investigating? (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, 
please leave blank.) 
1. Burglary                                    ☐       7. Kidnapping                                                       ☐ 
2. Domestic violence/abuse          ☐        8. Rape and sexual assault                                   ☐ 
3. Arson                                        ☐        9. Theft (including theft of a motor vehicle)       ☐ 
4. Fraud                                        ☐       10. Serious assault                                                 ☐ 
5. Drug Offences                          ☐        11. Child abuse                                                    ☐ 
6. Robbery                                    ☐        12. Murder                                                           ☐ 
  
       If any others, please state.  Click here to enter text. 
 
20. Have any of those civilian investigators employed from private security agencies been 
designated with powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002? Click here to select 
an answer form the drop down menu. 
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21. If possible, please provide the total number of private security employees performing the 
role of civilian investigator within your constabulary currently. 
Click here to enter text. 
 
22.  Has your constabulary held contract(s) with private security agencies for the supply of 
civilian investigators in the past?  Click here to select an answer form the drop down menu. 
 
a) Which private sector agencies/companies? 
Click here to enter text. 
b) What was the length of contract(s) agreed with these companies? 
Click here to enter text. 
c) Were any designated with powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. It would be helpful if it were possible to 
contact you should I need to clarify any of the answers provided. If possible, please provide  
your name, email and contact number. 
Click here to enter text. 
If you have any further comments, please use the space provided be low to elaborate.  
Click here to enter text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
430 
 
Appendix 6: Qualitative Coding Framework 
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Appendix 7: Powers Available for Designation to ‘Investigating Officers’ 
 
The following details the powers available to Chief Constables for designation to 
‘Investigating Officers’ under section 38236 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and explained 
in greater detail in Chapter 30, Schedule 4, Part 2 of the same Act. 
The information provided in this appendix in regard to the powers exercisable by CIs has 
been reported as displayed on legislation.gov.uk as of July 2016.  
 
Search warrants 
16. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) he may apply as if he were a constable for a warrant under section 8 of the 
1984 Act (warrants for entry and search) in respect of any premises [whether 
in the relevant police area or not]; 
(b) the persons to whom a warrant to enter and search any such premises may be 
issued under that section shall include that person; 
(c) that person shall have the power of a constable under section 8(2) of that Act 
in any premises in the relevant police area to seize and retain things for which 
a search has been authorised under subsection (1) of that section; 
(d) section 15 of that Act (safeguards) shall have effect in relation to the issue of 
such a warrant to that person as it has effect in relation to the issue of a warrant 
under section 8 of that Act to a constable; 
(e) section 16 of that Act (execution of warrants) shall have effect in relation to 
any warrant to enter and search premises that is issued (whether to that person 
or to any other person) [but in respect of premises in the relevant police area 
only,] as if references in that section to a constable included references to that 
person; 
(f) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from 
seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person 
by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of 
anything by a constable; 
(g) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised 
information) shall have effect in relation the power of seizure conferred on that 
person by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as it applies in relation to the power of 
seizure conferred on a constable by section 8(2) of that Act; 
(h) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have 
effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the 
power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as if the references to a 
constable and to an officer included references to that person; and 
                                                                 
236 Part 4, Chapter 1. 
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(i) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) 
shall have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise 
of that power, or taken away by him following the imposition of a 
requirement by virtue of sub-paragraph - 
(i)  as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the 
power conferred on a constable by section 8(2) of that Act or taken 
away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by 
virtue of section 20 of that Act; and 
(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of 
section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph 
applies. 
 
16A. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) the persons to whom a warrant may be addressed under section 26 of the Theft 
Act 1968 (search for stolen goods) shall, in relation to persons or premises in 
the relevant police area, include that person; and 
(b) in relation to such a warrant addressed to him, that person shall have the 
powers under subsection (3) of that section. 
16B. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, subsection (3), and (to 
the extent that it applies subsection (3)) subsection (3A), of section 23 of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 (powers to search and obtain evidence) shall have effect as if, in 
relation to premises in the relevant police area, the reference to a constable included 
a reference to that person. 
 
Access to excluded and special procedure material 
17. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under section 9(1) of the 1984 Act 
(special provisions for access) to obtain access, in accordance with Schedule 
1 to that Act and the following provisions of this paragraph, to excluded 
material and special procedure material; 
(b) that Schedule shall have effect for the purpose of conferring those powers on 
that person as if — 
(i) the references in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 12 and 13 of that Schedule to a 
constable were references to that person; and 
(ii) the references in paragraphs 12 and 14 of that Schedule to premises 
were references to premises in the relevant police area (in the case of a 
specific premises warrant) or any premises, whether in the relevant 
police area or not (in the case of an all premises warrant); 
(bb) section 15 of that Act (safeguards) shall have effect in relation to the issue of 
any warrant under paragraph 12 of that Schedule to that person as it has effect 
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in relation to the issue of a warrant under that paragraph to a constable; 
(bc) section 16 of that Act (execution of warrants) shall have effect in relation to 
any warrant to enter and search premises that is issued under paragraph 12 of 
that Schedule (whether to that person or to any other person), but in respect of 
premises in the relevant police area only, as if references in that section to a 
constable included references to that person; 
(c) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from seizure) 
shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise 
of the power conferred on him by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as it 
has effect in relation to the seizure of anything under that paragraph by a 
constable; 
(d) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised 
information) shall have effect in relation the power of seizure conferred on that 
person by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as it applies in relation to the 
power of seizure conferred on a constable by that paragraph; 
(e)  section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have 
effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the 
power conferred on him by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as if the 
references to a constable and to an officer included references to that person; 
and 
(f)  sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall 
have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that 
power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by 
virtue of sub-paragraph (d), and to anything produced to him under paragraph 
4(a) of Schedule 1 to that Act— 
(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power 
conferred on a constable by paragraph 13 of that Schedule or taken 
away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue 
of section 20 of that Act or, as the case may be, to anything produced 
to a constable under paragraph 4(a) of that Schedule; and 
(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of 
section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph 
applies. 
 
Entry and search after arrest 
18 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
 
(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under section 18 of the 1984 Act (entry 
and search after arrest) to enter and search any premises in the relevant police 
area and to seize and retain anything for which he may search under that 
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section; 
(b) subsections (5) and (6) of that section (power to carry out search before 
arrested person taken to police station and duty to inform senior officer) shall 
have effect in relation to any exercise by that person of those powers as if the 
references in those subsections to a constable were references to that person; 
(c) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from 
seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person 
by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of 
anything by a constable; 
(d) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised 
information) shall have effect in relation the power of seizure conferred on that 
person by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it applies in relation to the power of 
seizure conferred on a constable by section 18(2) of that Act; 
(e) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have 
effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the 
power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as if the references to a 
constable and to an officer included references to that person; and 
(f) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall 
have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that 
power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by 
virtue of sub-paragraph  
(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power 
conferred on a constable by section 18(2) of that Act or taken away by a 
constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of section 
20 of that Act; and 
(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 
21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies. 
 
Entry and search for evidence of nationality after arrest 
18A Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) sections 44 to 46 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (entry, search and seizure after 
arrest) shall apply to that person (with any necessary modifications) as if a 
reference to a constable included a reference to that person, and 
(b) a provision of the 1984 Act which applies to constables in connection with any 
of those sections shall apply (with any necessary modifications) to that person 
General power of seizure 
19 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) he shall, when lawfully on any premises in the relevant police area, have the 
same powers as a constable under section 19 of the 1984 Act (general powers 
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of seizure) to seize things; 
(b) he shall also have the powers of a constable to impose a requirement by virtue 
of subsection (4) of that section in relation to information accessible from such 
premises; 
(c) subsection (6) of that section (protection for legally privileged material from 
seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person 
by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of 
anything by a constable; 
(d) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have 
effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the 
power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as if the references to a 
constable and to an officer included references to that person; and 
(e) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall 
have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that 
power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by 
virtue of sub-paragraph  
(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power 
conferred on a constable by section 19(2) or (3) of that Act or taken away 
by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of 
section 19(4) of that Act; and 
(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 
21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies. 
 
Access and copying in the case of things seized by constables  
20 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, section 21 of the 1984 Act 
(access and copying) shall have effect in relation to anything seized in the relevant 
police area by a constable or by a person authorised to accompany him under section 
16(2) of that Act as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of 
section 21 (supervision of access and photographing of seized items) included 
references to a person to whom this paragraph applies. 
 
Arrest at a police station for another offence 
21 (1) Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, he shall have the power 
to make an arrest at any police station in the relevant police area in any case where 
an arrest— 
(a) is required to be made under section 31 of the 1984 Act (arrest for a further 
offence of a person already at a police station); or 
(b) would be so required if the reference in that section to a constable included a 
reference to a person to whom this paragraph applies. 
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(2) Section 36 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) (consequences 
of failure by arrested person to account for objects etc.) shall apply (without prejudice 
to the effect of any designation applying paragraph 23) in the case of a person arrested 
in exercise of the power exercisable by virtue of this paragraph as it applies in the case 
of a person arrested by a constable. 
 
Power to transfer persons into custody of investigating officers 
22 (1) Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, the custody officer for a 
designated police station in the relevant police area may transfer or permit the 
transfer to him of a person in police detention for an offence which is being 
investigated by the person to whom this paragraph applies. 
     (2) A person into whose custody another person is transferred under sub-paragraph 
(1)-  
(a) shall be treated for all purposes as having that person in his lawful 
custody; 
(b) shall be under a duty to keep that person under control and to prevent his 
escape; and 
(c) shall be entitled to use reasonable force to keep that person in his custody 
and under his control. 
(3) Where a person is transferred into the custody of a person to whom this paragraph 
applies, in accordance with sub-paragraph (1), subsections (2) and (3) of section 39 
of the 1984 Act shall have effect as if— 
(a) references to the transfer of a person in police detention into the custody of a 
police officer investigating an offence for which that person is in police 
detention were references to that person’s transfer into the custody of the 
person to whom this paragraph applies; and 
(b) references to the officer to whom the transfer is made and to the officer 
investigating the offence were references to the person to whom this paragraph 
applies. 
 
Powers in respect of detained persons  
22A Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, he shall be under a duty, 
when in the course of his employment he is present at a police station— 
(a) to assist any officer or other designated person to keep any person detained at 
the police station under control; and 
(b) to prevent the escape of any such person, and for those purposes shall be 
entitled to use reasonable force. 
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Power to require arrested person to account for certain matters  
23 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under sections 36(1)(c) and 37(1)(c) 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) to request a person 
who— 
(i) has been arrested by a constable, or by any person to whom paragraph 
21 applies, and 
(ii) is detained at any place in the relevant police area, to account for the 
presence of an object, substance or mark or for the presence of the 
arrested person at a particular place; and 
 
(b) the references to a constable in sections 36(1)(b) and (c) and (4) and 37(1)(b) 
and  
(c) and (3) of that Act shall have effect accordingly as including references to the 
person to whom this paragraph is applied. 
 
Extended powers of seizure  
24 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person— 
(a) the powers of a constable under Part 2 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
2001 (c. 16) (extension of powers of seizure) that are exercisable in the case of 
a constable by reference to a power of a constable that is conferred on that 
person by virtue of the provisions of this Part of this Schedule shall be 
exercisable by that person by reference to that power to the same extent as in 
the case of a constable but in relation only to premises in the relevant police 
area and things found on any such premises; and 
(b) section 56 of that Act (retention of property seized by a constable) shall have 
effect as if the property referred to in subsection (1) of that section included 
property seized by that person at any time when he was lawfully on any 
premises in the relevant police area. 
 
Persons accompanying investigating officers  
24A    (1) This paragraph applies where a person (“an authorised person”) is authorised 
by virtue of section 16(2) of the 1984 Act to accompany an investigating officer 
designated for the purposes of paragraph 16 (or 17) in the execution of a 
warrant. 
(2) The reference in paragraph 16(h) (or 17(e)) to the seizure of anything by a 
designated person in exercise of a particular power includes a reference to the 
seizure of anything by the authorised person in exercise of that power by virtue 
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of section 16(2A) of the 1984 Act. 
(3) In relation to any such seizure, paragraph 16(h) (or 17(e)) is to be read as if it      
provided for the references to a constable and to an officer in section 21(1) and 
(2) of the 1984 Act to include references to the authorised person. 
(4) The reference in paragraph 16(i) (or 17(f)) to anything seized by a designated 
person in exercise of a particular power includes a reference to anything seized 
by the authorised person in exercise of that power by virtue of section 16(2A) 
of the 1984 Act. 
(5) In relation to anything so seized, paragraph 16(i)(ii) (or 17(f)(ii)) is to be read 
as if it provided for— 
(a) the references to the supervision of a constable in subsections (3) and 
(4) of section 21 of the 1984 Act to include references to the supervis ion 
of a person designated for the purposes of paragraph 16 (or paragraph 
17), and 
(b) the reference to a constable in subsection (5) of that section to include 
a reference to such a person or an authorised person accompanying him.  
(6) Where an authorised person accompanies an investigating officer who is also 
designated for the purposes of paragraph 24, the references in sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of that paragraph to the designated person include references to the 
authorised person. 
 
